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Abstract 
Political parties in New Zealand are now affected by elements of ideological 
erosion - they are characterised by both a policy convergence and a general 
electoral pragmatism. This thesis attempts to characterise and explain this 
ideological erosion in New Zealand party politics. It also aims to show that the 
erosion of ideology is closely related to a host of other aspects of party 
transformation, such as weakened partisan ties (including the decline in party 
membership, decline in linkages with interest groups, and class dealignment), as 
well as an increased reliance on the state for resources, the professionalisation 
of the party organisations, and an increased anti-party sentiment in society. The 
central argument of this thesis is that these phenomena relate closely to and 
reflect the shift away from the 'mass membership' type of political party to an 
'electoral-professional' model. It is argued that this transition has been in motion 
since the 1950s, but accelerated in the 1970s and then again in the 1990s. 
This debate revolves around a paradox in which, on the one hand, political 
parties in advanced industrial countries remain central to the conduct of 
parliamentary democracy and, on the other, they often seem to be less 
connected to the constituencies they claim to represent and less able to provide 
voters with effective choices. This thesis engages with this debate by examining 
both ideological and organisational transformation in one particular democracy, 
New Zealand. 
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Introduction 
A Study of Ideological and Organisational 
Transformation 
7 
Political parties in New Zealand have been undergoing a significant 
transformation in recent decades. As in other advanced industrial democracies, 
they have been affected by changes in ideology, organisation, campaigning 
techniques, membership numbers, and their general relationships with society. 
One of the key aspects of this transformation relates to changes in ideological 
competition, which has led many party theorists and political commentators to 
argue that a post-ideological age now underlies the party systems of liberal 
democracies like New Zealand. In most Western countries this means the main 
political parties are all aligned with mainstream liberal democracy and have 
joined a consensus about the fundamentals of economy and society. This is 
certainly the case in New Zealand where both the major political parties adopted 
radical neo-liberal economic and social policies in the 1980s, leading to a period 
of turbulent economic, social and political reform. In the 1990s, this sense of 
radicalism and turbulence died away, and a policy consensus on major issues 
emerged, thus forming a 'new centre' in the political spectrum. 
It is argued in this thesis that parties in New Zealand are now affected by 
elements of ideological erosion - they are characterised by both a policy 
convergence (in the sense of moving closer to the centre of the political 
spectrum) and a general electoral pragmatism (in the sense of parties operating 
increasingly as 'office-seekers' rather than 'policy-seekers', and thus placing less 
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emphasis on issues of ideology, policy and programme). This thesis attempts to 
characterise and explain this ideological erosion in New Zealand party politics. It 
also aims to show that the erosion of ideology is closely related to a host of other 
aspects of party transformation, such as weakened partisan ties (including the 
decline in party membership, decline in linkages with interest groups, and class 
dealignment), as well as an increased reliance on the state for resources, the 
professionalisation of the party organisations, and an increased anti-party 
sentiment in society. The central argument of this thesis is that these phenomena 
relate closely to and reflect the shift away from the class mass membership type 
of political party to an electoral-professional model. It is argued this transition has 
been in motion since the 1950s, but accelerated in the 1970s and then again in 
the 1990s. 
More generally, this thesis constitutes an attempt to produce a radical re-
examination of the New Zealand party system. To do this it critically analyses the 
nature of the institution of the New Zealand political party, re-evaluating all the 
important elements and suggesting that New Zealand politics has been 
thoroughly altered by an important transformation of parties and, in particular, the 
erosion of ideology. 
Why Study Political Parties? 
This thesis investigates some of the ways parties have changed. However, this 
research has not been carried out just because this change has been extensive 
and interesting, but also because the political party itself is an important 
institution that warrants understanding. Traditionally political 'theorists have 
asserted the importance of parties in advanced industrial democracies like New 
Zealand. E E Schnattschneider has stated that, 'democracy is unthinkable save 
in terms of parties' (Schnattschneider, 1942: p.1). According to Giovanni Sartori, 
parties are 'the central intermediate and intermediary structure between society 
and government' (Satori, 1976: p.ix). Likewise, Peter Merkl says that 'political 
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parties and party systems are among the most important political institutions of 
twentieth century society' (Merkl, 1980: p.1). This continues to be true in 2003 in 
New Zealand, yet there are also good reasons for researchers to doubt the 
ongoing strength of parties and to evaluate the performance of some of their 
functions. That there has been so little attention focused on political parties in 
New Zealand academic literature should not be taken as a sign that parties are 
any less important in this country than elsewhere or at an earlier time. Instead it 
probably suggests that political parties are so fundamental to the operation of 
modern politics that their role and significance is taken for granted. For, in reality, 
parties today are more important than they have ever been, and their influence is 
as prevalent as ever. In New Zealand they are ubiquitous in current affairs, and 
no aspect of contemporary politics is uninfluenced by them. After all, politics is 
about the struggle for resources and power, and these conflicts occur primarily 
through parliamentary politics and government. The New Zealand Parliament is 
essentially a forum for party political contest and cabinet government is 
essentially party government. 
In theory, if not practice, political parties playa number of roles that make them 
indispensable to modern liberal democracies. First, parties function as agents of 
elite formation and recruitment. They serve as the major mechanism for 
preparing and recruiting candidates for public office. Second, political parties 
perform the role of organising the government. They provide leaders to 
government and control the state apparatus. Third, parties serve as a point of 
reference for many supporters and voters, giving people a key to interpreting a 
complicated political world, as well as socialising and mobilising the public into 
politics. Fourth, parties serve as agents of interest articulation and aggregation. 
They unite a multitude of specific demands into manageable packages of 
proposals that combine as coherent programmes. The programmes offer the 
various sections of society useful channels for seeking to influence government 
policies in their favour. Thus voters are provided with a means of deciding 
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between alternative political directions.1 Related to this, political parties also 
constitute a vital link between the state and civil society - 'between the 
institutions of government and the groups and interests that operate within 
society' (Heywood, 1997: p.229). Therefore not only are parties responsible in 
New Zealand for electing the government and Parliament's 120 MPs, they also 
bridge the gap between politicians and the people. 
Furthermore, under the recently introduced proportional representation electoral 
system known as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP), political parties are even 
more central to the functioning of democracy. The contest of elections is now 
explicitly a party contest in that voters have a specific 'party vote' that determines 
the composition of Parliament. And in line with that, the parties are properly 
acknowledged in law for the first time. This requires them to be registered in 
order to compete for the party vote. Thus, under MMP, there has been a 
renewed focus in the media and everyday life on political parties as the most 
important organisations in New Zealand politics and government.2 
The basis for this thesis, therefore, is that politics in New Zealand is almost 
entirely about party politics and it seems appropriate that such an important and 
enduring institution should be examined, understood and critiqued. However, 
there is also reason to doubt the strength of the New Zealand party institution. 
While parties are ubiquitous in society, and in public office are apparently 
stronger than ever, in many other respects they are in decline. This thesis 
examines elements of this weakening, focusing on party organisations, their 
1 See: Mulgan (1997: pp.67-68), Hague et al. (1998: p.131), and Heywood (1997: p.233). 
2 The relevance of the party institution is also shown by the fact that so many parties have been created in the last 
decade. Since its establishment in 1994 the Electoral Commission has registered 40 parties. Never in New 
Zealand's history has there been so widespread an effort on the part of citizens and aspiring political leaders to 
form new parties and to win representation in Parliament. By 2003, 23 parties had been de-registered, leaving 17 
registered political parties. Vowles also points out the centrality of parties when he says, 'Immediately after the 
change of electoral system, nearly 70 per cent of New Zealanders believed that political parties were necessary to 
make the political system work' (Vowles, 2002a: p.413). 
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interactions with civil society, and their political ideologies. In terms of 
organisation, the modern New Zealand parties are very different to the class-
based mass membership organisations of the past, having substantially fewer 
members and smaller and weaker extra-parliamentary organisations. In terms of 
their interaction with civil society, the parties have a tenuous hold over social 
constituencies, weaker relationships with societal organisations, and increasingly 
fail to mobilise voters. In terms of party ideology, the parties are increasingly 
similar and inclined to compete by promoting populist issues and leaders rather 
than policy and ideological appeals. 
If in these ways the party institution is in decline, then this phenomenon is a topic 
that warrants urgent analysis. Yet, in some ways, this thesis is actually more 
concerned with the continuing survival of parties than with their decline. As the 
Economist has asked: 'Is it so very comforting that parties can lose members, 
worry less about ideas, become detached from broader social movements, 
attract fewer voters and still retain an iron grip on politics?' (Economist, 24 July 
1999b: p.56). In this sense, this thesis highlights the fact that while important 
elements of the New Zealand political party are in decline, these issues are not 
being addressed because the actual survival of the parties is not under threat. 
These changes might therefore be viewed as one of adaptation by the parties. 
Regardless of whether the term 'decline' or 'adaptation' best characterises the 
changing state of the parties, this thesis examines the consequences of the 
contradiction between this weakening of parties in society and their apparent 
strengthening as public office-holders. 
In looking at party decline, the primary focus on ideology is arso warranted 
because ideological erosion is deemed to be particularly negative. Essentially 
this particular erosion negates voter political choice because, 'Implicit in electoral 
choices is the notion that the party or candidate one votes for will somehow be 
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different from and preferable to the competition' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.220).3 
The tendency towards moderation and compromise means that even New 
Zealand's current multiparty system is so dominated by the political centre that it 
is unable to offer clear ideological alternatives. With the move of the parties into a 
'new consensus', voters are having greater difficulty perceiving differences 
between them, and are either opting out of participation or looking to anti-party or 
alternative anti-political options, neither of which is desirable for democracy. 
A Focus on New Zealand 
Internationally, the trends described above have given rise to a multi-faceted 
debate about the meaning of these changes for parties (in particular, the 
question of whether they are in decline as vehicles for representing interests) and 
for parliamentary democracy more generally. This debate revolves around a 
paradox in which, on the one hand, parties remain central to the conduct of 
parliamentary democracy and, on the other, they often seem to be less 
connected to the constituencies they claim to represent and less able to provide 
voters with effective choices. This thesis engages with this debate by examining 
both ideological and organisational transformation in one particular democracy, 
New Zealand. 
Amongst industrialised nations the New Zealand party system contains many 
particularly advanced examples of party decline and more specifically of 
3 See: Mulgan, who argues that the effectiveness of voter choice and accountability in New Zealand democracy 
depends on the 'extent to which the voters can assess the differences between the parties and their likely 
behaviour should they gain office' (Mulgan, 1992: p.518). Caul and Gray also conclude that in advanced industrial 
democracies, the role of parties 'in structuring the vote choice and structuring the policy-making process has 
weakened. Clear, distinct, and consistent partisan profiles are integral to structuring the voters' choices and to 
setting the policy agenda. Because party profiles are obscure, it is less likely that once in office parties will have 
clear and distinct objectives for the policies that they enact. In addition, because parties are growing increasingly 
similar, parties may no longer simplify the voting choice. And if they do not emphasize issues consistently from one 
election to the next, then we must question the amount of valuable information that can be provided by parties in 
government' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.236). 
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ideological erosion. In terms of partisan convergence, the two main New Zealand 
parties famously adopted the same neo-Iiberal economic framework in the 1980s 
and 1990s. On non-economic issues, too, Labour and then National adopted 
significant socially liberal reforms.4 A strong consensus emerged between the 
two major parties, despite significant public disapproval of many of these 
reforms. 
The convergence of National and Labour in the late 1980s planted the seeds of 
public discontent that culminated in the 1993 reform of the electoral system. This 
is another reason why the New Zealand case has become especially significant. 
It was expected that the introduction of MMP would produce a parliament and 
party system that was more diverse and better representative of the more 
complex opinions of an increasingly heterogeneous society. Other political 
reforms in the last two decades have led to the increased regulation of political 
parties and, for the parties in Parliament, greater access to taxpayer-funded 
resources.5 All of these changes were expected by many analysts to salvage the 
political system, rebuilding public faith, interest and participation in the political 
process and the institutions of government. In particular, the change in the 
electoral system was predicted to encourage the representation in Parliament of 
other political parties from outside the Labour-National consensus.6 This thesis 
evaluates the extent to which these reforms have - or have not - succeeded in 
achieving such changes. 
4 These included the nuclear-ships ban, establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, the recognition of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, environmental resource management legislation - all of which became bi-partisan. See: James 
(1990c: p.100; 1993: pp.57-58), and Jesson (1990e: p.146). 
5 In terms of increased state regulation, there is now a regime of compulsory disclosure of donations to political 
parties over a certain amount of money, caps have been imposed on national election expenditure, and parties are 
now required by law to carry out a democratic candidate selection process. These issues are examined in Chapter 
Nine. 
6 See: Vowles et al. (1995: chapter eleven). 
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There are a number of other factors relating to party transformation in which the 
New Zealand case has proved significant: class dealignment, a decline in voter 
turnout, a decline in party membership, a decline in party identification, an 
increase in voter volatility, a decreasing trust and respect in parties, increased 
party fragmentation, a declining vote for the traditional parties, and an increased 
reliance by the parties on the state for resources. In all the measures for these 
factors, New Zealand represents an extreme and significant example of party 
change amongst comparable nations, and these factors are all examined in this 
thesis. By concentrating on a party system with what might be regarded as 
particularly advanced examples of party decline, some important conclusions 
about this phenomenon can be drawn. The findings of this thesis will therefore 
hopefully contribute to the international knowledge about party transformation, 
decline, and adaptation. 
New Zealand is also the focus of this study because of the lack of research on 
political parties in this country. There has· only been one book written about 
political parties in New Zealand: Stephen (R S) Milne's Political Parties in New 
Zealand which was published in 1966. Since then there has been no 
comprehensive book-length study of this country's political parties. Even in terms 
of individual party histories there have been few in-depth publications - Barry 
Gustafson's 1986 history of the National Party stands out amongst other much 
shorter accounts of recent political party history in New Zealand. There have also 
been a number of journal and textbook articles that examine aspects of the party 
system, but nothing since Milne that revisits the subject of political parties as an 
entirety. Now, nearly four decades later, and especially after the last two decades 
of turbulent party change, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive and in-
depth analysis of the modern party system. In particular, there is a need to 
redress the lack of academic research in the area of party transformation and 
ideological erosion. 
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Although Milne's excellent book has been the 'holy grail' for the academic study 
of parties in this country, because it was published in 1966 its analysis and focus 
did not benefit from the new wave of political party theory that emerged from the 
later 1960s onwards. Beginning with Otto Kirchheimer in 1966 and Leon Epstein 
in 1967, party scholars began reflecting on the decline of the class mass party in 
Europe and the rise of the 'catch-all' party. In this new type of party, the 
leadership was increasingly dominant within the organisation, and it 
communicated directly with the voters via the media rather than through a large 
and active membership. Moreover, the catch-all party was characterised by its 
attempt to broaden its social bases to encapsulate as many interests as possible 
while reducing its dependence on ideological appeals. Thus the existing bonds 
between mass parties and their constituencies became unfrozen, leading to a 
considerable weakening of collective political identity and loyalty. The shift from 
the mass party to the catch-all party was therefore seen by Kirchheimer as the 
transformation of class-based (and sometimes denomination-based) mass 
membership parties into less doctrinaire organisations with much more 
heterogeneous electoral support. Since Kirchheimer there has been a wealth of 
vital theory developed about party transformation. Of particular note, Angelo 
Panebianco further developed the catch-all thesis in the 1980s, asserting the rise 
of what he calls the 'electoral-professional' party. This model has stressed the 
weakening of relations between parties and civil society, while emphasising the 
correspondingly stronger linkage between party and state. The electoral-
professional party is also characterised by an increased emphasis on elections, a 
much greater professionalisation of the party organisations, the prominence of a 
personalised leadership, and a stress on issues rather than ideology. This thesis 
on the New Zealand parties has therefore been influenced by' all of these 
theories and utilises them in an attempt to update Milne's Political Parties in New 
Zealand. For this reason, the thesis appropriates Milne's book title, adding the 
subtitle, 'A Study of Ideological and Organisational Transformation'. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
Following this introduction, the first chapter sets out the theoretical basis of the 
thesis and outlines the research methods employed. After Chapter One, the 
thesis is divided into four sections. The first section, entitled 'Ideology in the Party 
System', examines the ideological transformation of the party system since World 
War II. It provides systematic evidence of ideological transformation in the party 
system. Within this, Chapter Two looks at ideology in the party system during the 
postwar period up until the vote for electoral reform in 1993, but concentrating on 
the decade of radical reform since 1984. Party ideology in the decade since 1993 
is then addressed in Chapter Three. Together with Chapter One on theory, 
section one therefore provides the foundation of the thesis by establishing the 
nature and degree of ideological erosion. 
Following the chapters on ideology, this thesis examines other factors relating to 
ideological erosion in New Zealand politics. Section two, entitled 'Societal 
Support for the Parties', deals with the relationship of the New Zealand parties 
with the electorate. Chapter Four looks at the social bases of voter support for 
the parties, and in particular the declining salience· of class. This examination 
shows the ways in which the erosion of constituencies of support for parties has 
contributed to ideological erosion. Then Chapter Five deals with the 
organisational support for parties in civil society - for example, the trade unions 
and business organisations that are aligned to parties. Again it shows the 
weakening linkage between parties and civil society. 
The third section, 'Party Organisation', explores the extra-parliamentary elements 
of New Zealand parties. Chapter Six examines the state of the party 
organisations and, in particular, their memberships (or 'labour resources'). It 
shows how the marginalisation of party members and the decline of membership 
numbers has turned modern New Zealand parties into elite cadre-type 
organisations. Chapter Seven is on party finance (or 'capital resources') and 
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looks at the sources of party funding and how they use it. It also shows how the 
parties have become highly professionalized. 
The fourth section investigates 'The State-Party Relationship', and suggests how 
adaptation by the parties has ensured their survival. The first chapter of this is 
concerned with the resources the state provides to the parties. It is argued that 
this, more than anything else, has strengthened the parties and ensured their 
organisational survival. After this, Chapter Nine explores the regulation of political 
parties by the state. It argues that increased regulation is related to increased 
state funding, and its effects are to reduce party autonomy from the state while 
often furthering the interests of the dominant existing parties. 
To draw together the issues and arguments of all the previous chapters, and 
thereby conclude the thesis, Chapter Ten looks at elements of anti-party attitudes 
in society and general partisan decline which, it is argued, are a logical 
consequence of the various elements of the decline of the party institution in New 
Zealand and, in particular, the erosion of ideology. This is followed by a short 
concluding chapter. The conclusion reached is that in many ways parties are 
failing - especially in their role of providing meaningful choices and fostering 
citizen participation in political decision-making. Their ability to aggregate and 
articulate the interests of different sections of civil society into meaningful 
alternatives has been substantially diminished. 
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Chapter One 
Literature Review and Methodology 
In examining transformation, decline, and adaptation in the New Zealand party 
system, the central interest of this thesis is in highlighting and explaining 
ideological erosion. The introduction to this thesis defined ideological erosion as 
involving policy convergence and increased electoral pragmatism. This chapter 
provides further discussion of these concepts. 
As has already been argued, theories on ideological erosion suggest that it can 
occur in two distinct ways.1 The most obvious is the movement of parties towards 
the centre of the political spectrum - policy convergence. In this centripetal drive, 
the major political parties in any given system moderate their ideologies, placing 
themselves closer to the centre - which is commonly viewed as being the 
location where the 'median voter' sits in the political spectrum. In this situation 
the parties might continue to be just as policy-oriented and principled, but they 
now hold more moderate positions. In this sense, party systems are deemed to 
1 This formulation is taken, first, from Jaensch, who argues that party convergence can 'be the result of two 
different phenomena - the de-emphasis of ideology, or the result of parties taking on a different ideology. 
The former refers to political parties that are in the process of shedding their ideologies and becoming catch-
all, pragmatic, centre parties. The latter involves at least one of the major political parties changing its 
ideology to one closer to the centre which may be just as strongly held' (1994: pp.226-227). Second, Orbell 
and Fougere argue, 'A distinction needs to be made between the movement of parties to the centre of the 
left-right continuum and the decline of ideology as a characteristic of party platforms' (1973: p.440). 
Furthermore, they say that, 'that movement toward the centre will not necessarily involve a decline in 
ideology', although the 'obvious historical tendency is for parties to move toward the centre as the 
ideological component of their platform declines, and the centrist movement can usually be quite fairly seen 
as a consequence of the ideological decline' (ibid: p.442). 
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have either a centripetal (centre-oriented) or centrifugal (centre-resistant) logic in 
terms of where the parties position themselves on the left-right (or other) political 
spectrum. 
A second element of ideological erosion occurs where political parties adopt a 
more practical orientation, shedding their ideological direction and adopting 
relatively non-programmatic stances. In this scenario, pragmatism dominates and 
electoral calculations shape decision-making. This orientation often (though not 
necessarily) results in the party shifting towards the centre, but the key point is 
that it means the party puts less stress on policy issues and ideological themes. 
Political scientist Otto Kirchheimer called this process 'de-ideologization' (1966: 
p.187), and other writers have referred to it in terms of 'de-emphasising ideology' 
(Maor, 1997: p.205), or the 'decline' or 'decay of ideology'. 
This second element of ideological erosion is closely related to the distinction 
between parties as office-seekers or policy-seekers - an idea developed by 
scholars under the influence of Anthony Downs and the rational choice tradition 
in political science.2 Office-seekers are regarded as self-interested parties or 
politicians who act purely in order to win power, while policy-seekers are 
regarded as ideologically-driven cause parties or politicians. These two types are 
by no means mutually exclusive, but instead should be regarded as heuristic or 
'ideal' types. Political actors differ and change in the degree to which they 
represent either orientation. 
The office-seeking approach is expressed most famously in Downs' 1957 
seminal account of electoral competition, in which it is said that, 'Parties 
formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to 
2 Alternatively, Strom distinguishes between three separate political orientations: (1) vote-seeking; (2) office-
seeking; and (3) policy-seeking parties. However, Strom's justification for regarding vote-seeking and office-
seeking as separate orientations are vague except in theory relating to the examination of government 
coalition formation. See also: Strom and Wolfgang (1999). 
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formulate policies' (Downs, 1957: p.28). Furthermore, according to Downs, 
politicians 'are motivated by the desire for power, prestige, and income' (Downs, 
1957: p.30). However, politicians and parties do not often admit to being office-
seekers. Because office-seeking is often seen by the electorate as being overly-
pragmatic, opportunistic, and self-serving, political actors therefore attempt to sell 
their actions and motivations as being based on some sort of pursuit of policy or 
an ideal. Even 'a politician driven only by the purest of office-seeking motivations 
must to a certain extent camouflage these, even after having succeeded in 
getting into office' (Laver and Schofield, 1990: p.38). Policy-seekers, in contrast, 
are generally associated with the representation of social constituencies, and the 
desire - above all else - to transform or defend the established social and 
economic arrangements of society. Yet to be a policy-seeking party is not 
necessarily viewed positively by all. Centre parties 'like to portray their political 
rivals as members of some lunatic fringe, typically alleging an obsession with 
extreme policies and thereby attempting to marginalize them from the political 
process' (ibid: p.47). Policy-seeking political actors are also criticised as being 
ideologues, inflexible, intransigent, dogmatic, and doctrinaire. 
As shown later in the chapter, the 'mass membership" party type has commonly 
been based on the policy-seeking orientation while, in contrast, the 'catch-all' or 
'electoral-professional' party type is based on the office-seeking orientation. Both 
this chapter and Chapter Six show how mass membership parties have often had 
their origins in working class movements which advocated 'a cause by 
propaganda or economic pressure', rather than primarily by seeking 
parliamentary office (Maor, 1997: p.105). Such parties are seen to have an 
'integrative' or 'expressive' function - rather than being responsive' to electorate 
demands, they express the beliefs and interests of particular classes or groups in 
society. In contrast, electoral-professional parties have been created specifically 
to contest elections and gain office and they are therefore highly responsive to 
the mood of voters. Such parties give 'a higher priority on electoral success than 
ideological consistency' (ibid: p.107). They tend 'to adopt a non-programmatic 
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character, enabling the leadership to respond to diverse electoral considerations' 
(ibid: p.106). In order to maximise their office-seeking success, electoral-
professional parties mould their programmes to please the electorate, rather than 
attempting to mould the opinion of the electorate to that of the party's 
programme.3 
This thesis argues that parties in New Zealand are now affected by both 
elements of this ideological erosion - they are characterised by a policy 
convergence and a strong electoral pragmatism. Therefore, the party system 
displays a centripetal dynamic and the parties operate increasingly as office-
seekers rather than policy-seekers. This chapter will outline what research has 
already been carried out on such ideological erosion. Part One of the chapter 
looks at the international literature on party convergence and electoral 
pragmatism. Part Two examines the New Zealand literature on this topic. After 
that, Part Three provides an outline and reflection on the methodology used in 
producing this thesis. 
Part One: International Ideological Erosion 
From 1945 until the 1970s a 'postwar consensus' existed throughout advanced 
industrial democracies. During this period, most party systems were underpinned 
by a large measure of political stability, consensus and policy agreement. This 
was based on the long postwar economic boom that made possible the 
establishment and continuation of welfare states.4 The postwar consensus was 
identified throughout the Western world during the 1950s and 1960s and was 
often labelled the 'end of ideology', because many writers detected that a demise 
3 See: Caul and Gray, who argue that, 'Rational office-seeking parties are expected to change their policy 
positions to correspond with the majority of voters' preferences, which given a normal distribution typically 
lies at the centre of the ideological scale' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.209). 
4 See: Roper (1991), and Mitchell (1962a: p.16). 
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of ideology was at the core of the consensus. This qualitative change in Western 
politics was explored by a number of political scientists and sociologists such as 
Seymour Martin Upset (1963). According to Upset the big questions about the 
economic direction of society had suddenly disappeared: 
The socialists no longer advocated socialism; they were as concerned as the conservatives 
with the danger of an all-powerful state. The ideological issues dividing left and right had 
been reduced to a little more or a little less government ownership and economic planning. 
No one seemed to believe that it really made much difference which political party 
controlled the domestic policies of individual nations (Upset, 1963: p.441). 
Generally in this period there was a belief that there had been some kind of 
synthesis between the extremes of free market capitalism and Marxist socialism, 
producing what Upset (1963) called 'conservative socialism', but which was 
otherwise known as 'social democracy' or 'welfare capitalism,.5 The decline of 
ideology was seen as being partially due to the fact that the major ideological 
tendencies of the early twentieth century had been undermined: 
The major ide<?'ogies of the left and right in the early twentieth century had been defeated, 
discredited or found extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Out of this process 
emerged a compromise position that all the major parties of the early postwar period could 
at least partly support (Fraser, 2000: p.352). 
Others talked of a 'historical compromise' in which there emerged agreements 
between capital, labour and the state which were seen to be mutually beneficial. 
This arrangement amounted to an acknowledgement of the right of business to 
pursue profitability, balanced with the establishment of a comprehensive welfare 
state. Building on this, Daniel Bell's 1960 book The End of Ideology concluded: 
'In the Western World, therefore, there is today a rough consensus among the 
intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a welfare state; the desirability 
5 These terms acknowledge that the economy in those capitalist societies was a mixed one, involving private 
enterprise together with comprehensive welfare systems, and government intervention and ownership in the 
economy. The proponents of this arrangement often labelled it social democracy, while critics of both left 
and right used terms like 'welfare capitalism'. 
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of decentralised power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism. In 
that sense too, the ideological age has ended' (Bell, 1960: p.373).6 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s the end of ideology prognosis was dismissed 
as premature. It was challenged firstly by the explosion of social movements and 
labour unrest. Secondly, the end to economic prosperityl brought about an era of 
political turbulence as governments attempted to navigate the difficult times by 
restructuring their economies. The party systems of many countries were thus 
radicalised during the 1970s and 1980s, with some of the major parties moving 
away from the centre and, in effect, destroying the historic compromise. In many 
Western countries neo-liberal economic policies were adopted by major parties, 
leading to a lurch to the right. This was also matched in some countries by 
equally dramatic, but temporary, shifts to the left by social democratic parties.8 
Suddenly party politics was reinvigorated with ideology, and those parties 
adopting neo-liberal policies were often ideologically strengthened. New political 
parties also entered the party systems, and offered increased political choice. 9 In 
some countries - particularly those with two-party systems - the major parties 
eventually embraced similar economic reform programmes, leading to ideological 
convergence. However, in New Zealand, this was not a typical situation of 
ideological convergence, firstly because the main parties were not in the centre 
of the party system (but well to the right), and secondly because the convergence 
6 Upset also argued that the intellectual base of politics had lessened in society: 'In recent years, however, 
democracy in the Western world has been undergoing some important changes as serious intellectual 
conflicts among groups representing different values have declined sharply' (Upset, 1963: p.439). 
7 The economies of the West were especially hard hit by the oil. shocks of 1974, after which economic 
growth slowed, inflation spiralled, full employment disappeared, and public expenditure declined. See Roper 
(1993; 2001), and Callaghan (2003: p.126). 
8 For a discussion of the election of the French Socialist Party on a radical left-wing programme, which it 
later jettisoned in favour of neo-liberal reforms, see: Hewlett (1998, Chapter Four). Initially there were also 
relatively radical programmes being pushed by the main left parties in the United Kingdom, Portugal and 
Spain. 
9 For example, throughout the West environmental-based parties emerged - most notably in Germany and 
New Zealand 'green' parties were established which eventually were elected to Parliament. 
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was not typically apolitical but one highly charged with ideology (even if this was 
sometimes exaggerated by commentators and opponents). It was also not 
normally a political consensus that involved either the majority of society or the 
rest of the party system. 
During the second-half of the 1990s, however, the consensus and convergence 
displayed between the major political parties often spread to the rest of the party 
system and gained greater public acceptance. Also in the mid- and late-1990s 
much of the neo-liberal reform came to a halt as the major parties withdrew from 
the extremes, becoming both more pragmatic and centrist. A 'new centre' was 
created in many political systems, and most parties came to agree on a policy 
framework in which the neo-liberal reforms were basically retained but few further 
reforms were made. In addition, many parties of the right came to accept socially 
liberal reforms and policies, which further cemented the consensus. 
To sum up, the postwar decades involved a significant movement towards 
consensus in the party systems of Western democracies. This consensus broke 
down in the 1970s, leading to revitalised party systems, especially with the 
establishment of new political parties over the next two decades, but with many 
of the major political parties eventually adopting similar neo-liberal economic 
policies. Although the adoption of these policies in the 1980s and early 1990s 
meant that the main political parties in many countries were often highly 
convergent, a full consensus was not established until later in the 1990s. The 
arrival of this consensus has brought about a new political era. 
National Examples 
The fact that some sort of ideological partisan convergence has occurred in most 
advanced industrial countries in recent years is now firmly documented in the 
political science literature. This section deals with some of these examples. 
26 Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 
Much of the convergence throughout the Western world during the last two 
decades has been due to a substantial moderation on the part of ostensibly 'Ieft-
wing' parties.lO There has been a long list of social democratic, socialist or labour 
governments making u-turns after initially pursuing left-wing - or 'more state' -
policies. Left-wing governments in Australia, New Zealand, Scandinavia, Spain 
and Ireland have all carried out wide-scale neo-liberal social and economic 
reforms. In the United Kingdom and the United States, also, there has been a 
broad continuity of policies between administrations such as those of Margaret 
Thatcher and Tony Blair, and Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. Although different 
countries responded to changes in the economy with different measures - which 
relates to their governance of different varieties of capitalism 11 - generally social 
democracy throughout the world now embraces neo-liberalism in some form or 
another. 
In the United States, the two political parties have converged to a greater degree 
than ever before. Before he became president, Bill Clinton helped to shift the 
Democratic Party towards a greater acceptance of the importance of business 
and free trade. In government, he maintained and extended Ronald Reagan's 
policies, including radical welfare reforms.12 Likewise, in Britain 'New Labour' 
functions under the ideology of the so-called 'Third Way' and no longer even 
portrays itself as the political arm of the trade-union movement. Labour has made 
a virtue of its middle class appeal under Tony Blair, while carefully downgrading 
10 For an overview of this, see Lipset (2001), who has traced the path of this move of socialism to the right 
and towards economic liberalism in a large number of countries. See also: Denemark (1990a), the 
Economist (1994), Kitschelt (1994), and Przeworski (2001). Bale also argues that 'instead of falling apart 
when the apparent triumph of free market liberalism first pushed them out of office, centre-left parties 
realised that, rather than abandon or undo deregulation, privatisati/;m and welfare reform, they could offer 
the electorate a kinder, gentler version. This took more account of the social costs of those policies, and 
pursued them only where such pursuit was pragmatic, rather than ideological' (2000a). 
11 See: Thomson (2000: chapter two) for a discussion of the varieties of capitalism. 
12 See: the Economist (1999b: p.55), and Kerr (2000: p.5). 
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any policies that link the party with either the past or the working class.13 One of 
the key Labour MPs behind the party's transformation, Peter Mandelson, has 
asserted that Labour is now 'a market capitalist party' (quoted in Lipset, 2001: 
p.57).14 To get to this point, Blair proclaimed that the era of big government was 
over, rejecting Labour's historic emphasis on public ownership, and embraced 
the free-market, promising to govern from the centre (ibid: p.57).15 
The rest of Europe has also generally shown significant ideological convergence 
since the 1970s and more lately has adopted localised versions of the Third Way. 
In Spain, the Socialist Party moved away from its neo-Marxist post-Franco phase 
and into government. Under leader Felipe Gonzalez, the party was transformed 
into a supporter of privatisation, the free market, and NATO. It undertook welfare 
cuts, deregulation of the labour market, and gave tax cuts to the wealthy. The 
Economist described these economic policies as having made the government 
'look somewhat to the right of Mrs Thatcher's' (quoted in Lipset, 2001: p.59). 
Since leaving government, the Socialist Party's new leader, Jose-Luis Zapatero, 
has moved the party 'in a more free-market direction' (Bell and Shaw, 2003: 
p.3).16 Other Southern European social democratic parties have also shifted 
significantly to the right. In Portugal, the 1974 revolLition 'briefly threatened a 
complete break with capitalism before the position was normalised under 
13 Even before Blair, the British Labour Party made a substantial retreat from its former radical policies of the 
early 1980s, when it divorced itself from its pOlicies of 'unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal from the 
European Community, adoption of import controls, public ownership, industrial planning and expansion of 
the welfare state' (Callaghan, 2003: p.127). Under leader Neil Kinnock, Labour began to adopt a market 
approach, retreating from the policies of public ownership and expanded public spending (ibid). 
14 The differences with the Conservative Party were virtually settled when Margaret Thatcher declared at the 
start of New Labour's victorious 1997 election campaign, that 'Britain will be safe in the hands of Mr Blair' 
(quoted in Lipset, 2001: p.58). In government, the British Labour Party retained the main elements of the 
Conservative's restrictions on unions, focused on keeping inflation low (which required wage gains be held 
down), shifted control over monetary policy and interest rates to Bank of England, and launched welfare 
reform (Upset, 2001). 
15 A number of commentators and academics have written about New Labour's shift to the centre of the 
political spectrum. See: Thomson (2002), Driver and Martell (1998), Leys (1998), and Glyn (2001). 
16 See also: Share (1999), Navarro (1997), Frank Wilson (1994), and Callaghan (2003: p.128). 
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governments of the Socialist Party' (Callaghan, 2003: pp.127 -129). The Socialist 
Party renounced its Marxism, and adopted policies of privatisation, austerity, and 
deregulation (Thomson, 2000: pp.87-91). Similarly, in Greece, following the fall of 
the military regime in 1975 the Socialist Party pushed a radical socialisation 
programme, as well as wanting to break from America's control and withdraw 
from NATO. But in government between 1981 and 1989, the socialists 
'demonstrated the neo-liberal orthodoxy which gave priority to budgetory 
austerity, monetary stability and sound finances, even at the cost of mass 
unemployment and the demobilisation of socialist aspirations' (Callaghan, 2003 
p.128). 
As recently as the early 1980s the French Socialist Party also went from being a 
party with a highly conspicuous anti-capitalist stance to leading a government in 
the 1980s and 1990s which made tremendous reforms in the interests of 
business as espoused by its opponents.17 Most notably, Francois Mitterrand 
carried out an extensive privatisation programme during his 14-year presidency. 
The Socialists also 'pursued severe anti-inflationary measures' for most of their 
time in office (ibid: p.127). Therefore, although France's party system has 
traditionally been polarised, it is of particular note that the main parties converged 
so thoroughly in the 1980s and 1990s that according to Hewlett: 
a reading of the manifestos of the mainstream right and the mainstream left showed that 
they had virtually the same positions on the major issues of the day, namely the economy, 
immigration, education and foreign policy ... This was reflected in public opinion, according 
to the polls, which consistently pointed to a widespread and growing belief in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that there was little difference between mainstream left and mainstream 
right and a belief that it made little difference to most French people who won elections, left 
17 In France 'the Socialists started an ambitious reflationary programme involving income redistribution, job 
creation and public ownership. Less than six months after taking office, the Finance Minister was obliged to 
call for a "pause" in the reform programme' (Callaghan, 2003: p.126). See Hewlett (1998) for an outline of 
the radical rightwing reforms of the party in government. According to Hewlett the party 'changed very 
rapidly from being a party which had a programme clearly influenced by Marxism to one which had fully 
embraced the politics of pragmatism, and in particular neo-liberal economic policy' (Hewlett, 1998: p.63). 
See also: Thomson (2000: pp.66-80). 
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or right.. .. Politicians had great difficulty in asserting what was distinct about their particular 
party, how it differed from other centre-orientated parties (Hewlett, 1998: p.78). 
In general the social democratic parties of Northern Europe have all taken on 
strong elements of neo-liberalism. Recently the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) under Gerhard Schroder has adopted an orthodox neo-liberal path after 
initially suggesting a relatively more left direction. The party has embraced the 
market and competition, with Schroder proclaiming that the SPD is not a party of 
the left but occupies a 'Neue Mitte' (New Middle). Elected in 1998, the party's 
business-friendly programme promised 'a reduction in the non-wage costs of 
labour, a reduction in corporate taxation and assistance for small business start-
ups' (Padgett, 2003: p.42). In government, the SPD has been very business-
friendly, reducing taxation on company profits from 52 percent to 37 percent. The 
SPD also axed some social welfare benefits and linked 'increases in pensions to 
inflation rather than increases in earnings' (ibid: p.45). Then in 2003 the SPD 
Government pushed through 'a big cut in health spending, a modest reduction in 
unemployment benefits for the long-term jobless and changes to the labour laws 
to make it easier for employers to hire and fire' (Hooper, 2'003).18 
Scandinavian social democracy has, likewise, not been immune to neo-
liberalism. The long-time ruling Social Democrats in Sweden have 'reversed their 
previous wage-growth, high-income-tax, and strong-welfare-state orientations' in 
favour of a neo-liberal economic approach (Upset, 2001: p.58). This shift to the 
right started when the party returned to office in 1982 and moved away from the 
politics of redistribution. Then in the early-1990s they introduced 'a tax reform 
18 The Greens in Germany have also shown that examples of converg,ence and moderation are not limited to 
the established major parties. According to Berman, the German Greens have, in little more than a decade, 
'moved from radically opposing traditional parties and much of the postwar German political consensus to 
generally accepting the existing rules of the game, while organising its behavior and internal structures 
accordingly' (Berman, 1997: p.115). According to Padgett (2003), 'The "eco-socialist" tendencies of the early 
1980s have been curbed in favour of "steering the economy towards eco-capitalism" with an imaginative 
blend of environmentalism and novel economic thinking .... In many other respects, however, the new left 
agenda has been mainstreamed. Lacking the labour-movement baggage of the Social Democratic left, 
Alliance 90/the Greens are more open in many ways to liberalising economic reform' (Padgett, 2003: p.39). 
30 Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 
(cuts) package ... designed to increase work incentives' and 'a very large 
austerity package' (Arter, 2003: p.89). In the mid-1990s the Swedish Social 
Democrats under Goran Persson 'pushed in a free-market direction' and 
introduced a programme of strict public spending cuts to reduce the state debt 
(Bell and Shaw, 2003: p.4). Throughout the 1990s, the Social Democrats made a 
priority of reducing inflation, and effectively reduced the size of the state. In 1999 
the party privatised 25 enterprises (Lipset, 2001: p.60).19 
The social democrats in Finland have pursued similar policies, especially with 
public spending cuts. The Finnish SPD came to power in 1995 and formed a 
coalition which included the Conservatives, and the Peoples Party. After deciding 
to join the euro-zone in 1999, a huge programme of cuts was introduced to meet 
the criteria (ibid). Pesonen (1999) has shown that the space between the 
established parties of Finland has steadily shrunk since the 1980s. According to 
Bell and Shaw (2003), 'the Social Democrat leader Paavo Lipponen, moved the 
party into a more aggressive libertarianism than any of the others in the Nordic 
area' (Bell and Shaw, 2003: p.4). Similarly, in Norway, the Labour Party now 
emphasises the free market and individualism, after dropping 'its commitment to 
socialist society and state intervention' (ibid). Recently in government, the party 
has 'pushed through the partial privatisation of state offshore oil and gas interests 
and pursued a policy of fiscal restraint' (Arter, 2003: p.92). 
In Australasia the changes have been ever more marked. In the Australian party 
system the dominant Liberal and Labor parties have become much more populist 
and centrist. This is especially true of the once ideological, blue-collar Labor 
Party which has shed its allegiance to the policies ·of the postwar consensus and 
is now run by more pragmatic and middle class politicians. In government during 
the 1980s and 1990s, Labor cut income taxes, pursued economic deregulation, 
19 See also: Boreus (1997). 
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and privatised various industries.2o In addition, as this thesis will show, the New 
Zealand's Labour Party has been the most extreme example of social democratic 
capitulation to neo-liberalism. 
The current ideological consensus in the West is not, however, only produced by 
the capitulation of left-wing parties to economic austerity, but also to the 
exhaustion of the right-wing in the 1990s. As the 1980s economic boom faded in 
the 1990s, the dynamic right-wing agenda that accompanied it was also 
exhausted.21 This was also due, in part, to the 'collapse of communism' and the 
ending of the Cold War, which threw the old world order into disarray, unleashing 
a general crisis of legitimacy. It is therefore becoming increasingly recognised 
that Cold War politics strongly shaped the ideological and institutional framework 
of Western politics, and therefore played a strong role in structuring party politics. 
As Ware has argued: 
cold war issues did divide parties of both left and right, often in quite subtle ways, and 
helped to shape the context in which they competed and cooperated with each other. 
These issues helped to anchor party positions and strategies, in relation to each other, 
in a whole variety of ways. Remove an anchor and underlying currents will have a 
rather different effect on the objects they were once holding (Ware 1995, 324-325). 
The external threat of the Cold War generally gave right-wing concepts more 
meaning, thus creating dividing lines within Western politics. The ending of the 
Cold War has meant the loss of the propaganda focus that gave the right 
cohesion throughout the Cold War era, and further discredited the 'state socialist' 
policies associated with the left.22 Parties of the right have also lost much of their 
identity and direction precisely because social democratic parties have stolen 
20 The Australian Labor governments of 1983-96 responded to stagflation by privatisation: deregulation and 
public-sector cuts. Public utilities were opened to market forces, welfare benefits were linked to compulsory 
training and job seeking for the unemployed, while a major redistribution of income produced one of the 
highest levels of inequality in the advanced capitalist world' (Callaghan, 2003: p.128). See also: Jaensch 
(1994), Ward (1991), Jennett and Steward (1990), Battin (1993), Castles et al. (1996), Kelly (1994), and 
Beilharz (1994). 
21 See: Gamble (1997: pp.362-363). 
22 See: Lipow and Seyd (1996: p.281) and Jupp (1982, 23-26). 
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their economic policies (as examined above). Therefore in many countries the 
parties of the right came adrift and appeared increasingly irrelevant as they 
searched around for issues or an agenda through which to redefine themselves. 
This has especially been the case for the Conservatives in the United Kingdom, 
the Conservatives in Sweden, and the National Party in New Zealand. 
According to Bale, successful centre-right parties throughout Europe have only 
won elections recently where they have played down their ideological instincts, 
and tacked towards the centre: 'they admit to differences of emphasis but don't 
promise or even intend to do away with the "Third Way" mix of stability plus smart 
intervention that seems to be serving most economies reasonably well. A little 
deregulation and privatisation, perhaps; but not much more than the centre-left 
itself was doing' (Bale, 2002d). The first parties of the right to successfully carry 
out this centrist strategy were the governing Popular Party in Spain and Fianna 
Fail in Ireland - both of which were re-elected for second terms after stressing 
their centrist consensus politics (ibid). 
In the United States even the right-wing has become less extreme. Although 
Republicans like Newt Gingrich pushed a hard line stance in the mid-1990s, this 
soon faded out, and when Republican George W. Bush won the presidency, he 
did so not on a radical right-wing platform, but on one of 'compassionate 
conservatism,.23 Then in the White House, Bush has overseen increased 
government spending and the continuation of the vast majority of the Democratic 
administration's pOlicies.24 
Not only have the conservative parties of the right become part of the new 
consensus by abandoning the extremes of neo-Iiberal economic reforms, but 
23 See: the Economist ( 1999b: p.56). 
24 Bush has been a much higher spender than Clinton. According to the Congressional Budget Office, a 
deficit of US$246 billion is expected for 2003, 'and this might rise to $1.8 trillion over the next decade' 
(Roughan, 2003). See also: Berkowitz ( 2003). 
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they have also often abandoned traditionalist social and cultural policies as well. 
They might still place some emphasis on social issues such as immigration and 
crime, but their policies on these issues are often at minimal variance with those 
of their opponents. In fact, on social issues, parties of the right are often 
indistinguishable from those of the left. In Europe, for example, politicians of the 
right such as France's Jacque Chirac have shown just as much ideological 
flexibility by portraying an apparent 'anti-war' persona on issues such as the 
2003 war against Iraq. 
Throughout the West therefore, a new consensus has been emerging that is both 
centrist and largely non-doctrinaire. It is, however, based upon Third Way 
principles of free-markets with renewed government intervention, and more 
socially-liberal polices. It is this 'new centre' that is the backdrop to the study of 
parties in this thesis. 
Theory of Ideological Erosion 
There is not a large body of international academic literature dealing with 
ideological erosion per se, but there are a number of books and articles that 
address it while looking at other wider issues and by documenting the histories of 
particular parties. As early as 1911 Robert Michels asserted in his book Political 
Parties that an increase in organisation by political parties would have a 
moderating effect on party ideology and orientation. Identifying this universal 
tendency as 'the iron law of oligarchy', Michels suggested that party ideals would 
eventually be corrupted because of the inevitable emergence of a powerful and 
autocratic elite to whom power became an end in itself rather than ·the means of 
achieving ideological goals. Such a leadership structure would ultimately be 
conservative as it develops its own special interests and aims which are 
inevitably self-serving, as more and more such interests come to represent the 
organisation's survival rather than the purposes for which the organisation was 
established. Essentially, according to Michels, parties become office-seekers 
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rather than policy-seekers. Furthermore, in order to gain power, retain it, or just 
survive, Michels thought parties would need to win support beyond the confines 
of their own activists, which invariably means moderating their ideologies and 
policies. 
This organisational perspective on party change was very influential, and for the 
next half-century few other theories about party moderation or convergence were 
developed. Then in the 1950s and 1960s the rational choice school of thought 
also theorised that parties eventually come to resemble one another in their issue 
positions, thus moving towards the centre of the political spectrum. In his 
landmark book, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), Anthony Downs 
constructed a predictive model in which he assumed that parties are like 
entrepreneurs seeking profits in a marketplace, and that citizens acting like 
rational consumers, gave their votes to the party which they consider provides 
them with the best personal outcome. This theory views parties as pragmatic 
office-seeking organisations. Parties therefore alter the many facets of their 
parties (policy, image, etc) in order to maximise their share of total votes. 
Politicians and voters always act out of self-interest and Downs believed that, 
especially in a socially homogeneous, two-party system, parties compete for the 
political centre (converging in pursuit of the 'median voter') and largely take their 
traditional left- or right-wing supporters very much for granted. 
Such rational choice theory has always been criticised for its assumption that 
political parties act purely in order to win power. The consensus in the party 
literature is that Downs construed party motives too rigidly, when it is true that 
parties - particularly traditional mass-type parties - do generally seek to 
influence policy, and they do not follow the goal of power at any cost, especially 
because of the constraint of party members. Downs is also criticised for the non-
sociological nature of his theory. His model ignored the fact that Western political 
parties are traditionally integrated and aligned with social classes and other 
social constituencies which act as brakes on the free movement of political 
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parties along the left-right political spectrum. The political sociology approach, 
exemplified by Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967),25 showed that the traditional 
party system was based on social cleavages, and parties generally related to 
different groups of supporters in the electorate, meaning they were not simply 
free to move along the ideological spectrum until they reached their respective 
vote-maximising positions. Although Downs saw party changes in ideology as 
being reflections of changes in social preferences, he did not see parties as 
particularly driven by changes in social class. 
Downs' spatial theory of parties is also partially consistent with Giovanni Sartori's 
(1976) arguments about party system polarisation. Sartori challenged the 
assumption that parties are essentially projections into the political arena of 
underlying social groups and that party activities can therefore be explained in 
terms of, or indeed reduced to, the activities of those groups. Therefore his 
understanding of party motivations also fitted better with Downs' office-seeking 
model.26 But Sartori's 'party-centred' approach also differed from Downs' 
'society-centred' model, in which social phenomena (or voters' wishes) are seen 
to govern the competition between political parties. Instead, Sartori viewed 
parties as independent actors that altered their own environment. This was also 
consistent with the approach of Adam Przeworski and John Sprague (1986) who 
'assume class to be a result of a party's class strategy rather than an objective 
premise of politics. In other words, left parties are actively engaged in a process 
25 In their important 1967 essay, Lipset and Rokkan argued that, 'Most parties have core supporters located 
in particular segments of society, which provides a solid, long-term grounding. These links between parties 
and social groups usually develop at crucial points of conflict in a country's history. Such moments define 
new social cleavages (that is, divisions) from which parties emerge and which they then reinforce, producing 
what is often called a "frozen" party system' (Hague et aI., 1998: p.135). These enduring pOlitical divisions 
thus provided a tight framework within which parties could develop and position themselves. 
26 According to Sartori, 'the party system is not the "consequence of class". Rather, and before, it is the 
class that receives its identity from the party. Hence class behaviour presupposes a party that not only 
feeds, incessantly, the "class image", but also a party that provides the structural cement of "class reality'" 
(Sartori, 1969: p.54). 
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which provides voters with cues that sustain class identification' (Maor, 1997: 
p.202). 
Downs is therefore said to have ignored the possibility and reality of parties 
influencing and changing voters' own policy preferences. Downs' argument saw 
political parties simply as followers, constantly altering their policies in order to 
please voters and so gain as many votes as possible. However, because parties 
are interactive, also sometimes 'preference-shaping', they have more flexibility in 
the electoral market than Downs implies: 'parties are not simply feedback 
mechanisms that respond automatically to external changes. They are, instead, 
complex organisations with their own "bounded rationalities" constructed out of 
embedded discourses, relationships with ongoing resource bases, and particular 
internal power structures' (Ross, 1992: p.44). 
Related to this preference-shaping function, Sigmund Neumann (1956) 
suggested that parties could be classified as either parties of integration or 
parties of representation. Parties of integration see their primary function as 
shaping rather than merely reflecting public opinion. Parties of representation, by 
contrast, are more likely to seek to reflect public opinion in an attempt to secure 
votes in elections - they 'adopt a catch-all strategy and therefore place 
pragmatism before principle and market research before popular mobilisation' 
(Heywood, 1997: p.232). Downs' theory is obviously more relevant and valid 
when political parties are dominated by the representation model (and thus less 
organically integrated into society). 
Otto Kirchheimer (1966) also argued that a transformation was· occurring from 
parties of 'mass integration' to what he called the 'catch-all' party. Parties were 
making strong attempts to broaden their social bases of support, and this 
required a reduction of their dependence on specific ideological appeals and a 
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downgrading of the role of their mass memberships.27 In the attempt to be many 
things to many voters, instead of trying to represent and appeal to a particular 
social constituency Kirchheimer argued that the class mass parties were losing 
touch with their traditional constituencies, their ideological distinctiveness, and 
thus their original reason for existence. In The Transformation of the West 
European Party Systems Kirchheimer noted that parties were moving away from 
having a comprehensive ideology to focus on specific issues, as they attempted 
to maximise their share of the votes so that the potential for a parliamentary 
majority was maximised.28 Kirchheimer was worried that without strong parties 
integrated or attached to particular social constituencies, politicians would simply 
reflect moods of the electorate or the influence of pressure groups battling for 
scarce resources. In doing so, parties would suffer a legitimation problem, 
ceasing to involve citizens in political affairs and politics would become 
increasingly meaningless. In this sense political parties were becoming more like 
the office-seekers that Downs characterised them as, rather than policy-seekers. 
Downs' approach became more meaningful as political parties took on the 
characteristics of the catch-all type - parties attempting to appeal to the 
electorate at large.29 Kirchheimer believed that the link between parties and 
voters was changing largely due to a decline in class, arguing that the erosion of 
27 Because catch-all parties are responsive rather than expressive, and their raison-d'etre is to win office, 
Kirchheimer thought they operated with the ideological flexibility needed to react to shifts in electorate 
opinion. 
28 Caul and Gray: 'As the ideological and traditional group bonds that structured party competition diminish 
in potency, Kirchheimer theorized that parties would integrate an ever greater number of voters drawn from 
an increasingly disparate set of categories. In other words, the weakened partisan ties ... should encourage 
centrist policies in pursuit of the median voter' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p'.209). 
29 According to Maor, Kirchheimer's theories also fitted with Downs' economic rationalist approach in 
another way: 'The approaches of Kirchheimer (1966a) and Downs (1957) converge in that both accept the 
law of the "political market" and the connection between this and party response using preference-
accommodating strategies. Thus, a party's choice of policies is based on an evaluation of voters' 
preferences which are thought to be "intrinsic", i.e. determined by factors which are assumed to be 
exogenous to the process of party competition. Parties' electoral strategies are designed in response to 
changes in electoral tastes brought about by various economic, social, or other environmental factors' 
(Maor, 1997: p.206). 
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traditional social boundaries meant a weakening of formerly highly distinctive 
identities, leaving parties without strong constituencies (Maor, 1997: p.204). This 
erosion acted to both pressure and provide opportunities for parties to appeal to 
a wider audience. -Kirchheimer saw this as a negative phenomenon, in which the 
appeal of immediate electoral success robbed the parties of their original value 
because they deemphasised ideology, preferring to focus on innocuous issues 
and put a stress on personality. According to Maor, this produces competitive 
ideological convergence: 
A key outcome of this process is the prevalence of centripetal over centrifugal forces. 
The characteristic trend of party systems affected by this process is a persistent shift of 
votes from one or both of the extreme ends towards the centre. This, in turn, gives 
weight to one direction of electoral competition, the centripetal one. As a result, 
students of politics start witnessing a process - similar to the one presented in the 
Downsian model - in which parties accommodate themselves to the preferences of the 
electorate at large, rather than to specific sectors of the electorate (Maor, 1997: p.205). 
There was also an organisational aspect to Kirchheimer's thesis. He believed 
that mirroring the ideological change was an organisational shift of power to the 
leadership and those with technical and managerial skills, leading to 
professionalisation and intensive campaigning. Corresponding to this, there was 
a marginalisation of party members and activists. Taking a similar organisational 
perspective - which was also in the tradition of Michels - Leon Epstein (1967) 
suggested that a decline of class mass parties was taking place, with their 
replacement by more professional organisations. Epstein explained that this was 
due to the growth of modern technology and the professionalisation of media 
skill, but also due to social changes such as rising educational levels and an 
enlarged middle class. He believed the political implication of this was that 
modern polling techniques, advertising methods, -and public relations strategies 
were starting to dominate the arena of the electoral campaign at the expense of 
issues of ideology and doctrine. The function of parties was also changing, and 
paid professionals were replacing volunteer workers, because the new style of 
campaigning required competent professional skills. Epstein believed that 
business-oriented middle-class parties would dominate the future. 
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Influenced by Michels, Kirchheimer and Epstein, Angelo Panebianco (1988) 
argued that by the 1980s the class mass party had evolved not just into the 
catch-all party, but into what he referred to as the 'electoral-professional party'. 
While the class mass party was associated with bureaucracy, membership, 
ideology and a dedicated electoral base, Panebianco described the electoral-
professional type-party as characterised by wide electoral support, the promotion 
of issues and leaders rather than ideology and most of all, a strong reliance on 
professional staff with extra-political and extra-party skills. In this new type of 
party, the emphasis given to ideology is replaced by the importance of leadership 
and issues, and 'true believers' are displaced by careerists and representatives 
of interest groups. The normal result of this is a move by the party towards 
political orthodoxy. Panebianco drew attention to the decline in party 
membership, their professionalisation, and their subsequent re-orientation 
towards the state to finance this development. According to Panebianco, as a 
result of these trends, ideological competition has declined in significance and 
party policies have become more malleable in the hands of party leaders and 
professionals. The measuring of public opinion by opinion researchers becomes 
a significant determinant of party direction. 
A number of other theorists have looked at how the professionalisation of parties 
has contributed to convergence. Farrell and Webb (2002) say that the way 
political parties now organise for elections makes them appear as 'increasingly 
unprincipled, opportunistic power-seekers who will fail to offer voters clear or 
meaningful choices' (Farrell and Webb, 2002: p.124). Expanding on Panebianco, 
they say that the professionalisation of party campaigning under the electoral-
professional party-type has meant that there has been a perceptible and critical 
shift in the marketing approaches of modern parties. Where marketing once took 
a predetermined ideology and attempted to sell it, the new marketing approach 
centres around adjusting the product to suit the market. This shift from 'selling' to 
'marketing' is partly to do with the increasingly sophisticated means of 
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accumulating feedback and the desire to test opinion. This new professionalised 
model of party malleability is therefore more in-line with Downs's model of party 
competition because they are both 'overwhelmingly preference-accommodating 
rather than preference-shaping' (ibid: p.106). 
Sociological theories also contribute to the debate on ideological erosion and 
party transformation. For example, the argument is frequently made that the 
changing class structure of post-industrial society has caused a decline in the 
ideological component of parties. Some, such as Herbert Kitschelt (1994), argue 
that the class structure has changed dramatically - especially in the decline of 
the size of the working class, and this has led leaders of left and right parties to 
blur their programmatic differences.3o These changes in the social structure have 
also been said to produce a more consensual politics in society. 
Ronald Inglehart's theory of postmaterialism (1990; 1997) is perhaps the most 
influential thesis explaining the decline in class voting. The increasing affluence 
in the West, Inglehart argues, has produced a culture shift which represents the 
major political development since the Second World War. This is seen through a 
change of priorities from 'materialist' to 'postmaterialist' values - especially since 
the 1970s. Materialist-economic issues such as wages, provision of healthcare, 
education, and welfare are largely differentiated from less tangible postmaterialist 
policies and values associated with issues of society, culture and morality. 
Scholars studying postmaterialism suggest that party systems are increasingly 
structured around these issues at the expense of the traditional 
economic/materialist left-right dynamic. One implication of the increasing 
salience of this alternative dimension of conflict is that it allows parties to 
converge on the more primary economic left-right dimension by providing parties 
with alternative issues on which to differentiate themselves. 
30 See also: Thomson (2000: pp.52-56), 
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By the early 1990s, developments in a number of countries were stimulating a 
fresh round of academic speculation about party convergence. In most advanced 
industrial democracies, the neo-liberal economic reforms of the 1980s and the 
effects of economic globalisation in the 1990s meant that a political convergence 
was developing amongst major parties which undermined the ideological 
distinctiveness of party governments. Many scholars argue that since the 1970s 
political parties have been forced into greater convergence by the fact that 
globalisation of the economy means that parties in government have fewer 
means by which to make a difference. Changes in the international environment, 
such as the growing influence of the international economy are limiting both the 
scope and the discretion of many national governments, and hence the ability of 
parties in national governments to steer policy has been reduced over time. 
Socio-economic constraints have thus weakened both the economic and political 
bases for support of the welfare state, thus reducing the importance of partisan 
control over government policy. Parties may be increasingly constrained by the 
same set of policy parameters and therefore find themselves sharing the same 
set of policy priorities. Consequently differences between parties have declined, 
with parties offering only variations on, for example, market-oriented economic 
programmes. This means that it makes little difference whether parties of the left 
or right are in government. 
Other more recent theories about convergence seek to partially explain the 
programmatic convergence trend by drawing attention to the role that state 
funding of political parties is playing in making parties less dependent on society 
for their resources. Richard S Katz and Peter Mair (1995; 1997) have used their 
theory of 'cartellisation' of parties to explain how modern parties collude to 
participate in the 'spoils of the state', gaining all sorts of resources to be used for 
political means and goals. Katz and Mair: say that reliance on these spoils is 
making parties more aligned with the state than with the particular social 
constituencies that they traditionally represented. In a sense, by being freed up 
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from the constraints and pressures of social classes and other constituencies, 
politicians are even more likely to act in the way that Downs suggested. 
There have been few arguments against these assertions of convergence - and 
many of these only challenge elements of it. Some scholars, such as Wagschal 
(1998), have argued that while it might be true that the major political parties in 
advanced industrial nations have converged, it is also true that new political 
parties have emerged offering new political choices. For example, many of these 
party systems have witnessed the establishment of new environmentalist parties. 
Likewise, small 'new left' parties and centrist parties have often experienced 
renewed electoral vigour. More recently, new right parties have arisen. 
Therefore, even if the major parties 'have generally converged, the ideological 
diversity of entire party systems may have followed a divergent course, with new 
parties moving into the space vacated by the major parties' (Caul and Gray, 
2000: pp.213-214). Empirical evidence has been produced that both confirms 
and opposes this theory. 
The Downsian view of political competition is thus at the heart of discussion of 
ideological erosion, as Downs suggested that parties are (1) prone to 
convergence on the median voter, and (2) prone to office-seeking rather than 
policy-pursuing. In the past many theorists have disputed that party politics 
operates as simply as this, because other factors constrained party leaders from 
operating as free agents with the ability to adjust their party policies in a 
Downsian sense. In particular, parties were said to be constrained by their ties to 
particular social constituencies and their large extra-parliamentary party 
organisations. However, it is questionable as to whether these 'constraints still 
exist on party leaders in New Zealand. Alternatively the New Zealand political 
parties might be best understood as el.ectoral-professional parties - as described 
by theorists such as Kirchheimer and Panebianco. Such parties are little more 
than col/ections of individual leaders that are not reliant on party members for 
resources, are largely unconnected from strong social constituencies, are 
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increasingly regulated by the state rather than those involved in the party, and 
are highly reliant on professionals and capital-intensive campaign-techniques to 
get MPs elected. Instead of integrating themselves into society and attempting to 
reshape the political preferences of voters, such electoralist parties act as 
opportunistic followers of centrist political trends. The question of whether, and to 
what extent, these are the characteristics of the modern New Zealand party is 
what this thesis seeks to investigate. 
Empirical Research into International Convergence 
Much of the discussion above is based upon qualitative and single party 
evidence of ideological convergence. There is, however, quantitative evidence 
that purports to provide both evidence for and against ideological convergence in 
advanced industrial countries. This section reviews some of this research, after 
first discussing ways of measuring ideological change. 
To understand whether parties are subject to centripetal competition it is 
necessary to measure the ideological or policy dimensions of the parties. There 
are five basic methods of measuring party ideology and analysing policy 
dimensions: 
(1) party manifestos can be analysed; 
(2) the actual record of parties can be evaluated, either when the parties are in 
government (looking at policy outcomes) or in legislatures (looking at voting 
records); 
(3) public opinion surveys can identify party positions; 
(4) experts can be surveyed about party positions; 
(5) party and MP statements, speeches, and media releases can be analysed. 
To be most useful, these methods need to convert party behaviour into locational 
positions on some sort of unidimensional or multidimensional scale. Then, these 
positions can be analysed over time to evaluate shifts in ideology. The positions 
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on the scale can also be used to calculate the degree of polarisation in the party 
system. The most commonly used scale is the left-right dimension. According to 
most party scholars, party competition in advanced industrial democracies tends 
to create this one central ideological dimension that organises political conflict. 
The terms of 'left' and 'right' captures a variety of issues that help voters and 
parties make sense of the political landscape. 
The first method mentioned above, party manifesto analysis, has been used 
most extensively by the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) and associated 
researchers.31 These researchers code each manifesto in terms of the attention it 
devotes to 57 separate themes, adding 'together the percentage of each party's 
platform devoted to issues with a leftist emphasis and the percentage with a 
rightist emphasis, and then calculated the difference to create a left-right score 
for each party in a given election year' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.211). The 
shortcomings of this technique relate mainly to whether or not party manifestos 
can be taken as reliable representations of party ideology, and there are many 
reasons for questioning this assumption.32 Furthermore, within the party 
literature, this method is well known for providing unexpected and implausible 
outcomes.33 
31 Formerly known as the Manifesto Research Group, the CMG has since 1979 analysed the electoral 
programmes of all relevant parties in 25 democracies in the postwar era. 
32 For example, in the New Zealand case, Richard Mulgan (1997) argues that the policy in election 
manifestos has always been 'deliberately imprecise in its wording and many decisions which government 
took were not covered in the policy at all' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.115). Also, see Mulgan (1990) for a useful 
account of the weakening influence of election manifestos in guiding government action in New Zealand. 
Furthermore, under MMP, it seems that there are fewer 'detailed policy statements/manIfestos because they 
may be seen as constraints on future negotiations for a place in a coalition government' (Wilson, 1998: 
p.174). 
33 See Riccardo Pelizzo (2003), who examines why the left-right scores generated by party manifesto 
analysis 'do not do a very good job, in terms of face validity, of describing parties' locations on the left-right 
dimension' (Pelizzo, 2003: p.67). He argues that such methods produce 'a considerably distorted picture of 
the Italian party system', and that they have also proved 'problematic in terms of face validity in the cases of 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands' (ibid). 
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The second method mentioned above is the study of parliamentary means to 
determine the actual behaviour or record of parties in government or parliament. 
A number of scholars have carried out detailed empirical research on what 
different types of political parties do in government.34 Similarly in some 
legislatures where party discipline of MPs is low, the voting data on lawmaking 
can be analysed to determine the ideological positions of individuals and parties 
(Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: pp.5-6). 
The third and fourth methods involve using either the public or experts to provide 
a picture of the ideological placement of parties. To research the public's views 
requires substantial (and therefore expensive) surveying, and this, of course, 
also involves respondents who know little about party politics. Expert surveys, by 
contrast, can be cheaper and are regarded as more reliable. A questionnaire is 
normally mailed to political academics, which asks the respondents to place 
parties on a ten-point Left-Right scale. The most significant cross-national 
surveys have been carried out by Francis Castles and Peter Mair (1984), Michael 
Laver and W. Ben Hunt (1992), and John D. Huber and Ronald Inglehart (1995). 
The main problem with using this technique for analysing ideological erosion, is 
that it tends to overstate polarisation and centrifugal competition. This is because 
respondents tend to spread their placements of parties across the whole 0-10 
scale, paying greater attention to how the parties relate to each other on the 
dimension than how they relate to the centrifugal or centripetal nature of party 
competition. Thus parties that are only moderately left or right are often placed at 
a more extreme place on the spectrum in order to differentiate the parties from 
those in the middle of the spectrum (Castles and Mair, 1984).35 
A fifth less quantitative method can be used to analyse MP statements, 
speeches, and media releases, as well as generally monitoring party competition. 
34 Most famously, Richard Rose (1980), published his book Do Parties Make a Difference? 
35 See also: Pennings and Keman (2000), who say that 'The expert estimations predict far more extreme 
policy positions' than using manifesto analysis and comparison. 
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This can be used to establish the ideological histories of parties in certain 
periods. This technique might lack the strong scientific methodology of the 
previous one mentioned, but it allows for a rich analysis of party developments.36 
To calculate whether the party system has been subject to centripetal or 
centrifugal changes over time, it is useful to measure the polarisation of the party 
system at different times. This is done by weighting each party's summary left-
right score with the party's share of the votes or seats at each election, so that 
each party's contribution to the diversity score is proportional to its level of 
support in the party system. This produces a quantitative score which represents 
the level of polarisation. Some researchers calculate polarisation based upon the 
distribution of parliamentary seats across the political spectrum rather than actual 
popular support expressed in terms of party votes.3? As argued later, it makes 
more sense to use the measure of votes, as in many electoral systems -
including the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system present in New Zealand prior to 
1996 - the distribution of parliamentary seats does not proportionally represent 
the spread of public support for parties. 
In terms of the immediate postwar period, there has been much research 
produced to confirm 'end of ideology' theories. For example, using party 
manifesto data for ten Western party systems, John Thomas (1975; 1979) found 
evidence for a strong trend toward convergence from the 1950s to the 1970s. On 
ten major socio-economic issues, Thomas documented a movement toward the 
centre in every country. CMG researchers used similar methods to look at ten 
Western democracies between 1945 and 1987. Klingemann et al. found that to 
the extent that there has been any type of convergence, 'it happened in all 
countries at about the same time - during the 1960s and early 1970s' 
(Klingemann et aI., 1994: p.237). Yet, overall, the researchers came to the 
conclusion that the leading parties of the left and right continued to keep their 
36 For examples of this approach in the New Zealand case see: McLeay (1994), and Barker (1998). 
37 For example: Brechtel and Kaiser (1999). 
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distance and maintain their identity, rather than clustering around the median 
voter in the centre. 
Mair's analysis of expert surveys carried out in 1982 and 1993 for thirteen 
different European democracies has, by contrast, indicated a significant decline 
of partisan purpose and the blurring of differences between traditional parties: 
the gap which separates the traditional major party on the centre-left from that on the 
centre-right has declined in eleven of the thirteen European countries for which comparable 
data are available. In some cases, the increasing proximity of the traditional opponents is 
particularly marked, as in Belgium, for example, where the gap has been reduced by 
almost 40 per cent; and the UK, where it has been reduced by almost 35 percent. 
Elsewhere, as in Norway and Sweden, for example, the reduction has been much more 
muted. It is only in Denmark and Italy (notwithstanding the transformation of the PCI into 
the PDS), on the other hand, that the relative distances between the traditional protagonists 
have widened in the last ten years (by 3 per cent and 11 per cent respectively) (Mair, 1997: 
pp.133-134). 
Knutsen (1998) also traced the movement of parties over this period, using the 
same survey information, but developed some alternative conclusions because 
he focused on all the parties in the party systems instead of only the major ones. 
The results were consistent with Mair's when looking at the established parties. 
This centrist tendency was especially pronounced among left-wing parties - 60 
percent of whom had moved towards the centre (Knutsen, 1998: p.87). But 
offsetting this convergence, Knutsen found that the entrance of 'new politics' 
parties had often preserved the ideological range by becoming more firmly 
located on the extreme left and right (Knutsen, 1998: p.89). Overall, however, 
Knutsen found that more parties moved towards the centre (30 percent) than 
away from the centre (ibid: p.87). 
A number of scholars have also carried out detailed empirical research on what 
different types of political parties do in government in terms of public policy 
outputs and economic performance, and have usually found little evidence that it 
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makes a substantial difference which party or parties are in government.3a Most 
famously, Richard Rose's 1980 book Do Parties Make a Difference?, argued that 
in post-war British politics, the particular political party in office made little 
difference to governmental performance, and whichever political party was in 
office, the same sort of broadly similar policies would be pursued.39 
and Gray's (2000) research tracing the movement in parties' ideological positions 
in eighteen advanced industrial countries also points to convergence. First, they 
tested for convergence using the manifesto content analysis methods of 
Klingemann et al. (1994), and found that 'the general trend for most advanced 
industrial democracies is for the major left and right parties, and for the party 
system as a whole, to display a pattern of ideological convergence over time' 
(Caul and Gray, 2000: pp.214-215). Within this study, Caul and Gray also tested 
for Wagschal's idea that the ideological diversity of entire party systems may 
have been broadened by the arrival of new parties onto the left and right flanks of 
the party system. They found that in only a few countries did the whole of the 
party system evolve differently to that of the two major parties.4o 
38 Caul and Gray: 'In a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding parties and public policy, 
Hofferbert and Cingranelli conclude that the last thirty-five years of research "more often than not, reinforced 
the cliche that "politics doesn't matter'" (1996: 594)' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.220). 
39 Rose suggested 'it is non-partisan factors (mainly long-term secular trends) which influence the direction 
of the economy, not party policy' (Maor, 1997: p.211). In another example, according to Caul and Gray, 
'Thomas Cusack (1999) found that the impact of partisanship on government spending and on fiscal policy 
narrowed steadily after 1972 .... [And] steadily into the 1990s, parties converged in the "use of fiscal policy 
as a partisan-based instrument" (Cusack 1999: 480)' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.222). Likewise, 'Boix's (1998) 
research indicates that the differences between left and right governments almost disappeared for both 
fiscal and monetary policy after 1982 (control over public deficits and interest rates, respectively). Garrett 
and Lange (1991) conclude that 'while the impact of partisanship of government on fiscal policy is not clear 
there has been a convergence in monetary policy' (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.222). 
40 According to Caul and Gray, 'Both Ireland and Sweden show convergence for the two major parties, but 
not when the entire system is taken into account. Italy shows the opposite: the entire system showed signs 
of convergence, but the two major parties displayed no movement toward the centre' (Caul and Gray, 2000: 
p.214). 
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Caul and Gray also tested for the impact of parties on public policy to see if it 
made a difference whether a country had a government of the left or the right. 
After measuring the ideological place that particular governments were situated 
at in their party systems,41 the researchers matched these against 'six commonly 
used public policy and economic indicators' that they deemed 'the most likely to 
be affected by the left-right composition of government' (Caul and Gray, 2000: 
p.224). They 'found inconsistent evidence that "parties matter" in the manner 
expected by theory. Across the eighteen nations none of the spending or 
economic performance measures are strongly and generally affected by the party 
composition of government' (ibid: p.228). Indeed, 'some of the relationships are 
in the opposite direction to those theorized' (ibid). Overall, Caul and Gray 
concluded that the party manifestos and government performances reinforced 
the notion that 'politics doesn't matter': 'In sum, it appears that political parties 
across advanced industrial democracies increasingly find it difficult to maintain 
distinct identities. In most countries there has been a general drift towards the 
centre of the left-right ideological spectrum' (ibid: p.235). 
Part Two: New Zealand Literature on Party Change 
This thesis suggests that the period in New Zealand politics since the war can be 
broken up into three main ideological eras.42 The first is the immediate post-war 
period of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, when New Zealand politics was just as 
affected by consensus as anywhere else. National and Labour dominated the 
two-party system, and were often in broad policy agreement. 
41 The methodology used by Caul and Gray to measure the ideological strength of each government was to 
use expert classifications of parties involved in each government weighted by their share of seats. Thus 'A 
completely leftist government is scored at -1.0, a pure centrist government at 0.0, and a completely rightist 
government at 1.0' (ibid: p.224). 
42 Similarly, in the Oxford History of New Zealand (1992), postwar politics until 1991 is broken into two 
chapters: 'From Labour to National' (Robert Chapman) and 'The Politics of Volatility, 1972-1991' (Alan 
McRobie). 
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Then came a second more turbulent time in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s 
when this postwar consensus fragmented and so did the old party system. 
Accompanying this breakdown were substantial falls in party membership, voter 
turnout, votes for the two main parties, trust in political parties, party 
identification, and class voting. National and Labour shifted dramatically over the 
political spectrum - from left to right - yet on many issues remained very close. 
Popular opinion and the established parties were often very far apart, and as a 
result new parties and a new electoral system emerged that could better 
accommodate public preferences. This period saw the emergence of a number of 
significant new parties including Values (1972), a re-invigorated Social Credit 
party (peaking in support in 1981), the New Zealand Party (1983), the 
NewLabour Party (1989), the Christian Heritage Party (1989), the Green Party 
(1990), the Alliance (1991), New Zealand First (1993), and then Act 
(1992/1994).43 
A third era began during the early-to-mid 1990s when the two-party system 
collapsed and a centripetal logic re-entered political competition, despite the 
entry of a number of minor political parties into Parliament. This thesis takes the 
1993 general election as a significant turning point, marking the beginning of a 
new era of politics and leading to the establishment of a 'new centre' in the 
political spectrum.44 This is because that election constituted a swing to the left-
electing the Alliance and New Zealand First to Parliament, voting in a new 
proportional representation electoral system, and pulling the two major parties 
back from the extremes of neo-liberalism.45 At this point the ruling National Party, 
which suffered a large vote loss, brought its economic and social reforms to a 
43 Act started life in 1992 as the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers, and in 1994 registered as a 
political party. 
44 It is termed a 'new centre' because the consensus and competitive dynamic around the centre is not a 
return to the old centre of pre-1984. 
45 See Vowles et aI., who argue '1993 may have been a year in which the opinion pendulum swung furthest 
to the left ideologically, as a reaction to nearly ten years of free market reform' (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.206). 
Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 51 
near-halt (epitomised in the sacking of finance minister Ruth Richardson), and 
the Labour Party, which failed to capitalise on National's unpopularity, made a 
correction to its neo-liberal programme (epitomised by the replacement of leader 
Mike Moore by Helen Clark). Furthermore, the many new parties began to 
moderate their initially radical political programmes, while the party system 
continued to fragment and evolve during the transition to the first MMP election. 
Also after this point the public slowly came to accept the new political consensus. 
Yet most of the negative statistics that might be associated with 'party decline' 
persisted. This era is the main focus of this thesis. It concentrates on 
understanding the 'new centre' of politics and how ideological erosion and party 
decline have affected the political system. First, though, this next section outlines 
the New Zealand literature that deals with party positioning over the entire post-
war period, using this three-period division. 
19505 and 19605 Postwar Convergence 
The New Zealand political science literature on the postwar period shows that 
there is no doubt that a strong policy consensus developed after the Second 
World War.46 Analysing the 1960 general election manifestos of the parties, 
Austin Mitchell declared that 'the steady trend to convergence of Left and Right 
seen in the affluent fifties had combined with the circumstances of 1960 to 
produce an even greater degree of similarity' (Mitchell, 1962c: p.96).47 He argued 
that the reason this occurred so easily was due to the pragmatic and 
opportunistic nature of the parties: 
They have been able to change the more readily [sic] because 'neither party is 
anchored by the firm ideological ties of some overseas parties. Both are in the main 
46 Reviewing the postwar literature, Vowles et al. comment: 'The first generation of political scientists who 
studied New Zealand politics were very much struck by its consensual aspects' (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.3). 
Likewise, 'Pragmatism prevailed, according to most authors writing of the 1950s and 1960s, as the two 
parties presented alternative policies within this "broad policy consensus'" (ibid: pA). 
47 Robert Chapman also argued that the two parties 'since 1946 have agreed on social and economic policy 
to a marked degree' (Chapman, 1999: p.59). 
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pragmatic, even opportunist in their policies. A political history which has lasted for just 
over a hundred years has provided no ideology for the party of the Right, and no 
institutions, other than a generalised status quo, for it to venerate (Mitchell, 1962c: 
p.14). 
Likewise, Milne suggested in 1966 that 'the differences in the ideologies and 
programmes of the major parties are slight' (Milne, 1966: p.276).48 He found that 
even in official party constitutions there was little to distinguish Labour and 
National: 'There are no striking contrasts between the objects of the parties, as 
given in the party constitutions. The first four objects of the National Party would 
be acceptable to almost any New Zealander' (ibid: p.276).49 
In 1969 Mitchell also emphasised 'the increasing similarities between Labour and 
National', stating that Labour and National's 'political evolution has brought them 
closer together; jostling for safe middle ground is the essence of political conflict 
in New Zealand' (Mitchell, 1969a: p.140). According to Mitchell the parties were 
reflective of opinion rather than driving public opinion, and he thought that they 
were therefore 'less courageous, less anxious to endorse a cause until it has 
broad community support, more sensitive about popularity and less likely to 
undertake a missionary role of advocating new and unpopular courses' (ibid: 
p.310). 
48 Milne noted that as evidence of the parties' convergence, each party was extraordinarily determined to 
keep the contents of their election manifesto secret until the election: 'Each party is mortally afraid that the 
other will steal its clothing, mainly because the clothing is not diqtinctively marked with the party's name' 
(Milne, 1966: p.281). 
49 For a homogenous society like New Zealand, Milne suggested that there may have in fact been too much 
consensus. Milne explained that a consequence of the policy convergence was to push the parties into an 
extreme form of policy auctions and electoral bribery: 'The fact is that the New Zealand parties, since they 
lack any clearly thought-out body of middle-range policy, have no alternative but to offer a mixed bag of ad 
hoc proposals to the voter. Naturally, if the contents of the "bag" are not linked with an appeal to any great 
principle or cause, the voters prefer attractive items to repulsive ones. Policy then degenerates into 
promises' (Milne, 1966: pp.280-281). 
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In 1969 Keith Jackson and John Harre also argued that it made 'little difference 
which of the two main political parties wins an election' and that New Zealand 
politics was characterised by a strong pragmatism: 
In practice the differences over fundamentals - whether nationalism or socialism - are so 
small that the lack of room for political manoeuvre has occasionally contributed to the 
collapse of all real opposition in the country .... It is doubtful whether the formal role of 
opposition in New Zealand has even been particularly effective except to provide an 
alternative government, and even here the pattern of change is very slow. Today the 
function of criticism belongs more and more to pressure groups, newspapers, radio and 
television commentators and it is questionable how much formal parliamentary opposition 
adds to this. The difference between the small one- and two-party state may be simply a 
question of respectability. In the land where both political parties are broadly centre of the 
road and interested in power rather than principles, pragmatism is king (Jackson and 
Harre, 1969: p.67). 
Similarly, Jackson commented in 1973 that with both parties 'adopting largely 
status quo positions, and both aiming at broadly similar middle-of-the-road target 
groups of voters, there appears to be little room for manoeuvre' (Jackson, 1973: 
p.115). Jackson argued that 'political parties in New Zealand, particularly during 
the two decades of the fifties and sixties, acted in a way far removed from their 
origins', and he also characterised the New Zealand party system as 'static' (ibid: 
p.1 01). Five years later, John Roberts labelled this period 'the New Zealand 
Elizabethan era' because it was 'marked by a dominant and astonishing stability' 
(Roberts, 1978: p.70). He also confirmed the anti-intellectualism of the period: 
'The most recent period of New Zealand history is distinguished by the almost 
total absence of political ideas, or definition of national goals' (ibid). 
Bruce Jesson (1989) has also dealt with the ideological convergence in this era, 
but says it actually began in the 1930s with the establishment of New Zealand's 
version of the 'historic compromise' between labour and capital. He' confirms that 
the 1950s and 1960s were a time of exceptional political stability 'with the two 
main political parties in agreement on the fundamentals of policy and broadly 
supporting the status quo' (Jesson, 1989a: pp.22-23). Geoffrey Debnam also 
argued this, saying that 'the period of the modern New Zealand two-party system 
54 Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 
is generally regarded as marked by consensus rather than conflict - at least until 
the early 1970s' (Debnam, 1990: p.4). 
Colin James (1992) uses the term 'prosperity consensus' to describe New 
Zealand's post-war experience, regarding the similar nature of both the leading 
parties' economic policy. He argues that 'The big broad middle of New Zealand 
society from the 1940s, with its agreed value-system and with much to lose from 
change and challenge, locked in consensus' (James, 1992a: p.238).50 Vowles et 
al. (1995) have also described the nature of the consensus as a 'blurring of party 
distinctions' due to the agreement on state intervention and control of the 
economy, the welfare state, and more specifically, joint commitment to 
'harmonious industrial relations based on a commitment to full employment, 
private enterprise, ... an agrarian economy heavily reliant on trade with Britain, 
and foreign and defence policies which centred on the old Western alliance 
structure' (Vowles et aI., 1995: pp.3-4). Peter Aimer (2001) categorises the major 
parties of this period as of the 'catch-all' variety, saying they were able to 
'encompass the full range of opinions over the limited number of contentious 
issues, while still competing for the elusive centre of politics' (Aimer, 2001: 
p.273). He also points out that consensus was not total, nor were adversarial 
politics absent: 'Consensus had not meant an absence of political dispute. But it 
did imply that political conflict occurred over a limited range of negotiable issues. 
Radical social policies or economic prescriptions were exiled from the political 
mainland' (ibid). 
Contemporary politicians, too, have written about the age, noting the consensus 
that existed. According to Simon Upton, 'The breadth of the coalitions and the 
overlap of some important political prejudices between parties means that policy 
consensus tends to prevail. From 1935 to at least 1978, there was a broad 
50 James also points out, however, that, 'Even when, as in the 1950s, there was arguably a deep and broad 
popular consensus on the parameters of political debate, the system was explicitly adversarial within those 
limits' (James, 1997k: p.11). 
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consensus' (Upton, 1993c: p.8). Such partisan acknowledgement of the postwar 
consensus is, however, uncommon. Within the academic and political literature, 
the existence of a consensus is not often accepted by partisan supporters of the 
National and Labour parties. Rather, they have been unwilling to accept that it 
made little difference as to whether their own party or their opposition was in 
power. 
Although the parties in government during that period presided over and 
implemented very similar policies, at elections they still managed to appear to be 
distinct by putting forward manifestos and constitutions that suggested more 
radical action would occur. This notion is augmented by a study of election 
manifestos and constitutions over the 1946-1981 period by David Robertson, 
which suggested that on the basis of their words alone the New Zealand parties 
did not seem to be in consensus at all, but far apart in ideology. He concluded: 
'party competition in New Zealand has been remarkably immobiliste. The two 
parties are, indeed, some distance apart, and largely static' (Robertson, 1987: 
p.69). Robertson believed it greatly significant that the Labour Constitution 
expresses a commitment to 'co-operation rather than competition', whereas the 
National Party emphasises 'competition and private enterprise'. Such analysis 
illustrates the problems with content analysis discussed earlier. 
There has, in fact, been very little content analysis carried out on New Zealand 
party manifestos to ascertain party change.51 One of the few researchers to do 
this, Matthew Gibbons (1997), has used the content analysis methods developed 
by the Manifesto Research Group to measure how party positions have changed 
over time in his research paper entitled 'Dimensions of Competition in New 
Zealand Politics: 1911-1996'. The analysis produces a picture of party movement 
51 This lacunae is noted by Gibbons: 'Despite the central role of election manifestos in New Zealand politics 
there has been little systematic analysis of them using these methods ... Probably the main reason there has 
been little analysis of New Zealand election manifestos is that they are extremely difficult to locate' 
(Gibbons, 1997: p.3). 
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which Gibbons describes as being in line with the changes in party positions 
found in reading secondary texts: 
For instance, the graph shows Labour's move away from radical change during the late 
1930s. Similarly, National's acceptance of much of the essence of Labour's policies is 
reflected in the way that it becomes much more moderate after 1938, before campaigning 
on the need to increase personal and economic freedom at the 1949 election. Although the 
parties are further apart than expected during the early 1950s ... (Gibbons, 1997: p.17). 
1970s and 1980s Divergence and Turmoil 
Much of the literature about the New Zealand party system in the 1970s and 
1980s paints a picture of an initially convergent, centrist, and pragmatic 
competition that disintegrated in the mid-1980s, eventually leading to the major 
political parties re-assembling close to each other on the right of the political 
spectrum in the late-1980s. Yet also throughout this period a full array of political 
tendencies was in evidence across the left-right spectrum - mainly due to the 
rise of minor parties - which showed that the New Zealand electorate was more 
divided and politically dispersed than at any other time since the 1930s. 
It is an uncertain matter as to when the postwar consensus came to an end. For 
many commentators, the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984 
marks the end of the postwar consensus, but the reality is that it was unravelling 
for at least a decade prior to this. Some commentators argue that the 
disappearance of consensus occurred in part with the rise of the protest 
movement in the late 1960s, which included and interacted with student and 
trade union militancy, the establishment of a 'new left', and an increasing 
'postmaterialist' sentiment in society. James (1992) also views. the increasing 
two-party swing that started occurring in the 1970s as another indication of the 
unravelling of the postwar settlement. Whereas throughout the 1950s and 1960s 
the average swing between the two major parties in elections was only 2.2 
percent, in the 1970s this doubled to 4.9 percent (James, 1992a: p.237). Rising 
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support for Social Credit and the Values Party also suggested that voters were 
dissatisfied with the two mainstream parties.52 
It is not just in retrospective research that the 1970s mark the end of consensus 
- some commentators were well aware of it at the time. For instance, writing in 
1978, John Roberts commented on the recent 'sudden and dramatic collapse' of 
the era of consensus (Roberts, 1978: p.72). Also indicative of a fragmenting 
political order, Roberts noted that 'the figures for industrial stoppages have 
begun to climb steeply' (ibid: p.92). 
According to Stephen Levine and Alan McRobie, the 1981 general election could 
not be classified as a consensual one, but instead by a further breakdown of 
consensus: 'murmurings about Tweedledee and Tweedledum were not 
widespread this time around. The pre-election consensus among political 
commentators was that New Zealand had reached a "turning point", an historic 
moment at which major and durable choices were to be made' (Levine and 
McRobie, 2002: p.1). Levine and McRobie believed that 'If the 1981 general 
election was to serve as an occasion for historic paths to be trod, it was because 
the choices available seemed so diametrically opposed, each with consequences 
not merely far-reaching but irreversible' (ibid, 2002: p.5). 
In a number of textbook chapters, Aimer (1997; 2001) also writes about the 
fragmenting New Zealand party system in this period and what he calls the move 
to 'moderate pluralism' .53 Using a framework influenced by Sartori, Aimer has 
argued that the fracture of the party system was due to the fact that it was 
52 See: Miller (1985), McRobie (1992), James (1996d), and Kelsey (1995). 
53 This categorisation is based on Sartori's (1976) distinction between polarised and moderate mUltiparty 
systems: 'In this categorisation, moderate pluralism exists in countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Norway where ideological differences between major parties are slight, and there is a general inclination 
to form coalitions and move towards the middle ground. Polarised pluralism, on the other hand, exists when 
more marked ideological differences separate major parties, some of which adopt an anti-system stance' 
(Heywood, 1997: p.245). 
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becoming difficult to contain an increasingly complex and diverse electorate 
within two parties. Citing Sartori, Aimer argues that a two-party format could be 
sustained only 'when the spread of opinion is small and its distribution single 
peaked', and that political opinion since the 1970s 'undoubtedly became more 
polarised and more complex than during the preceding two decades' (Aimer, 
1997b: p.190). Because this widening spread of opinion was basically still along 
the crucial socio-economic policy dimension, Aimer argues this eroded the 
theoretical conditions for two-party politics, leading to internal party tensions and 
the eventual emergence of splinter parties - Values to the left of Labour and the 
New Zealand Party to the right of National (Aimer, 2001: p.274). This, according 
to Aimer, provides 'a practical demonstration of the relevance of Sartori's 
hypothesis' that 'the greater the ideological distance, the more a two-party format 
is dysfunctional' (Sartori, 1990, p.192). 
A small-scale expert survey on the New Zealand party system in 1982 by Castles 
and Mair suggested, however, that there was still only a low level of polarisation 
in the party system. Placing the parties on an 11-point left-right policy scale, the 
experts put Labour at 3.8, Social Credit at 5.6, and National at 6.0 (Castles and 
Mair, 1984). Thomas Brechtel and Andre Kaiser have described this as 'an 
unusually narrow spectrum on the left-right continuum' (Brechtel and Kaiser, 
1999: pp.7-8). Brechtel and Kaiser combined Castles and Mair's data with the 
parties' share of seats in Parliament after the 1981 general election and 
discovered that the level of polarisation was a low 1.19 (ibid). In comparison, 
Brechtel and Kaiser pointed out that 'in a multi-country study on party system in 
Western Europe, Hazan found an overall average of 4.23 for the 1979-1989 
period' (ibid). 
Polarisation in the New Zealand party system during this period was somewhat 
greater according to Gibbons' manifesto analysis, which showed some 
unexpected results for this early-1980s period: 
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The period where the results seem most unexpected is for National at the 1981 and 1984 
elections. This is because the results show National taking a more right-wing position at the 
1981 and 1984 elections, when during this period National has been perceived as 
increasing intervention in the economy. National's 1981 position seems plausible, however, 
when it is considered how there were deep divisions within the party over economic policy. 
It is also important to remember that after 1981 National began to move towards more right 
wing policies in many areas, with health spending being cut and voluntary trade unionism 
being introduced. National's even more extreme 1984 position probably reflects an attempt 
by the party to reduce vote loss to the New Zealand Party (Gibbons, 1997: pp.17, 18).54 
The manifesto research on New Zealand by Caul and Gray found that partisan 
convergence was a definite reality in the New Zealand party system. According 
to Caul and Gray - who used the methods of the Comparative Manifesto Project 
to create ideological scores for the parties - the average ideological distance in 
the 1950s between Labour and National, on a 0-100 left-right scale, was 32.6. 
Then in the 1980s the average distance had narrowed to 15.4 - a decline of 17.2 
points (Caul and Gray, 2000: p.213). When including minor parties, Caul and 
Gray found that the ideological dispersion across the party system had an 
average 15.3 difference in the 1950s, compared to a 7.6 percent difference in the 
1980s - a decline of 7.7 points (ibid: p.215).55 
Following the years of neo-Iiberal reforms by Labour and National governments, 
another expert survey by Huber and Inglehart (1995), conducted in early 1993, 
put the newly-established Alliance at 3.5 on their 11-point scale (the position 
previously occupied by Labour), Labour at 5.8 (in the centre), and National at 7.3 
(on the moderate right). Brechtel and Kaiser again weighted these scores against 
parliamentary seats gained in the 1990 general election and calculated that 
54 Lijphart also found that an analysis of party manifestos showed that the distance between the New 
Zealand political parties on the left-right spectrum was much greater than in other countries (Lijphart, 1984). 
55 Caul and Gray also found that the correlation between left and right parties and their policy output was 
very insignificant. In terms of GDP growth it was 0.061; unemployment was 0.187; inflation was -0.144; govt 
spending was 0.018; and defence spending was 0.047 - all 'insignificant correlations' (Caul and Gray, 2000: 
p.227). 
60 Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 
polarisation had decreased even further to 'an astonishingly low 0.59' (Brechtel 
and Kaiser, 1999: p.8}.56 
Similarly, where academic accounts focus only on the two major political parties 
in this period, they emphasise a convergence taking place.57 Such a focus is 
understandable in this period, as in 1987 only Labour and National were elected 
to Parliament, and even in 1990 only one seat was won by a third party. In 
contrast, accounts of the entire party system in the second-half of the 1980s and 
the early 1990s (therefore including parties such as the Alliance and New 
Zealand First) emphasise polarisation, radical party programmes, the lack of a 
wider consensus, and the more salient ideological dimension of the parties. But 
the mechanics of the FPTP electoral system meant that National and Labour 
totally dominated Parliament, and most writers therefore drew attention to the 
ideological competition of those two parties. For example, Jane Kelsey argues 
that a new consensus developed in this period with Labour and National 
repositioning themselves within the new neo-liberal status quo: 'National and 
Labour had repositioned themselves within its bounds, offering variations in form 
and detail but skirting around the internationalised market-driven economy' 
(Kelsey, 1995: p.316). But as far as Kelsey - and most of New Zealand society -
is concerned, this was a radical two-party consensus rather than a centrist 
consensus.58 It was this convergence in support of neo-liberal economic reforms, 
according to Vowles et al. that planted the seeds of public discontent that 
56 Arguably Brechtel and Kaiser should have either combined Huber and Inglehart's 1993 survey data with 
the parties' votes received in the 1993 general election or used votes received instead of seats. This would 
have shown a much greater level of polarisation - which would be in line with the secondary political science 
literature. Instead Brechtel and Kaiser have explained that 'This declining level of polarisation since 1981 is 
mainly due to the fact that National's share of seats was at an extraordinarily high 69 per cent in the 1990 
election' - At this election, National won 67 seats, Labour 29 seats, and the Alliance (then NewLabour) won 
one seat (Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.8). 
57 According to McRobie, 'National's policies were in reality very little different from Labour's' (McRobie, 
1990: p.16). 
58 See also: Jesson (1990e: p.146). 
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culminated in the 1993 electoral system reform (Vowles et aI., 1995: chapter 
eleven). 
Jesson also argued that the two main parties had converged in a far-right 
consensus: 'If National and Labour seemed indistinguishable in the 1960s when 
they were parties of the centre, they are scarcely visible in the 1990s as they 
disappear off the political spectrum on the far Right' (Jesson, 1990e: p.146). 
Regarding Francis Fukuyama's theory that Western society had reached some 
sort of non-political 'end of history', Jesson pointed out that 'New Zealand is the 
place where the thesis seems most apposite' (Jesson, 1990c: p.139). Levine and 
McRobie also proclaimed a new consensus, saying that 'Where National and 
Labour have differed, from 1990 onwards, has been over details; in their rhetoric; 
and on policies (in defence and foreign affairs, for instance, and over Maori 
issues) distinct from more straightforward questions of economic management 
and the role of the state' (Levine and McRobie, 2002: p.188). James agreed that 
a consensus had developed between the two main parties, and that this was a 
consensus only upheld by the political and business elite, having 'little support 
among ordinary folk' (James, 2000e). This policy consensus between Labour and 
National was detailed in James' 1993 book New Territory. 
there is now a degree of consensus between Labour and National in most policy areas 
- by which is meant not actual agreement on policy positions, but agreement where the 
boundaries of the debate lie and agreement that those boundaries are relatively 
narrowly drawn. There is still a considerable difference over industrial relations, social 
services and income maintenance policy, but in most areas the difference is relatively 
small (James, 1993j: p.140).59 
59 James discusses the new policy consensus in detail: 'The debate on economic policy' has become less 
ideological and more pragmatic as the issues in dispute have changed in nature from those of radical 
restructuring to those of improving the workability of the new arrangements, as the National Party's instinct 
for "private", as distinct from "free", enterprise reasserts itself as a determinant of policy ... as there is, in 
common with governments elsewhere, a resurgence of interest in the appropriate positive role for the state 
in business and the economy at both the micro and macro levels and as outcomes ... have begun to indicate 
that there is a basis for economic growth. The upshot is not unfettered free markets, much as socialists like 
to paint it so. The economic policy consensus that is emerging is for a much greater reliance on markets as 
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According to James, the consensus did not, however, encompass the minor 
parties: 
there are considerable differences between the big two and the other parties. All minor 
parties oppose the Reserve Bank Act and the policy constraints it imposes, for 
example, and dispute much of the evidence of constraints on greater use of fiscal 
policy to stimulate economic growth to get jobs faster. There are fundamental 
differences on tax policy (James, 1993j: p.140). 
Therefore he painted a picture of a diverse party system existing prior to 1993: 
The main constituents of the Alliance are to the 'left' of Labour; Christian Heritage is 
considerably to the 'right' of National and New Zealand First is off to one side; in terms 
of economic policy it is to the 'left' of Labour and National and in immigration and what 
might be termed 'societal' policy it is to the 'right' of National (James, 1993: p.140). 
Other academics who identified the consensus in the late 1980s include Antony 
Wood, who argued that New Zealand politics was, despite appearance, relatively 
centripetal: 
while the parties offer a real choice to the electors, they nonetheless do not endeavour 
to push the cleavage of New Zealand politics to extremes .... Both parties, then, seek 
the middle ground and while the rhetoric of New Zealand politics is that of 
confrontation, the practice tends to involve consensus. This would explain why 
elections may be times for party competition and two-party division but, parliamentary 
activities apart, New Zealand government is characterised by conciliation, discussion, 
and absence of the pursuit of partisanship (Wood, 1988: p.72). 
According to the literature, therefore, between 1970 and 1993 there was a 
disruption to the postwar consensus, producing a fragmenting and divergent 
party system. During this time the two major parties also diverged from the policy 
consensus, and set about establishing a new policy consensus,- albeit one that 
was relatively unpopular with the public and not shared by the other political 
parties. Few commentators saw the party system in this period as being strongly 
a mechanism for allocating resources and distributing outcomes, but, after the rebalancing has worked 
through by the mid-1990s, a fair lashing of state intervention' (James, 1992a: pp.312-313). 
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characterised by either centripetal competition or a decline in the ideological 
nature of parties. Hence, ideological erosion did not characterise the system. 
19905 Convergence 
Few of the writers dealing with the ideological changes in the party system since 
1993, have identified the ideological convergence and emergence of a new 
consensus. During the 1990s few other political commentators or academics 
appeared to be interested in the phenomenon, although since 1999 there has 
been a slowly growing acceptance that some sort of convergence has been 
occurring. The media commentators who have been most ready to acknowledge 
the convergence are Colin James, Bruce Jesson and Jeff Gamlin. Academics 
who have sometimes dealt with it include Peter Aimer, Tim Bale, Jane Kelsey, 
and Raymond Miller. 
By 1995, even after Clark had replaced Moore as Opposition leader, James 
believed Labour and National were ideologically closer than ever: 'Labour MPs 
are in many respects in their official policy now as close to the National position 
as Labour has ever been, even taking into account the great consensus years of 
the 1950s and 1960s' (James, 1995b: p.13). James (2001) believes that the 
decline in party memberships together with 'the fragmentation and increasing 
complexity of society, has encouraged the development of "catch-all" parties, and 
weakened the ideology of other parties as they have sought to appeal to a wider 
span of social opinion to maintain vote share' (James, 2001 a: p.201). James has 
also argued that the elite consensus of the 1980s spread in the 1990s into one 
enveloping ordinary voters - 'Now instead voters seem to have settled into a 
mixture of resignation and realism: a negative consensus, you might say' 
(James,2000e). 
Gamlin has consistently argued in the National Business Review that MMP is a 
centripetal electoral system, and that consequently political success is found by 
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parties that strongly contest the middle ground of politics. He has explained the 
popularity of the Labour Party since the late-1990s by its prowess at controlling 
the centre of politics in New Zealand.60 Gamlin has also written at great length 
about the pragmatic nature of parliamentary politics since the mid-1990s,61 
highlighted the decreasing differences between the major parties and minor 
parties, and drawn attention to the declining ideological nature of political 
issues.62 He has also argued that recent elections have been relatively non-
ideological.63 
Jesson also found the continuing catch-all nature of the parties under MMP 
disappointing, and emphasised the limited amount of change in the party system: 
The trouble is that we are going into the first MMP election with basically the same four 
contenders we had last time: National, Labour, the Alliance and New Zealand First. I 
don't believe this line-up is appropriate to the new situation. Logically, there should 
have been a regroupment of the parties during the past three years, but this hasn't 
happened. First past the post electoral systems foster broad spectrum parties which 
are a coalition of interests .... What MMP should produce, however, are parties with a 
more clearly defined focus than we have now .... Instead, what we have at the moment 
are four broad spectrum parties, each containing several points of view (Jesson, 
1996e: p.125). 
While Aimer argued that in the 1980s 'the extended ideological distance between 
the radical free-market and radical interventionist ends of the socioeconomic 
policy dimension fractured the existing two-party structure into four, producing 
satellite parties beside the stellar components of National and Labour' he 
believed that the situation had changed again in the 1990s (Aimer, 2001: p.274). 
In 2001 Aimer asserted that the ideological distance along the socioeconomic 
issue dimension of society has been shortening since the early-1990s, when the 
pace of neo-liberal reforms slowed. Using Sartori's theory, Aimer expected more 
centripetal competition in the party system: 
60 See: Gamlin (2002b). 
61 See: Gamlin (2001 a). 
62 See: Gamlin (2000b; 2001b; 1999b; 1999c). 
63 See: Gamlin (1999g; 1999h). 
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inhibiting the development of multi-party politics is the diminishing polarisation along 
the socioeconomic dimension of politics, as people have shown that they reject the 
extremes of economic liberalisation and state interventionism. The major political 
parties have responded to this by resuming their competition for the political centre 
(Aimer, 2001: p.280). 
Other academics who have explained ideological convergence amongst the 
political parties since the early 1990s include Tim Bale, who has often 
concentrated on the parallels between European convergence and what is 
happening in New Zealand. He believes National and Labour have jettisoned 
their traditional differences: 
Sure, there are differences between centre-right and the centre-left in New Zealand. But 
they are not that big, at least not where it really counts when it comes to most people 
making up their mind who to vote for - economic management and the quality and extent of 
public services. Centrist pragmatism is a virtue claimed by both Helen Clark and Bill 
English. So it is hard to believe that, faced with similar challenges, their policy responses 
would be 'typically Labour' or 'characteristically National' - especially when they may have 
to rely on other parties to push them through Parliament (Bale, 2002c). 
Raymond Miller has also found party ideology in the 1990s to be affected by 
centrism and pragmatism. For example, Miller has critiqued modern campaign 
techniques, arguing that 1999's election battle was particularly centrist and 
ideologically empty. In his 2001 textbook chapter on 'Labour', Miller explores the 
oligarchic and moderate nature of that party. In other writings, he has also 
characterised breakaway parties like United as having 'no clear sense of 
direction, let alone policies' while their 'motivations were primarily opportunistic 
and tactical' (Miller, 1997a: p.38). Miller also characterised such parties as being 
'creations of Parliament, not the voting public, having been formed by and largely 
in the interests of professional politicians', and that 'Instead of developing an 
ideology or nurturing a constituency' the primary function of such parties 'is to 
devise strategies to maximise their parliamentary influence' (ibid: pp.38-39). 
Miller saw the major parties as re-asserting their catch-all tendencies after 1993: 
'In the transition to MMP, both major parties attempted to choke off potential 
support for new and more established minor parties by appealing to a broad 
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cross-section of voters' (ibid: pAO). He believed that Labour was continuing to 
converge with National on economic policy ('continuing to endorse the main 
elements of Rogernomics') while diverging with National on social policy but 
resisting 'any pressure to return to the left' (ibid: ppAO, 42). Likewise, Miller says 
that 'after 1993 National adopted some of the characteristics of the catch-all 
party, with the Prime Minister promising an inclusive, consultative and 
constructive style of government. Over the next three years, the party adopted a 
more measured and moderate approach to reform' (ibid: pA1). This catch-all 
approach was, according to Miller, an attempt to thwart the ability of small parties 
to cut out their voter niches.64 
Kelsey's 2002 book, At the Crossroads, elaborated on the Labour Party's 
continued adherence to the neo-liberal framework, saying that 'the fifth Labour 
Government and its coalition partner have consolidated the economic 
restructuring that the fourth Labour Government began in 1984' (Kelsey, 2002: 
ppA9-50). She confirms that the continuing ideological convergence of the 
National and Labour is based on a small shift away from neo-liberalism by both 
parties: 'In an economic policy sense, the two major parties that have dominated 
this country's political history are again converging, this time within the 
parameters of a global market-driven economy, in which both offer slightly more 
regulation and promise a more human face' (ibid: ppA9-50). Kelsey also argues 
that the political party that had been most outside of the new consensus - the 
Alliance - then partially joined it in the late 1990s. Elsewhere she also argues 
that 'The re-emergence of party differences in the 1990s created an illusion of 
political choice while stabilising the change' (Kelsey, 1995: p.316). 
Gibbons' (1997) analysis of manifestos has little to say about whether the party 
system since 1993 has been subject to centripetal or centrifugal forces in the 
1980s and 1990s. But his content analysis suggests that in the 1993 and 1996 
64 Perhaps contradictorily, Miller also labels this a centrifugal strategy and suggests that 'the two major 
parties remained resolutely ideological' (Miller, 1997a: p.41). 
Chapter One: Literature Review and Methodology 67 
elections National took 'a very moderate policy stance. It also shows that in 1993 
New Zealand First was ideologically very close to National, but that in 1996 it 
attempted to position itself more towards the centre of the political spectrum' 
(Gibbons, 1997: p.18). Gibbons also found that between 1993 and 1996 Labour 
moved substantially back to the left. This was not entirely consistent with the 
findings of Fiona Barker (1998) in her MA thesis, 'Party Policy Positioning: The 
New Zealand Labour Party in Opposition 1990-1996'. In her analysis of Labour 
Party manifesto policy, public statements of Labour MPs and interviews with 
politicians, Barker found that although Helen Clark's leadership coup of 1993 
'enabled Labour to project a stronger image as a centre-left social democratic 
party, its policy detail underwent less change and appeared to still make appeals 
at both philosophical ends of its support base' (Barker, 1998: pp.125-126). Her 
analysis indicated that under Clark, 'much of its economic policy still resembled 
the programme implemented by the Fourth Labour Government' (ibid: p.136). 
Nonetheless, most writers have suggested that some sort of 'correction' was 
made to Labour's neo-liberal economic framework and in general the party 
repositioned itself away from the right-wing ground it had been associated with. 
Thus, a number of researchers have contributed to the idea that some sort of 
new political consensus or convergence has been developing since the early 
1990s. 
Yet there are some academics who have argued that polarisation in the party 
system has actually increased since 1993. Jackson and McRobie (1998) have 
been inclined to see a 'move away from "catch-all" type parties ... to what might 
be dubbed "niche-market types' and 'a return to an emphasis upon principles by 
political parties' and have speculated that this might produce a reversal of the 
decline of mass parties (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: p.326). Such predictions 
correspond with other nations' experiences with proportional representation. The 
literature on proportional representation suggests that a mUlti-party system sees 
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parties adopt niche positions.65 The candidate survey research of Banducci and 
Karp (1998) also suggested centrifugal competition in the mid-1990s. They 
compared average candidate and voter positions at the 1996 general election 
and found increased polarisation: 
The parties for which there are comparable data show that, on average, party candidates 
have moved to more extreme positions in 1996. For example, National and New Zealand 
First average candidates have moved to the right, while Alliance and Labour average 
candidates moved to the left; these shifts are primarily due to changes in positions on 
privatisation and regulation (Banducci and Karp, 1998: p.150). 
However, Banducci and Karp also stated that in terms of 'new politics' there was 
a uniform shift by parties to more socially liberal positions: 'Instead of the parties 
moving toward the ends of the political spectrum - the liberal side becoming 
more liberal and the conservative side more conservative - all parties have 
shifted in a liberal direction' (Banducci and Karp, 1998: p.1S0). 
In another study based on the 1996 election, Brechtel and Kaiser (1999) carried 
out a survey of experts which concluded that the party system was now 
characterised by polarisation: 
We now see a party system with two pronounced polar parties, the Alliance in the first 
quintile representing the extreme left, and Act in the fifth quintile representing the extreme 
right. Both major parties of the past are located in the moderate quintiles, Labour in the 
second quintile representing the moderate left and National in the fourth quintile 
representing the moderate right. However, both Labour with a mean of 4.6 and National 
with a mean of 7.3 are placed near the centre. Two parties are located in the centre, i.e. the 
shaded area of the third quintile ranging from 5.0 to 6.9: New Zealand First and United 
(Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.9). 
Surprisingly, the survey showed that polarisation had actually increased rather 
than reduced since the early 1990s. Three years after Huber 'and Inglehart's 
65 Yet in Barker's study of Labour, she found that Labour had not adhered to this pattern: 'In practice its 
solution seemed to counter the argument that political parties adopt narrower and more focused policy 
positions in multi-party parliamentary systems, That is, it sought to develop policy that would appeal to both 
the right wing of its own party, to "soft" National supporters, and to its left wing. In doing so it appeared to 
continue its "catch-all" approach, whereby it sought to attract votes from a large section of the electorate' 
(Barker, 1998: p.81). 
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expert survey produced a low polarisation level of 0.59 (based on their 1993 
survey combined with the 1990 distribution of seats), Brechtel and Kaiser's 1996 
survey found a polarisation level of 3.41, which they noted was 'considerably 
higher than in the early 1980s and early 1990s' (Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.9). 
The result is surprising, and even Brechtel and Kaiser sound seemingly in 
contradiction when they comment on this increased polarisation, by noting that 
'the party system exhibits low polarisation, because the two largest parties, 
Labour and National, although to the moderate left and right of the centre, are 
clearly centre-oriented' (ibid: p.25). 
As explained earlier, these weighted polarisation calculations are based upon the 
distribution of parliamentary seats across the political spectrum rather than actual 
popular support. The greater the number of MPs from parties outside of the 
ideological centre, the greater the polarisation score. Therefore it was almost 
inevitable that the figure of polarisation was going to expand under proportional 
representation, entirely due to mechanical changes in the electoral rules that 
meant a greater proportion of seats would go to minor parties (who were often 
outside of the centre). Indeed, a lower and more useful polarisation figure would 
have resulted from using party votes in the calculation instead of seats, which 
would be more appropriate to bridge the change in electoral system.66 Under 
Brechtel and Kaiser's schema for measuring polarisation it is therefore entirely 
conceivable that the political parties in Parliament might have all moved closer to 
the political centre, but because the parties to the left and right of the two major 
parties gained more MPs due to a change in the electoral system, this increased 
Brechtel and Kaiser's polarisation value. Their conclusion that the ideological 
polarisation of the parties has increased since the 1990-93 period can thus be 
challenged. After all, as a result of the survey, Brechtel and Kaiser labelled the 
66 An example to illustrate this is the left-of-Labour Alliance party, which went from having only one seat in 
1990 to 13 seats in 1996, contributing to Brechtel and Kaiser's measure of polarisation dramatically 
increasing. However, in the same period, the Alliance (combining the 1990 parties of the NLP, Greens, and 
Democrats) went from 14 percent of the vote to only ten percent of the vote (to say nothing of their 
substantial moderation in policy - especially after 1993), which actually suggests convergence occurring. 
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Alliance an 'extreme left' party and Act an 'extreme right' party - a classification 
that is not consistent with either academic or media analysis of those parties in 
the mid-1990s.67 
The judgement of the experts in the Brechtel and Kaiser survey may also be 
challenged. It is possible that academics might have exaggerated the polarisation 
of the party system in the post-1993 period. The academics surveyed possibly 
made the assumption that a fragmenting party system and the introduction of 
proportional representation almost inevitably leads to a more polarised party 
system. Certainly the pre-1996 literature produced by political commentators and 
academics clearly expected that under the shift to MMP there would be a greater 
success for minor parties and greater divergence of pOlicy.68 It is possible that 
because this was supposed to happen, many survey participants made 'expert 
judgments' that this had actually happened. Such predictions are part of a large 
party literature, which includes the theories of Downs.69 But this thesis does not 
argue that the policy convergence has occurred because of the change to MMP, 
but that it has happened despite the change in electoral system. It seems that the 
change in electoral rules has indeed made polarisation and diverse policy points 
of view more likely, but that this centrifugal pressure has been outweighed by 
other forces of moderation and pragmatism. So while the change to MMP has 
contributed to party fragmentation and greater competition for votes, there is 
reason to doubt that it has led to greater policy divergence. The most significant 
changes in the party system were already occurring before the vote for MMP in 
1993. In fact the post-1993 fracturing of the old parties has not fostered any new 
67 See: Trotter (2001 a), Jesson (1997b), and Aimer and Miller (200~: p.12). 
68 For example, Banducci and Karp have argued that under the rules of MMP, parties are less inclined to 
appeal to a wide group of voters and this allows them to be more ideologically pure or non-centrist: 'in a 
mUlti-party system, rather than converging toward the median voter, parties will strive to distinguish 
themselves on ideological and policy matters .... This strategy will have the effect of appealing to the full 
spectrum of interests in the electorate rather than simply the median voter. A transition to proportional 
representation should result in a more diverse offering of parties competing for representation' (Banducci 
and Karp, 1998: p.142). 
69 See Chapter Three (Part One). 
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diversity of political viewpoints and ideological perspectives. If anything, the 
fractionalisation has made for an even greater emphasis on issueless politics and 
candidate-centred campaigning. Elections under proportional representation 
supposedly provide democratic heterodoxy through increased competition but, 
following electoral reform, New Zealand has only seen a competition for 
orthodoxy. It seems that in politics, as in economics, competition is rarely a 
safeguard against monopoly and seldom a guarantee that the competitors will 
offer the consumer a substantive choice. 
Part Three: Methodology and Research Methods 
The previous sections discussed the questions that drive this thesis, and how this 
research is situated within the international and New Zealand literature about 
parties. This next section provides a reflection on the processes of the research. 
The decisions on research design are explained, and more generally a 'research 
biography' is articulated. 
The genesis of this topic came out of growing up during a turbulent time in party 
politics. I started following and trying to make sense of New Zealand politics in 
the mid-1980s, which coincided with the commencement of a remarkable period 
of tremendous political change. While critical of much of this change, at the same 
time I found it fascinating. In this sense nothing about my approach has changed 
- I remain a critic of the dominant politics of the last two decades, but continue to 
be interested in any opinion and analysis on the subj~ct. 
An eclectic mix of academic theory has been utilised in writing this thesis. Theory 
from all shades of political opinion has been utilised, and the result is a thesis 
that should not look like it is embedded in anyone particular theoretical 
framework. Similarly, this thesis is neither a classical sociology or political 
science thesis, but a political sociology thesis. While undertaken in the discipline 
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of sociology, it deals with a subject that is normally studied within political 
science. One central theme of this methodology is a critical approach to the 
subject. This is in line with Evert Vedung, who has argued that 'One key task of 
political science is to criticise other political science and political conceptions in 
general' (Vedung, 1982: p.3). This thesis is therefore deliberately critical of 
existing political parties, it is critical of the institutions that they interact with (such 
as Parliament, the Electoral Commission, interest groups), and it is critical of the 
existing literature on party politics in New Zealand. This critical approach does 
not emerge out of a desire to criticise, but from the belief that all institutions - and 
particularly those that playa role in administering society - should be subject to 
rigorous evaluation. Likewise, because sociology should be concerned with 
understanding the difference between how society is said to work and how it 
really works, this thesis is written from the point of view that it is important to 
explore what lies beneath the surface reality of politics. Some of the myths about 
New Zealand party politics relate to deception and what political parties would 
have society believe. This thesis takes a critical approach to such claims, and 
therefore represents a critique of all contemporary New Zealand political parties 
and the party system. 
In 1995 I wrote a research paper on the NewLabour Party (NLP). This was an 
analysis of the ideological and organisational evolution of the party in the first six 
years of its existence. It was a critical account which argued that the NLP began 
as a radical ideological and organisational reaction to the reforms of the Labour 
Party in the 1980s, but that it had rapidly transformed into a more moderate party 
with a bureaucratic and authoritarian modus operandi. In many ways, this PhD is 
a continuation of that research - it extends this examination of ·the NLP to the 
whole party system. My fascination with the way that the ideologies of the parties 
change (or remain the same), and the way that the parties operate has 
continued. The research for this thesis has therefore always had this dual focus 
on both party ideology and party organisation. 
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The original research focus of this PhD has, however, changed somewhat since I 
started. Initially, I defined my research as studying 'party change in New Zealand 
since 1984'. I wanted to explore how party politics had changed so dramatically 
from what it was in 1984 when I first started following politics (and the landmark 
election of the Fourth Labour Government), to what it became in the late 1990s. 
Initially I defined the late-1990s state of politics by what I saw as a substantial 
move to the right - the party system had been radicalised by neo-liberal 
economic and social reforms. Part of this belief related to the fact that I disputed 
that the ostensibly left-wing parties (the Alliance and the Labour Party) 
represented any sort of genuine left-wing radicalism. It seemed that the Labour 
Party had lurched substantially to the right in the 1980s and during the 1990s had 
remained in this location. National then moved even further to the right. The new, 
minor parties that had been established were also following this trajectory. The 
NLP had moved rightwards in its early years, and its amalgamation into the 
Alliance represented an even greater moderation. The New Zealand First party 
had also shifted to the right when it ditched its more anti-establishment and anti-
neo-liberal economic policies in the lead-up to the 1996 election. Moreover, the 
Act and Christian Heritage parties were the epitome of the right-wing 
radicalisation of New Zealand politics. Other less successful minor parties 
appeared to be of a conservative nature as well. 
I wanted to be able to document and analyse this phenomenon. As a first task, I 
started writing thick-descriptive histories of each of the political parties in 
Parliament. The justification for this was that by writing so early in the thesis, this 
project would open up some ways into the issues surrounding political party 
change, and also eventually provide material for the thesis. My basic hypothesis 
for this project was that these histories would show the extreme nature of the 
New Zealand parties. During this time I was struck that few commentators and 
academics were supplying adequate and detailed explanations and 
documentations of the changes in party politics. Even at a basic level, no-one 
was writing the histories of the parties. I searched for party histories and found 
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that few existed.7o The histories that I was writing appeared to be unique for this 
reason. 
In writing these histories I was also struck by the lack of attention that academics 
and journalists had paid to the general subject of political parties in New Zealand. 
Nearly all the main issues and areas that make up the topic of political parties -
apart from those relating to elections and voting - had not been recently covered 
in any real depth. There had been only limited research about class and party in 
New Zealand, and nothing that gave any sort of overview of the modern social 
bases of support for the parties.71 When it came to the relationship between New 
Zealand parties and interest groups, I found that no-one had written specifically 
on this topic.72 Likewise, there was virtually nothing written about party 
membership numbers in New Zealand.73 There had been little attention paid to 
extra-parliamentary organisations with a view to applying recent international 
theory about them.74 The financial resources of parties had also not been 
researched in New Zealand?5 When I investigated this topic I also found that the 
financial resources that the state provides were becoming a considerable source 
70 For books on the history of the National Party see Gustafson (1986). For the Labour Party, see: Brown 
(1962), and more recently, Jesson (1989) and Sheppard (1999). For the Democratic Party (then Social 
Credit), see: Sheppard (1981) and Zavos (1981). For the New Zealand Party, see: Grierson (1985). For New 
Zealand First, see: Hames (1995). There have been no books published about the histories of Act, the 
Alliance, United Future, or the Green Party. 
71 The research of Vowles has been the most important. In particular, see: Vowles (1992c). However most of 
the research on social structure and party has dealt with particular elections rather than any overview and 
study of the on-going relationships. 
72 As Vowles has written: 'The relationship between membership of single-issue groups and that of political 
parties is, like many other aspects of political sociology in New Zealand, under-researched' (Vowles, 1998a: 
p.14). Some political scientists have written about particular interest group-party relations, but only looking at 
individual cases. 
73 The most useful existing account of party membership can be found in Vowles (2002b), which 
summarises the current state of the membership numbers in four paragraphs. Other political scientists have 
given very short summaries of membership numbers in textbook chapters. 
74 The best accounts are Gustafson (1993), and Vowles (2002b), 
75 Milne (1966) provides the best existing account, but this is now out of date. See also: Vowles (2002b) for a 
short summary of party income and expenditure. 
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of strength for the parties in Parliament, yet little research appeared to have been 
carried out on this?6 The other side of the coin is the regulation of parties by the 
state, which has also been increasing in very recent years, but which has 
escaped evaluation by academics?7 Likewise, little had been published on anti-
partyism in New Zealand - which I began to see as a significant phenomenon in 
New Zealand?8 When I looked at the political marketing and campaigning 
techniques of the parties, I found more research, but there were still no 
substantial chapters or articles on this topic - apart from ones that dealt with 
particular aspects or particular campaigns?9 
Soon after starting writing the party histories, I began to conceptualise the 
changes in politics differently, disproving my original hypothesis. Researching the 
recent histories of both the Act and National parties I found that in policy terms 
these parties had actually retreated substantially from their more radical political 
positions of the early 1990s. Furthermore, when I started to draw all the material 
together and track the ideological changes of all the parties it became obvious to 
me that they were wishing to de-emphasise their ideological component and 
emphasise their consensus-orientation, their centrism, and their lack of 
extremism. Some sort of 'new centre' in politics appeared to be forming. The 
centre marker in the left-right party system had merely been moved, and I 
76 The most comprehensive investigation of state funding was by Klinkum (2000), who examined New 
Zealand's parliamentary research units. 
77 The main publishing on state regulations come from those that do the regulating: Paul Harris (1987; 
1997a; 1997b), the Electoral Commission (1996; 1997; 1999), the Electoral Law Commission (1998). There 
has been some academic comment about regulations in chapters, articles and books on broader topics, 
such as Vowles (2002b), Palmer (1992), Wilson (1998), James (1998a), Jackson and McRobie (1998), and 
McRobie (1995). 
78 The most substantial work on anti-partyism in New Zealand only appeared in 2002 - by Bale and Roberts. 
There has also been reasonable interest in some of the aspects of anti-partyism such as declining party 
identification and declining trust in parties. The best of these include: Vowles (2002b), Vowles et al. (1995), 
Banducci and Karp (1997), and Mulgan (1997). 
79 The best recent accounts include: Atkinson (1989), James (2001 a), Hope (2001), Vowles et al. (1995), 
and Mulgan (1997a). 
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noticed parties from across the political spectrum were now mostly moving 
towards it rather than away from it. 
Looking to the existing New Zealand literature on political parties I found that no 
political commentators or academics were drawing attention to these trends 
either. In fact it was quite the opposite - there seemed to be a received wisdom 
that was prone to labelling the parties as highly-ideological and extreme or 
radical. It was as if such a scenario was a better and easier story to tell than that 
of ideological erosion. After many years of dramatic and often radical ideological 
change, people were ready to believe such a trend was continuing beyond 1993. 
In addition, the participants in the party system appeared to be colluding in this 
story of ideological extremity and polarisation. Their main criticism of other 
parties was that they were outside the new consensus. Furthermore, the 
introduction of MMP - and the supposed rules about proportional representation 
systems - encouraged commentators to believe that parties were increasingly 
characterised as ideological, niche parties controlled by 'true believers'. Many of 
my own preconceptions about how politics worked were similar to those of the 
commentators, and were thus being challenged by my writing of the party 
histories. For example, the Downsian idea that political parties were motivated by 
office-seeking behaviour had always been one that I disagreed with, but 
increasingly I started to accept this approach as relevant. Similarly, I had always 
understood party politics as some sort of 'democratic expression of the class 
struggle' (Upset, 1963: p.230), yet the more I studied the parties, the less this 
made sense. This discovery was not in any way a repudiation of the existence of 
class in New Zealand society or of the usefulness of class analysis - but it did 
seem clear that class politics were increasingly less represented by the struggle 
between political parties. 
Looking to the contemporary academic literature for explanations for this shift 
towards a new centre, yielded little. The most obvious guide to this phenomenon 
seemed to be debates and theories on 'the end of ideology' that occurred in the 
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1950s and 1960s.80 I studied this era and these debates. I then wrote an 
academic paper for the 1997 conference of the Australasian Political Science 
Association, entitled 'The Decline and Exhaustion of New Zealand Party Politics'. 
This paper was an early development of the idea that a 'rush to the centre' was 
occurring, and it linked this to a more general 'party decline' thesis. This theme of 
decline was evident in a number of aspects of modern political parties that 
interested me: the principles of the parties were increasingly being usurped by 
pragmatism (as examined in Chapter Three), the class basis of the party system 
has been eroding (Chapter Four), links with interest groups were eroding 
(Chapter Five), party membership numbers were dropping (Chapter Six), the 
traditional sources of party finance were drying up (Chapter Seven), and the 
public was increasingly unattached, disinterested, and even hostile towards 
parties (Chapter Ten). This trend linked up with international literature that I was 
beginning to read that was specifically on 'the decline of party'. 
Where any New Zealand research or writing did exist on all of these issues, it 
appeared to be too old to still be relevant. And just as the received wisdoms 
about modern political parties labelled them as doctrinaire and often extreme (as 
discussed in Chapter Three), I also observed that many journalists - and 
sometimes academics - were repeating myths about the other areas of party 
politics in New Zealand. For example, on the topic of the social support of the 
parties (Chapter Four), they said that Labour is dependent on its traditional 
working class support, while National receives its vote from the middle class and 
rural dwellers.81 In terms of organisational linkages (Chapter Five), many 
suggested that Labour is closely aligned to the trade union movement while 
80 However in Britain there were varieties of thought that argued that some sort of shift to the centre was 
occurring in British politics. One exponent of this was Prof. Frank Furedi, a sociologist at the University of 
Kent. 
81 For example: Henderson and Bellamy (2002: pp.71, 105), James (Dec 1992j: pp.156-157), Wood (1988: 
pp.115-116), and Kelsey (1995: p.25). 
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National is influenced by close links with business and farmer organisations.82 In 
issues of party organisation (Chapter Six), the traditional model of the class mass 
party (and relationship between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
organisation) still drove writings about the parties. On the issue of party finance 
(Chapter Seven) many writers still thought that parties operated on small scale 
fundraising, membership fees, and donations from big business. In terms of state 
funding of parties (Chapter Eight), most writers considered that New Zealand has 
only an insubstantial form of such funding.83 Similarly, in regard to the regulation 
of parties (Chapter Nine), there was little recognition that so much had 
changed.84 
It appeared that the lacunae in the literature could be filled by effectively 
producing a revised analysis of the general topic of political parties in New 
Zealand. Therefore although the initial thesis topic was already very wide in 
focus, it now became even wider. Essentially the research had taken on at least 
four different goals: (1) examining ideological convergence, (2) examining party 
decline, (3) updating the literature about New Zealand parties, and (4) 
challenging the assumptions and myths about the modern nature of parties. This 
approach meant the thesis initially became far too broad. In terms of research 
materials it meant gathering everything available on all of these issues. 
Considerable effort was spent locating all the newspaper articles, journal articles, 
chapters, and books that pertained to New Zealand political parties, and then 
taking notes on the aspects in these that were relevant to the study. These were 
gathered from various libraries and personal collections, including university 
libraries, the Parliamentary Library, the Radio New Zealand Library and the 
National Library. As internet databases become more advanced, ·these too were 
examined for specific information relating to New Zealand parties. 
82 For example: Henderson and Bellamy (2002: p.71), Mulgan (1997: p.254), Wood (1988: pp.92-93), and 
Vowles (1992c: p.352). 
83 For example, see: Vowles (1998c), in which state funding in New Zealand is described as 'modest'. See 
also: Johns (1999), and Revington (2002). 
84 For example: Henderson and Bellamy (2002: p.60). 
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The secondary material on political parties available in the mass media is 
voluminous, as newspapers and magazines utilise a large number of journalists 
to research New Zealand politics. Hence there are numerous interviews with 
politicians in the media. Likewise, there have been numerous academic theses 
that have interviewed politicians about political events in the 1980s and 1990s. It 
therefore seemed obvious that there was little need to replicate those interviews 
- which might only waste the time of both politicians and myself - when I could 
more easily make use of the opinions and facts that had already been uncovered 
by other researchers and journalists. My bibliography therefore evolved towards 
a comprehensive list of all that had been written about political parties in New 
Zealand. In addition I was able to locate a number of internal and public party 
documents that have been useful in building up a picture of how the parties 
operate. 
Because my data collection has been so wide and in-depth, I created a Microsoft 
Access computer bibliographic database for storing my notes. In all, over 3500 
documents were entered into the database. Most of these represent hard copy 
documents, and I have typed out relevant notes from those documents. More 
recently, as the internet has become a bigger source for news and articles, I 
have been able to cut and paste material from various electronic articles. In total, 
the database contains nearly a million words and 1,050 authors. Of the 3500 
records, about 2700 are from New Zealand sources, with the remaining 800 
being journal articles, newspaper articles, books published outside of New 
Zealand and not directly relating to party politics in this country. 
This rich information represented countless hours of research by other journalists 
and researchers into political parties. The in-depth nature of the projects and 
chapters that I have written while producing this PhD owes a great deal to the 
work of these people who have interviewed great numbers of politicians and 
officials, and spent considerable effort in analysing politics in New Zealand. Most 
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notable are political commentators Colin James (300 records in the database), 
Chris Trotter (267), Bruce Jesson (80), Jeff Gamlin (46), and Gordon Campbell 
(35). I have also been reliant on the daily news reporting of journalists like Ruth 
Laugesen (46), David McLoughlin (45), Jane Clifton (41), Audrey Young (40), 
Oliver Riddell (35), Brent Edwards (33), Vernon Small (31), Nick Venter (31), 
Graeme Speden (31), Peter Luke (24), Helen Bain (21), and the New Zealand 
Press Association (80). In terms of academic research, a great deal of 
information has been amassed from the work of Jack Vowles (40), Stephen 
Levine (25), Nigel Roberts (23), Elizabeth McLeay (18), Barry Gustafson (17), 
Jonathan Boston (17), Peter Aimer (16), Raymond Miller (14), and Alan McRobie 
(14), amongst many others.85 
All of the chapters were written to encapsulate the four aims mentioned 
previously, which unfortunately made the chapters unwieldy, unfocused and 
over-length. It eventually became obvious that the chapters could be narrowed 
down by concentrating on my original issue: ideological change, and more 
specifically, 'ideological erosion'. This focus actually also fitted with the other 
issues that I wanted to investigate - by putting the focus on 'ideological erosion' I 
was able to also look at the many different elements of party decline and show 
how they related to this ideological convergence and decline. The first two 
chapters that together make up section one on 'Ideology in the Party System', 
have evolved out of the initial ideological histories written about the parties.86 The 
other topic areas relevant to the thesis evolved logically into their own chapters. 
85 This database archive has proved invaluable in managing data. By being able to attach a number of 
keywords to each document record, the database allowed the logi.cal retrieval of information for writing the 
chapters. In all, 301 different keywords were assigned to the records. These were arranged and coded in a 
logical way that related to the thesis chapters. 
86 In one sense these chapters have been compiled as a literature review of the ideological histories of the 
parties. According to Laver and Schofield, 'One way of deriving expert judgements of party positions is on 
the basis of a good old-fashioned literature review. The researcher dives into the literature on a particular 
political system and eventually emerges clutching a picture of its policy space, drawn on the basis of a more 
or less systematic sifting of data and opinions culled from a range of published sources' (Laver and 
Schofield, 1990: p.51). 
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The general approach taken has been to break down the institution of the party 
and the party system into its separate examinable relationships. This has allowed 
the thesis to trace the linkages between parties and other relevant actors and 
institutions. Through this 'relationship-focused' method the thesis attempts to 
ascertain the nature of relationships firstly, between parties and society, and 
secondly, between parties and the state. It attempts to show how modern political 
parties now position themselves. Therefore, the first section of the thesis 
(chapters Two and Three) deals with the relationship of parties to ideology and 
policy. The second section (chapters Four and Five) deals with the relationship of 
the parties to civil society support bases. The third section (chapters Six and 
Seven) deals with internal organisational relationships. The fourth section 
(chapters Eight and Nine) looks at the linkages with the state. And the chapter 
that links this together is Chapter Ten about the declining relationship between 
parties and voters. 
In writing these chapters, the use of secondary material has been supplemented 
by using a number of other sources of data. 
Interview Research 
Interview research involved both personal interviews and mailed questionnaires. 
The choice of interviewees was based on the missing information from the 
chapters. I already had a great deal of information about the parties, but where 
information was missing, interviews were sought with the following people: Paul 
Harris, General Executive, Electoral Commission' (interviewed tWice)87; John 
O'Sullivan, General Manager Parliamentary Service88; John Slater, President, 
National Partl9; Rob Allen, General Secretary, Labour PartlO; Mark Stonyer, 
B7 Intereviewed: 1999; 6/6/03. 
BB Interviewed: 1/6/99. 
B9lnterviewed: 25/5/99. 
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Chief of Staff, United New Zealand91 • The interviews were loosely structured, 
using a basic set of questions that differed for each interviewee. Discussion 
always went beyond the prepared questions and lasted about an hour. Interviews 
were recorded on cassette and later transcribed. 
Feedback was also sought from the parties about what I had written about their 
party finances. I sent to the presidents of each party the respective individual 
sections from my thesis on party finance. Only very limited feedback was 
received, with most parties not replying at all. Paul Harris of the Electoral 
Commission also supplied feedback on the chapters relating to state regulation, 
party membership and finances. 
Survey Research 
A questionnaire survey was sent to 32 academics. This was a simple two-page 
questionnaire asking the respondents about dimensions of party competition in 
New Zealand, and about where they located the parties on a left-right continuum. 
This survey was a replication of the 1997 'expert survey' carried out in New 
Zealand by Brechtel and Kaiser (1999). Brechtel arid Kaiser asked 23 political 
scientists to comment on party competition at the 1996 general election. With the 
permission of Brechtel and Kaiser their 1997 questionnaire was slightly altered 
for the 2002 general election and sent out in April 2003. Unfortunately, for 
reasons of anonymity, Brechtel and Kaiser had not kept details of the 23 
recipients of their survey and therefore a new list of 'experts' was drawn up. The 
selection criteria was involvement in teaching 'New Zealand politics' in a New 
Zealand university. Of the 32 questionnaires sent out, 20 were returned - a reply 
rate of 63 percent. The results were one of the ways used to establish the 
ideological positioning of the New Zealand parties, so as to ascertain change. 
90 Interviewed: 24/5/99. 
91 Interviewed: 25/5/99. 
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Participant Observation 
My relationship with political parties has not been purely academic. I have 
worked on this research with some experience within political parties. In 
particular I have been a member and activist within a party (the NewLabour Party 
and Alliance, 1990-1992) as well as working for the Alliance in 2001. My first 
experience was as a rank-and-file party member who was occasionally involved 
in branch work and activity. My involvement ceased when I decided that my own 
politics were not the same as the Alliance and I believed that the party was 
evolving into something that I was no longer interested in. However, nearly ten 
years later, in 2001, I was employed for a year in the parliamentary unit of the 
party, this time purely as a 'party professional'. Officially I was employed by the 
party leader Jim Anderton, but in practice I worked for the party president, Matt 
McCarten, who operated out of the parliamentary complex. I was made 
redundant after a falling-out between the party president and the leader made my 
work there untenable. 
My experiences in the Alliance have therefore been influential in the writing of 
this thesis. As a one-time party member, I gained some exposure to how one 
party functioned in the electorate, getting a good idea about the operations of the 
branches, how communication takes place, and how decisions are made. In 
particular, I learnt that there was a large gap between how political parties are 
claimed to operate and how some of them really do. Working at Parliament a 
decade later I then got a close up look at how a head office and parliamentary 
wing function. Again, my experience clashed with the textbook understanding of 
political parties. While not directly informing the writing of this thesis, these two 
experiences have confirmed much about my academic research into political 
parties in New Zealand. 
For much of the time that I was writing this thesis, I was also living and working in 
the capital city, Wellington. During this time I made many connections with 
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political party participants. While I did not often discuss my overall thesis topic, I 
often discussed many aspects of political parties and their internal activities. I 
also attended a number of party conferences, including two Alliance conferences, 
one Labour Party conference, one Act conference, and one New Zealand First 
conference. 
Research Constraints 
It is almost without exception that thesis research is carried out within a set of 
constraints. Time and finance are major constraining factors. Certainly with the 
luxury of more time and resources I would have undertaken further research -
particularly more interviewing. There have also been some problems with 
studying a party system that is still evolving. It means that the research material 
has continued to constantly grow. My bibliographic archive is constantly being 
added to, even as I try to write the conclusions. Yet any cut-off point to 
information gathering would seem entirely artificial and risk making my thesis 
instantly out of date. And because the party system is changing, my theories are 
constantly being challenged and have to be updated. Therefore in terms of 
theory, I have been constantly reading. The expected process of confining theory 
to the start of the study and analysis to the end has not eventuated. Continuing 
political change relating to the party system has demanded constant analysis and 
led to the research continuing beyond the date I had initially set for completion of 
the project. 
I have also been constrained by the availability of data. A major problem faced 
was lack of access to internal political party 'information. There are great 
difficulties in obtaining internal information about political parties - particularly 
about their membership numbers and finance. Because the parties operate in an 
obviously very political environment, they function as secret societies, on guard 
against the prying of their opponents. Academic research and journalistic 
endeavours are therefore usually avoided, for fear that they will uncover negative 
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or sensitive information about the party. It has been particularly difficult to gather 
financial details about the operations of New Zealand's political parties. As 
Mitchell wrote in 1962, 'the parties have shown an obsessive concern with 
shrouding their finances in secrecy' (Mitchell, 1962b: p.??). This is still true today. 
However, there are various avenues by which to obtain the relevant data. The 
information for the chapter on capital resources has been derived from a variety 
of unofficial sources, including many articles and interviews published in the 
media about the parties, personal interviews with political party head office 
personnel, various official publications of statistics, and from party members.92 
The official sources of financial information also include the Electoral 
Commission, which makes public the information disclosed to it by the parties 
about their donations and election campaign expenditure. 
That these very prominent organisations can avoid such evaluation is partly 
because political parties are not public institutions or societies, but are in fact 
voluntary civic organisations. The parties therefore have little obligation to 
provide information about themselves to the public (see Chapter Nine). The fact 
that the state is now the primary resource-provider for the parties in Parliament 
(as examined in Chapter Eight) does, however, have some consequence for their 
lack of transparency, and means the parties are required to provide some 
membership details to the state.93 
92 Vowles has commented on the lack of information available: 'Members usually receive annual reports 
which disclose a certain amount of information, and some of these find their way into the public domain, with 
occasional commentary, but there has as yet been no systematic analysis. Such material is sometimes 
available to scholars with links with a political party, but often not to others. Another reason for the lack of 
analysis of this data has been the normal exclusion from such reports of information about the costs and 
expenditures associated with national election campaigns, about which even ordinary members have not 
been given information' (Vowles, 1998c). 
93 In undertaking this research a request was made to the Electoral Commission under the Official 
Information Act requesting the release of information about the submissions made by the political parties on 
their membership numbers. This was refused on the grounds that the information had been given in 
confidence, and that to release it would jeopardise the commission's ability to obtain that information from 
the parties in the future. 
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It has also been difficult to obtain information on the state's resourcing of parties. 
Because all the parties in Parliament benefit from the lucrative state resources, 
the system is kept sufficiently non-transparent to outsiders. This arrangement is 
perpetuated by the fact that the parties have made the Parliamentary Service 
and Ministerial Services exempt from the Official Information Act - meaning that 
information about the parties' use of state funds is generally not available to the 
public. However, there are various partial, published accounts of the resources 
provided to the parties, and it has been possible to piece these together to build 
a picture of the indirect state funding of parties. 
Probably the greatest constraint of this thesis has been the broadness of the 
topic. The thesis started out with an unnecessarily wide goal, and this only 
became larger throughout the research period. Each chapter of this thesis could 
probably have been made into a PhD thesis in itself. Nonetheless, this in-depth 
and broad approach was a deliberate attempt to make up for the lack of 
academic attention on changes in the New Zealand party institution in recent 
decades, and the result is hopefully a unique thesis. However this broadness 
does mean that some of the elements of the study could not be researched as 
thoroughly as possible, and some attention to detail therefore escapes it. The 
broadness also means that a substantial editing process has been required to 
edit the final version of this thesis, meaning that most of my writing has had to be 
set aside. 
In summary, the research process of this thesis has involved using diverse 
sources of qualitative and quantitative data. This 'has been collected in a large 
computer database and has been used to piece together an account of the key 
relationships and elements of the party system. The chapters in this thesis 
examine party ideology, the social support of parties, their membership 
organisations, their resources, their relationship with the state, and their 
relationship with general civil society. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that there is a need for a re-evaluation of the state of 
political parties in New Zealand. It has outlined the most significant New Zealand 
literature on New Zealand party politics, especially in regard to their ideological 
shifts since the Second World War. This has showed that there has been 
considerable agreement about the existence of a policy consensus and the 
centripetal nature of the party system during early post-war period. There has 
been less agreement about the nature of party competition in the period of the 
1970s and 1980s, although most writers see that the postwar consensus was 
unravelling in the lead-up to the Fourth Labour Government. There is also some 
agreement that the two main parties were still ideologically close in the 1970s 
and early 1980s but that the ideological nature of neo-liberalism that they then 
adopted made them more radical. This disrupted the existing structure of the 
party system, but brought them closer together in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
It is generally agreed that throughout this period the party system was in turmoil, 
with the emergence of a number of significant new parties that were often policy-
pursuing parties that represented a challenge to the development of that 
consensus. 
There is even less agreement about the period of politics since 1993. Much of 
the literature deals with party politics with the apparent assumption that the 
introduction of MMP has led to a more centrifugal ~nd doctrinaire party system. 
There is empirical evidence both to prove and disprove this. But there is an 
increasing acceptance that some sort of 'new consensus' developed in the 
1990s. Significantly, however, few New Zealand academics and commentators 
have addressed the issue of ideological erosion in this period - either in the form 
of the shift to the centre of the political spectrum or the de-emphasis and 
downgrading of ideology. 
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This chapter has also suggested that some sort of party decomposition or decline 
is occurring - although not one that necessarily threatens the survival of the party 
institution. This decline centres on the disconnection between parties and 
society, suggesting that although the parties have a strong place in the political 
system they possibly lack relevance in the lives of citizens. This is linked with 
ideological erosion, with the suggestion that there might be some link between 
the many ways in which parties are said to be in decline and in the shift of the 
parties towards the centre of the political spectrum and their decreasing 
emphasis on their ideological component. 
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Chapter Two 
Postwar Consensus and Radicalism (1945-93) 
This thesis argues that policy convergence and electoral pragmatism have 
dominated New Zealand politics since the Second World War, with the political 
parties increasingly shifting away from the ideological mass membership model 
towards the pragmatic electoral-professional model. This has meant that that an 
office-seeking orientation has characterised most parties and therefore the 
pursuit of policy has been a secondary consideration for parties. A policy 
consensus has largely dominated the party system, especially during the 
immediate postwar decades and again since the early-1990s. 
Critics of this general analysis of postwar New Zealand politics will, however, 
point to the 1980s and early-1990s as a time of heightened political radicalism, 
mainly because of the introduction of radical neo-liberal economic policies. They 
might suggest that during this period the two main parties deserted their 'median 
voter strategy', and that postwar consensus therefore disintegrated. To both 
supporters and critics of the reforms of this period, it probably seems that the 
politics of pragmatism and accommodation gave way to a new politics of 
principle, and thus a policy-seeking orientation .. Such an argument might 
therefore be seen to disprove the relevance of theories spelt out in the previous 
chapter about office-seeking, the Downsian 'economic model' of democracy, and 
Kirchheimer's catch-all party model. 
This chapter seeks to answer such a challenge. It traces the ideological 
transformation in the party system in this period of turbulence and radicalism, 
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charting the political evolution of each party. To do this, it concentrates on the 
classic distinction used in political science to describe the nature of political 
action, whereby it is usually based on two types of orientation: the seeking of 
policy or the seeking of office. As explained in Chapter One, policy-seekers act 
according to the basic long-standing political values that they hold. Office-
seekers are much more flexible with regard to their policy commitments, 
rationally acting on exogenously-fixed preferences, that is, the distribution of 
political preferences in the electorate.1 Whereas policy-pursuing is related to the 
representation of social groups and their main political goals, office-seeking is 
related to the Downsian idea that the main motivation of politicians is power and 
prestige. These orientations are heuristically ideal-types, and political parties, 
politicians, and party systems may be characterised by different combinations of 
the two, shifting over time.2 
This chapter suggests a modification of the policy-seeking versus office-seeking 
model. The evidence from this ideologically radical period of New Zealand 
politics suggests that in times of crisis or difficulty - in this case, economic -
parties and politicians sometimes move beyond this simple, but useful, 
framework. Crises pressure parties and politicians to adopt a more state-
preserving role3 which, although it may incorporate some elements of both, is not 
strictly based on either electoral pragmatism or the pursuit of ideology, and can 
have radical results. This proposed third type might be labelled a managerial-
reforming orientation. It occurs when parties take on the task of managing a 
crisis. It is argued in this chapter that all three types of orientation have been 
1 See: Laver and Schofield (1990: chapter three). 
2 See: Laver and Schofield (1990: pp.36-58). 
3 In times of war, economic crisis, natural disasters, and ecological threats, political actors - and especially 
those in control of the state - are less likely to be motivated by either office-seeking (or 'electoralism') or 
policy-seeking orientations in the decisions that they make, but are more likely to be influenced by 
managerial-reforming impulses. In the face of great threats to the survival of the state and possibly its 
people, the pursuit of doctrine and electoral opportunity are more likely to be set aside and attention paid to 
preserving the state, often through strong reforms. 
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present in the party system of the 1984-93 period, but that the governing parties 
of this period have been mostly characterised by the managerial-reforming 
orientation. Therefore while the governments of Lange-Douglas and Bolger-
Richardson were undoubtedly radical ones characterised by highly-ideological 
policies, this chapter argues for some caution against exaggerating the idea that 
political parties in this period were suddenly strongly characterised by a policy-
seeking orientation. As will be argued later, many commentators and academics 
have explained much about politics in this period by theories of a policy-seeking 
orientation that are not convincing. There is no doubt that an element of policy-
seeking occurred, but such an impression can be easily over-drawn, when in fact 
much of the radical reforms were primarily driven by economic exigencies rather 
than radical ideologies. 
The timeframe of this chapter concentrates on the years of radical reform: 1984-
1993. But this period obviously does not exist in isolation from the eras that 
preceded it. Therefore, the ideology of the postwar period of consensus (1945-
75) is briefly examined in Part One.4 Part Two examines the 1975-1984 
breakdown of the postwar consensus. Part Three starts with the election of the 
radical, reforming Fourth Labour Government in 1984, and ends with the 1993 
general election, which marked the approximate end of the reform period and 
also heralded electoral reform.s 
4 The dates for the postwar period are based on the end of the World War II (by which time a policy consensus was 
developing) and the 1975 election of the Muldoon National Government, which presided over the unravelling of the 
post-consensus at the end of the long economic boom. This second date is arbitrary, but is adopted in the absence 
of another date or landmark event that separates this era from the postwar period. The mid-1970s was definitely a 
distinctly different political period to the 1960s. The economy and society during this period were subject to great 
forces for change, but the political and party system lagged behind these shifts and the conservative National 
administration held back change. Also, as Part Two of this chapter explains, the 1975 election involved significant 
changes in the party politics, with the rise of Robert Muldoon to prime minister, the establishment of a number of 
significant new parties, and rise in class dealignment. 
5 The 1993 election constituted the distinct end of this period of radicalism. This is because the election involved a 
substantial swing to the left - electing the Alliance and New Zealand First into Parliament, voting in a new 
proportional representation electoral system, and pulling the two major parties back from the extremes of neo-
liberalism. 
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Part One: The Postwar Consensus 
The election of the First Labour Government in 1935 set the scene for the 
decades-long postwar political settlement, as well as laying the groundwork for 
the establishment of a persistent two-party system. Although the First Labour 
Government essentially continued in the direction that the Liberal Party pursued 
in government during the 1890s, this government was still responsible for 
establishing the policy framework that became the foundation for consensual 
politics until the 1970s.6 When the Labour Party arrived in government - the first 
time that a social democratic party took charge of the New Zealand state - it 
actually removed radical politics from the political arena? Instead of bringing 
about any form of socialism,s the first Labour Government established what is 
sometimes called an 'historical compromise' - whereby the Government 
attempted to fuse together the interests of capital and labour.9 This arrangement 
developed, through state support and regulation, the ability of business to pursue 
profitability, balanced with the establishment of a comprehensive welfare state. It 
was therefore a cross-class compromise, providing benefits to employers as well 
as workers.1o 
6 In examining the New Zealand party system, Gustafson finds that 'although there was change during the period of 
1890 to 1984, it was of at the level of quantitative detail, not a fundament qualitative change in values, perceptions, 
pOlicies or outcomes' (Gustafson, 1997b: p.5). 
7 Although starting out as a radical party, Labour's long climb to power prior to 1935 had involved a deliberate 
search for moderation and respectability, a rejection of far-left policies, and a substantial shift towards the centre of 
the political spectrum. See: Brown (1962: p.216), Webber (1978: p .. 186), Curtis (1989a; 1989b), and Hanley (1988). 
When the Labour Party finally won office in 1935, it had already undergone a substantial moderation of image and 
policy. See: Jesson (1989a: p.17). Labour's more radical programme of economic controls and nationalisation was 
never implemented - see: Jackson and Harre (1969: pp.64-65), Roberts (1978: p.71), and Edmundson (1997: 
p.29). 
8 For a discussion of social democratic definitions of 'socialism', see: Przeworski (2001, pp.316-317), and Thomson 
(1999: chapter one). 
9 For more on the idea of the 'historical compromise', see: Jesson (1989a), and Hewlett (1998: p.38). 
10 See: Castles (1984; 1995). 
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After 1940 Labour became a conservative party, expelling and marginalising the 
more radical and innovative forces. 11 The first Labour Government had not only 
reconciled the party with the management of capitalism, it had also adopted policies 
on other issues which were strongly at variance with the earlier left-wing stands 
taken by a number of its main leaders.12 Most residual elements of Labour's 
radicalism were lost following the end of the war.13 The party was finally forced out 
of office in 1949, after which it became increasingly concerned with portraying itself 
as a better manager of the status quo than its National Party rival. When Labour 
returned to office for a second time in 1957, it neither promised nor delivered any 
major social or economic reforms.14 In reality Labour had merely become the 
'alternative conservative party', and although it had a reputation for radicalism, 
this no longer had any real basis.15 As a result of Labour's loss of reforming zeal, 
much of the party's working class membership dropped OUt.16 Despite 
propaganda from National to the contrary, in the 1950s and 1960s Labour never 
pursued anything resembling 'doctrinaire socialism'.17 Instead, Labour leaders 
11 See: Chapman (1999: pp.63-64). 
12 For example, under Prime Minister and formerly convicted conscientious objector, Peter Fraser, strikers were 
jailed, conscription was introduced during the war and peace-time, and conscientious objectors were interned 
(Jesson, 1989a: p.20). 
13 In 1951 the party dropped from its constitution the socialisation clause in favour of the much milder objective: 'to 
promote and protect the freedom of the people and their political, social, economic and cultural welfare'. 
14 According to Debnam, 'the one-term Labour government of 1957-90 had come and gone without any significant 
policy disturbance' (Debnam, 1990: p.5). 
15 See: Chapman (1999: p.64). In the early postwar period, the New Zealand labour movement also lost its 
intellectual vitality. Jesson argues that as early as 1949 - when the Labour Party was thrown out of office - it 'had 
been completely drained of any capacity for dissent or resistance' (Jesson, 1989: p.20). This intellectual vacuity 
became a hallmark of the party for the following decades, and as Milne pointed out, 'there is some truth in the view 
that most of the present Labour MPs "know nothing of capitalism or socialism. They have never read a tract on the 
capitalist crisis. Their loyalty is not to an idea, but to a machine, to a job as an MP" , (Milne, 1966: p.289). 
16 According to Webber, 'The Grey Lynn, Otahuhu, Napier, Westport and Port Chalmers branches - all of them in 
undoubtedly working class districts and among the biggest in the party in 1940 - recorded membership decreases 
between 1940 and 1975 ranging from 87 to 94 per cent, far in excess of the average decline' (Webber, 1978: 
p.187). See also: Hanley (1988: pp.12-15), Jesson (1989a: p.24), and Gustafson (1976b: p.157). 
17 The Labour Party - like other social democratic parties in the West - rested on its laurels in terms of social 
progress, decreeing that their mission had been accomplished. In the 1950s and 1960s, the party leaders believed 
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spent much of the postwar period playing down divisions of class in society and 
projected Labour as a party of all New Zealanders instead of a party of working 
people or the disadvantaged (Webber, 1978: p.188). Throughout the 1960s 
especially, the Labour Party moderated its policies and its image. Significantly, 
Arnold Nordmeyer (Labour leader, 1963-66) proclaimed in the early 1960s, 
'There is no place today for what used to be known as the class struggle' (quoted 
in Milne, 1966: p.110). Nordmeyer took to emphasising the 'new look' of the 
party, and his successor, Norman Kirk (leader, 1966-1974) argued that, 'The New 
Zealand Labour Party is the New Zealand Labour Party. The words "New Zealand" 
are as important as the word "Labour''' (quoted in Gustafson, 1989: p.204). 
The prosperous decades that followed the First Labour Government's fall from 
office created a conservative climate better suited to the National Party,18 as the 
myth that held New Zealand to be a classless and harmonious society prevailed. 
For the following period of 23 years in which the postwar consensus existed intact 
(1949-1975), National was out of government for only one term. When National 
took office for the first time in 1949, its leader Syd Holland declared, 'There is 
going to be no more socialism in New Zealand' (quoted in Bassett, 2000).19 
Nevertheless, in power the National Party embraced the main features of 
Labour's historic compromise - which the National Party had previously defined 
as 'socialist' .In particular, National now accepted the Labour Government's 
that they had created the economic and social settlement that the party had set out to achieve, and they saw little 
need for any great reform of society (Trotter, 19991: p.11). 
18 The National Party was formed in 1936 out of the conservative farming-based Reform party, the urban-liberal 
middle-class United Party, and the libertarian Democrat Party. The parties united over their opposition to the 
election of what they regarded as the 'socialist' Labour Party. For more on the early history of the National Party, 
see Gustafson (1986), and Wood (1992). 
19 Despite the legend that paints the National Party as a party with a free market philosophy, National has therefore 
always been a party of conservatism and conformity. Certainly in the long postwar period of its dominance, National 
was 'largely satisfied with the system of regulations, controls and state ownership of public utilities it inherited from 
Labour' (Jesson, 1989d: p.156). While the party continued to espouse 'individualism' along with the rhetoric of 'free 
enterprise', this created a contradiction when at the same time they continued to manage Labour's welfare state 
(Roberts, 1978: pp.71-72). This all proved that the party lacked a strong sense of political philosophy - which was 
something that the leadership prided itself on and labelled pragmatism (Jesson, 1989d: p.154). 
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social security legislation. A societal consensus had developed about its value, 
and conservative politicians therefore had no choice but to promise not to 
undermine it.2o That National had reluctantly accepted Labour's Keynesian 
economics and the welfare state in the 1940s and 1950s might have seemed like 
a huge defeat for the right, but this concession was actually the basis on which 
the National Party, like other parties of the right around the Western world, was 
able to dominate politics in the second half of the 20th century. National was 
perceived as the best administrator of the new policy regime. The new 
consensus suited the party because of its largely conservative rather than 
reforming nature.21 Although it might have appeared that National's continuation 
of the welfare state was counter to the interests of the party's wealthier 
supporters, its existence had in fact proved useful for the advancement of 
capitalism in New Zealand. By guaranteeing wages, keeping the workforce 
healthy, housing those on low incomes (in houses built by private companies), 
the welfare state effectively gave business a subsidy and a guarantee of a 
healthy and contented labour supply. Both parties also intervened heavily in the 
economy to facilitate private business - conducting heavy programmes of state 
investment in 'roading and electric power, not to mention farmland development, 
20 In fact National governments prior to 1984 added considerably to the welfare state, introducing, amongst many 
other things, the Equal Pay Act 1972, the Accident Compensation Corporation, the Human Rights Commission, 
Maternity Leave Protection Act 1980, the genesis of the Domestic Purposes Benefit, and the generous National 
Superannuation scheme. See also: Bassett (2000), Gustafson (1997b: p.8), and Rudd (1993). 
21 The National Party proved itself to be very pragmatic and operational, following a strategy which would keep the 
party in office. In a sense it truly was a 'national' party, always seeking to broaden its popularity rather than 
implement any particular vision or ideal. The particular type of conservatism that National represented was, 
according to Jackson and McRobie, that which is mainly anti-doctrine and anti-political, rather than any kind of 
reforming conservatism (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: p.64). Essentially the party fulfilled its role as a conservative 
party - conserving the status quo that Labour had established. Typically, while the party did indeed undertake 
some reforms, these were carried out with 'small, fine-turning change done in a deliberate, measured, slow way' 
(James, 1992: pp.22-23). See also: McRobie (1992: p.386). In line with its incrementalist approach, National only 
made a few alterations to Labour's framework of economic protectionism and its welfare state. In government the 
party remained sympathetic to full employment, and trade union leaders continued to have access to ministers. 
While the party did restrict some working class advantages here and there, and sometimes increased competition 
in the economy, such changes were relatively minor. In the end, National rule did little to change the main features 
of the historical compromise. 
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the telephone system, freight railway equipment, aviation and aerodromes and 
so on' (Chapman, 1999: pp.59-60). Rather than constituting any type of socialism 
these policies really amounted to a form of 'state capitalism'. Rather than simply 
being enacted and retained in the interests of workers - as a common 
understanding might suggest - the welfare state and economic intervention 
essentially laid the foundation for business profits, which is how such businesses 
could accept the welfare state (James, 1992a: p.26).22 Moreover, through the 
welfare state National was able to pay generous family benefits to middle New 
Zealand and educate their children. 
Hence, between 1935 and 1949 an unspoken bi-partisan policy consensus 
developed in the following areas: full employment, underpinned by Keynesian 
demand management; active government, including a widening of the perceived 
responsibilities of the state and greater intervention in the economy; a mixed 
economy;23 harmonious industrial relations, entailing the conciliation of 
(compulsory) trade unions and their subsequent involvement in policy-making; 
the welfare state; and a foreign and defence policy centred on the United States 
and Britain. Within the parameters of this broad political consensus there was still 
some substantial disagreement. 24 But while the detail of this consensus was 
sometimes contested and the edges of the agreement were often blurred, but 
22 Even the neo-liberal Michael Bassett argues that some level of state intervention was in the interests of 
business: 'It wasn't all bad. Material creation of what are often called "public goods", such as roads, bridges, 
tunnels, and harbours, coupled with public education, helped everyone realise his or her individual potential. That 
was good for the economy' (Bassett, 2001). Also, state-owned enterprises actually proved to be of great benefit to 
New Zealand capital. Many of these revolved around providing a service essential to the development of capitalism 
in New Zealand. The enterprise projects that the state invested in often demanded a huge commitment of capital 
which would not see a profitable return in the short to medium term. Many of these industries were therefore 
unattractive to, or beyond the capacity of, private capital (Bassett, 1998). See also: Edmundson (1997) for an 
examination of how state-owned housing, railways, and banking served the interests of capital in New Zealand. 
23 Certainly Labour never seriously attempted to carry out any socialisation of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange: 'Above all, both parties concurred in leaving the major portion of the economy to the operations of 
private capital, checked and in part controlled by the state, but neither comprehensively planned nor threatened 
with expropriation' (Chapman, 1999: pp.59-60). 
24 As James points out, 'the system was explicitly adversarial within those limits' (James, 1997k: p.11). 
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essentially the priorities of both parties remained the same. The requirements of 
election competition meant that some sort of differentiation was necessary, and 
this forced the parties to at least attempt to disguise their basic agreement by 
stressing their differences and making use of rhetoric. As Chapman pointed out, 
both main parties were sensitive to charges of being essentially the same, 'and 
each strove to differentiate itself from the other' (Mitchell, 1962c: p.96). At the 
level of the media and election campaigns, the 'old symbols and rhetoric of party 
conflict were retained for electoral purposes' (Smith, 1972: p.3). Therefore, 
although the parties in government presided over and implemented very similar 
policies, at elections they still managed to appear to be distinct by putting forward 
manifestos and constitutions that suggested more radical actions would occur. 
Whenever real political conflict did actually take place, very often this occurred 
within the parties rather than between them. Deep inter-party wrangles occurred 
over a wide range of policies and often threatened to divide the parties internally. 
It is also notable that where National did have significant disagreements with 
Labour it often failed to act in government to make any significant changes to 
Labour's regime.25 In addition, where differences did structure party politics, they 
were often not so much ideological, but issues of practical and technical 
implementation of policy. 
The postwar political party era was therefore characterised by ideological 
convergence, centripetal competition, office-seeking behaviour, and general 
moderation. The consensus existed on the foundations of the economic 
prosperity of the long postwar boom. Two-party competition was also predicated 
on a relatively homogenous society, in which Labour and National fought each 
25 In the case of the compulsory unionism introduced by the First Labour Government, the National Party 
campaigned against the law in 1949, but once in government, effectively continued that policy. See: Jackson and 
Harre (1969: p.67). According to Debnam, the National Government 'simply chose to make compulsory unionism 
contingent on a secret ballot if at least 15 per cent of union members asked for one' (Debnam, 1990: p.5). 
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other over secondary economic issues, and obtained votes from relatively distinct 
support bases.26 
Part Two: Breakdown of the Consensus 
It is a matter of some debate as to when the postwar consensus came to an end. 
For many commentators, the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984 
marks the end of consensus, but the reality is that the historical compromise was 
unravelling for at least a decade prior to this. A change in economic conditions 
was the major reason for the end of the consensus, and a major precipitation for 
this economic crisis in the 1970s was the loss of New Zealand's prosperous 
trading relationship with Britain in the late-1960s.27 Also, in 1974 the first OPEC 
oil crisis hit New Zealand, causing serious economic stagflation and a balance of 
payments crisis. But whatever the reasons for economic decline, by the mid-
1970s economic growth slowed, the inflation rate rose, public expenditure was 
pushed up, and full employment disappeared. 
The economic slump became the dominating feature of New Zealand politics for 
the following decades, and its immediate effect was to throw the basis of the 
consensus into disarray. The failure of the major parties and their shared 
economic policies caused a fall in electoral confidence in both Labour and 
National,28 and in general the political ideologies that were the foundation of the 
historical settlement became discredited. The consensual mood of the previous 
decades was also shattered by the wave of substantial protest activity and strikes 
26 See Chapter Four. 
27 Also, in the mid-1960s, 'the price of wool - then the most important export - collapsed, a disaster reinforced by 
downward pressures on meat and diary export prices' (Easton, 1999a: pA). 
28 For details of Labour and National's declining electoral fortunes, see Chapter Ten. As a percentage of age-
eligible Yoters, Labour and National's joint share of the yotes had been declining from 1946 when they had 91 
percent of Yotes, hitting a record low in 1978 of 66 percent, and then 65 percent in 1981 (Vowles, 2002b: pA16). 
Chapter Two: Post-Consensus Radicalisation 101 
that began in the late 1960s and early 1970s.29 There was a substantial growth in 
extra-parliamentary politics - particularly on the left - and this culminated in the 
1981 Springbok Tour protests.3D This activity appeared to indicate that under 
Muldoon a considerable section of the electorate were looking for a more radical 
or leftwards movement in New Zealand society. The increasing heterogeneity of 
society and the breakdown of political patterns were reflected in the development 
of significant minor parties like Values, Social Credit and Mana Motuhake. Also, a 
small but growing section of New Zealand public opinion was moving to the right 
and against the postwar consensus. Increasingly, these voters saw the welfare 
state as too expensive and the trade unions as too militant.31 Certainly by the 
late-1970s and early-1980s the postwar consensus was seen by some as the 
cause of economic stagnation.32 This was eventually reflected in the emergence 
of another significant party, the libertarian New Zealand Party. 
At the same time, other aspects of the traditionally stable electoral arrangements 
and behaviour were rapidly eroding. For example, voter volatility rose from 6 
percent in 1972 to 9 percent in 1975 - the highest level then recorded (Vowles, 
2002b: p.415). The share of two-party vote as a percentage of age-eligible voters 
dropped from 70 percent in 1975 to its (then) lowest recorded level of 66 percent 
29 For the increase in industrial action, see: Roberts (1978: p.93). Roper (1997) also points out that 'From 1968 to 
1977 a major upsurge in class struggle took place that involved the highest levels of strike activity in New Zealand's 
history' (1997: p.83). 
30 For increasing protest activity, see: Nagel (1998: p.233). There was substantial growth in social movements 
protesting against New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War, racism within New Zealand and in South Africa, 
and women's oppression. 
31 See: Roper (1993: pp.155-164), who observes that many pressure groups were calling for more market from the 
1970s. 
32 At an elite level, and especially in the economics profession and business community, during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s there was a shift in view, with Keynesian demand management losing popularity to supply-side, neo-
liberal economics. For evidence of the growing influence of neo-liberal or supply-side economics in the economics 
profession, see: Jesson (1989a: chapter two). For its influence in the business community, see: Roper (1991) who 
argues that a supply-side economic policy consensus emerged within the 'business community' in the period from 
the late 1970s. Proponents of this new approach believed that the key features of the old social democratic 
consensus were no longer working as they were intended. 
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in 1978 (Vowles, 2002: p.416). Vowles' calculation of class voting in New 
Zealand showed that this had declined from 30 percent in 1963 to only 19 
percent in 1975 Vowles (2001: p.176). Vowles' aggregation of party membership 
statistics has also shown that membership as a proportion of the electorate 
declined from 20 percent in 1960 to only 9 percent in 1972 (Vowles 2002b: 
p.416).33 
Labour Party (1975-84) 
The nature of the Labour Party was changing in the 1970s, especially with the 
influx of 'a growing number of younger, well-educated liberals and radicals 
attracted to the Party largely because of its increasingly vocal opposition to the 
Vietnam war' (McRobie, 1992: p.386).34 The 1972-75 Third Labour Government 
had, however, proved something of a disappointment for its supporters on the 
left. After an initial economic boom, a period of economic crisis led to government 
austerity, and slow economic growth turned out to be both a serious constraint 
and a reason to break with the past. Yet no substantial political transition 
occurred, and 'Its front bench of modernising "technocrats"... reinforced the 
image of modest improvers and conservers, tinkering with things to make them 
better rather than changing things at base' (James, 1986a: p.38). The Norman 
Kirk Government did make some breaks with the past and introduced a few 
social reforms - partly picking up on issues from the liberal educated middle 
classes - but mostly it represented a continuation of the postwar consensus, and 
was led initially, until Kirk's death in 1974, by a traditionalist whose instincts were 
inherently conservative, and who continued to push his party further away from 
its class-orientated and radical origins.35 
33 These trends are examined in greater detail in following chapters. 
34 Consequently the old guard of trade unionists and First Labour Government-era radicals were now a minority. 
With the ascendancy of Bill Rowling to the leadership upon Kirk's death in 1974 the party was now clearly 
controlled by the middle classes (McRobie, 1992: p.390). 
35 Kirk was notable for describing Labour's philosophy in 1973 without mentioning 'socialism' once (Levine, 1979: 
p.71). 
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After losing office in 1975 after only one term, the Labour Party immediately 
instigated a turn to the left - thereby helping corrode the postwar settlement. This 
left-turn was illustrated by a decision at the party's 1977 annual conference to 
restore the principle of 'the socialisation of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange' to the party's constitution.36 Changes at the top of the party 
organisation were also having a significant impact, as a new generation of 
liberals and radicals moved in and transformed the party. However, contrary to 
what might be expected, the influx of the educated liberal milieu had not caused 
the party to become heavily doctrinaire. Webber argued in 1978 that in the 
Labour Party, 'doctrinal impoverishment has reached the summit: the intellectual 
life of the leaders is remarkably restricted, no real theoretical and doctrinal 
activity can be observed among them' (Webber, 1978: p.186). Also in 1978, 
Roberts commented on the state of the economy, pondering that 'Strangely, no 
one has yet suggested extraordinary measures to deal with this crisis' (Roberts, 
1978: p.94). Looking to the Labour Party for change, Roberts commented: 
'Paralysed by defeat and stripped of many younger more flexible 
parliamentarians, the Labour party seems incapable of revitalising the policy 
debate' (ibid: p.96). However, change certainly was occurring within the party 
that would soon allow a paradigm shift in economic thinking. As the 'Vietnam 
generation,37 entered into the parliamentary wing of the party, they brought with 
them a desire to question the old assumptions and make radical changes, and 
they were not adverse to fundamentally changing the governments role in the 
economy. By the early 1980s this new educated liberal-left milieu clearly 
36 This was largely due to attempts by activists in the 1970s to r.eturn the party to its supposed heritage of 
socialism. According to Collins, after being soundly beaten at the 1975 election, 'the Labour Party drew back in the 
next couple of years to its socialist origins' (Collins, 1987: p.10). Also, 'Other voices pulled Labour in the same 
leftward direction. In the 1976 youth report to the party conference, Phil Goff ... declared: "We stand opposed to a 
capitalist system based upon the exploitation of the many by the few.'" (ibid). See also: Walker (1993: p.12). But 
'leaders such as Kirk, Rowling, and Lange continued to project Labour as a party motivated by the much more 
general concept of "social justice for the whole nation" , (Gustafson, 1989: p.204). 
37 The 'Vietnam generation' is a term used by James to describe those liberal political leaders born in the postwar 
period. For a critique of his argument, see Easton (1997b: pp.221-223). 
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commanded the party machine, and a liberal uniformity developed around issues 
such as feminism, peace and anti-racism (Jesson, 1989a: p.48).38 
It was at this time that Labour started to accept elements of what would later be 
termed 'Rogernomics' (named after Roger Douglas, finance minister, 1984-88). 
Labour's economic policy was very much in flux between 1979 and 1984, with 
leading Labour politicians and activists39 beginning to advocate radical measures 
for change.4o As early as 1979 Roger Douglas signalled his radicalism by 
welcoming foreign investment, proposing commercialisation of state businesses, 
arguing for a shift to direct taxation, suggesting user-pays charges for 
government services, opposing increased levels of import protection, advocating 
a flexible exchange rate, and generally advocating greater use of 'the market 
mechanism' (James, 1992b: p.143).41 David Caygill, too, was signalling the 
Labour Party's adoption of neo-Iiberal economics when in 1980 he stated that the 
Labour Party had an 'enthusiasm for restructuring so that our economy is more 
38 See also James (1992a: p.145), Jesson (1989a: chapter three), Wilson (1989). This was primarily a middle class 
layer and their control of the party machine was at the expense of the union bureaucracy, thereby taking the Labour 
Party further away from its old working class base. 
39 This shift towards neo-liberalism was not an entirely elite phenomenon, as various party conferences passed 
economic policies that were a precursor to Rogernomics. For example, 'As early as February 1980 [Jim] Holt got 
through the party's Auckland regional conference an economic remit echoing some of Douglas's arguments' 
(James, 1986a: p.143). The new generation of Labour Party leaders and activists were very aware of the need for 
economic restructuring and especially the abolition of import controls. Such moves were not necessarily viewed as 
right-wing ones, especially since it was National that was blocking such change. 
40 See: Oliver (1989: p.11), and Jesson (1989a: pp.57, 58). Roger Douglas, in particular, 'from 1978 onwards, 
argued increasingly vocally that there were 'no soft options" in terms of economic restructuring (James, 1986: 
p.69). 
41 Douglas' radical economic philosophies were well known by his colleagues and the public after he had laid out 
much of his economic plans in a book. The majority of the Labour MPs who would make up the Labour Cabinet 
'knew Douglas's intentions and endorsed at least the general approach ... [or] generally accepted the rationale 
behind Douglas's ideas' (James, 1986a: p.172). Furthermore, 'Lange had specifically committed himself in 1981 to 
making Douglas Finance Minister' (ibid). See also: Easton (1987; 1989), Oliver (1989), and Jesson (1989a: chapter 
three). 
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market-orientated' (quoted in James, 1992b: p.146).42 According to Oliver, 
Labour leader, Bill Rowling also favoured lowering trade barriers and he 
'criticised export incentives and supplementary minimum prices for distorting 
market signals to producers and undermining New Zealand's competitive position 
in the world market' (Oliver, 1989: p.32). 
Despite the increased radicalism of this 1975-84 period, Labour was still more of 
a Downesian party of electoral contestation - that is, policy was being strongly 
affected by electoral considerations. For example, Labour's loss in the 1981 
general election brought about an important re-evaluation of economic policy. In 
the election campaign, Labour had focused its economic policy on employment 
creation, but 'After the loss of the election there were widespread criticisms of the 
election policy.... A caucus subcommittee reported on electorate reaction to 
Labour Party policy and stated that the focus on unemployment had reinforced 
the public impression of the Labour Party as "soft on the undeserving" ... It was 
stated that social welfare policies appeared to have won few votes' (ibid: p.28). 
As a result, according to W H Oliver, Mike Moore advocated that, 'the best 
course would be to make economic restructuring the first priority and postpone 
welfare concerns' (Oliver, 1989: p.29). This was adopted by the Labour caucus, 
and this general approach of office-seeking behaviour appears to have been a 
continuing influence on the party's ideological development. 
National Party (1975-84) 
The erosion of consensus had a severely negative effect on National, as the 
party had defined itself by the existence of the social democraUc settlement. 
Because the National Party was seen to be the best manager of welfare 
42 Caygill, a former Young Nationals office-holder, was appointed by Rowling as chairman 'of the caucus economic 
committee with a brief to review thoroughly the economic policy. This Caygill did, questioning all the old 
assumptions' (James, 1986a: p.141). He went on to say in late 1982: 'I want to see central government off the 
backs of private enterprise' (quoted in James, ibid: p.146). 
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capitalism, when the consensus disintegrated, National lost its way and Muldoon 
unsuccessfully attempted to hold the postwar consensus together between 1975 
and 1984.43 After holding onto office in 1978 and 1981 with less than 40 percent 
of the vote, the National Party was aware of the need to hold onto the middle 
ground and therefore party ideology was largely designed to be centrist. Initially, 
therefore, Robert Muldoon's administration did not playa part in eroding the 
postwar consensus, but instead added to it.44 Yet the right-wing of the National 
Party - personified by MPs Derek Quigley and Jim McLay - were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the traditional approach to the economy and shifted further to the 
right, in a neo-liberal direction.45 By the end of the 1970s - and especially after 
the near-loss of the 1978 general election - there was a strong desire within 
National Party branches and caucus to reassert its liberal and free enterprise 
philosophy. The 1978 intake of MPs listened to the growing free market mood in 
the wider party, consequently strengthening the free-market sentiments in 
caucus (James, 1986a: p.95). But a struggle to shift the party and government 
into a more right-wing direction was partially lost when in October 1980 the 
'Colonels' Coup' to remove Muldoon failed.46 
Muldoon, however, recognised this desire for change and to some degree 
acceded to it. There was a general move to 'more market' policies, and 
specifically there was some restructuring and deregulation in regard to taxation, 
transport, farming, film distribution, meat processing, shopping hours and 
43 According to McRobie, 'By the early 1970s National's image was that of an exhausted party and government.. .. 
Under [Jack] Marshall, National sought to project an image of a p~ogressive and liberal party, one experienced in 
government' (McRobie, 1992: p.387). Under Muldoon, the party's direction later became even more unusual. 
44 Examples include: National Superannuation, the 'Think Big' programme of state employment creation, and the 
wage and price freezes. 
45 National MP Ian McLean coined and popularised the phrase 'more market' to describe the theme of a new 
approach increasingly being pushed by backbench Labour and National MPs (James, 1986a: p.70). James (1992a: 
p.241). 
46 For more on the 'Colonels' Coup', see: James (1986a: p.100), McRobie (1992: p.396), and Gustafson (1986: 
p.138). 
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unionism (James, 1992a: p.63).47 In many ways these reforms were the first 
major break with the postwar social democratic consensus. Although appearing 
as a modest 'mish-mash' of contradictory free-market reforms, they amounted to 
a change in direction - one that foreshadowed Labour's Rogernomics. However, 
in the early 1980s the deregulators lost their nerve and the reforms slowed to a 
halt. Muldoon was unwilling to take the government any further and National 
relapsed into conservatism. Muldoon was not naturally a liberaliser, and when he 
reverted to the social democratic 'think big' programme and the wage-price 
freeze, most of the party went along with him - including many of those who 
were philosophically in favour of a freer business environment (James, 1986: 
p.98). In the end the Muldoon Government mostly attempted to protect and 
prolong the social democratic historical compromise. Muldoon therefore 
remained loyal to the prosperity consensus - even as it evaporated. In dealing 
with economic decline the government had two broad choices: to follow the neo-
liberal direction that was being taken by Margaret Thatcher in Britain since 1979, 
or to continue with Keynesian demand management. Muldoon chose the latter, 
intensifying this approach, which led to a worsening situation, and one that would 
eventually require radical change.48 
In general, then, National's hold on power from 1975 to 1984 caused the postwar 
economic framework to remain in place, even though the foundations for stability 
47 Other important changes included moves as early as 1976 to a more flexible interest rate policy, and moves in 
1977 to more flexible wage settlements. After 1978 price controls on goods and services were also removed from 
many goods (Roberts, 1978: p.94; James, 1992a: p.63). Muldoon also allowed liberalisation of controls on 
overseas investment and allowed seven banks to trade in foreign exchange (James, 1992: p.63). Trade 
liberalisation also occurred through the negotiation of the Closer Economic Relations agreement with Australia. See 
also: Jesson (1987a: p.119), Nagel (1998: p.237), and James (1986a: p.167). Muldoon 'liberalized interest rates, 
started to remove government controls over financial markets, introduced a crawling peg exchange rate, reduced 
consumer subsidies, restructured farm subsidies, moved against compulsory unionism, and opened the way for 
competition between trucking and railways' (Nagel, 1998: p.237). 
48 Some would argue that there were more than just two options for reform, and might cite Australia's experience 
under the Hawke-Keating Government as an example. Yet in that country too, a general market liberalisation 
direction was taken, although this example does show, nonetheless that variations existed within the market 
liberalisation option. For analysis of these different paths, see: Goldfinch (2000), and Castles et al. (1996). 
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and the status quo no longer existed in either the economy or society. It was a 
fragile continuation and because little significant change occurred, wh~n actual 
policy changes finally flowed through from changes in the party system during 
the mid-1980s, these appeared decisive and clear. 
Minor Parties 
The two-party system in New Zealand persisted relatively easily from its 
establishment in the mid-1930s until the breakdown in the postwar consensus in 
the 1970s. At this point a number of parties arose to challenge National and 
Labour's hold on voters. In this 1972-84 period, the most significant were Social 
Credit (formed in the 1930s, but revitalised in the 1970s), the Values Party 
(formed in 1972, and fading away in the early 1980s), Mana Motuhake (which 
formed in 1980 and contested the Maori seats until its merger with the Alliance in 
1991), and the New Zealand Party (which was formed in 1983, effectively 
contesting only one election before fading away).49 These new parties made a 
considerable impact on national politics during the 1970s and 1980s. 
All New Zealand political parties were in the process of significant internal and 
ideological change. Social Credit (known until 1982 as the Social Credit Political 
League, then as the Social Credit Party until 1985, when it became the 
Democratic Party) had been running candidates since 1954, but was 
repositioning itself on the ideological spectrum in the 1970s, becoming more 
office-seeking (or populist) and popular - thus constituting the first major 
challenge to two-party domination since the late 1930s. The party became the 
most successful vote-winning third party since the rise of Labour - winning 6.7 
percent of the vote in 1972, 16 percent in 1978, 21 percent in 1981, and 8 
49 These parties were in many ways more radical than their early-1990s counterparts. Certainly the neo-liberal New 
Zealand Party was more radical and sophisticated than its successor, Act New Zealand. Values was less 
institutionalised and mainstream than its successor, the Green Party. And Social Credit provided more divergent 
policies than its later version, the Democratic Party. 
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percent in 1984. It also won seats at four general elections and two by-elections 
since 1954, meaning that prior to 1990, it was the only third party to secure 
representation during more than half a century.50 
Moving away from its traditional emphasis on monetary reform, the party was not 
simply becoming centrist in the 1970s, but straddling the extremes, being more 
anti-capitalist than the Labour Party on financial matters and more populist on 
social and moral issues than Muldoon's National Party (Jesson, 1994: p.108). 
The party's fluctuating voting base was mostly characterised by protest voters 
disenchanted with the two main parties - not necessarily centrist voters.51 
Amongst populist issues, Social Credit also emphasised policies on the 
environment, education and electoral reform. Then in the mid-1980s the party 
became 'the nearest thing to a left-wing grouping in the New Zealand Parliament' 
when Labour adopted neo-liberal economics (Collins, 1987: p.165). By this time 
the party was 'in favour of import protection, more controls over the monetary 
system and jobs for everyone' (ibid). 
The increasing popularity of postmaterialist values in the 1970s and the 
burgeoning social movements were difficult for the Labour Party to incorporate, 
and the party proved unable to construct a left alternative to the postwar 
settlement. Instead, this movement for change filtered into the creation of the 
Values Party. Now seen to be one of the world's first environment political 
parties, this earlier incarnation of the Green Party was then essentially a 
postmaterialist, liberal-leftist coalition of socialists, liberals and other radicals. It 
emphasised a 'steady state' economy and environmental protection, and 
promoted radical policies like 'Zero Economic Growth, Zero Population Growth 
50 It was also the only party to maintain 'an effective party organization for more than two elections in a row' 
(Vowles, 2002b: p.411). For more on the history of the Democratic Party (Social Credit) see: Miller (1989), 
Sheppard (1981), Zavos (1981), and Whitmill (1995). 
51 See: Miller (1989), and Locke (1994: p.101). 
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and abortion, drug and homosexual law reform' (Dann, 1999).52 Formed in 1972, 
the party performed particularly well at the 1975 general election, winning 5.3 
percent of the vote. Values was then torn apart by internal strife about its political 
orientation, and the party went into decline, winning only about 2 percent in 1978. 
In the 1980s, it existed largely in spirit rather than in practice, until it became part 
of the new Green Party in 1990. 
The Mana Motuhake party was formed in 1980, evolving out of Maori 
disenchantment with the two-party system and especially Labour. Its founder, 
Matiu Rata, had held the Northern Maori seat for seventeen years as a Labour 
MP and had also been a Minister of Maori Affairs in the Third Labour 
Government. The Labour Party traditionally had a very strong relationship with 
Maori, but Rata, like many others, felt that Labour had abused that trust and 
taken Maori support for granted, particularly with respect to land claims. The 
1970s saw a renaissance of Maori people fighting for their land, language and 
cultural rights, and they found the Labour Party wanting. Rata left Labour in 1979 
citing the party's failing to address critical Maori issues. Consequently Rata 
resigned from Parliament and re-contested the by-election in his Northern Maori 
electorate as an Independent. Although Matiu Rata polled very strongly in the by-
election of 1979 (38 percent), he was unable to win the seat in this or any later 
elections, and support for his party Mana Motuhake slowly declined up until 1991 
when it joined the Alliance. Up until the 1990s, however, Mana Motuhake 
consistently ran second to Labour in all four Maori seats, with Rata nearly 
winning Northern Maori in 1990.53 
At a time when both the National and Labour parties appeared to still be 
ideologically bland, the 1983 launch of the New Zealand Party was an exciting 
52 The Values Party also had the first female Deputy Leader of a New Zealand political party, the first female 
Leader, and the first 'out' gay candidate (Dann, 1999). 
53 For more on the history of Mana Motuhake, see Cox (1993), Walker (1992), and Vasil (1990). 
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development for the New Zealand political system.54 The party was established 
and led by wealthy and high profile Wellington property investor Bob Jones who, 
along with thousands of other National Party members and voters, decided that 
Muldoon's National Party could not be broken from its postwar consensus 
policies, and a more dynamic liberal party was required (Gustafson, 1986: 
pp.148-149). The new party was therefore made up of a generation of social and 
market liberals who wished to reinvigorate 'the political right around the principles 
of liberal capitalism' (Ai mer, 2001: p.274). The New Zealand Party therefore 
espoused a radical change of direction for New Zealand society. The party was 
most well-known for its libertarian and anti-state political platform which 
condemned the welfare state and preached freedom from economic regulation 
and taxes. As opposed to the muddled and centrist economic programmes of the 
main parties, the New Zealand Party's ideology was undoubtedly radical and 
innovative. 
Significantly, the party also had very liberal and far-reaching policies on social 
and moral issues - which distinguished it from new right parties in other countries 
that were more authoritarian or populist (Spoonley, 1987: p.233).55 The party was 
remarkably radical on issues of personal freedom, strongly advocating women's 
right to abortion, the availability of contraception, and the legalisation of drug use 
and other behaviour that they labelled 'victim-less crimes'. The party was also 
anti-censorship, but generally very conservative on law and order issues. These 
mostly libertarian positions on social issues dovetailed with the party's liberal 
economic policies. In foreign policy, the New Zealand Party not only endorsed a 
nuclear-free policy that was more radical than the Labour Party's, but they 
advocated a position of unarmed neutrality for New Zealand, effectively 
54 The party was both a continuation of the short-lived Democrat Party which had been formed 50 years earlier by 
'wealthy urban business and professional interests' who were dissatisfied by the moderate and interventionist 
Coates Government of the early 1930s, and a precursor to the formation of Act New Zealand a decade later 
(Gustafson, 1986: pp.148-149). 
55 According to Spoonley, 'On matters such as defence, education or contraception and abortion, the party actually 
articulated the position of the upwardly mobile urban petty-bourgeoisie' (Spoonley, 1987: p.233). 
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disestablishing the defence forces and officially pulling out of ANZUS. The New 
Zealand Party was also seen as utopian on education issues, expounding that 
much more money be spent. Likewise, the party was radical in favouring 
substantial government involvement in the arts. They also emphasised 
environmental and quality-of-life issues. The party contested the 1984 general 
election, winning 12 percent of the vote, but no electorates. Although the New 
Zealand Party only effectively existed for two years, it proved very influential and 
significant by projecting a clear - if somewhat eclectic - ideological programme. 
After the election and the introduction of much of the New Zealand Party's 
economic policy by the Fourth Labour Government, the party lost much of its 
support, and Jones attempted to dissolve it.56 
Part Three: Radical Reform (1984-93) 
In the mid-1980s party competition was becoming more centrifugal, with the 
ideological gap between the parliamentary parties widening - and not just on 
economic issues. According to Jesson, 'In 1984 there were definite differences 
between National and Labour on a range of issues: homosexual law reform, the 
Treaty of Waitangi, peace, [and] women's causes' (Jesson, 1990e: p.146). 
However, although it was not apparent in the election manifestos of 1984, the 
economic agendas of the two parties were also dramatically different, with those 
who became powerful in Labour planning to create a substantially different 
economy and society to the one which National was presiding over. The actual 
party manifestos were quite different to this, with Labour's projecting a social 
democratic-type government and National's suggesting an economic shift to the 
right. Then, at the 1987 general election, after three years of radical reform, the 
two main parties remained relatively polarised. During the campaign, Labour, 
according to Nagel, 'differed significantly from National in four distinct 
56 For more on the short history of the New Zealand Party, see: Aimer (1985; 1988), aon (1988), Grierson (1985), 
and Gustafson (1986, chapter four). 
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dimensions: economic management, defence, industrial relations and social 
policy. Its stands on each of these issues appealed disproportionately to a 
different element in its 1987 electorate coalition' (Nagel, 1998: p.255). The 
Labour Party was still at the height of implementing its Rogernomics agenda, and 
Bolger's National Party was still partly Muldoonist in its economic approach while 
also remaining very socially conservative. 
Following the 1987 general election, polarisation reduced dramatically, and a 
new bipartisan agreement developed - mainly due to National's capitulation to 
Labour's social and economic reforms. The period of 1989 to 1990 was critical, 
with National adopting some significant Labour Party policies: the Treaty of 
Waitangi as the founding document of the nation, the anti-nuclear legislation, the 
Reserve Bank Act, the Public Finance Act, and resource management 
legislation.57 Therefore, by the time of the 1990 election, there was a great deal 
of convergence between the two main parties: 
After the sharp policy discontinuity of the mid-1980s, when the two parties appeared to 
be a reverse image of their normal positions, they have drawn within range of each other 
and begun to assume more 'normal' positions. Their policy positions have also begun to 
converge, in the sense of fitting within the same debate (James, 1990c: pp.99-100). 
The substantial differences on postmaterialist issues largely disappeared, with 
the National Party taking on social-liberal sentiments as well as the economic 
framework of Labour. National declared itself opposed to nuclear ship visits, and 
Bolger celebrated the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. No longer did 
homosexual law reform, the Treaty of Waitangi, peace and women's causes 
present major differences of opinion between the two, parties. 
Despite the two main parties converging in their election policies, a full policy 
consensus was still not able to develop. Firstly, this was because although the 
two main parties were characterised by ideological convergence, it was not a 
57 See James (1992a: p.261 and pp.310-311; 1993b: p.91, 1997b: p.19) for more detail about this transition, and 
especially the National Party's stance on the Treaty of Waitangi. 
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centrist convergence but a radical one, and hence competition between Labour 
and National was outside the traditional centre of politics. Therefore, the two 
main parties remained out of synch with the electorate, as most voters remained 
opposed to the neo-liberal reforms.58 Reflecting this, there was an array of minor 
parties challenging the neo-liberal direction. This meant that the party system 
remained centrifugal, polarised, and locating a centre on the political spectrum 
remained impossible. 
The Labour Party 
The Lange-Douglas Government represented the final demolition of the postwar 
settlement, which by 1984 was already in decline. The administration upturned 
the whole economic, social and political fabric of the country, carrying out a 
reform programme that has been widely described as a 'revolution,59 and 
commonly referred to as 'Rogernomics', after the Minister of Finance Roger 
Douglas. The key components of this programme included radical liberalisation 
and deregulation of most economic sectors, commercialisation and privatisation 
of major state-owned assets, the erosion of welfare provision, contracting for 
public services, and the closure of many unprofitable public services.6o To 
understand the nature of party ideology in this period, and to find explanations for 
both the reforms and party change, a number of questions are often asked or 
answered by writers on the Fourth Labour Government. To what degree was the 
58 For instance, a survey in 1987 by the Royal Commission on Social Policy found substantial support for increased 
government spending and intervention in the economy - see: James (1992a: pp.239-240). 
59 This thesis uses both the terms 'revolution' and 'reforms' to describe the policy changes brought about between 
1984 and 1993. However, as John Quiggin notes, 'The term "reform" is normally interpreted to mean "change for 
the better'" and that a more accurate term would probably be "reaction'" (Quiggin (2001: p.84). 'Revolution' might 
also have positive connotations. However, both these terms are now commonly used to describe the political 
events, usually without any presumption that the reforms were necessarily desirable. 
60 For a fuller account of the actual measures taken, see: James and McRobie (1987: pp.9-18; 1990: pp.24-39; 
1993: pp.7-31), James (1992a), Collins (1987), Boston and Holland (1987; 1990), Easton (1987; 1989), Walker 
(1989), and Castles et al. (1996), Jesson (1989a), Russell (1996), Roper (1993), Goldfinch (2002), and Kelsey 
(1993; 1995). 
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1980s Labour Party and its leadership characterised by a policy-pursuing 
orientation? Was the party affected more by a office-seeking orientation? Or - to 
introduce the third distinction - was Labour characterised more by managerial-
reforming behaviour? 
To suggest the reforms were motivated by a policy-pursuing orientation is to 
argue that the reformers were guided by doctrine and were attempting to 
refashion New Zealand society along lines that matched a certain ideology. This 
is an argument most notably made by critical academics and commentators such 
as Kelsey (1993; 1995), Easton (1996; 1997a) and Jesson (1989a).61 On the 
other hand, to suggest the reforms were motivated by office-seeking behaviour is 
to argue that the reformers were seeking popularity or at least to expand their 
base of voters. This is an argument made by Vowles and McAllister (1996) and 
Walker (1989). Alternatively, to suggest the reformers were motivated by a 
managerial-reforming approach is to argue that the state of the economy 
required thorough restructuring to avoid economic collapse, and because the 
reformers were responsible for managing the economy they were forced to carry 
out a reform process - specifically one that would reduce the costs for business 
and remove inefficient industries from the economy. This is an argument made 
by the reformers themselves, as well as supportive commentators like James 
(1992a), and its critics such as Roper (1991) and 8edggood (1996).62 As James 
has noted on this divide, 
There has been vigorous debate since the beginning of the reforms as to whether the 
fourth Labour government was driven by theory. Those responsible for devising and 
implementing the changes, particularly the politicians, generally deny that theory played 
a significant role. Instead they argue that they were producing practical solutions to 
practical problems (James, 1997b: p.18). 
61 Despite these authors stressing the policy-pursuing explanation, as detailed later they also all provide evidence 
and arguments (perhaps sometimes unwittingly) for competing arguments. 
62 In the opinion of Vowles, 'There are Marxist accounts which focus on the necessary restructuring of New 
Zealand capitalism in response to economic crisis, thus determining state policies regardless of the party in power. 
These are convincing in broad outline but less so in detail, and imply an absence of alternative options also 
asserted from the right' (Vowles, 1992a: pp.74, 75). 
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Although writers on this period find little agreement about the explanation for the 
reforms, there can be little doubt that the extent to which the Labour Government 
took its economic reforms was remarkably radical and undoubtedly based on a 
new right outlook. These measures - such as reducing the state's ownership of 
resources, assets, and services, introducing substantial indirect taxes, reducing 
income tax rates, and deregulating internal markets - are all internationally 
recognised characteristics of new right economic theory, and hence 
commentators accurately labelled the programme as such. It is unsurpnslng, 
therefore, that the Lange-Douglas years are often painted as a time of conviction-
politics. Douglas' intentions are seen as an attempt to break with the postwar 
orthodoxy and establish a new type of New Zealand society.63 In this view the 
reforms were part of an 'experiment' carried out by 'ideologues' or 'visionaries'. 
Therefore, many academics and political journalists have praised or damned the 
1980s Labour leaders for pursuing their political vision. Kelsey (1993; 1995) has 
written extensively on the influence of the new right ideological agenda -
suggesting a preference on the part of the reformers for an emphasis on the 
individual at the expense of the collective and a small role for the state. Aimer 
has written that, 'Imported neo-liberal doctrines were responsible for wedging the 
political left and right further apart than at any time in the postwar period' (Aimer, 
2001: p.274). Jesson (1988; 1989a) has also focused on the process by which 
the ideas and theories of the 'Chicago school' of Milton Friedman and the 'public 
choice' theory of James Buchanan filtered through to the reforms via business 
groups, university economics departments and government departments. Like 
James, Jesson concentrates to some extent on the 'micro' issues, such as the 
political persuasions of the personnel within the Labour Party, Treasury, and the 
Reserve Bank, and claims a significant amount of change which occurred was 
63 For example, Upton saw the reforms as having a theoretical basis and origin: 'the process bears the hallmarks of 
being experimental in another sense: rather than being an organic outgrowth of evolving policies, the changes to 
some extent sprang fully from the minds of the Government's advisors' (Upton, 1989: pp.31). James characterised 
this view: 'The mythology about the years 1984-90 in the Labour Party is that the party in government was captured 
by a small cabal of monetaristlfreemarket ideologues' (James, 1992a: p.14). 
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due to the political hijacking of the Labour Party by a group of 'theory-driven 
zealots'. He argues that, 'The personal level is much more important than is 
usually acknowledged by political writers' (Jesson, 1989a: p.10), and that his 
account, 
is the story of a small and unsophisticated nation being hijacked by extremists. Despite 
recognising the importance of the interpersonal element in New Zealand politics, I have 
treated the turmoil of Labour politics mainly as a developing conflict of ideas and 
political interests whose inevitable outcome has been the sensations of 1988-89. An 
obvious objection to treating Labour politics in this way is that it seems bereft of ideas. 
Labour's intellectual poverty has in fact been one of my main themes, and one of my 
explanations for the ease with which the Labour Government was hijacked by the 
libertarian Right (Jesson, 1989a: pp.11-12). 
This idea of ideological hijack is seen by the fact that the Labour Government did 
not merely undertake the corrective deregulation needed to reverse the excesses 
of the Muldoon era, but actually went much further. For example, in partially 
withdrawing the state from the delivery of social services they were perhaps not 
merely introducing 'practical solutions to practical problems' but, instead, carrying 
out the dictates of new right ideology about how the state should approach social 
services. Likewise, Douglas intended to establish a voucher system for health 
care which, had it been carried out, would have pushed the reforms into a much 
more ideologically-inspired direction.64 Another example of restructuring that 
appears to have had a strong policy-pursuing basis was the State Sector Act of 
1987. This restructuring of the whole state sector was, according to Chapman, 
'not simply the pursuit of flexibility and efficiency which prompted this stroke of 
state, but rather the managerialist attitudes and neo-liberal arguments which lay 
behind corporatisation and the quest for the minimal state' (Chapman, 1999: 
p.346). Also, a doctrinaire impulse can be detected in that the privatisation 
process 'went much wider, including the contracting out of government activities 
64 But the fact that proposals to move away from delivery of social services through state agencies was rejected, 
suggests that this sort of highly-ideological policy was not acceptable to most Labour ministers. In general Labour's 
approach was about the 'partial withdrawal of the state from delivery of social services and its concentration instead 
on funding' (James, 1990c: p.97). 
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to private providers... and the importation of private sector management 
principles of management and financial control' (James, 1993a: p.21).65 
James has identified six reasons why the nature of the reforms might be 
regarded as having a policy-pursuing basis: 
[1] 'in making the shift, a "pure" line was often followed that caused unnecessary 
economic and social damage'; 
[2] 'many of the market-based prescriptions adopted by the Labour cabinet 
derived directly from "new right" analysis'; 
[3] the reformers had a libertarian attitude that was demonstrated in their 
approach to social issues; 'the Labour Government reduced the degree to which 
the state was involved in economic activity ... That direction was consistent with a 
move towards market-libertarianism'; 
[4] 'Several ministers would have been prepared to go much further'; 
[5] they developed 'a bunker-like obduracy against challenges or questioning' 
etc; 
[6] 'this rigidity in the face of opposition in turn fuelled and gave credence to 
critics' arguments that means were beginning to determine ends' (James, 1992a: 
p.26).66 
While Douglas has generally argued that his approach was governed by 
managerial-reforming, he has also argued, albeit in retrospect, that he was a 
policy-pursuing politician rather than just a managerial-reformer. For example, in 
justifying privatisation, Douglas emphasised that its primary purpose was debt 
reduction, but he also threw in ideological justifications when he said that 'There 
is another equally compelling reason for selling a·nd it is this - ministers do not 
make good business leaders' (quoted in Sheppard, 1999: p.140). 
65 Labour also started to agree with National about the need to create 'a bigger role for non-state delivery of social 
services, particularly health, and tougher financial monitoring and management' (James, 1990: pp.99-100). 
66 James argues that, 'Theory did playa part' and investigates the theoretical influences on the reformers (James, 
1987: p.18). Overall, however, he concludes that neither the politicians, nor those in Treasury, were 'ideological 
zealots' (James, 1987a: p.18). 
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In contrast to the policy-pursuing arguments above, the office-seeking 
explanation has been put forward by those writers who paint the Fourth Labour 
Government more as electorally 'pragmatic'. For example, Labour Party insider 
Simon Walker claims the leadership made a calculated re-election strategy in 
devising policies, rather than simply being ideologically driven: 
Central to their thinking was the fact that the previous two Labour Governments had 
been defeated after a single three-year term; the probability that New Zealand Party 
voters would return to their National roots made it likely that this administration would 
share their fate. The new ministers concluded that timid policies and an attempt simply 
to improve economic management by tinkering with current practices would ensure 
defeat in 1987. Even if the Government moved boldly, victory in 1987 was against the 
odds: but innovative policies and a complete change of direction were their best hope. 
Their approach needed to be radical, but they might well have difficulties explaining it to 
the electorate and, in particular, the Labour Party (Walker, 1989: p.212).67 
The Fourth Labour Government's economic strategy can therefore be read as an 
attempt to reconfigure the party's support base. According to Vowles and 
McAllister (1996), the premise of their new approach in government was the 
realisation that the old division of party support between National and Labour had 
never served Labour well in electoral terms (Vowles and McAllister, 1996). 
Consequently, many in Labour 'sought to expand their support bases from their 
traditional working-class social foundations into more broadly based "Ieft-
libertarian", "post-materialist", or "new politics" issue dimensions' (ibid: p.3). This 
meant attempting to gain a monopoly on middle class support.68 Taking notice of 
the support for the New Zealand Party in 1984, it seems that some Labour 
strategists may have viewed its economic reforms as the basis for consolidating 
Labour rule. After all, in 1984 the New Zealand Party had won an impressive 12 
67 Walker argued that, 'many of its initiatives sprang not from philosophy, but because the victory of a party without 
the previous Government's electoral baggage permitted long overdue change' (Walker, 1989: p.208). Walker also 
commented that the government was guided by electoral pragmatism: 'The Lange administration had attracted 
international attention because of its pragmatism' (ibid). Furthermore, 'many of its initiatives sprang not from 
philosophy, but because the victory of a party without the previous Government's electoral baggage permitted long 
overdue change' (ibid). 
68 For a full account of this reconfiguration strategy, see Chapter Four. 
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percent of the vote on a policy platform that the Labour Government was taking 
up. 
This modernisation process was only possible because the old patterns of party 
support were breaking down. As Chapter Four of this thesis shows, a process of 
partisan dealignment had been under way in which the major political parties had 
become progressively detached from their traditional class-based support, and 
therefore the traditional electoral constraints on policy innovation had weakened. 
Consequently Labour was freer in an electoral sense to break away from its 
traditional social moorings - or put another way, they had compelling reasons to 
redefine and re-stabilise their constituency (Vowles and McAllister, 1996: p.200). 
Furthermore, in parallel with the decline of the working class in politics, and 
within the Labour Party especially, there was also an expanding class of new 
entrepreneurs developing from the early 1980s who, according to Steve 
Maharey, 'began to make money in property development, finance and new 
industries .... Significantly, the people in this rapidly expanding fraction of capital 
lacked any real political representation' (Maharey, 1987: p.78). MP Peter Neilson 
also spelt out this goal in an internal party document in which he argued for a 
broadening of the party's electoral base: 'Quite bluntly, Labour has to attract 
more middle-class support to survive as a potential party of government. .. The 
people in industry and commerce offer a major source of additional voters to 
Labour and the opportunity to make them ours should not be overlooked' (quoted 
in Sheppard, 1999: p.7). Thus Labour took up the opportunity to represent this 
class, which was evident at the 1987 general election when the party received an 
unusually large number of votes in higher socio-economic electorates.59 The re-
elected government had cobbled together an' electoral alliance of urban 
professionals, liberal social activists, together with its existing base of working 
class support. The first two groups were the prosperous beneficiaries of 
Rogernomics, many of whom had previously been sympathetic towards either 
69 Labour performed very well in the electorates of Fendalton, Remuera, Eden, Birkenhead, Miramar, Ohariu, and 
North Shore, See: Lange (1992a: p.84), and McRobie (1990: p.15). 
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the New Zealand Party or the Values Party, while the less-enthusiastic working 
class supporters had nowhere else to take their support in 1987 - apart from 
non-voting - and were therefore a relatively captive vote for the party?O This 
office-seeking explanation therefore shows that the transformation of the Labour 
Party during the mid-1980s can also be viewed as an act of deliberate self-
change, rather than simply a case of ideological capture. It is undeniable that the 
radical nature of the Labour Party in government was partly due to the desire by 
certain sections of the party to bring about some sort of political renewal of the 
party and expansion of its support base?1 
These two explanations for the radical reforms - policy-pursuing and office-
seeking - are neither mutually exclusive nor incorrect. Both explanations are 
broadly true, yet there are some problems and weaknesses with them which 
suggest that they are inadequate as a total explanation for party change, and that 
a further explanation is required. The first problem with the theories is that they 
conflict with the essentially technocratic - and thus pragmatic and anti-ideological 
- nature of the individuals involved. The Labour Party's new breed of members 
and MPs were increasingly receptive to technocratic politics in the 1980s due to 
their social backgrounds. The new type of middle class members that the party 
attracted were, according to James, representative of an education meritocracy: 
Education had led those education meritocrats into occupations in which they had to use 
their heads. They were rationalists rather than sentimentalists. Problems could be solved 
by rational analysis and reasoned proposition. This could and did lead different groups 
70 For the incoming Labour Government then, the adoption of what might have appeared to be an unlikely 
economic philosophy actually constituted (1) a 'comparatively low-risk strategy' in that there was little electoral 
disadvantage in failing to act in the interests of the working class and (2) one that promised the possibility of a 
major pay-off in terms of a renewed electoral appeal through gaining the additional support of non-traditional 
Labour voters (Castles et aI., 1996: p.216). 
71 See also Trotter (1997m), who argues that the experiences of the Labour MPs in the Third Labour Government 
played a part in bringing about a party awareness of the need for modernisation. McQueen has argued that the 
reforms were about political strategy, however they had an ideological result: 'The political intent of Douglas and 
Prebble was to capture so much ground right of centre that Labour would replace National as the dominant party' 
(McQueen, 1991: p.34). 
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among them in different directions. They were not bound to the interests of any social 
groupings, classes or strata. The bonds they had with their base constituency were 
mental, not ties of blood (James, 1992a: p.242). 
Certainly the backgrounds of many of the MPs in the Labour caucus and cabinet 
were conducive to a technocratic approach. For example, 'three of the Labour 
core (Caygill, Peter Neilson and David Butcher) had economic degrees' (James, 
1993: p.70). In fact, nearly three-quarters of the Labour caucus 'came from the 
professional class, including nineteen who had been teachers or university 
lecturers and ten who had law degrees' (Gustafson, 1992b: p.277). The Cabinet 
itself 'contained, among its twenty members, seventeen from professional/semi-
professional occupations, including eight former teachers and six with law 
degrees' (ibid: p.277). These backgrounds were likely to have had the effect of 
encouraging them to see the economy as essentially a technical issue. And even 
the less economically literate in the caucus, when faced with the dilemmas of the 
New Zealand economy, still saw the options presented to them rather technically 
as being 'between more or less state intervention in and regulation of the 
economy' rather than as an ideological issue (James, 1993k: p.70). The most 
typical of the technocrats were lawyers such as Caygill and Palmer. Such Labour 
members were 'interested in problems of administration and efficiency primarily, 
but who didn't have any deeply felt political commitment' (Jesson, 1989a: p.76). 
Jesson has also painted a picture of Douglas that does not fit well with his 
ideological image: 'It is important to stress that Roger Douglas in 1983 was still a 
politician in search of a policy. Since those days a legend has developed among 
his admirers that portrays Douglas as a man totally committed to his policies, 
uninterested in personal glory, and prepared to· sacrifice his career when his 
ideas were thwarted' (ibid: p.S9). According to Jesson, Douglas was never the 
intellectual and theoretical economic intellect that some have made him out to 
be: 'Roger Douglas was receptive to ideas during his years in Opposition, and 
appears to have had a genuine interest in them. He had never been a deep 
thinker. The ideas that interest him are practical ideas that provide practical 
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solutions to practical problems. Nor is he a coherent thinker, but has a habit of 
scattering unrelated ideas around in all directions' (ibid).72 Douglas himself 
provides further evidence of his technocratic nature when he says, 'The 
technocratic element of being finance minister is probably one of the most 
satisfying things you can do. In this job I often envy the person who at the end of 
the day can build a concrete block wall and see it all level and all there' (quoted 
in Wright, 1987: p.31). He also ascribed the origins of Rogernomics to 
managerial administrators rather than theoreticians: 'The real contribution to the 
formation of our policy came from those used to taking practical action - the 
business people' (Douglas and Callan, 1987: p.30). Roger Douglas was, 
therefore, the epitome of the technocratic process within the Labour Party. He 
was essentially without any consistent economic ideology in the early 1980s, but 
had instead always been a man of practicalities searching for practical solutions 
- and not necessarily neo-liberal solutions. 
Even over issues that appeared as ideological as the question of the flat-tax 
proposal, the Labour Government reformers were possibly driven largely by their 
technocratic impulses. Caygililater reflected on the flat-tax debate, saying: 'While 
no doubt this looks like an ideological battle, in fact iii many respects it was as 
much to do with details and numbers as it was to do with principles' (quoted in 
Sheppard, 1998b: p.15). This was possibly also the case with social policy, which 
was one of the biggest areas of dispute during the Fourth Labour Government -
and therefore the most ideologically-looking area. Yet James has argued that 
Labour's reforms in social policy were also driven more by practical issues than 
ideology: 'It has also been less of a conscious shift for its own sake than driven 
by Budget pressures - which were forced partly by economic policy changes 
which have demanded the Budget be balanced' (James, 1990c: p.95)?3 Such 
disputes suggest that many of the technocratic-reforming market liberals appear 
72 These arguments are also confirmed by Oliver (1989). 
73 While some wanted to extend the welfare state, Douglas' attempts to reform social policy were pushed by a 
combination of his need to cut the budget deficit and his pursuit of ideological objectives (aon, 1989: p.1 09). 
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to have transformed into policy-pursuing, market libertarians. While Douglas was 
probably without any deep-seated new right intentions when he began the 
reforms and could be characterised as a managerial-reforming 'market liberal', 
he did eventually become a new right 'market-libertarian' while in office?4 
Certainly in his later role founding the Act party, Douglas was a policy-pursuing 
'market libertarian'. 
Policy-pursuing and office-seeking theories also conflict with the reformers' 
claims that the economic reforms were practical 'means to ends'. For example, 
the targeting of social provision was not seen as a good end in itself, but a cost-
saving means that would allow the state to afford to continue such provision. 
According to Jesson, 'Labour politicians have constantly argued that their free 
market policies will provide the prosperity necessary for their social goals' 
(Jesson, 1987b: p.118).75 This practical logic appealed to many of the Labour 
left, who put up relatively little resistance to the neo-liberal reforms and mostly 
accepted them?6 According to Jesson, the Labour left had little interest in 
ideology: 'Every level of the Labour Party succumbed before the free market and 
monetarist onslaught. Much of the explanation was an absence of ideology, and 
a lack of interest in economics' (ibid: p.123).77 In such a situation, many of the 
Labour left were thus won over to the reforms by the practical - and not 
ideological - arguments that the deregulated markets would produce greater 
efficiency, which could then be used to improve equality. Put another way: the 
Labour left was won over to the idea of neo-liberal policies as good means 
through which to pursue social democracy rather than good ends in themselves. 
74 In 2003, Douglas professed to have never read Milton Friedman's theories on health and educational reform until 
after his time as Finance Minister (Dominion, 2003). 
75 See also: Vowles, who deals with the claim by senior Ministers of the Fourth Labour Government that 'the ends 
of Government policy remain constant, it is merely the means that have changed' (Vowles, 1987: p.25). 
76 See: Jesson (1997e: p.31; 1987a: p.123; 1987b: p.125). 
77 Jesson argues that while 1970s 'anti-intellectualism had served a conservative function' in New Zealand, in the 
1980s 'anti-intellectualism facilitated a revolution of the libertarian Right' (Jesson, 1987a: p.124). 
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They were also won over because their previous economic method -
Keynesianism - had not only failed to reverse the crisis, but had made it worse. 
A good example of the technocratic element of even the Labour Party left was 
seen in their approach to asset sales. At the 1988 annual Labour Party 
conference, 'A formula was worked out regarding the asset sales; they would not 
be opposed outright, but would be considered on a case-by-case basis' (Jesson, 
1989a: p.136). This solution was a compromise between the extra-parliamentary 
party and Cabinet ministers, and illustrates the ability of both sides to move 
beyond (or abandon) principles and theory in favour of a practical evaluation of 
the consequences of each sale. Likewise, the leadership 'justified the 
[privatisation] programme with practical arguments - debt repayment - rather 
than defending it as a matter of principle' (Jesson, 1989a: p.141)?8 According to 
Sheppard, 'For Douglas, the question was one of outcomes - were service 
outcomes superior from a trading operation in state hands or one responsive to 
the demands of the market?' (Sheppard, 1999: p.141). This suggests a certain 
practical or technocratic approach. 
In practice the reformers also contradicted many of· the neo-liberal economic 
rules, suggesting they were not so ideologically-driven. For example, the Fourth 
Labour Government actually increased government spending - in stark contrast 
to the ideology of supply-side neo-liberal economics. According to James the 
government spent heavily: 'Between 1984-85 and 1990-91 ... education spending 
rose by 45% and health spending by 18%' (James, 1992a: p.137). Furthermore, 
rather than heralding a new minimalist low-tax state, the Labour Government 
under Roger Douglas actually increased the taxation take. During· the time that 
Douglas was finance minister, 'the overall tax take as a percentage of GOP went 
78 See also: James (1992a) who argues that practicality led the Labour left 'to conclude traditional social 
democratic mechanisms did not achieve social democratic ends' (James, 1992a: p.21). Therefore ostensibly left-
wing MPs implemented the market-liberal programme, even though they did not start out as market-libertarians or 
even market-liberals (ibid). 
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up 6 points' (Perigo, 1997).79 There are many reasons to think Douglas was not 
at this time entirely wedded to implementing a strict version of neo-liberalism. As 
Sheppard argues, 'Douglas would never have been able to proceed with his 
agenda had he actually been just another ideological zealot, a guise in which he 
is often depicted' (Sheppard, 1999: p.11). 
In discussing the issue of whether or not the Fourth Labour Government was 
primarily driven by a policy-pursuing orientation, James makes the distinction 
between the categories of 'market-liberals' and 'market-libertarians': 'It is the 
difference between rational agreement, the quality I have ascribed to market-
liberals, and belief, which I have ascribed to libertarians. One is a matrix for 
finding solutions, albeit sometimes radical solutions; the other is a charter for a 
new society' (James, 1992a: p.18). James puts the Fourth Labour Government 
reformers in the first category - that of 'market liberals', and asserts that they 
were not initially believers in highly ideological concepts such as the minimal 
state or rampant individualism: 'The 1984-90 Labour Government did not set out 
to give effect to a "new right" ideology. Its members were not at the outset 
market-libertarians ... They became market-liberals because practicality led them 
to conclude traditional social democratic mechanisms did not achieve social 
democratic ends' (ibid: p.21). 
All of the above reasons make the policy-pursuing and office-seeking 
explanations less convincing as full explanations. An alternative explanation is 
needed which incorporates the convincing aspects of these models, while 
overcoming their weaknesses. This third model could be characterised as the 
managerial-reforming model. This sort of behaviour is more likely in times of 
79 The idea of ideologically-driven politicians being responsible for party change is less than convincing when it is 
difficult to ascertain exactly how many MPs were characterised by this approach. Simon Upton estimates that, 
'Even at the height of Roger Douglas's influence, I'd be surprised if more than a third of Labour's caucus really 
believed in the cause' (Upton, 1996a: p.8). Likewise, Jesson says that the true believers of Rogernomics never 
amounted to any more than twenty, while the rest were prepared to go along with it for technocratic reasons 
(Jesson, 1989a: p.134). See also: James (1993b: p.91). 
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crisis, when necessity makes a managerial-reforming approach more dominant 
than either policy-pursuing or office-seeking behaviour. Arguably those MPs most 
receptive to managerial-reforming requirements are politicians of a technocratic 
nature or background and relatively detached from either their traditional party 
ideology or the party's traditional supporters. It appears plausible that this is 
exactly what happened in the Labour Party. Bob Jones, for instance, argues that 
in the mid-1970s the Labour Party became led by what he labels 'technocrats' 
capable of such reforms, and that such technocrats found themselves suited to 
resolving the crisis they inherited in 1984: 
In a stable society, the conservative party is the natural party of government. But 
periodically, wider disruptive circumstances, as have occurred in the past decade, 
dictate massive upheaval and change. It is then the time for the party of reform to carry 
out these changes, which is precisely what has occurred since 1984. A great soul-
searching, which because of their innate conservatism takes many years, then 
eventuates in the conservative ranks. Younger, more intellectual Opposition members 
are the first to embrace the need for the reforms, and gradually with the passage of 
time the conservatives come to accept these as the new order (Jones, 1988: p.42). 
Jesson has described technocrats as politicians lacking any 'deeply felt 
commitments' (Jesson, 1989a: p.76). According to James, the main players in 
the Fourth Labour Government were technocratic in the sense that 'They were 
part of the "seminar culture". The correct answer could be found through earnest 
and intelligent inquiry and debate' (James, 1992a: p.142).80 James argues that 
the conversion to market economics was more a 'gradually intensifying tendency 
of thinking in response to practical economic issues in specific circumstances 
than a conversion to a desirable and universally applicable theory and for that 
reason logically likely to be limited to provable gains' (ibid: p.148). Of course, 
different individuals varied to the degree to which they were technocratic or 
ideological. 
Some writers also argue that the technocrats leading the Labour Party were 
confronted by economic problems that demanded the general approach that they 
80 aton prefers to call these politicians 'modernisers' (Easton, 1997: p.38). 
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took. It is generally accepted that a downturn in the world economy in the 1970s 
triggered a political crisis that afflicted governments in the West, leading to 
austerity measures such as neo-liberal reforms. Throughout advanced industrial 
democracies the preconditions for the existence of welfare capitalism had been a 
healthy economy in which employers could both 'increase profits and at the same 
time concede some of the demands of labour, such as pay rises, shorter working 
hours and the nationalization of key sectors of the economy' (Hewlett, 1998: 
p.40). According to Berman, because of the ongoing postwar economic boom, 
mainstream parties of both left and right had been able to, 'deliver increasing 
material security for workers while at the same time increasing the prosperity of 
society as a whole .... There was little if any trade off, in this view, between 
increasing equality and economic growth; social democrats could thus accept 
capitalism while claiming that they were remaining true to the ultimate values of 
the socialist movement' (Berman, 1997: p.1 07).81 
Within liberal democracies, parties like the New Zealand Labour Party had 
become explicitly accommodationist - they came to be integral and respectable 
parts of the established order, at the same time as their linkages with civil society 
and their traditional constituencies withered. This was unproblematic as long as 
social democratic parties were still able to deliver on their traditional promises to 
their working class constituents. It only became a problem, in the early 1970s, 
when the economic crisis began eroding the social democratic, historical 
compromise. All around the world, the social democratic parties, which by now 
had to satisfy diverse coalitions of support, found this increasingly difficult as 
each element of social democracy - the welfare state, Keynesianism, and 
corporatism - were put under pressure and started to erode (ibid: p.107). As 
early as 1971 Paul Mattick noted, "the conditions under which (the Keynesian 
81 Until the 1970s the profitability of the economy meant that governments could continue to afford more 
adventurous initiatives, but the reverse occurred when falling profitability made fewer things possible. Parties and 
governments which manage, or plan to manage, the economy are always constrained by the limits of the market 
economy, and they must tailor their programmes to suit what is possible under that system. 
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solution) can be effective are in the process of dissolution' (Mattick, 1971: p.viii). 
As the crisis worsened through the 1970s and early 1980s, traditional economic 
programmes were unable to fulfil the demands of their constituencies, which led 
to the discrediting of the dominant social democratic emphasis on state 
intervention in the economy. Throughout the West, a similar economic impasse 
was being reached, which eventually led to fundamental economic change, 
carried out by parties of both left and right, which might be described as 'neo-
liberal', 'free-market', or 'monetarist' economic reforms. 82 
There is a general consensus that upon taking office in 1984 the Labour Party 
was confronted by an economic crisis - both in the sense of an immediate short-
term currency crisis, and a longer-term crisis of economic profitability. Marxist 
political scientist Brian Roper, writing in 2001, has explained that a prolonged 
economic crisis has plagued governments since the mid-1970s: 
From then until the present the economy has suffered from economic stagnation, mass 
unemployment, recurrent and growing balance of payments deficits, increasing public 
and private indebtedness, declining real incomes for a large majority of the population, 
high inflation during the 1970s, and high levels of strike activity from 1968 to 1991 
(Roper, 2001: p.545). 
Roper has shown how those in control of the state have been forced to resolve 
this crisis because it affects the state's solvency, due to a fiscal crisis (whereby 
the state simultaneously faces rising social expenditure and declining taxation 
revenue), and due to a crisis of profitability (whereby the economy contracts 
leading to a reduced standard of living).83 
The globalisation of the world economy was also having a significant impact on 
New Zealand. The increased mobility of capital - and particularly multinational 
companies - along with the growth of financial markets beyond governmental 
control has meant that there has been a reduction in the powers of national 
82 See Chapter One (Part One) for an outline of social democratic parties implementing these reforms. 
83 See Roper (1991; 1997; 2001). 
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governments to use traditional social democratic levers to run the economy. This 
has been said to encourage a convergence throughout the world around a neo-
liberal economic policies. 
Therefore after the 1984 election, the serious economic problems confronting the 
new Labour administration, together with the changing place of New Zealand in 
the world economy, meant that the Cabinet ministers had little space for 
ideological debate, but had to implement what they perceived as the obvious 
economic prescriptions that were increasingly common throughout the Western 
world. Therefore, rather than leading any ideological revolution or establishing 
new theories, Douglas and his government were merely replicating the new 
orthodox solutions to the same problems that other countries were facing. In 
Australia, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, neo-liberal 
measures were already being implemented.84 In following these newly orthodox 
solutions the New Zealand Labour Party was really only sailing with tides that 
were already altering politics and society. Furthermore, Keynesian policies had 
been discredited because, when they were applied to the economic malaise that 
followed the end of the economic boom, these 'solutions' actually made things 
worse, increasing stagflation.85 By the time the Fourth Labour Government 
arrived in office, such policies were no longer an option, and the range of 
possible solutions to the economic crisis had been reduced. 
84 Most prominently Margaret Thatcher begun a programme of neo-liberal reforms in 1979, Ronald Reagan in 
1981, and in Australia the Hawke-Keating Labor Government carried out similar reforms from 1983. According to 
Paul Kelly, 'there was a shift towards such policies in West Germany, the USA, Canada, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Japan, Sweden, Denmark and Norway' (Kelly, 1999: p.235). All around the world, including in the former command 
economies of the East and in the newly industrialising nations, ther.e has been a substantial movement to embrace 
the market. Such neo-liberal agendas were not pursued uniformly, and initially the variations were considerable. 
But ultimately all these Western nations at least took a broadly neo-liberal approach of reducing government 
spending, redUCing government debt, privatising state-owned industry, focusing on anti-inflationary measures, 
shifting away from progressive income taxes, and reducing entitlements to welfare measures. 
85 Keynesianism could not explain stagflation - according to Keynes' theory, such a phenomenon could not exist. 
See for example Mattick (1971; 1978). Mattick notes how 'the combination of economic stagnation with inflation, 
which destroyed both Keynesian theory and the neo-Keynesian synthesis that had passed as the standard theory 
of economics' (Mattick, 1978: p.viii). 
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However, the neo-liberal reforms were arguably carried out to a greater extent 
than anywhere else, and this was due (in part at least) to the fact that the 
economic crisis was more intense in New Zealand than elsewhere. By freezing 
the economy for almost a decade, Muldoon unwittingly forced the Labour Party 
into a much more radical reform programme than would otherwise have been 
contemplated.86 It is obvious, therefore, that regardless of which party was in 
power during the mid-1980s, there would have been some significant neo-liberal 
economic and social restructuring. As James argues, 
policymakers, even if they had wide discretion as to detail, had little choice about the 
general liberalising direction they took. The internationalising and globalising world 
economy made it increasingly difficult for economies ranging from Albania to Zambia to 
follow nationalistic economic policies that denied, defied or distorted world financial and 
market realities (James, 1992a: p.279). 
This argument that the general direction of change was inevitable is broadly 
agreed upon by academics and journalists as diverse as Boston and Holland 
(1987), James (1986a; 1987;1992a), James and McRobie (1990), Roper 
(1993),87 Easton (1999a: p.5), and Dalziel (2001).88 Therefore while there might 
have been a variety of responses possible within this broad need to restructure 
the economy to improve business profitability, they all fell into a general neo-
liberal direction. There is, therefore, a large element of truth in the argument 
made by the reformers that the changes were driven more by economic 
86 Other reasons that the implementation of neo-liberal reforms were more severe in New Zealand are given by 
Boston and Holland (1987), Nagel (1998: p.231), Castles et al. (1996), Mulgan (1997b: p.265) and Vowles and 
McAllister (1996). Many of these explanations relate to political-level t~eories about change - such as the nature of 
the constitutional structure which enabled the government to push through unpopular reforms. 
87 Roper (1991) and (1993) has tried to explain in structural terms, from a Marxist perspective, the changes that 
New Zealand has experienced in the last twenty years, which he categorises as the historic shift from 
'Keynesianism' to 'neoclassicism'. 
88 Boston and Holland point out that' it was evident that whichever political party won the 1984 General Election 
some important policy changes would be essential' (Boston and Holland, 1987: p.6). Similarly, Simon Walker has 
said, 'Any administration elected in 1984 would have faced the need to urgently remedy inefficiencies which had 
been tolerated for two decades' (Walker, 1989: p.208), 
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practicalities than by theoretical dogma. Throughout his writing on the period, 
James reinforces this argument. Agreeing with the claims of the reformers, he 
has written that the Fourth Labour Government's 'attraction to the policy lines 
that developed was based on an assumption that economic liberalisation was the 
most practical solution to the country's large economic problems' (James, 1997b: 
p.19). 
This focus on the belief of 'practical solutions for practical problems' points to the 
fact that in the absence of a strong intellectual or ideas-based propensity the 
Labour Party had become strongly characterised by a technocratic impulse. The 
Labour Party leaders came to be converted to the economic reforms due to the 
political nature of the individuals as rationalists or technocrats. These politicians 
were not deeply imbued with their party's social democratic ideology and the 
need to further such an agenda - far from it, they were open-minded rationalists 
and therefore receptive (or susceptible) to non-traditional and innovative 
solutions to the economic crisis. This meant that rather than merely being policy-
pursuers attempting to implement a pre-conceived economic vision, or office-
seekers pursuing popular solutions, they had become managerial reformers. 
Being the administrators in an economic crisis that demanded a return to greater 
business profitability meant that the parties and politicians were pushed to take a 
market liberal approach rather than them voluntarily and deliberately wanting to 
implement the neo-liberal policies demanded by business groups like the 
Business Roundtable.89 
Despite the managerial-reforming nature of the reforms and reformers, the 
leading actors often attempted to sell the reforms as having some theoretical 
basis, which sometimes gave the government the appearance of being policy-
pursuing. As Peter Dorey has argued about Thatcherism in the UK, 'Policies 
89 Business was divided on most economic issues. Throughout the neo-liberal reform period the Manufacturers 
Federation and the Business Roundtable had very different interests and stances on the economic reforms. See 
Roper (1993). 
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have often been adopted in response to extraneous pressures and 
circumstances, even though Governments will usually attempt to present their 
responses as part of their ideological repertoire or long-term strategy' (Dorey, 
1995: p.314). Dorey says, in regard to Thatcherism, that the reforms 'were 
presented as part of an ideological project rather than a pragmatic response to 
unfavourable economic circumstances and constraints' (Dorey, 1995: p.308). It 
seems likely that the reformers often used ideology to justify and sell their 
reforms because it provided some intellectual or reasoned basis for their actions. 
This is a point made by Przeworski in discussing the use of ideology in rightward 
shifts by social democratic parties throughout the world: 
Each of these innovations was rationalized by a theoretical blueprint.... Each policy 
regime found a theoretical articulation founded in contemporary economic theories. 
Even if some ideas were formulated only after the policies they justified were already 
being implemented, they had an autonomous effect on routinizing the particular policy 
regimes by persuading the elites, and even the masses, that these policies are based 
on reason (Przeworski, 2001: p.327). 
In a similar way, Easton has argued the shift in power from the 'old right' to the 
'new right' in the mid-1980s 'could not be justified by an external threat, 
corruption, or communal tensions, as happens in the Third World, so the new 
coup leaders used an ideological justification for their seizure of power. 
Conveniently, the Treasury and the New Right offered such a dogma' (Easton, 
1997a: p.227). Here Easton confirms that the theory of neo-liberalism was more 
of a justification than a cause of reform. Jesson also points out that in the New 
Zealand case, too, the ideology of the reforms came out of the reform process 
rather than the other way around: 'It wasn't a case of political ideas affecting the 
exercise of power, but of the exercise of power producing a change in the 
dominant ideas' (Jesson, 1987a: p.128). 
The story of the restructuring shows, therefore, that crises open up 'policy· 
windows' which, while not always dictating the choice of one particular solution, 
give the administration a few possible courses of action that must be taken, and 
sometimes these are bold ones. In this case, the Fourth Labour Government was 
134 Chapter Two: Post-Consensus Radicalisation 
forced to respond to a crisis of business profitability, with the only viable options 
taking the reformers in a general neo-liberal direction - as was the case in other 
countries because the Keynesian solutions had failed. Taking up the remarkable 
strategy that they did, it seems likely that the Labour reformers were (1) primarily 
reacting to events; (2) also pursuing an ideological policy agenda; and (3) also 
seeking ways to reconfigure that support base in such a way that would facilitate 
their retention of office. These are all compatible and valid explanations, and this 
thesis argues that while much of the literature has focused on the second 
explanation, the first one is the most significant, as the second and third 
explanations have weaknesses that the first overcomes. 
National Party (1984-93) 
On the left-right political spectrum, National had been leap-frogged by the Fourth 
Labour Government implementing its new right revolution, leaving National with 
an ideological identity crisis. Between 1984 and 1987, National was in a state of 
political flux, with the existence of significant and bitter divisions over policy and 
leadership hampering the party.90 Leadership changes heralded continuing 
ideological shifts in direction, with Jim McLay replacing Muldoon in November 
1984 and taking the party on a hard-line neo-liberal road. McLay, a 'moderniser', 
sought to regain National's policy position to the right of Labour by agreeing with 
most of what Douglas had done yet identifying elements of it to criticise.91 
McLay was not, however, able to position National in such a strong policy-
pursuing position, because much of the party was either pragmatically opposed 
90 See: Roberts (1987: ppAO-47), Jesson (1989c), Kelsey (1995: pp.38-39), and McRobie (1990; 1992: pA05). See 
also Jackson and McRobie (1998) who argue that, 'The second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, under the 
leadership of Jim Bolger, witnessed almost bewildering mixtures of Pragmatic Conservatism and Radical 
Conservatism' (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: p.93). For a view from National's right-wing see Richardson (1995, 
chapters four to eight), Goldsmith (1997), and Hames (1995). For a 'left' National view, see: Muldoon (1996), Laws 
(1998a: ppA1-183), and Bolger (1998). 
91 See: Collins (1987: p.162), Upton (1987), Gustafson (1986; chapter four), and Campbell (1985: p.9), 
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to this shift or simply did not agree with the neo-liberal economic philosophy. 
National Party traditionalists were still tied to the postwar consensus and wished 
to take advantage of the discontent that Rogernomics was causing in the 
electorate - especially in National's traditional farming constituency. Therefore 
they wanted National to take a more office-seeking and centrist approach, 
effectively putting the party to the left of Labour on economic issues. These 
traditional and modernising factions became increasingly visible and solid, and 
their existence was apparent in both the party organisation and caucus. 92 
McLay's 16-month attempt to get his party to cross the new economic divide was 
thus halted in March 1986 when he was challenged and replaced by Jim Bolger, 
who then moved the party away from such an ideological (policy-pursuing) 
approach. McLay's downfall was, according to Ruth Richardson, caused by a 
belief amongst MPs that McLay was making the party too radically free-market.93 
National was also divided on societal issues, possessing a dominant social 
conservative faction as well as an increasingly socially liberal component. 
Throughout the mid-1980s, the two major parties were therefore polarised on the 
issue of visits by nuclear ships. Labour had banned nuclear ship visits, and until 
1990 National maintained its support for the ANZUS alliance and therefore also 
for ship visits. On a number of other societal issues the party remained 
conservative. For instance, in 1987 National campaigned on the need for a 
referendum on capital punishment. During this period it also opposed Treaty of 
Waitangi land settlements and the establishment of the Ministry of Women's 
Affairs. 
Throughout the late 1980s National continued Jo be plagued by divisions on 
economic issues. The 'free marketeer' group headed by Ruth Richardson and 
Simon Upton was in open conflict with the populist 'interventionist' faction 
92 See: Jesson (1989c: p.160). 
93 See: Richardson (1995: p.39). Alternatively, McLay's dumping has been seen as a result of taking key National 
politicians off the front bench (Gustafson, 1986: p.164). 
136 Chapter Two: Post-Consensus Radicalisation 
epitomised by Winston Peters and Muldoon. That the party was now led by 
Bolger - a traditional and very pragmatic leader - meant that at the 1987 and 
1990 general elections National had the appearance of renouncing Rogernomics 
and wanting to return to the postwar consensus. Yet as with Labour in 1984, the 
party leadership was being deliberately ambiguous in order to satisfy the left and 
right internal camps.94 However, the party system within Parliament was totally 
mixed up, with more common agreement on many issues existing across party 
lines rather than within the parties. Even in 1987 'National Party politicians 
frequently made speeches, about the closure of hospitals or the reduction of 
protection for industry, for example, that put them closer to the dissident "left" on 
the Government's back bench. Winston Peters could easily have followed his 
party line from within Labour' (James, 1992a: p.256). 
In one sense it might seem surprising that any of these issues caused such a 
problem for National. Traditionally an office-seeking party aligned with 'the 
Establishment',95 National had been relatively unconcerned with ideology and 
political programmes. The adoption of a new programme supported by dominant 
business interests should therefore have been easy for the party. Being 
pragmatic rather than ideological, traditionally National could shift more easily 
than Labour in response to public moods or economic necessity. The first 
problem, however, was that much of the public mood and economic necessity 
pulled in different directions - the reforms were increasingly unpopular with 
voters. The second (related) problem was that National had become 
94 According to Gustafson, 'In economic matters Bolger wanted a pragmatic centre-right party that tried to combine 
features of Muldoon's interventionist and Quigley's free market approaches' (Gustafson, 1986: p.151). 
95 The term Establishment is used to cover what Stallybrass (1988) calls the 'ill defined amalgam of institutions, 
social classes, and forces which represent authority, legitimacy, tradition and the status quo' (Stallybrass 1988: 
p.284 - cited in Easton, 1997b: p.211). Easton (1997b) also says: 'The expression "the Establishment" is used here 
to cover the group of men (and latterly some women) who are most closely involved in the governing of New 
Zealand. It includes key politicians, businesspeople, and public servants who are influential in decision-making, 
have a commonality of vision and a networking of relations. To say there is an establishment is neither paranoid 
nor conspiratorial. Overseas political analysts discuss the notion endlessly, recognising that there is an ambiguity in 
the term and a number of meanings' (ibid: p.211) 
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disconnected from its Establishment (or business base), being surpassed by the 
ruling Labour Party. Generally the National Party had, during the 1970s, become 
much more of a catch-all party than ever before, and the breakdown in the 
party's class ties meant that it was less sensitive to the economic necessity of 
restructuring the economy to improve profitability, while at the same time it was 
more sensitive to the effects of neo-liberal reform on ordinary working class 
voters. Thirdly, as Berman argues, 'A party's sensitivity to changing 
environmental imperatives and its ability to formulate responses to them ... will 
depend on the party's internal configurations' (Berman, 1997: p.11 0). In the case 
of Labour in the 1980s, the party was very easily transformed because of its 
changing class composition, shallow internal democracy, and relatively low 
membership. National, on the other hand, found the transition to neo-liberal 
economics more complicated because it was more of an organisationally 
entrenched mass membership type of party. 96 
Within the party organisation, however, there had been forces attempting to shift 
National's economic ideology to the right since the early 1980s. At this time the 
two top positions were held by party 'modernisers' - Sue Wood (party president) 
and Barrie Leay (general secretary). However, momentum for ideological change 
was lost, first with the departure of Leay, and then in 1986 when Neville Young 
replaced Wood. In 1989, however, Young was replaced by John Collinge, a 
strong advocate of the free market who believed in National completing the 
Roger Douglas programme.97 It was therefore not until that year that National 
properly took up its neo-liberal economic approach and more socially liberal 
policies (a, 1992: p.255). 
96 As will be seen in Chapter Six, such parties have a 'mass membership, formalized interactions among members, 
and a large bureaucracy' which mean that they have 'trouble responding flexibly to challenges' (Berman, 1997: 
p.111 ). 
97 There appeared to be a general consensus within the party in favour of the policies of deregulating the labour 
market and reforming the welfare state. And such policies were hardly surprising in light of National's general 
antipathy towards unions and beneficiaries (James, 1990a: p.69). See also: Kelsey (1995: p.39). 
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Although appearing to be more radical, non-centrist, and policy-pursuing than it 
had been for some time, National in the late-1980s was still a relatively pragmatic 
party. That the National Party was capable of adopting policies for office-seeking 
reasons should be beyond question. Their adoption in 1990 of Labour's policy on 
ANZUS and nuclear-ship visits, for example, was very clearly due to pragmatic 
calculations.98 The ideological nature (or lack thereof) of the party was 
epitomised by the leader. Although sympathetic to market economics, Jim Bolger 
was largely without a personal political philosophy.99 Therefore, for most of the 
Bolger era of the late-1980s National was highly ambivalent towards 
Rogernomics. Richardson notes of the party in 1987, that it was 'Afraid to pin our 
colours to the cause of reform, but also afraid of being painted as Muldoonist, we 
chose a muddled, middle course that was full of contradictions' (Richardson, 
1995: p.38). Therefore the manifesto of that year's election was shaped by 
internal policy battles and lacked any strong ideological coherence. lOO Ironically, 
pragmatism decided the strategy and possibly helped lose the election: 'National 
expected to win the 1987 election on the grounds that Labour could not hurt as 
many people as it was doing in pursuit of economic theory and survive. It took a 
shattering defeat in that election to give the ideas-people in the party the lever 
they needed' (James, 1992a: p.261). 
Following the 1987 defeat Richardson succeeded in becoming 'National's fifth 
finance spokesperson in less than three years' (Richardson, 1995: p.41). By the 
98 According to Wayne Eagleson, National's 1993 campaign director, 'If we hadn't changed our policy, the whole 
election campaign would have been fought on the nuclear issue' (quoted in Nagel, 1998: p.256). 
99 According to James, Bolger 'was in the old functionalist mould .. His mate Bill Birch, architect of the "think big" 
heavy industrialisation programme, was likewise' (James, 1992a: p.261). Later, after' National had adopted and 
implemented its new right programme, Jesson criticised the National cabinet for their lack of principles: 'They are 
people with no definite beliefs. They will accept whatever is convenient, even a nuclear-free foreign policy if that is 
what it takes to ensure public acceptance. People of no definite beliefs can be easily dominated by those with a 
dogmatic point of view, which seems to be what is going on now' (Jesson, 1991 b: p.147). 
100 See: Kelsey (1995: p.39). According to Richardson, 'In the area of the labour market, for instance, our policy 
was weak and half-hearted. There were other elements of our policy that could only be described as Muldoonist, 
such as the pledge to give a subsidy for every new job created in the regions' (Richardson, 1995: p.41). 
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late 1980s, she took on much of the responsibility for assembling National's 
economic policy, and set out to bring National into line with the new deregulated 
economy - most notably in convincing the party to accept the Public Finance Act 
and the Reserve Bank Act (ibid: p.47).101 Both Jim Bolger and the National Party 
then underwent a significant political transformation in the year prior to their 
election to government. Even as late as the beginning of 1990 Bolger announced 
that 'growth would replace low inflation as the principle economic goal under a 
National government, and that National would aim for growth of at least 3 per 
cent. According to [Bolger], Labour's target of 0-2 per cent inflation by 1992 
would be abandoned' (ibid: p.63). Similarly in 1989 Bolger was uncomfortable 
with criticism being made by National that the Labour government was lowering 
import protection too slowly, yet by 1990 he was 'signing up to further reductions 
in import protection' (ibid: p.65). Bolger was not totally converted to a hard-line 
new right position, and in areas such as the superannuation surtax he wanted 
National to commit to repealing Labour's surtax in the first budget instead of just 
the first term (ibid). 
In power between 1990 and 1999, the National Party was often either derided as 
being ideological or respected for displaying conviction, yet it was in fact 
somewhat more pragmatic than history has so far recorded. Certainly at the 
beginning of the National's nine years in office, the more ideological and free-
market orientated MPs such as Ruth Richardson, Simon Upton, John Luxton, 
Maurice Williamson and Max Bradford held sway. They convinced the pragmatic 
middle faction of conservatives like Jim Bolger, Bill Birch, Jenny Shipley, Don 
McKinnon and Doug Kidd to implement much of their radical programme. 
Fighting against this alliance were moderates like Winston Peters, Philip Burdon, 
101 Simon Upton also became a key new right ideologue in the National caucus - but was moderating his economic 
approach. During his time studying at Oxford University in 1988, he moved away 'from the highly individualistic 
brand of liberalism argued by the Austrian anti-fascist Friedrich von Hayek' in favour of more moderate social 
contract theory (James, 1990a: p.73). Likewise, many senior members of the party, such as John Falloon and 
Philip Burdon, remained 'private enterprisers rather than free enterprisers' (James, 1990a: p.75). According to 
James, in 1990 'About half a likely Bolger Cabinet would fit roughly into this description' (ibid). 
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Michael Laws, Christine Fletcher, Wyatt Creech, Peter McCardle and Doug 
Graham. Roughly these factions constituted the right, centre, and left of the 
party.102 The breadth of ideological viewpoints in the National caucus was 
illustrated by the departure of a large number of MPs from the party between 
1991 and 1995. The first to go were the moderate first-term MPs Gilbert Myles 
and Hamish Macintyre, both of whom opposed National's cuts to 
superannuation, health, education and social welfare. Departing in 1991 to set up 
the Liberal Party, Myles and Macintyre's move was highly significant, as this was 
possibly the first time that more than one MP had split from a party in 
Parliament.103 
In its first term in power, the Fourth National Government was undoubtedly a bold 
one. The reformers implemented wave upon wave of unpopular reforms that 
were genuinely radical, pushing into areas that the previous Labour government 
had not been able to agree upon. The 1991 budget, in particular, was the 
defining moment of the Richardson period. It represented a fundamental change 
in social philosophy for the government and was undeniably radical and highly 
ideological. It brought together the various social and economic reform policies of 
the government into one programme. It slashed welfare expenditure, and 
introduced student loans and hospital part-charges. In the same year, the 
introduction of the Employment Contracts Act (ECA) also made fundamental 
changes to workplace conditions, altering labour relations in favour of 
employers.104 The government immediately moved to substantially cut 
government expenditure and rein in the deficit. A central part of this was 
achieved by restructuring the welfare state and cutting benefit payments by $1.6 
billion a year. The government vowed to make the public pay more for their own 
welfare and social services through user part-charges. 
102 See: Trotter (1993e: p.20). 
103 For more on the Liberal Party, see: Laws (1998a: pp.107-108). 
104 However, even in reforming the labour laws, National was viewed by some employers as giving in to the 
pressure of workers by extending the personal grievance procedure to non-un ionised staff and retaining the 
Employment Court (Robertson, 1999b: p.20). 
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National's 1990s programme was largely a continuation of Douglas' economic 
agenda.105 Yet there were differences - particularly in its stronger attempts to 
rein in the fiscal deficit. By extending Labour's economic privatisation forces into 
social policy, National was carrying out what Labour had been unable to agree 
on. Part of the reason for this extremism was because the finance minister, Ruth 
Richardson, was fundamentally a policy-pursuer rather than just a technocrat 
attempting to fix the economy. As James points out: 'Ruth Richardson ... was not 
interested in cutting the Budget deficit simply to make the books look better. As 
she made plain in a number of interviews, cutting the deficit was part of the 
"redesign" of the welfare state, not the other way 'round' (James, 1992c). Also, 
initially Richardson could more easily dominate Cabinet than Roger Douglas had 
been able to because the 1990 National Cabinet contained at least twelve free-
market supporters. i06 Some key National Party MPs were also inclined towards 
policy-pursuing behaviour in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, Simon 
Upton's thinking was very influenced by neo-liberal economists and he influenced 
others (James, 1992a: p.89). The policy pursuers were briefly very dominant in 
the National Government. According to James, Bolger, 'took command of 
Richardson's economic and social policy as his oWn. Birch, from Bolger's 
vintage, was persuaded to a hard line on labour market deregulation. So 
Richardson and Upton, with determined support in social welfare from Jenny 
Shipley who cut benefit rates, stamped the Government with a radical, 
ideological cast' (James, 1993b: p.91). Richardson and her Cabinet supporters 
and Treasury held sway for the first year (or 16 months at most) after which a 
second phase began where reforms slowed in the lead-up to the 1993 
election. i07 
105 The reforms of the incoming government were, although radical, still essentially a continuation of Labour Party 
reforms. As James has put it, the fiscal reforms of Ruth Richardson, 'just carried on a story line already well under 
way' (James, 1993e: p.62). 
106 See: Kelsey (1995: p.41), and Jesson (1992e: p.l6). 
107 According to James, 'For its first nine months in office National was driven by its radical ideologues' (James, 
1993b: p.91). 
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James has identified two major areas where National made significant reforms 
that were more ideological in origin than merely driven by economic exigencies. 
He says that in both social services delivery and income maintenance 'the Bolger 
Government was, uncharacteristically for National, driven by ideas. In carrying 
through some of the not-quite-finished economic changes, it was likewise driven 
by ideas' (James, 1993b: p.82). Likewise, the introduction of the ECA was the 
clearest example of radical ideology at work. According to James, this industrial 
legislation 'was the most extreme deregulation since that of the financial markets 
in 1984-85' (James, 1993e: p.38). Jesson also argued 'that the government's 
policies are motivated by ideology rather than necessity' (Jesson, 1991 d: p.146). 
This was evident, he said, in that many of the key National Government policies 
were not intended to solve budgetary problems: 
The ideological nature of the government's policies is demonstrated by the fact that in 
many cases they will have no effect on the budget deficit at all. The Employment 
Contracts Act is one example. The changes to the structure of the health system are 
another: they are intended to commercialise health spending rather than save money 
(Jesson, 1991d: p.146).108 
Many of these reforms were unsignalled, and viewed by the public as broken 
promises.109 Yet National leaders sought to dispute the idea that the party was 
introducing a hidden ideological agenda by claiming that the reforms were the 
necessary response to the fiscal crisis that National inherited upon its election.110 
After coming to power in November 1990 Bolger and his Cabinet were indeed 
forced to confront the economic problems left by Rogernomics. The government 
was faced with massive company collapses and rocketing unemployment. The 
108 Jesson also argued that despite the radicalism of this period, there was still a foundation of pragmatism to the 
National Government: 'Once its initial conservatism has been overcome, however, National proves to be a 
malleable party because there are no definite principles to be overcome' (Jesson, 1990e: p.151). 
109 See: Miller and Catt (1993), Boston and Dalziel (1992), and James (1992a: pp.272-273). 
110 This was somewhat disingenuous however, as the National Party's 1990 election platform was drawn up in full 
knowledge of the real fiscal position of the government, and Bolger and Richardson had argued in the election 
campaign that Labour's forecast budget surplus was a sham. See: Jesson (1991c) and Dalziel (1992). 
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case of the neo-liberal policy-pursuers was augmented by the immediate 
dilemma of the Bank of New Zealand near-insolvency111 and the government's 
fiscal crisis. Treasury advice was that the state's spending crisis 'could be met 
only with drastic spending cuts' (James, 1993e: p.33). Bolger's situation was 
remarkably akin to that which David Lange found himself in when coming into 
government in 1984. In both eras the prime ministers were forced to respond to 
crises, and did so with tough policies that allowed them to appear as strong 
reformers. 112 Richardson and Treasury presented Bolger with the practical 
solutions that involved cutting social services expenditure and continuing 
deregulation and restructuring. Being ideologically weak himself, Bolger was 
initially susceptible to being carried away with Richardson's ideological 
programme. He signed up to the programme completely and helped the hard-line 
right of the party defend their initiatives against critical backbench MPs. But even 
within the Cabinet, ministers like Wyatt Creech were unconvinced of the 
extremity of the reforms and constantly struggled against Richardson's agenda. 
He was sometimes supported by other moderates such as Birch, Burdon and 
Graham. 
In non-economic politics the Bolger Government proved to be characterised by 
both conservatism and liberalism. As James argues, the government was 
'conservative in the sense of the centrality of the family in social and individual 
affairs, preferring minimal change, operating and preserving the status quo and 
taking an interventionist moral stance on, for example, crime and punishment, 
religion, [and] pornography' (James, 1993b: p.92). And, of course, on law and 
order issues the National Government was unsurprisingly conservative, bringing 
in harsher sentences and 900 more police. Also,' in making John Banks the 
Minister of Police, National had a very conservative law and order minister.113 On 
111 See: Trotter (1999d: p.16), 
112 See: James (1993e: p.32), and McLoughlin (1997d: pAO), 
113 James also labelled Shipley's welfare reforms as socially conseNative rather than economically liberal: 'In 
formulating post-1990 social security policy Shipley explicitly required young solo mothers and unemployed to look 
first to their families before turning to the state for help. The standdown period for newly unemployed was partly 
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environmental issues the government was also more conservative than Labour. 
In 1992 the Government abandoned the target set by the Labour Government of 
reducing carbon emissions by 20 per cent. It also 'slightly relaxed conditions on 
logging native forests', while 'changes to resource management law in 1993 
weakened the protection for the Queen's chain beside all waterways' (James, 
1993e: p.61). Furthermore, the Department of Conservation's budget was also 
cut each year in real terms (ibid). 
Yet the new government was not entirely conservative on societal issues -
National also inherited and adopted socially liberal positions from the outgoing 
Labour Government, such as the 'anti-nuclear defence policy, commitment to 
accord partner status to Maori and much greener resource management 
proposals' (James, 1993b: p.82). Also, James argued that on the issue of 
homosexual rights, 'The party of deep moral and civil rights conservatism, 
however, proved surprisingly liberal' (James, 1993e: p.S7). And while National 
had previously suggested that it might close down the Ministry of Women's 
Affairs, Jenny Shipley heaped praise on the ministry and it survived the 
government's review. In race relations, too, a new consensus began to form in 
1990 when it gained the strong support of Bolger and Treaty Negotiations 
Minister Doug Graham. Prior to this - and as late as 1988 and 1989 - Bolger had 
attacked the Labour Government's Treaty settlements. After becoming prime 
minister, however, he claimed the initiative and courage of settling Treaty 
gri evances .114 
intended to encourage a family-orientated first response. A classical liberal approach would focus on each 
individual separately, regardless of family context. The family focus reminds us of the conservatism [of the National 
Party], (James, 1993b: p.93). 
114 See: Hubbard (1999b: p.C6), and James (19940: p.15), 
Chapter Two: Post-Consensus Radicalisation 145 
The New Parties (1989-93) 
In the 1989-93 period, a number of new minor parties were - mostly -
established to further various ideological causes. The establishment of these 
principle-based vehicles brought about an increase in the policy-pursuing 
propensity and radicalism of the New Zealand party system. These included the 
NewLabour Party (which formed in 1989 and contested the 1990 general election 
before forming the Alliance), the Christian Heritage Party (which formed in 1989 
and has contested each election since, including the 1996 election as part of the 
Christian Coalition), the Green Party (which formed in 1990 and contested every 
election since, including the 1993 and 1996 elections as part of the Alliance), Act 
(which first formed in 1992 and has contested every election since 1996), and the 
New Zealand First party (which formed in 1993 and has contested every election 
since). All these parties were at their most radical in this 1984-93 era, before 
moderating themselves in the post-1993, MMP transition period. Mostly they 
embodied centrifugal competition and policy-pursuing behaviour. 
NewLabour Party 
As a direct result of the Labour Party's lurch to the right after 1984, the 
NewLabour Party was formed in April 1989 to fill the gap left unoccupied by 
Labour on the left of the political spectrum. By calling themselves the NewLabour 
Party the founders indicated that they believed that they were the real Labour 
Party and that they intended to supplant the old Labour Party as the mass social 
democratic party in New Zealand. However, the formation of the NLP involved 
not only ex-Labour Party members but also a number of left-wing groups, 
independent socialists, and those political activists drawn from the 'new social 
movements' - all of which pushed the party to be more radical than its leader, 
Jim Anderton, wanted it to be. This 'splinter party' was clearly a policy-pursuing 
party, and initially the NLP contained substantial debate and interest in issues of 
socialism. This was reflected in the party constitution asserting the desire to build 
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a 'sustainable socialist society'. The ideology of the NLP was a diverse affair, 
reflecting the nature of the party membership's diffuse beliefs and political 
backgrounds. Its economic framework represented a defence of the 
achievements of the first three Labour governments. An NLP government would, 
therefore, attempt to roll back the economic reforms of the Fourth Labour 
Government and reintroduce a comprehensive wage-earners welfare state. This 
involved a high taxation policy and universalist welfare measures. However, this 
essentially 'statist' ideology was mixed with a somewhat contradictory emphasis 
on 'community control' of many non-economic affairs. 
These traditional social democratic politics were blended with some 
postmaterialist values - due primarily to the existence of a strong social liberal 
grouping in the party. For example, the NLP's strong environmental identification 
was recreated as a form of 'eco-socialism'. The radical left with backgrounds in 
Marxist politics were also influential in creating an internationalist ideology 
present in the party's foreign policy. The diverse nature of the NLP origins served 
to determine that rather than being simply another labour party, a social 
movement, or a revolutionary party, initially it was, instead, a new kind of hybrid 
- albeit one heavily dominated by the ideology of social democracy. In the end, 
the policies that the NLP offered electors in 1990 were reflective of its dominant 
ideology of belief in a strong state. Of particular importance to the party's election 
platform was re-nationalisation of state assets, the heavy re-regulation of the 
economy, and a high taxation and expenditure policy. 
Christian Heritage Party 
The New Zealand party system had been relatively unaffected by religion, lacking 
overtly religious parties.115 But this changed with the creation in July 1989 of the 
Christian Heritage Party (CHP). The CHP was initially a hard-line party of the 
115 See Chapter Four. Some parties have, however, at times had strong religious internal elements and electoral 
support. 
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right, with very conservative social policies and extreme free-market economic 
policies. This traditional Christian party was generally judged at this time to be 
'considerably to the "right" of National' (James, 1993j: p.140). It was a classic 
ideologically-motivated cause party. According to Trotter, the impetus for the 
founding of Christian Heritage 'came from the evangelical churches' experience 
of the Homosexual Law Reform Bill debate in the late 1980s .... This failure 
prompted a number of fundamentalist and conservative Christians, especially 
from the Baptist community, to try their luck in the electoral marketplace' (Trotter, 
2000b: p.1S). Reflective of these more traditional and conservative churches, the 
party published a manifesto in 1990 that was remarkably right-wing. Even party 
leader, Graham Capill commented a decade later that, 'Our original manifesto 
sometimes put things very harshly and lacked compassion' (quoted in Bain, 
2000a: p.12).116 
The 1990 election platform was strictly biblical and made a strong pitch for the 
conservative family values vote (Campbell, 1996b). The manifesto showed the 
party to be anti-abortion, pro-censorship, anti-homosexual, and in favour of the 
death penalty. The party was fiercely anti-collective in ideology, and this was 
reflected in its economic policies, where the party wanted the new right reforms 
carried much further. For example, the CHP wanted a negligible welfare safety 
net, and public health replaced by a compulsory health insurance scheme.117 
Green Party 
The Green Party traces its origins back to the Values Party. Like that party, the 
Greens started life with a very diverse set of philosophies and personnel. The 
party was created out of the revival of political environmentalism in the late-
116 See also: James (1993p: pp.1 06-1 07). James characterises the party as Christian 'fundamentalist'. 
117 In the 1990 election, Christian Heritage stood in 18 electorates, winning 9591 votes or 0.5 percent of votes cast. 
It improved its vote in 1993, standing in 98 seats, winning 2 percent of votes, and performing very well in the 
regions. 
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1980s when various environmental candidates contested local body elections 
throughout New Zealand. Various green strands then came together in May 1990 
and formed the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand. It fought the 1990 general 
election, winning an average 8.9 percent of the vote in those electorates it 
contested and 6.3 percent of the total national vote. 
The Green Party of 1990 was notable for its genuinely anti-party and anti-political 
nature.118 Consequently much of the identity and nature of the party was based 
around issues of process rather than politics. A central belief in decentralised 
democracy guided them from the start, and compared to today's professionalized 
and institutionalised Green Party, the original party was rather utopian and 
amateur. Instead of operating like the other parties, the Greens spurned 
conventional leaders, policies and politics, which helped them capitalise on 
widespread voter discontent. The new party was thoroughly postmaterialist, with 
policies that indicated the influence of members who had been involved in 
progressive politics against war, racism, and sexism. In this sense the party was 
a continuation of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. As well as 
having radical views on environmentalism and decentralised democracy, the 
party also heralded issues like republicanism. Although in 1990 the party had 
little agreed upon policy, various candidates spoke about many controversial 
issues, such as marijuana legalisation, voluntary euthanasia, republicanism and 
so on. The Greens therefore were perceived as a radical challenge to 
mainstream materialistic culture. 
From their founding, the Greens involved a coalition of at least three tendencies: 
pragmatic environmentalists, eco-socialists, an"d the more mystical green 
lifestylers.119 The eco-socialists come out of a radical tradition of building an 
118 A large element of the Green Party was an emphasis that 'was very much on building an "anti party party" with a 
strong regional focus' (Rainbow, 1991 b: p.88). 
119 In other countries, and in particular Germany, it is more common to distinguish between the 'realos' and the 
'fundis'. The realos - or 'pragmatic environmentalists' - are more interested in parliamentary results and 
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egalitarian society and believe in some sort of class struggle. The pragmatic 
environmentalists are more narrowly concerned about protecting the environment 
and are therefore not necessarily left-wing or right-wing - and some in the 
Greens definitely came from both sides. Such people often came out of action-
focused green groups. The mystical green lifestylers are sometimes referred to 
as the hippies, 'who see being green as a question of lifestyle based on a quasi-
religious holistic paradigm' (Rainbow, 1991 a: p.31). According to James, they 
'have an almost mystic approach valuing intuition over rational science and 
extolling wholeness and spirituality in contrast to the one-dimensional focus they 
see in industrial societies' (James, 1993p: p.1 01). 
At this time the Greens were of an ambiguous political persuasion involving 
candidates and members from across the political spectrum. Leaders like 
Stephen Rainbow were of a definite right-wing ideology,120 while future Green 
MP and ex-Communist Sue Bradford joined for only four months finding the party 
far too conservative and later declaring her involvement an embarrassing 
mistake. According to one report, 'Bradford says she found the Greens to be 
either ignorant of or hostile to worker and union issues. She describes two kinds 
of Greens: hippie dropouts content to make pots, be creative and smoke dope; 
and those who are quite right wing, "who think it's fine to send the unemployed 
out to work for the dole as long as it's work that is environmentally sound like 
cutting bush tracks'" (Legat, 1993: p.68).121 
At various stages since the formation of the party in 1990, the strength and 
influence of these tendencies has changed dramatically. At its launch, all three 
tendencies were strong, but due to the ethereal nature of the party organisation 
there was no real indication of what the strengths of the tendencies were and the 
pragmatism while the fundis - or 'eco-socialists' and 'green lifestylers' - have taken more uncompromising and 
principled decisions. 
120 Rainbow, along with Guy Salmon of the Mariua Society, later stood as National Party candidates in 2002. 
121 Later in 1999, Bradford returned to the Green Party and became a list MP in the election of that year. 
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three competing tendencies prevented anyone message being delivered to 
voters in 1990. Following the election the opportunity of becoming involved in the 
Alliance pushed some of the mystics and conservative pragmatists out of the 
party. The eco-socialist tendency then dominated. 
In 1991 the party decided to involve itself in the new Alliance party being formed, 
and this decision put the Green Party on a definite left-wing trajectory.122 Leaders 
like Rainbow became marginalized and left the party. The departure of such 
pragmatic environmentalists led to the formation of the separate Progressive 
Green Party, and some of the departing mystic-oriented environmentalists set up 
the Green Society. These departures further pushed the Green Party towards a 
left-wing programme more in-line with the dominant group in the Alliance, the 
leftist NewLabour Party. 
The Alliance 
Contributing to the Labour Party's downfall at the 1990 general election were the 
four parties of Mana Motuhake, the Greens, the Democrats and the NLP,123 who 
all competed in that election in opposition to neo-liberal economic policies. 
Because of this common opposition to Labour and National policies, after the 
election a formal alliance was proposed. The Alliance was then formed in 
December 1991 and shortly after was joined by the Liberals, which was a splinter 
party headed by two former National MPs, Gilbert Myles and Hamish Mcintyre, 
122 Upton saw the Greens as having signed up to a hard-left programme and orientation: 'a large part of the Green 
movement has gravitated toward very traditional (and conservative) bastions of social dissent: the hard (and often 
academic) left with its romantic attachment to class theories, organised labour and conspiracy theories about 
business and politics' (Upton, 1995c: p.8). 
123 In the elections NewLabour polled 5.2 per cent of the vote, the Greens 6.3 per cent, and the Democrats 1.7 per 
cent. Mana Motuhake ran second to Labour in the four Maori seats, with its leader Matiu Rata nearly winning 
Northern Maori. Jim Anderton the NewLabour leader won the Christchurch electorate of Sydenham, becoming the 
first MP to resign from his party and be re-elected for another party. 
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who had resigned from their party due to their disillusionment with the National 
Government's cuts to superannuation, health, education and social welfare. 
The Alliance effectively established itself as a left critic of Labour and National, 
promising to oppose privatisation and to re-establish the welfare state. The core 
element of the Alliance was the NLP, which saw itself as a socialist party, and 
was initially successful in pushing the Alliance to adopt leftist policies on both 
social and economic issues. In the context of the times, the initial set of policies 
were relatively radical - even if by Western European or pre-1984 New Zealand 
standards the Alliance policies would have been regarded as a moderate social 
democratic programme. The Alliance supported public ownership and 
government intervention in the economy, with a major goal of full employment. 
The party clearly stood for higher and more progressive taxes, increased social 
spending, universal 'free' public education and health, a $1 billion public works 
programme and industry protection. It promised to restructure Treasury, and to 
shift the Reserve Bank Act's focus from low inflation to jobs and regional 
development. Foreign currency exchange would be regulated. Welfare benefits 
would be returned to their pre-April 1 1991 levels. Government expenditure 
would immediately increase by $2.6 billion, mostly funded by $2.2 billion in higher 
taxes, with the rest from borrowing. The leader of the party, Jim Anderton, also 
suggested nationalising the steel, airline and energy industries (Campbell, 1989: 
p.16). 
The Alliance's relative radicalism and opposition to the economic consensus of 
Labour and National lifted the party onto a wave of popular support, which was 
reflected in opinion polls that often gave them over 30 percent support. The party 
was buoyed because it shared and amplified voters' great disillusionment and 
distrust of the political system and culture that had been brought about by Labour 
and National's policy 'betrayals'. The Alliance was also positively associated with 
the transition to MMP (which it had strongly advocated for), and a supposed 'new 
type of politics'. 
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In the 1993 general election, at which the deeply unpopular National government 
barely retained office, the Alliance won 18.2 per cent of the vote. The vagaries of 
the old FPTP electoral system meant, however, that the Alliance won only two 
seats. Jim Anderton won his Sydenham seat with a huge vote majority, and in 
Auckland Sandra Lee won a particularly symbolic victory in unseating right-wing 
Labour MP Richard Prebble in the electorate of Auckland Central. Lee defeated 
the standard-bearer for Rogernomics and came to personify the Alliance's 
progressive nature. She was the first Maori woman to win a general electorate 
seat. 
New Zealand First 
When he formed New Zealand First in 1993, Winston Peters claimed his party 
would be a centre one. But rather than just positioning the party in the middle of 
the political spectrum and being centrist on all issues, Peters took up positions 
that were left on some issues and right on others.124 In this way, New Zealand 
First avoided being squeezed by the parties on either side, and was able to 
represent itself to the discontented voter as a party which was radical without 
being strongly associated with the left or right. Sometimes political commentators 
therefore mistook the party as a left-wing one, and other times as a right-wing 
one. More accurately, the party could be described as one of populist 
nationalism.125 The new name of the party was also the same as the title of a 
124 According to Jesson, 'Peters actually straddles the extremes, being more anti-capitalist than the Alliance on 
financial matters and a populist Muldoonist on social and moral issues' (Jesson, 1994: p.108). Nagel has also 
argued that a centre party must deviate from the mushy-middle of the political spectrum so that voters have a 
reason to support it. He points out that voters are attracted to parties which exhibit a more extreme positioning than 
themselves (Nagel, 1994b: p.156). 
125 From the beginning, New Zealand First was distinctly populist in its ideology. This was apparent, firstly, in that 
the party was being 'built not around a programme but protest at the policy changes since 1984' (James, 1993p: 
p.109). As Hames noted of the party's launch, 'There was no small measure of populist xenophobia in Peters' 
launch address. He told his audience the government had sold assets to people who did not even speak our 
language' (Hames, 1995: pp.192-193). 
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publication put out by the far-right League of Rights in Auckland in the early 
1980s. The party colours of black and white and the party logo also fitted in with 
the dominant nationalistic image. 
During the party's early years, it was distinctly not part of the Establishment. On 
economic matters it was well outside of the Labour-National economic 
consensus, advocating greater social spending, government intervention and 
economic nationalism - which appeared to align the party with the Alliance. 126 In 
fact, in 1993 New Zealand First's economic ideology was not dissimilar from the 
Alliance's, basically advocating a return to the more controlled and insulated 
economy of pre-Douglas years. Its election policy contained many overtly left-
wing policies. For example, their 1993 tertiary education policy promised to 
abolish tertiary fees and cancel all student loan obligations. The party was also 
radical in its opposition to 'bulk funding of teachers' salaries, students' fees, user-
pays and privatising moves in health, and asset- and income-testing of elderly 
beneficiaries and superannuitants, as well as its enthusiastically regulatory 
approach to environment policy' (James, 1995j: p.17). Peters also criticised the 
Employment Contracts Act, and voted for an Opposition bill aiming to set up a 
council to draft new legislation. Another indication of the party's dissatisfaction 
with the new economic framework was Peters' private members bill to include 
employment along with low inflation as one of the objectives of the Reserve 
Bank. 
Suspicion of big business was central to the political-economic identity of New 
Zealand First. Peters also made opposition to foreign investment a key part of 
New Zealand First's political platform. This left-glaze of anti-internationalism and 
opposition to deregulation obscured the real political nature of New Zealand 
First's more reactionary and conservative ideology. Instead of being seen as left-
wing, James suggests that New Zealand First can be seen, 
126 Most political commentators and voters initially mistook New Zealand First's signals of disgruntlement with the 
new political order as indicating the essentially left-wing nature of the party. 
154 Chapter Two: Post-Consensus Radicalisation 
as a poujadist or 'small-people's right wing', the sort of illiberalism mixed with fear that 
fuels xenophobia, racism and opposition to migration and minorities, which is as wont to 
turn on 'bludgers off welfare' as on big foreign companies and which seeks solace in 
strong, protective government (James, 1997a: p.77). 
While the left-wing nature of even these economic positions is debatable, the 
party's positioning on many other issues has clearly been right-wing. For 
example, New Zealand First's early positions on social issues, such as 
immigration, law and order, and gender relations, clearly cast it as a conservative 
party in the tradition of Robert Muldoon. 
A tough line on immigration was central to the party's identity from the start, with 
Peters suggesting that immigrants were taking the jobs of New Zealanders. 
Therefore, as distinct from the Alliance's nationalism, Peters' party's anti-
internationalism was largely founded on ill-liberalism, rather than any coherent 
'leftism'. Despite their competition for similar types of voters, New Zealand First 
possessed an inherent right-wing conservatism that was not ingrained in the 
Alliance's political character. It seems that while the Alliance and Labour had 
enthusiastically embraced the 'new politics' of the new social movements, New 
Zealand First set itself apart by its adoption of old-style social conservatism. For 
example, in the 1993 general election, it chose not to have a policy for women 
but instead, a 'family' policy (McLeay, 1994: p.57). In this policy, the party 
illustrated its socially conservative credentials by stating that the party was 
committed to the concept of 'the family as the keystone of Society'. 
Act New Zealand 
Act New Zealand began life in 1992, not as a political party, but as a lobby group 
called the 'Association of Consumers and Taxpayers'. Only later, after two years, 
did it metamorphose into a parliamentary-focused political party.127 Its driving 
127 Act officially became a political party in November 1994. However it was not until February 27, 1995 that the 
party was officially launched, and then in April ran its first concentrated media campaign as a party. 
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force was former Labour Finance Minister, Roger Douglas.128 His new vehicle 
was a radical new right force that was serious about substantially changing New 
Zealand society. Act became known for promoting very low taxes, a minimal 
state, increased individual responsibility, and a general continuation of the new 
right 'revolution'. The essence of Act's philosophy was a strong belief in 
deregulated markets and a minimal state. 'Anti-welfarism' also played a central 
role in Act's ideology. Intrinsic to the 'Act idea' is that the consumer should have 
access to quality welfare, although the state should have little to do with actual 
provision, instead giving the necessary minimal regulation and supervision of that 
provision. 
Douglas' book Unfinished Business was essentially the party's founding 
document, and Douglas played the role of the party's guru or thinker. In reality, 
however, Act's political ideology was derived from the political economy of Milton 
Friedman and Frederick A Hayek, and therefore Unfinished Business can be 
read as representing the views of Hayek and Friedman as applied to New 
Zealand. Act's early economic platform was a relatively radical agenda, and one 
that reflected the party's adherence to Hayekian economics. To Hayek, state 
economic intervention was inherently totalitarian. 
Market libertarians within Act were motivated by the pursuit of policy more than 
office, and early in its life, Act presented itself clearly as an overtly ideologically-
focused party advocating a minimum state. The harder-line faction of the party 
pushed for the party to stand on a platform of an unfettered free market society, 
liberated from all state interference, except on 'necessary' intervention to ensure 
the maintenance of law and order - in particular the protection of private 
property. Roger Douglas was personally opposed to state involvement in 
everything from health care to fire-fighting. Likewise, even Richard Prebble was 
on record saying that the state should be limited to a role of minimal regulation of 
128 Ex-Cabinet Minister and National MP, Derek Quigley, was also important in the founding of the Act. He became 
deputy leader of the party and an Act MP (1996-99). 
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enterprise and that of ensuring law and order - although he conceded that much 
of the law and order operations could also be contracted out to private firms 
(Kilroy, 30 April 1996: p.9). Therefore Act presented itself as a new political 
paradigm. The party initially promised measures such as privatising social 
services, halving the government's bureaucracy, reducing income tax to zero and 
introducing educational vouchers. 
According to its early platform, an Act government would abolish income tax 
(implementing this in progressive stages); require a degree of compulsion in 
making people provide for their own social services such as health, education 
and insurances; privatise all the government's trading activities; set a goal for the 
state to only own and operate the nation's defence, foreign policy, justice and 
administrative government issues - thus devolving more and more social 
services to private sector providers (although still retaining state-provided 
options); abolish all labour market restrictions; and deregulate wherever possible 
to minimise state interference in business (Clifton, 1998b: p.36). 
Conclusion 
The swing to the left in the 1993 general election signalled that the neo-liberal 
economic revolution was over.129 The period of political radicalism had lasted 
nearly a decade - 1984 to 1993. Preceding this had been 50 years of relative 
political continuity, based upon economic prosperity. When these positive 
economic conditions evaporated in the early 1970s, so too did the historic 
political settlement. A decade of political flux then occurred, leading up to what 
has been called New Zealand's 'revolution'. For both main parties it was a 
traumatic period. National has traditionally been relatively non-ideological, but 
129 James argues that, 'The period between 1984 and 1992 was a rare ascendancy of radicals over conservatives 
and liberals. In 1993 voters, in reaction against that radicalism, came within a few votes of hanging the Parliament' 
(James, 1998b: p.27). 
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since the breakdown of the historic compromise in the early-1970s, the party has 
been pushed through two intensely ideological and disorientating phases. Firstly, 
under Muldoon, National pursued a variation of social democracy, then in the 
late-1980s and early-1990s it adopted a highly-radical version of economic neo-
liberalism. Labour was also ideologically affected, implementing an economic 
programme that was diametrically opposed to its original principles. This internal 
contradiction was not easily resolvable, leading to the left-NLP split off and the 
right-Act split off. 
Although the party system was revitalised from the mid-1980s by this centrifugal 
competition and move away from simple office-seeking behaviour, it was not a 
return to traditional forms of party conflict. I n the mid-1980s the 'old division of 
New Zealand politics between a slightly more individualistic National Party [that] 
represented generally the better off and a slightly more collectivist Labour Party 
representing generally the less well off was cut across at right angles' (James, 
1990b: p.66). This contributed to the breaking up of the old party system and the 
introduction of a number of significant new parties with sometimes radical 
policies. 
This period of political radicalism helped split up the duopoly in New Zealand 
politics. Prior to this, the two catch-all parties of 'Labour and National could 
encompass the full range of opinions over the limited number of contentious 
issues, while still competing for the elusive centre of politics - and without 
collapsing into factions' (Aimer, 2001: p.273). However, by the end of this period, 
society could no longer be contained within this schema. The societal conditions 
for two-party politics began to wane. As Aimer has argued, 'the "spread of 
opinion" was widening, especially along the crucial socio-economic policy 
dimension. Imported neo-liberal doctrines were responsible for wedging the 
political left and right further apart than at any time in the postwar period' (ibid: 
p.274). 
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As this chapter has attempted to portray, the radical period of 1984-93 was not 
merely created by policy-pursuing behaviour, nor by office-seeking motivations, 
but also by a third variant - managerial-reforming actions. Ideology definitely 
played a strong part, but the radicalism of party politics in the 1980s and early 
1990s was primarily due to changing economic conditions necessitating reform. 
In James' assessment: 
What happened in the 1980s was that the prosperity consensus collapsed and a policy 
vacuum resulted. A small number of people of like mentality found themselves with the 
task of filling that policy vacuum. They filled it with policies drawn from theories which 
were at hand and which, as it happened, fitted their mentality (James, 1992a: p.237). 
This chapter has also disputed the idea that both the postwar and post-1984 
periods represented ideologically extreme cases - that the first era constituted a 
doctrinaire-socialist-Ieft regime, and the second era constituted a doctrinaire-right 
regime. In regard to the first (consensus) period of 1945-75, the chapter makes 
the point that the social democratic policy regime persisted so long after the 
election of the First Labour Government because it was an arrangement that was 
not only affordable in the long postwar boom years, but also because it actually 
bolstered capitalism. In regard to the second (radical) period of 1975-93, the 
chapter argues that although the economic reforms brought about by the Lange 
and Bolger governments were sweeping and fundamentally right-wing, the 
doctrinaire nature of these reforms has been exaggerated by some 
commentators. Both periods were about effectively managing the economic 
system in ways that suited the changing conditions. 
The post-1984 governments were undoubtedly more ideological in their 
objectives and approach than previous post-war governments, but nonetheless 
they had been repeatedly compelled to react to problems and events as and 
when they emerged, whilst simultaneously having to acknowledge the practical 
problems of pursuing certain policies in view of the economic, international and 
political constraints impinging upon them. Likewise, all of the political parties 
have been influenced by phenomena, other than simply ideology, that have 
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made them take certain decisions that have made them more radical and 
polarised than would normally be expected in New Zealand society. However, 
while many political parties were undoubtedly radical in this period, the next 
chapter illustrates how this all changed after 1993. 
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Chapter Three 
The Post-Reform Consensus (1993-2003) 
After the policy upheavals of the 1980s and early 1990s, a new consensus has 
developed in the New Zealand party system, and political parties are becoming 
oriented to a 'new centre' on the political spectrum. This new policy regime is one 
in which the parties agree on the basic policy parameters in which New Zealand 
politics operate. The spread of opinion has narrowed considerably within the 
party system, and the flank parties to the left and right of the new centre are not 
pushing for a total overturn of the status quo. Conflict between parties still exists, 
but it is less severe and is not based on such sharp ideological differences. 
The re-orientation of the parties to the new centre does not mean that they have 
moved back to the centrist position that existed before the neo-liberal reforms 
commenced in the mid-1980s, but that those reforms have established a new 
policy marker for what is 'normal', 'common sense' or mainstream. The new 
centre is generally much further to the right than it was prior to 1984, and it is 
generally more socially liberal as well. It means that after a turbulent period of 
party and ideological breakdown and rearrangement, a new orthodoxy has been 
created, which has narrow parameters and asser:ts a strong pull on today's 
parties. Although it is to the right of the old centre of politics, the new centre is 
also one that has retreated from the extreme position that National and Labour 
were advocating in the 1980s and early-1990s. The neo-liberal reforms have 
been deemed to have gone too far, and the new centre therefore involves a 
'corrective' that nearly all the parties in Parliament implicitly endorse. 
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The shift by New Zealand's political parties towards a new centre of the political 
spectrum is made clear by the fact that there is now a real lack of significant 
disagreement among the parties on economic policy fundamentals, as the parties 
all share similar principles and assumptions.1 Indeed, the 2002 general election 
showed that there were few significant economic issues that separated the two 
main parties. The content of recent Labour and National election manifestos 
reveal that these parties are now in broad agreement on all the major economic 
issues. Basically they both believe in free trade, free enterprise, mild 
interventionism, the Reserve Bank Act, low taxation, debt repayment, leaner 
government, balanced budgets, and to a lesser extent the current industrial 
relations framework. On all these issues the minor political parties are also 
increasingly in agreement or at least not stressing their disagreement anymore. It 
is this shift towards the centre by the minor parties that has allowed the 
establishment of a durable new consensus. And even on non-economic issues -
or 'societal' issues - nowadays most parties are never too far apart; in particular 
they have similar policies on immigration, law and order, education, race 
relations, the environment and foreign policy. However, some differences do still 
exist in these areas and therefore such issues have become points on which 
parties can illustrate their distinctions from one another. 
This chapter attempts to show that the parties now have more in common than 
they have differences, and that consequently, and contrary to popular belief, 
none are espousing much that is radical. More than ever before they all claim to 
represent an orthodox or common sense politics rather than any sort of 
innovative transformation of society. Politicians of most parties have therefore 
had great difficulty since the mid-1990s in asserting what is distinct about their 
particular party. This chapter .also tells the story of this ideologically empty period 
using the same theoretical framework as Chapter Two - describing the nature of 
1 As political reporter Richard Harman put it, 'it sometimes seems as though we are living in a one-party 
state in which mainstream thinking on most topics and the ideology and programme of the Government have 
converged' (Harman, 2002: p.i). 
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political action as being based on three different types of orientation: the pursuit 
of policy, the seeking of office, or the management of reforms in times of 
difficulty. Policy-pursuers act according to the basic long-standing political values 
that they hold - often reflecting the interests of key constituencies; Office-seekers 
are much more flexible with regard to their policy commitments, rationally 
reacting to the distribution of political preferences in the electorate; Managerial-
reformers take on the actions required by the state to administer or conserve 
society, sometime through radical change. It is argued here, that the creation of 
this new centre has involved parties returning to an office-seeking emphasis. 
After the success of the neo-liberal reforms in returning New Zealand business to 
profitability, the managerial-reforming behaviour discussed in Chapter Two is 
now less necessary. Similarly, policy-pursuing is also less common. Instead, the 
bold programmes of New Zealand political parties of the 1980s and early-1990s 
have been replaced by cautious status quo collections of policies that stress their 
orthodoxy, and reflect the dominance of electoral pragmatism in this period.2 In 
this sense, the party system is characterised by both ideological convergence 
and a declining emphasis on ideology - both of which were defined in Chapter 
One as constituting an erosion of ideology. 
Timeframe and Overview 
This chapter examines the nature of party ideology in the ten-year period since 
MMP was voted in. Part One examines the shifts in party ideology concerning 
economics over the 1993-2003 period. It uses the timeframe of the parliamentary 
election cycle as a natural structuring for examining ideological change. The first 
period examined is the period 1993-96, during which the party system evolved in 
the transition towards the first MMP election of 1996, and the major parties 
2 Therefore this ideological transformation of party politics in the 1990s is apparent in two ways. Firstly, there 
is an ideological convergence in the sense that there has been a movement by the parties away from the 
extremes and towards a new centre of the political spectrum, and secondly there has been a general 
exhaustion of ideology, in that principle and philosophy are less central to the operations and nature of the 
parties - and office-seeking characterises the motives of most parties. 
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converged even further.3 This convergence was centred around a small 
movement back from the extremes of neo-liberalism - or at least a general halt to 
its progression. Also during this time, the existing main parties fragmented, new 
parties arose, and the minor parties moderated their ideology in readiness for 
coalition governing. This involved all the parties edging closer to the newly 
established policy markers - for example Act became less purist in its neo-
liberalism, and the Alliance and New Zealand First abandoned significant 
elements of their anti-neo-liberal programmes. After the transition to MMP the 
'new consensus' settled in - especially with the retreat from neo-liberalism by 
Labour and National in the 1996-99 period. Hence the policy marker moved 
leftwards, effectively allowing the parties opposed to neo-liberalism (the Alliance, 
New Zealand First, and the Greens) to be able to join the new consensus. The 
1999-2002 period consolidated the new consensus, especially due to the election 
of the Labour-Alliance Government which largely adhered to the neo-liberal 
framework, removing any threat that it would be dismantled. 
Part Two of this chapter examines the nature of party conflict on the 
'postmaterialist' dimension of party competition. It is argued that the strong 
convergence on economic issues has pushed the parties to compete more on 
this alternative dimension of issues. Although the parties still share many similar 
non-economic policies, they increasingly differentiate themselves by emphasising 
(or exaggerating) their differences in these areas. In Part Three, the nature and 
elements of this new consensus are discussed. It is argued that the consensus is 
a negative one, characterised by a conservative approach to change, an 
exhaustion of principles and policy, and thus the New Zealand party system has 
increasingly become dominated by trivial and personality politics .. 
3 Chapter Two ended with the 1990-93 period, where the party system was relatively radical - being both 
ideologically centrifugal in competition, and containing many parties that were mostly not characterised by 
an office-seeking emphasis. 
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This chapter utilises the results from the survey of political scientists in New 
Zealand conducted for this thesis, which asked respondents to locate the 
positions of the parties on a left-right scale where 0 equalled 'totally left' and 10 
equalled 'totally right'. It also allowed respondents to create additional scales to 
represent any other significant political conflicts they identified. The survey was 
carried out in 2003 but asked respondents to classify the parties on where they 
were positioned at the 2002 election. The results are compared with an earlier 
version of the same survey carried out in 1997 (but based on the 1996 general 
election) by Brechtel and Kaiser (1999). 
Part One: The Economic Consensus 
It was on economic issues that the New Zealand party system was most divided 
during the 1984-93 decade of reform, and it is now in this area that the greatest 
degree of consensus exists, as neo-liberal economic policy is firmly embedded 
as the framework of governing New Zealand. Basically, all the parties in 
Parliament accept the ongoing economic realities that pressure governments to 
keep their economic policies within the broad neo-liberal framework. Some 
parties, such as the Greens and Act, may sometimes appear to advocate radical 
changes to economic management, but in reality their programmes of reform 
amount to mere adjustments to the new economic framework. Essentially, the 
economic policies dividing left and right have been reduced to proposing a 
fraction more or a fraction less government intervention, regulation, ownership, 
and taxation. The shift to this new centre in the 1 ~90s is best illustrated by an 
examination of the individual political parties in New Zealand. The histories of 
Labour, National, New Zealand First, Act, the Greens, the Alliance and the 
Christian parties show a remarkable moderation of economic policy and vision 
between 1993 and 2003. 
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The Economic Conditions (1993-2003) 
Chapter Two argued that the economic reforms of the Fourth Labour and 
National governments constituted an attempt to manage an economic and fiscal 
crisis and return New Zealand business to profitability and stimulate economic 
growth in some sectors. The state faced a crisis, since difficulties in the economy 
placed it under considerable fiscal pressure because it both increased the 
demands on the state for welfare services while eroding the tax base. To resolve 
this crisis the state had to restructure the economy on behalf of capital, redefining 
the state's functions. This involved implementing radical economic 'solutions' 
which adhered to newly orthodox theories of neo-liberalism after the Keynesian 
'solutions' in the 1970s had failed. This process involved market liberalisation and 
an attempt to reduce state expenditure in the provision of social services and 
welfare. 
These reforms were partially successful in their task of returning profitability to 
business by depressing both the private wage and the social wage, while the rate 
of inflation reduced substantially. Evidence for this is outlined below. However, 
the neo-liberal measures also failed to achieve much of what was promised by 
their advocates, especially the promise of markedly higher growth rates - and 
this is also detailed below. While the 'Keynesian' policies in the 1970s and early-
1980s failed to resolve either the fiscal crisis or the high level of inflation (except 
temporarily) the neo-liberal policies resolved them by stagnating the economy for 
almost a decade. This section outlines the continuing economic slump in New 
Zealand in the 1990s. 
The reformers have claimed success in achieving their policy objectives, and 
internationally the New Zealand case was sold as an exemplar of neo-liberal 
restructuring, and therefore a model for the world to imitate.4 They point to low 
4 For the reformers' accounts of success, see: Douglas (1993), and Richardson (1995). See also: James 
(1992a) for a supportive analysis. 
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inflation and the fiscal surplus. As a result of the tax reforms and cutbacks to 
social services, income support and the state sector, budget surpluses were also 
achieved after 1993. The economy emerged from recession in 1993, with two 
years of rapid expansion in 1994 and 1995. Even critical commentators saw the 
existence of significant improvement - Jane Kelsey admitted at the time, 'The 
short-term trends certainly looked impressive' (Kelsey, 1995: p.243). The 
economy grew by about three percent in 1993, and 'reached six per cent in June 
1994, where it remained for twelve months' (Dalziel and Lattimore, 2001: p.113). 
Rising unemployment also turned around, dropping from 11.1 percent in 1992 
after having risen from 4 percent in 1987, to 6.1 percent in 1996. 
That there was some kind of a recovery is beyond doubt, but debt requirements 
soaked up much of the state's fiscal surplus, which meant that governments and 
those parties seeking to be in government had few extra resources to plan to 
spend. The recovery also started from a trough - the economy had previously 
contracted and therefore the so-called 'rapid growth' of 1994 and 1995 was only 
a short respite that took the economy up a level, from a low base. Economic 
indicators showed improvement but they suggested that the economy was still in 
a worse state than when the reforms began. 
That the 1993-95 recovery was weak and fragile was clear by 1997, when the 
economy slowed down and headed into another recession. The economy shrunk 
by 0.7 percent of GDP in 1998, while in the OECD it grew by an average of 2.4 
percent and in Australia by 5.1 percent (Goldfinch, 2000: p.211). Unemployment 
rose also, with New Zealand falling behind the OECD averages. Through the 
following years there continued to be substantial unemployment. When the 
reforms began, the unemployment rate had stood at 3.7 percent (June 1984), 
and by the end of 1998 - following the recovery, the rate was 7.7 percent, with 
Paul Dalziel pointing out that this 'rate was twice as high in 1998 as it was in 
1984' (Dalziel, 1999: p.67). More recently the unemployment rate has settled 
below 6 percent in 2003, and is still somewhat higher than the rate of 3.7 percent 
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that the reformers promised to reduce. Furthermore, the 'official jobless figures' 
are much higher, and behind job growth figures lie 'important questions about the 
quality of new work' (Kelsey, 1995: p.265). 
According to Brian Easton, 'New Zealand's volume GOP growth has been low 
relative to the rest of the DECO since the reforms began' (Easton, 1999: p.61). 
For the 1985-96 period, New Zealand's GOP volume growth has been 1.3 
percent per annum, compared to 2.7 percent average for the DECO. Likewise, 
labour productivity growth has been on average 0.6 percent for New Zealand and 
1.7 percent for the DECO. Employment growth for this period has been an 
average 0.7 percent compared to 1.0 percent in the DECO (Easton, 1997a: 
p.145). The current deficit in the balance of payments account has also continued 
and been at much higher levels than were considered sustainable before 1984. 
New Zealand now seems to be growing slightly faster than the DECO as a whole. 
Inflation is down, profitably up, and there is less fiscal stress on the state. The 
burden of the reforms has been carried by lower private and social wages and 
higher unemployment and poverty, and at the cost of increasing foreign private 
debt as a proportion of GOP. 
When the programme of neo-liberalism was introduced in 1984, it promised 'to 
deliver higher relative economic growth, lower poverty and reduced 
unemployment', but as Dalziel pointed out, 'on all three criteria, New Zealand is 
clearly much worse off in 1999 than it was fifteen years earlier' (Dalziel, 1999: 
p.64). Yet not everyone is worse off, which reflects that the reforms have been 
successful in restructuring the economy in favour of capital, increasing the wealth 
and income of business owners and other high inc'ome earners, while others had 
to bear most of the brunt of the slump. Economic inequality had significantly 
increased, producing a deeply divided society: 
Between 1984 and 1998, the average income of the bottom decile saw their real 
spending power fall by 5.8 per cent, from $17,000 to $16,016. Over the same period, 
middle New Zealand (the fifth decile) also saw their spending power fall, by 7.2 per 
cent, from $32,789 to $30,419. The ninth decile held their own: $59,297 in 1984 
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increased to $61,402 in 1998, but the real gains were made by the top income group. 
The real spending power of decile 10 increased from $79,476 to $104,888, an increase 
of 32 per cent (Dalziel and Lattimore, 2001: pp.30-31 ).5 
In concluding his 1997 book, In Stormy Seas: The Post-War New Zealand 
Economy, Easton says that the economic reforms have failed to produce a 
proper economic recovery: 
The evidence of the decade is that the greedy pursuit of self interest does not produce 
economic benefits. Rather it produces a financial system which was corrupted, an 
economic performance which was stagnant, and a populace angry at being misled, 
publicly and collectively expressing their feelings vehemently in the 1990, 1993 and 
1996 elections (Easton, 1997b: p.250). 
As already described, the overall effect of two decades of neo-Iiberalism has 
been to dramatically increase the major forms of social inequality while failing to 
generate sustained economic growth and low unemployment. The fact that in the 
late-1990s 'Most New Zealanders' were still 'at a lower material standard of living 
than they were when the reforms began' is evidence of an ongoing economic 
slump (Easton, 1999: p.7). As will be seen, this persistent slump had a strong 
impact on party politics between 1993 and 2003. 
1993-96: Transition to MMP 
The revival of minor parties in the late-1980s and early-1990s was boosted in the 
1993-96 parliamentary term by new parties establishing themselves to take 
advantage of the arrival of proportional representation.6 These were mainly 
5 According to Infometrics, the 'real spending power of those in employment between 1987 and 1992 rose by 7 
percent for the wealthiest 20 percent and fell by 2.9 percent for the poorest quintile' (Kelsey, 1995: p.258). By 1993 
'the top 20 percent of households currently received 45 percent of all gross income, up from 35 percent in the late 
1970s', while 20 percent of households shared 3 percent of the total income (ibid). Likewise, economist Srikanta 
Chatterjee found that 'between 1984 and 1996 the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution experienced a fall 
in their spending power of more than three per cent. The cut in spending power for the bottom 10 per cent was a 
staggering 8.7 per cent' (Dalziel, 1999: p.67). 
6 These included: The Republican Party, Te Tawharau, Advance New Zealand Party, United New Zealand, 
Christian Democrats, NZ Superannuitants and Youth Action, Aotearoa/New Zealand Party, Natural Law 
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centre or centre-right oriented vehicles, often pragmatically created for the re-
election of National and Labour MPs splintering from their parties. The 
'sameness' of these parties added to the appearance of fragmented 
convergence. Furthermore, the existing minor parties - the Alliance, New 
Zealand First and Act - all moderated their policies in the lead-up to 1996. Much 
of this moderation was probably related to office-seeking behaviour - fuelled by 
the intense competition to establish themselves at the first MMP election. It 
seems that as the Alliance and New Zealand First programmes of economic 
nationalism came further under the microscope, the untenable (or technically 
difficult) elements were being exposed, and then abandoned by the parties.7 
Minor parties were forced to acknowledge the growing orthodoxy of the new 
economic framework and to focus on how it might be modified rather than 
overturned. Because all parliamentary parties aspire to manage the state and 
economy, they must mould their policies to suit what is possible under that 
system. Their options are always confined by the need to maintain the conditions 
for business profitability. Thus, while the economy is strong, governments and 
parties can sometimes afford more generous initiatives, and vice versa (Myers, 
1997). The continuing weak state of the economy meant that the parties were 
less able to make promises of much sUbstance or initiative. 8 
Between 1993 and 1996, differences between Labour and National declined 
further, leading Gordon Campbell to comment that 'The boundaries between 
National and Labour have certainly blurred. In the past, social welfare and 
education were litmus areas that threw the differences into sharp relief' but these 
Party, Christian Coalition, Progressive Green Party, Green Society, Aotearoa Legaiise Cannabis Party, 
Ethnic Minority Party of New Zealand, Animals First, Mana Maori Movement, Libertarianz, Asia Pacific 
United Party, The New Zealand South Island Party, Freedom Movement, and the New Zealand 
Conservative Party. 
7 Laws later explained the dropping of the party's strong brand of economic nationalism: 'it is an inordinately 
difficult proposition to wed oneself to this sort of financial jingoism when one lives in an extremely small and 
minor South Pacific hybrid that is utterly reliant on foreign trade' (Laws, 1998a: p.324). 
8 See Berman (1997: pp.107-108). 
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no longer existed (Campbell, 22 Jul 1995: p.31). Colin James also declared in 
1995 that the two main parties were now ideologically more similar than ever in 
their histories: 'Labour MPs are in many respects in their official policy now as 
close to the National position as Labour has ever been, even taking into account 
the great consensus years of the 1950s and 1960s' (James, 1995b: p.13). James 
also saw that there was parliamentary agreement on the basic economic policy 
setting, saying that there was 'now a parliamentary majority for the current 
economic policy settings - not for the detail, but for the broad parameters: low 
protection, low inflation, fiscal rectitude and light regulation. Even those on the 
Labour "left" accept the basics of this "open economy'" (James, 1994h: p.77). 
The similarities of the three highest polling parties in the 1996 general election -
National, Labour, and New Zealand First - meant that in reality it made little 
difference which of these parties formed the first MMP government. Comparing 
the competing coalition agreements that New Zealand First had negotiated with 
both National and Labour, Fiona Barker found that there was 'a high degree of 
convergence' between the two of them, which indicated the 'reasonably close 
positioning of the three parties in the centre of the political spectrum' (Barker, 
1997: p.253).9 
Labour Party (1993-96) 
Following the 1993 election, Helen Clark took over the Labour Party leadership 
from Mike Moore, and was heralded as the leader who would move the party to 
the left. Yet while there was a small movement to the left, Clark was actually 
crucial in keeping Labour to the path compatible with Rogernomics: The idea that 
Labour became a centre-left party was more a case of perception, and while 
Clark made all the right noises consistent with a left turn, she never actually 
9 Barker argued that, 'both Labour and National have sought to command the centre-ground of New Zealand 
politics, resulting in some convergence of their respective policy positions' (Barker, 1997: p.248). 
172 Chapter Three: Post-Reform Consensus 
produced any substantive results.1o In fact throughout the 1990s Labour failed to 
establish many significant policy differences with National. Even though there 
was some divergence in spending priorities, none of these differences amounted 
to anything more than matters of degree rather than direction. Labour therefore 
consistently lacked 'litmus issues' with which to illustrate that it stood for 
fundamentally different things to the National Party. Labour's proposed changes 
to labour laws, increased spending, and reversing National's welfare reforms was 
only ever about making relatively minor variations to the National Party model. 
In the mid-1990s Labour was eager to seize the centre ground in economic 
policy, choosing to avoid an ambitious agenda on either the left or right wing. The 
party had by now become a recognisably centre party, with a strong office-
seeking orientation. Labour's economic policy under Clark entailed providing a 
somewhat mixed message: on the one hand it campaigned against the 
consequences of National's economic policies, yet in practice its economic 
strategy largely accepted the neo-liberal economic framework. Lacking any 
unifying political philosophy from which to build its policies, Labour remained very 
ideologically disorientated and bland. The party's adoption of a variation on the 
British Labour Party's 'third wayo11 led Easton to describe Labour as 'not a red 
party, nor a pink one, but a grey one' (Easton, 1997c). 
More than anything, Labour promoted itself as the party that best represented the 
centre. It did this by arguing that, having restructured the economy, it was the 
only party that would use the economic growth created to follow equitable ends. 
Using this strategy, Labour posed as the moderate party in the contest against an 
extremist National Party that would take the reforms even further. The National 
10 Clark continued to use the effective strategy of forever promising a shift to the left, but qualifying this by 
specifying such changes as occurring in the longer term. This essentially allowed Labour to fudge any real 
commitment to their promises, and to avoid any answers to the questions of where they would get the 
money to pay for increased expenditure. 
11 For more on the British Labour Party's third way, see: Driver and Martell (1998), and Thomson (2000). 
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Government's choice to impose such hard-line new right economic policies in its 
first term allowed Labour to more feasibly claim a distinctive difference. 
In working out just where the Labour Party in the 1990s stood in relation to the 
reforms of Rogernomics, the single greatest indication of clarity and unity that 
emerged, was that Labour accepted the internationalised economy, and in 
accepting this, the party recognised the constraints on the formation of economic 
and social policy. In this, Labour was in close agreement with National -
although, while many in Labour accepted the new open and international 
economy, they were less than enthusiastic about it. 
National Party (1993-96) 
After a radical early period in government, the Bolger National Government went 
into the 1993 general election with decidedly pragmatic intentions and messages. 
In fact, for some time before the election the right-wing reforms were slowed to a 
halt, and subsequent pressure mounted for a reversal of direction.12 Critical MPs 
were placated by policy u-turns and minor deviations. Much of the 1991 'mother 
of all budgets' was reversed, and in particular, some of its user-charges were 
scaled back13 and Richardson's commitment to balancing the books by 1993 was 
abandoned (McLoughlin, 1993b: p.45; James, 1993e: p.42).14 Richardson's 
budgets in 1992 and 1993 were relatively 'bland "hold-the-line" documents' 
12 Much of this pressure came from within the National caucus when MPs 'realised that unless National 
changed its course they risked losing their seats in the next election. The more outspoken MPs crossed the 
floor and voted against the government on key elements of its economic and social policy' (Kelsey, 1993: 
pp.149-150). 
13 In April 1993, the government made a key reversal of its policy on user-pays health, abolishing its 
overnight charges of $50 a night for public hospital beds, only a year after they had been introduced. 
14 After the embarrassing Tamaki by-election of February 1992 there was talk of Richardson being removed, 
but instead of being sacked she was quietly sidelined and muffled (Kelsey, 1993: p.149). 
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(McLoughlin, 1993b: p.45).15 In their social welfare reforms - changes that were 
promised to 'redesign the welfare state' with a view to creating a more wealthy 
and self-reliant society - few of the planned changes eventuated.16 Also in early 
1993, rightist Simon Upton was removed as Minister of Health, to be replaced by 
the more pragmatic and cautious Birch. National had some radical moments 
during its first term, but after 1991 it was becoming a mild conservative party that 
once again sought to merely maintain the status quO.17 The National Government 
therefore implemented even fewer new reforms from the start of 1993, instead 
coasting to the election, preferring a strategy of talking up the so-called 
'economic recovery' and attempting to upset as few voters as possible 
(McLoughlin, Oct 1993: p.45). National had now moved into a more conservative 
mode, where it was more concerned with governing than it was with ideas; after 
stepping back from the extremes, National was pushing to be a centre party 
again. 
The 1993 general election result encouraged a further re-think for the right of 
National when a huge swing against the party led Labour, the Alliance and New 
Zealand First to secure 61 percent of the vote between them. Winning only 35 
percent of the vote, and being reduced to a narrow one-seat majority in 
Parliament had the effect of encouraging an even stronger emphasis on office-
seeking behaviour, and hence less radical reform. Richardson was quickly 
dumped from the finance position by Bolger who attempted to establish a new 
15 See also: James (1992a: ppAO, 262; 1994e: p.10), and Jesson (1992e: p.77). The budget of 1993 
contained no significant reforms, and according to Vowles, had a 'steady as it goes' approach aimed at 
conservative voters who were wary of further change (Vowles, 1994.b: p.383). 
16 According to Robertson, National argued at the time that 'More steps could be taken later. [But] Later 
never came. Mr Upton [only] removed the remaining universal welfare benefits and then that was that. 
Nothing bold occurred there-after' (Robertson, 1999b: p.20). 
17 Neo-liberal businessman Douglas Myers argued that, 'After its initial liberalising efforts of the early 1990s, 
National became lazy and smug' (Myers, May 2000: p.24). Following this period, 'Sporadic initiatives to 
deliver real gains, like the ACC reforms, were tardy and half-hearted' (Myers, 2000: p.24). Perceptively, 
Myers notes that in the end 'Buzz words like "decent society", "social capital" and the "knowledge economy" 
substituted for policy substance' (ibid). 
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image for the National Government.18 Other ministers on the right of the party 
were also demoted, including rightist Rob Storey, who was dropped from 
Cabinet. Replacing Storey and Richardson were Peter Gresham and Bruce Cliffe 
- both pragmatic moderates. Clearly this post-1993 National Cabinet line-up was 
formulated to push National back into the centre of the political spectrum, and 
when Bolger described his administration and party as a centre-right one, he now 
emphasised the 'centre' (James, 1994a: p.164).19 With Richardson gone from the 
finance portfolio, the moderates within the National Cabinet were able to push 
through higher government spending, which was immediately reflected in the 
1994 Budget - a particularly bland exercise intended to win back middling voters. 
National also brought its controversial health sector reforms to a standstill and 
key aspects of them were reversed. 
Redefinition of right-wing ideology proved to be an ongoing exercise for National 
Party politicians from the mid-1990s onwards. In response to the fact that 
National and Act politicians had not been able to create any positive view of the 
future around free market policies and ideas, the party leadership lost confidence 
in neo-liberalism and therefore sought to come up with a new 'big idea'. In early 
1995 Jim Bolger released a bland policy document entitled Path to 2000, which 
was clearly pitched at the mainstream and signalled the intention to move 
National further into the centre.20 
18 Upton has pinpointed Richardson's departure as the turning-point for the party in the 1990s, and declared 
that 'The virus of radicalism that hit both Labour and National during the eighties has [now] largely burned 
out' (Upton, 1994c: p.10). Following her departure he believed National had returned to its historic role of 
being 'sceptical about change and preferring to manage the status quo' (ibid). 
19 See also: Vowles et al. (1995: p.1 06). 
20 Similarly, in 1997, Bolger announced his adoption of 'Social Capital' as a guiding principle for future policy 
decisions. As with the previous Path to 2000, this was, James argued, 'a model aimed at defining a new 
middle ground. The key words are "social capital", "community" and "belonging". His aim is a "cohesive" or 
"inclusive" society' (James, 1997i: p.19). In general it seemed that Bolger 'was unable to "brand" National 
because he believed in little and stood for nothing other than keeping National in power' (Maharey, 1997: 
p.30). At the same time, James noted the emergence of a new strand of thinking in the party which he 
labelled as "centrist realism", and he labelled Simon Upton and Bill English as its best exponents (James, 
1997i: p.19). 
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New Zealand First (1993-96) 
The history of New Zealand First in the transition to MMP provides the most 
dramatic example of a party rushing to moderate its political 'brand'. Earlier - in 
the late-1980s and early-1990s - Peters had positioned himself as a staunch 
opponent of free-market economic reform and, when he established New 
Zealand First, the new party could have been described as populist and 
nationalist, and at times even left-of-centre. By 1996, however, it more clearly 
aspired to occupy the centre of the political spectrum, and in the lead up to the 
election the party brought its more 'radical' policies into line with the expected 
'realities' of governing. His first moves constituted shifting his emphasis away 
from his opposition to the substance of the reforms to that of opposition to the 
actual reform process. The complaint was now one of things going too far and 
too fast.21 
It was in 1996 that Peters retreated most visibly from his economic nationalist 
and oppositional stance. For example, until June 1996 the party's proposed limit 
of 24.9 per cent foreign ownership of New Zealand companies was said by 
Peters to apply unequivocally and without exception to any New Zealand 
company, yet it was suddenly announced that it would apply only to 'key 
infrastructural assets', and that it could be waived altogether if a particular 
investment was considered to be in the national interest (Speden, 1996a: p.2). As 
the year went on, it became very obvious that New Zealand First's economic 
policy proposed only minor changes to government economic policy. This was in 
sharp contrast to the impression that Peters had previously given, that the 
economic reforms of the last 12 years had been totally wrong and that they 
21 In 1994 Peters was quoted as saying that he 'freely acknowledge[d] the advantages which have come 
from greater effiCiency and tighter financial constraint' (quoted in James, 1994c: p.13). Furthermore, 
according to James, Peters claimed, 'by association, a degree of authorship [of the economic reforms], 
asserting 30 "moves to free up the economy" before Rogernomics started' (ibid). 
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therefore had to be substantially overturned. In mid-July 1996 the new economic 
policy was presented to the party's annual convention. In most policy areas there 
were adjustments, moving them to the right. In education policy, for example, the 
party adopted a policy of a 10 percent tertiary student fee - where previously 
New Zealand First promised no fees.22 Similarly, the party's softening towards 
the Reserve Bank Act was informative. The new policy still proposed changes to 
the Act rather than its repeal, but in practice such changes would not, in Michael 
Cullen's opinion, 'lead to any great changes in the operation of monetary policy' 
(quoted in Kominik 23 Jul 1996: p.2). Even Bill Birch complimented New Zealand 
First's shift in direction, saying that now their 'economic framework partly 
embraced what had already been set up by National' (ibid). 
The moderation of the party probably occurred for office-seeking and managerial-
reforming reasons. Previously New Zealand First had clearly been swimming 
against the tide of public and elite opinion on the issue of economic reform. 
Although there was still a sizeable section of society wanting to turn back the 
clock - New Zealand First's and the Alliance's potential constituency - its 
numbers had been steadily diminishing (Hames, 1995: p.228). The preparations 
for coalition negotiations and relationships under MMP also played a part in the 
party's transformation - in that New Zealand First needed to carefully position 
itself in the centre between Labour and National in order to increase its post-
election negotiation options and leverage. Before the rightward shift in economic 
22 Michael Laws, then working for New Zealand First in Parliament, has outlined how he managed to 
moderate the party's economic policy despite these restraints: 'I had similarly manoeuvred around the 
dangerous shoals of previous Winston ian excess by accepting that the Reserve Bank Act required 
amendment, if only by adding the words "sustainable economic growth' to the legislative emphasis on price 
stability. In addition the inflation target of zero to two per cent would be softened to somewhere around three 
per cent - still at a level lower than that of most of New Zealand's major trading partners. Again, the final 
words used were intended to convey a sentiment rather than a pledge - they would supply sufficient impetus 
to amend the inflation target in any post-election negotiations without altering the substance of the Act. The 
same logic was applied to the party's policy on the Employment Contracts Act and the State Sector Act -
sufficient amendments to patch up the obvious flaws without damaging the legislative intent' (Laws, 1998a: 
p.327). 
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policy, New Zealand First had appeared to be incompatible with parties of the 
right - in particularly those of the neo-liberal economic right. A new economic 
policy framework was therefore created which would better match the party's 
centrist aspirations. 
Act New Zealand (1993-96) 
Act was originally formed to promote hard-line new right principles such as zero 
income tax and a minimalist state. It had an 'ideological' leader in Roger Douglas 
but little support in the polls. Richard Prebble, upon becoming leader in 1995, 
attempted to redefine Act as a supposed mainstream party of 'middle New 
Zealand'. In a major piece of re-positioning, Act's hard edges were blurred and its 
detailed policy statements were converted instead into 'values' .23 These 
ideological shifts were clearly about office-seeking. The party's disappointing 
performance in pre-MMP opinion polls very quickly led to a re-evaluation of its 
political message. The fact that Act was run by marketing professionals, 
entrepreneurs and managers meant that the party and its message were always 
treated largely as a 'product' .24 
The reinvention of Act not only involved stylistic change through a moderated 
image and new leader. The main thrust of its re-Iaunch was a substantial re-
evaluation and overhaul of the party's programme. In April 1996 a new manifesto 
was launched, shorn of the party's initial radicalism. The name of the manifesto-
'Commonsense for change' - was indicative of the new approach: less 
experimentalism and more orthodoxy. The new manifesto was most striking for 
the fact that it omitted two of Act's most radical and defining policies: its 
23 See Corbett (1996), and Heeringa (1996). 
24 In campaigning for the leadership of Act, Prebble explicitly stated his intention to moderate the party and in 
particular the policy of zero income tax: 'Before agreeing to take the leadership of Act I wrote to the members - all 
7,000. I said, "ACT has been perceived as a radical right wing party, the party of North Shore millionaires. Act 
must change its image to become a progressive, stable party of the centre right and drop some of its very clever 
but too radical policies such as zero income tax'" (Prebble, 1996) 
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education voucher scheme and the zero income tax policy. Both had proved 
controversial and so they had to go. As a replacement for the zero income tax 
policy, Act resurrected the old Fourth Labour Government's canned flat tax policy 
- in this case, set at 19.5 cents in the dollar for both individuals and companies. 
Although the new more moderate tax policy was still promoted by the party and 
opponents as a 'radical' measure, in reality the rates were not totally dissimilar to 
the governing National Party's tax policies.25 
Act also began to give up on defining and identifying itself as a party of economic 
reform and innovation. As with the other political parties, it no longer found the 
area of the economy one in which it could make much political headway. 
Furthermore, Act realised that the continuing economic slump was only going to 
bring further unpopularity for those parties associated with neo-liberal measures. 
Thus, the defining feature of the party's first few years was its process of 
'rebranding' - as it worked to recreate its public identity again and again. First Act 
went from being a programmatic 'party of policy' to being a 'party of 
personalities', and, again under Richard Prebble, it was re-branded as a 'party of 
values and virtues'. 
During 1996 the main message that Act attempted to impress on the public was 
the party's commitment to protecting the economic gains of the last 12 years and 
the current economic settings and framework. This was not a radical stance, but 
actually a status quo stance. It did little to differentiate Act from the National 
Party, nor from the plethora of new conservative parties which were also 
committed to the reforms. The new strategy was clearly a lowering of the party's 
horizons. After all, Act had originally been a party that saw the existing 
configuration of the economy as representing 'unfinished business' - an 
economy only half reformed. Their raison d'etre had been the extension of the 
'revolution'. By 1996 the party had lowered its goals to a defence of the status 
25 National, too, was promising to cut the lower-step 24 cent personal income rate to 19.5 cents as part of its 
programme of tax cuts. Act's difference with National was that it would also abolish the 33c rate. 
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quo, and focused much less on the problems of the current system nor on 
projecting Act's vision for further reforms. 
United Future New Zealand (1993-96) 
In many ways the party now known as United Future New Zealand epitomises 
modern New Zealand politics: moderate, centrist, neo-liberal, office-seeking, and 
constantly-evolving. The party, in its current manifestation, is an amalgamation of 
a number of minor parties - most notably the United New Zealand party and the 
Future New Zealand party. Both of these parties were formed in 1995 in the lead 
up the first MMP election. 
In 1995 United New Zealand was the more significant of the two parties - set up 
by four National MPs and three Labour MPS.26 The party deliberately sought to 
be a centre party that was market-orientated but socially liberal. Not only did the 
party lack a strong programmatic orientation27 but it also had no charismatic 
candidates or leaders, and largely had the appearance of a marriage of 
convenience to save the careers of its participants.28 
The other main component party - the Future New Zealand party - was formed 
by National MP Graeme Lee as a Christian party, and initially called the Christian 
Democrats. Lee formed it because he viewed the existing Christian party, the 
Christian Heritage Party, as being too extreme and fundamentalist. To Lee, the 
alignment between the Christian Heritage Party and the morally conservative 
26 The National MPs were Bruce Cliffe, Pauline Gardiner, Peter Hilt and John Robertson, and the Labour 
MPs were Clive Matthewson, Margaret Austin and Peter Dunne - although Dunne had already left Labour to 
start a short-lived party named Future New Zealand in November 1994. 
27 According to Boston et aI., 'it was not until late February - eight months after its formation and just prior to 
the announcement of the coalition - that the party issued a policy position statement' (Boston et aI., 1997c: 
p.120). It was also reported in 1999 that United's then leader, Peter Dunne, agreed the party might not 'have 
one or two policies that clearly set it apart from the rest' (Edwards, 199ge: p.2). 
28 This was reflected in a 1995 UMR-Insight poll that found two-thirds of voters thought the party was 
launched by its MPs in order to retain their seats (Smellie, 1995b: p.15). 
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churches made it narrow and extreme and thus unelectable. But unlike the 
Christian Heritage Party - and despite their name - the Christian Democrats 
never considered themselves a Christian party.29 This is largely because the 
party leaders believed that the collective Christian vote was not big enough to get 
the party into Parliament by itself. Correspondingly and unlike its rival Christian 
Heritage, the Christian Democrats welcomed non-Christians as members or even 
leaders (Heeringa, 1995: p.81). Their operating strategy revolved around the 
policy of 'think biblically, speak secularly' (James, 1995e: p.13). 
In 1996 the Christian Democrats went into an electoral arrangement with 
Christian Heritage, called the Christian Coalition. The Coalition represented a 
move to much more moderate policies for Christian Heritage, as that party's more 
extreme messages and ideas were shelved in order to expand their audience. 
This was apparent in the Coalition's list of 'non-negotiable principles', which 
comprised, according to Campbell, 'a bland set of statements about upholding 
the sanctity of life and promoting traditional marriage. Few could object' 
(Campbell, 1996c).30 On most of Christian Heritage's former social policy goals, 
the Coalition had nothing to say. This included: the Homosexual Law Reform Act, 
the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Act, the restoration of capital 
punishment, nor even the right to discipline children by hitting them (Clifton, 
1996b: p.C3). 
The Alliance (1993-96) 
The Alliance and its dominant element - the NewLabour Party (NLP) -
represented an attempt at resurrecting a traditional social democratic vehicle. 
29 The party's president, David Brown, pronounced: 'We reject the label "Christian party". I think it's fair to 
say that the party is informed by Christian values and ideas, but it's no more a Christian party than my 
business is a Christian business' (quoted in Heeringa, 1995: p.81). 
30 Clifton also pointed out the party was now pushing 'a more generic brand of Christianity', and rather than 
acting as 'an avenging, Calvinist presence in the House' the Christian Coalition was actually 'putting as 
much work as possible into looking moderate' (Clifton, 1996b: p.C3). 
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Although by the standards of European social democracy this programme was 
far from radical, compared to the other mainstream New Zealand political parties 
the Alliance's programme initially entailed a major shift to the left. Yet the Alliance 
was subject to moderating forces from its very formation, and moderated a great 
deal in a short period of time. A major shift occurred throughout the 1990s in 
taxation policy. When the Alliance first launched its tax policy in 1992 it proposed 
confiscatory marginal tax rates of 70 percent, but these became heavily criticised 
- most notably at the Wellington Central by-election. One year later at the 1993 
general election the party unveiled a much-moderated new scheme whereby 
'Everyone earning above $31,903 would pay more tax but with an overall top rate 
of 40 per cent (compared with the [then] 33 per cent) and a marginal rate of 49 
per cent' (McLoughlin, 1994c: p.66). In the early years the asset buy-back policy 
of the Alliance was also considerably toned down. Initially it advocating that those 
'strategic' assets that had been sold by the Fourth Labour Government - such as 
Telecom and Air New Zealand - should be re-nationalised, but the party ceased 
emphasising this policy and effectively dropped it by 1996. 
The Alliance's opposition to the free market declined over the years. Even as 
early as 1994, party leader, Jim Anderton was indicating that the Alliance would 
only modify the market a 'little'. Slowly, but surely, all the radical policies 
proposed at the party's formation were sidelined. For instance, in industrial 
relations the policy of a shorter working week was quietly removed from the 
Alliance's policy programme in 1994. Similarly its promise to create full 
employment was down played and revised to creating it within twelve years 
(Cowan, 1994: p.3}.31 
31 Anderton stated: 'I'd love to say we can return to full employment, but I've looked at it every which way 
and I don't think it can be done' (quoted in Hyde, 1994b: p.84). 
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1996-1999: The Decline of Neo-Liberalism and Rise of Third Way 
A central reason for the emergence of the new centre in the mid-1990s was the 
dissipation of neo-liberalism as an ongoing movement for change. As early as 
1992, and certainly by the mid-1990s, the free-market tide had turned. 
Internationally and within much of the local business community the enthusiasm 
for further reductions to the state was curtailed. Further deregulation and tax cuts 
also soon fell out of favour.32 A new 'balanced' economic approach was 
developing between Labour (first) and National (later) in the 1990s that combined 
both market forces and state intervention. This was often termed a 'corrective' to 
the economic framework - as the 'rough edges' of the reforms were removed. 
This approach was later labelled the 'Third way' and most associated with social 
democratic parties in Europe. Rather than a retreat from the general neo-liberal 
framework per se, the new approach represented a ruling out of the extremes of 
neo-liberalism thus making it possible for a more balanced neo-liberalism to 
finally become the new orthodoxy in the late 1990s. A crucial part of the 
developing economic consensus that allowed the left (such as the Alliance, 
Green Party, and Labour Party left) into the consensus was therefore the decline 
of the more severe and reforming elements of the new economic consensus.33 In 
this, social democrats promote the idea of an alternative to both old fashioned 
statist social democracy (the 'First Way') and the total market-driven society (the 
32 The decline of neo-liberal economic ideas amongst the elite began in the early 1990s. According to 
Kelsey, Richardson had 'lost most of her power in, and support from, the business community earlier in the 
[1993] year' (Kelsey, 1995: p.42). 
33 The ideology of the Third way provided justification for the adoption of a watered-down neo-liberal 
framework by the left. The nature of the Third way also involved accepting globalisation, but at the same 
time adopting 'an active state' policy to mitigate the negative affects of globalisation. But pointedly, such an 
active state did not necessarily involve increasing the size of the state or increasing taxes or state 
expenditure. All this really amounted to just 'liberalism on the cheap - a bit of support for high-tech industry, 
some incentives to stimulate research and development, a few job retraining programmes and 
apprenticeship schemes' (Campbell, 1998b: p.35). The new framework of thinking placed an emphasis on 
legal changes and regulation rather than radical intervention in the market place. Changes can be made 
without increaSing the size of the state and government spending. 
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'Second Way'}. Significantly, most of the right also embraced a withdrawal from 
the extremes of neo-liberalism, and accepted 'corrections' to the framework. 
This retreat from the neo-liberal agenda was due, firstly, to the failure of free-
market reforms to meet their stated objectives, which was leading, according to 
Easton, to their re-evaluation and the rejection of further initiatives (Easton, 
1999b: p.A 17). 34 Secondly, many business interests began to consider that a 
minimal state and an extreme free-market society were not actually good for 
profitability, and this furthered the decline of neo-liberalism.35 As pointed out in 
Chapter Two, business in New Zealand has always been assisted by government 
intervention in the economy, whether in the form of subsidies, cheap loans, or 
state investment in infrastructure. Consequently, as early as 1992, James was 
writing that 'a resurgence of interest' existed about an 'appropriate positive role 
for the state in business and the economy at both the micro and macro levels' 
(James, 1992a: p.313). According to James, 'The economic policy consensus 
that is emerging is for a much greater reliance on markets as a mechanism for 
allocating resources and distributing outcomes, but, after the rebalancing has 
worked through by the mid-1990s, a fair lashing of state intervention' (ibid). 
Furthermore, according to Kelsey, New Zealand· had secured 'a damaging 
international reputation among many real investors for running a Wild West 
economy. This image, combined with market failure in various privatised utilities, 
meant some re-regulation was unavoidable' (Kelsey, 2002: p.71). More 
businesses therefore were becoming critical of the withdrawal of the state from 
assisting business and the lack of regulations to protect them. They argued that a 
greater degree of government intervention was desirable for business growth. 
34 Easton argued that 'Commercialisation is being eased off the Government agenda. Sure, the pressures 
for privatisation and user-pays continue, but they are fewer and there is a seeking of new directions. It is not 
only MMP that has done that. The manifest failures of so many policies of the past are leading to their 
revaluation' (Easton, 1999b: p.A 17). 
35 This general trend was reflected in the decline of the influence and standing of the Business Roundtable 
amongst both business and the public. See: Chapter Five, Harris and Twiname (1998), and Rotherham 
(2000). 
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For example, by 1999, National's finance spokesperson Bill English was 
recounting that business had been antagonised by National's hands-off 
approach: 'We've been telling them [business] for eight years, "There is the 
framework and the government doesn't get involved" and that's worn the 
relationship' (quoted in James, 1999c).36 National's response was to begin re-
regulating, and this started with attempts to regulate the supply of electricity. 
Government re-regulation also became more acceptable - especially because it 
did not require increased government spending. Therefore while both National 
and Labour continued to be in favour of opening the economy further, they also 
both accepted the need for more stringent competition policy (James, 1999d: 
p.69). 
A 'correction' was also made in terms of the 'excesses' of neo-liberal social 
policy. Most prominently, Bolger pushed his ideas of 'social capital' and Bill 
English argued for greater social expenditure. According to James the right had 
accepted that a greater degree of government intervention is necessary for social 
solidarity reasons: 'They agree the state will spend around $25 billion on social 
assistance and social services, which they also agree must be more diversified 
and innovative, though they differ on the diversifications and innovations' (ibid). 
Upton later explained the need to moderate the National Party: 
National's enthusiasm for the market system is tempered by a realisation that if there is 
no accommodation with public demand in our sort of democracy for significant elements 
of social insurance, a liberal (as distinct from social democratic) government will be 
unelectable (Upton, 2000: p.21). 
In a sense, the Third way amounted to a sophisticated form of post-neo-
liberalism. According to Kelsey, it meant that 'Globalisation would have a social 
face, including protections for labour and the environment, and would only be 
undertaken on a reciprocal basis. There would be greater consultation with 
36 English summed up National's orientation to neo-liberalism when he said, 'We had to do what we did but 
are now looking for a bit of a New Zealand Inc approach' (quoted in James, 1999c). 
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business, unions and "civil society'" (Kelsey, 2002: p.38). This fitted in perfectly 
with creating a new centre on the political spectrum - one where: 
the 'free-market orthodoxy' is normalised and more deeply embedded. Succeeding 
governments continue to operate within the redesigned institutional structures, policies 
and laws. The core economic changes are maintained, while the government 
addresses the most serious market failures and socially disruptive effects' (Kelsey, 
2002: p.53). 
More specifically, according to Kelsey, the 'Third Way enables centre-left 
governments to rationalise their role in consolidating neoliberalism', while giving 
the appearance that those reforms are being rolled back (ibid: p.54). 
Commenting on the 1999 general election, Miller argued that 'While it suited 
National electorally to depict Labour as left-wing, in the vital area of economic 
policy the differences between the two parties were more imagined than real' 
(Miller, 2001: p.231). Likewise, James said the economic similarities between the 
two main parties were insignificant: 'Labour and National, with around three-
quarters of the vote, offer variations on a theme rather than different futures' 
(James, 1999d: p.69). Ruth Laugesen also pronounced the existence of a new 
economic orthodoxy: 'In reality though there is little on the economic policy 
fundamentals that separate Labour from National. The cross-party consensus is 
as strong as ever that New Zealand should remain a low-inflation, fiscally 
conservative, outward looking economy' (Laugesen, 1998b: p.F2}.37 
Labour Party (1996-99) 
The Labour Party's stance under Helen Clark could be characterised as 
economically right-wing combined with a soft-left approach to social issues.38 
37 According to Smellie, too, 'New Zealand is reducing debt, funding tax cuts, and increasing spending, all at 
once. What is more, every major political party fundamentally subscribes - with varying degrees of credibility 
- to that broad mix' (Smellie, 5 Jul1996: p.14). 
38 Prior to the 1999 general election, David Lange criticised his party claiming that Labour was no longer 
communicating ideals, and had no sense of purpose and that 'Labour's pragmatism means that the 
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This was especially the case after 1996 when the party moderated the more left-
wing aspects of its manifesto, and adopted an economic programme even less 
distinctly different from National's. In employment policy, for example, the party 
essentially mimicked the National Party's own arguments when it argued that 
only economic growth would reduce unemployment. Again Labour's position on 
the Reserve Bank Act shows that Labour's approach to unemployment and 
inflation was no different to what the National Government was doing. Slowly but 
surely throughout the late 1990s Labour accepted many other elements of 
National's neo-liberal reforms. Although the party appeared to stand against 
National's reforms - voting against them in Parliament and pointing out their 
negative consequences - Labour usually then went on to adopt National's 
positions as their own policy.39 
One of Labour's major moves to the right involved the adoption of a new low tax 
policy. After the National regime of 1990-99 implemented tax cuts, the Labour 
Party accepted the new taxation system, choosing not to reverse the cuts. 
Although Labour had not actually implemented the new regime itself, the party 
made a conscious choice to continue National's tax policy. Crucially, this 
acceptance of a lower income tax rate impacted heavily on Labour's projected 
spending. The tax cuts for the wealthiest New Zealanders meant that a Labour 
Government would have $2.4 billion less a year to spend, which in 1999 Labour 
proposed to offset only slightly with a small tax increase for those earning over 
alternative to the [National] Government looks like a mirror of the Government - a bunch of technocrats and 
opportunists' (Lange, 1999: p.C2). 
39 Time after time Labour ruled out reversing the National changes that they had once opposed. For 
example they opposed the abolition of the broadcasting fee, but then prior to being elected in 1999 they 
ruled out reinstating it. Also ruled out was the reintroduction of tertiary student allowances. The party also 
refused to guarantee lower student fees, despite its earlier promise to cap fees at $1000. Steve Maharey 
said he hoped to 'stabilise' fees at first - which was indeed achieved - and then gradually bring them down 
by agreement with the tertiary institutions. 
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$60,000.40 More significantly, Labour became even more fiscally conseNative 
than National by advocating even higher budget surpluses than National (to be 
used to underpin its national superannuation fund).41 
Labour's adoption of the third way approach underlined the party's office-seeking 
character. For, as Gamlin pointed out, this approach seemed to be mainly about 
pragmatism and political tactics rather than any real ideological objectives: 
it is not a statement of hard-driving ideals based on deep emotional commitments that 
once characterised parties of the left. It is a wish-list that seeks to cast a wide net for 
public support but which has no specific agenda. In this sense, the third way needs to be 
viewed primarily as a political strategy, with electioneering in mind. And it is a successful 
strategy, for while the old social democratic ideals may have been marginalised, the 
transformed parties of the centre-left have not. Since the early 1990s, these parties have 
been returned to power throughout the world, thanks to their willingness to compromise 
and adapt (Gam lin, 1999a: p.17). 
Essentially the Third way was a means of justifying the new middling position of 
social democratic parties between Keynesian social democracy and neo-
liberalism, and hence its original title - the 'middle way'. However the approach 
was never really at the mid-point between the two discredited ideologies, but was 
really, its critics argued, just the adoption of a more human face for neo-
liberalism, and so the name of the third way was adopted.42 
40 By 1999 Labour had adopted taxation and expenditure policies that were very similar to National's - only 
promising a very slight increase in taxation and expenditure, which eventually amounted to about 0.5 
percent of GOP. 
41 Even in welfare, the Labour Party eventually capitulated to National's reforms. After spending three years 
of the late-1990s fighting restructuring of the welfare sector, Labour released a new welfare policy prior to 
the 1999 election that endorsed all the changes National had brought in. 
42 As Eichbaum has argued, 'far from offering an alternative policy trajectory' the third way has been 'evoked 
in an attempt to mask a continuation of the earlier consensus' and that rather than being a new form of 
social democracy, it appeared 'as nothing more than a watered-down version of the neo-Iiberal politics and 
policies pursued by Thatcher and Reagan' (Eichbaum, 1999: p.38). Furthermore, 'as a political programme 
or policy set it represents not an alternative as such, but the recasting of the neo-liberal programme in a 
different guise - the difference between the neo-liberal programmes of Thatcher, Reagan (and Rqger 
Douglas), and the Blair/Clinton variants being more symbolic than substantive' (Eichbaum, 1999: p.52) 
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National Party (1996-99) 
In the mid- and late-1990s most National MPs were aware of the need to give up 
more of the radical ground in politics and reintroduce a new moderate approach 
to governing. However there were some MPs who 'had interpreted their party's 
narrow victories in 1993 and 1996 as a mandate to press on with a right-wing 
agenda' (Gamlin, 1999c: p.25). In the 1996-99 parliamentary term this faction 
pushed for and won further cuts to superannuation and the removal of ACC's 
monopoly, but the public's angry reaction to such reforms reinforced to the 
dominant National leadership the need to retreat to the centre. Bolger, in 
particular, was increasingly keen to portray National as the party of pragmatic 
economic management, and of continuity rather than change. He was also proud 
of the fact that following the first MMP election in 1996 he was able to move 'to 
accommodate the clear call for a "kinder, gentler" form of conservatism, by 
successfully wooing New Zealand First into a coalition with National' (Trotter, 
2000h: p.13). 
When Jenny Shipley eventually took over the leadership of National in 1997, 
many expected the government to lurch again to· the right. But such an 
expectation was mistaken. Shipley and her advisers were actually keen to portray 
her as a moderate, centrist prime minister. Her backers believed that Bolger was 
too closely associated with the battles of the past, and the party needed to re-
focus on issues that would win over the support of the middle ground (Templeton, 
1997: p.C2).43 Shipley attempted to convey an image of being a conviction 
43 Shipley launched her prime ministerial career creating the expectation that she would re-establish 
National's 'brand' by pushing through distinctively new right reforms, such as market-based sectoral reform, 
and later, superannuation cuts. And then after the coalition broke down, the new Cabinet, according to 
Vowles, represented a shift to the right - mainly 'Due to the exclusion of all former New Zealand First 
members other than [Tau] Henare' (Vowles, 1999: pA78). The hardliners in the caucus managed to push 
forward the neo-liberal ideology in a number of areas - but many of these efforts were defeated, including 
Max Bradford's Holidays Reform Act, John Luxton's Reform of the Producer Boards, and Rob Storey's 
Roading Reform. 
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politician with many new ideas, but this was deceptive.44 Economist Keith Rankin 
went as far as saying that Shipley was actually 'a neo-conservative, not a neo-
liberal. She represents the new Centre, not the far Right' (Rankin, 1997b: p.1). 
He argued that Shipley's putsch was part of a bold National Party reorientation 
towards the centre.45 Likewise, Chris Trotter argued that 'Shipley is no 
Richardson. Her thinking is much less dogmatic and a great deal more subtle 
than that' (Trotter, 1997r: p.14). Ian Templeton also argued that despite coming 
from the right-wing of the National Party, Shipley was actually coolly distancing 
herself from the Business Roundtable and associated extremism (Templeton, 24 
May 1998: p.C2).46 
In the second half of 1998 National made a clear retreat from its neo-liberal 
agenda. A succession of very poor poll results illustrated to the government that 
a dramatic re-orientation back to the centre was required. Clifton outlined how 
National retreated from hard-right positions in that year: 'National has staged not 
so much backdowns as cringe-aways from key tenets of progressive capitalism: 
roading reform, producer board de-monopolisation, further tax cuts - practically 
44 The myth of Shipley as a conviction politician was also illustrated by her heavy use of market research in 
making policy. In particular, when she assumed the leadership in November 1997, she reportedly spent 
much of her time consulting spin doctors (Laugesen, 1999d: p.C3). The world chief of Saatchi and Saatchi, 
Kevin Roberts, became a close personal mentor and confidant of Shipley's, and was apparently successful 
in dissuading her from using right-wing rhetoric (ibid). The fact that the Prime Minister was a poll-driven, 
media-politician sits awkwardly with the popular perception of Shipley as an ideologue led by conviction. 
45 Political commentators were quick to describe Shipley's Cabinet reshuffle at the end of 1997 as a 'lurch to 
the right', especially because winners included the neo-Iiberal Luxton, Williamson, and Bradford (Vowles, 
1999: pAl?). However, in reality, the new Cabinet line-up suggested a continuation of Bolger's move 
towards the centre - in injecting new and younger blood into the leadership, Shipley was actually promoting 
a new generation of pragmatic MPs. Furthermore, the most senior winner in the reshuffle was the highly 
pragmatic Wyatt Creech, who had in the early days of Bolger's government been the biggest thorn in the 
side of Ruth Richardson's Cabinet manoeuvres. 
46 There was some disquiet within National at the revival of this radicalism. At a party conference, president 
Geoff Thompson was strongly critical of the parliamentary leadership for pushing National into an extremism 
that threatened the party's support base. In particular, he singled out 'Agriculture Minister Lockwood Smith, 
Commerce Minister John Luxton and Transport Minister Maurice Williamson, saying reforms they were 
promoting threatened National's support in its rural and provincial heartland' (NZPA, 1998f: p.F2). 
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every policy initiative undertaken in recent times. Only the introduction of private 
insurance competition into accident compensation was ploughed ahead with' 
(Clifton, 1998e: p.19). The budget of that year was also a conservative and 
unremarkable one. Although it provided for debt repayment and a fiscal surplus, it 
also contained a relatively liberal amount of expenditure (Vowles, 1998c: p.482). 
As with the Bolger administration, under Shipley the government continued to 
increase its expenditure. And even after escaping the confining dimension of the 
coalition with New Zealand First, the Shipley government made no further 
structural reforms.47 The election year budget also included a lot of talk about 
helping 'low and middle-income mums and dads', and there was little in the way 
of spending cuts that National had identified itself with. Instead there were 
increases in tax credits (the baby bonus and other assistance to low and middle-
income families) (James, 1999b). Shipley was unusually very open about the 
government's new direction and sought to justify the new-found moderation by 
stating, 'U-turns may well become the norm as we negotiate and seek 
accommodations and considerations' (quoted in Armstrong, 3 Aug 1998: p.A6). 
While Bolger previously described his National government unequivocally as a 
centre-right government Shipley now pronounced National as 'centre, centre-
right' (quoted in Laugesen, 1999d: p.C3). 
National spent all of 1999 trying to find ways of reversing its rightward trajectory 
and reclaiming the political centre. Defensively, the party was keen to neutralise 
many of the differences between it and Labour. Shipley was even willing to admit 
the dearth of differences between the parties in the election campaign saying 
that, 'There are less overwhelmingly significant issues than there's been in many 
47 Shipley failed to push through the hard-line reforms that both her supporters and opponents expected, 
and in particular, 'changes to liberalise employment law were pushed off the government's agenda' (Vowles, 
1999: pABO). In few other areas did the rightwing of National make much progress: 'Proposals to introduce 
competition into accident compensation and to divide and privatise electricity generation went ahead, but 
National watered down its policies on producer boards in the agricultural sector. Original proposals to 
disestablish the Boards and their statutory export monopolies were set aside in favour of deregulation on a 
more consultative basis. The government also decided against the purchase of a third naval frigate' (ibid). 
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years' (quoted in Smellie, 1999: p.C1). The National leader cited the big election 
issues as tax, labour relations, jobs, and the country's economic direction. But it 
was only in the area of tax and labour relations that Shipley managed to 
differentiate the two parties. In the run-up to the election campaign National 
became more pragmatically interventionist. National now agreed with Labour that 
governments have a role not just in reducing the costs of business but also on 
the revenue side by working alongside business and setting up conditions that 
encourage or enable business to expand revenue. 
Another major capitulation was that National no longer pushed a line of reducing 
social spending - the party was now in agreement with Labour that the state 
should spend about $25 billion a year on social assistance and social services. In 
fact during the election National trumpeted how much it had been spending on 
social services. The new generation of ministers were particularly keen to point 
out and celebrate that the government was spending about $20,000 a year per 
household on health, education and welfare. They boasted that in real dollar 
terms, the money spent on social services, health and education had increased 
greatly under National. In particular, between 1993 and 1996 National had 
increased real spending on health, education and social services by up to 1.7 per 
cent a year, and after 1996 this had accelerated to more than four per cent 
(Armstrong, 17 Apr 1999). This message was a much different one to the heyday 
of Ruth Richardson, when the party expressed the need to not only limit the 
growth of social expenditure but to dramatically reduce it.48 
New Zealand First (1996-99) 
New Zealand First MPs justified their decision to go into coalition with National 
rather than Labour after the 1996 election on the basis that National was better 
able to bring about political stability and economic growth. In return for choosing 
stability and growth, New Zealand First had to give way in their 'demands for new 
48 See also: Speden (19991: p.13). 
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restrictions on overseas investment and immigration, and the idea of 
repurchasing the Crown's recently sold forestry assets' (Boston et aI., 1997b: 
p.11).49 According to Boston and McLeay, New Zealand First's policies were 
moderated during both the election campaign and the coalition negotiations, and 
thus the party 'truly crossed from centre left to centre right' (Boston and McLeay, 
1997: p.230).50 In a sense, the decision to go with National was also quite a 
natural one for New Zealand First, first, because its origins were in that party, and 
second because the basic ideological flavour of the party was now centre-right 
and not - as commentators and voters had previously perceived it to be - left-of-
centre. But the fact that New Zealand First was considering both National and 
Labour as its coalition partner, and could have easily gone either way, also 
indicates that the space between the parties was not significant. 
There is no doubt that, upon becoming part of the government, New Zealand 
First had to accept further elements of the prevailing economic orthodoxy. While 
compromises have to be made in any coalition, commentators like Laugesen 
pointed out that, 'Peters in his role as Treasurer has not just compromised, he 
has become an enthusiastic convert to the National economic world view' 
(Laugesen, 1998a: p.F1-2).51 Right from the beginning of the new government 
the coalition agreement committed New Zealand First to an essentially National 
Party line in macro-economic policy. The agreement broadly continued the 
National Party strategy developed between 1990 and 1996, with New Zealand 
49 See also: Barker (1998: p.253). New Zealand First also had to accept the continuation of the ECA, which 
New Zealand First had earlier pledged to repeal. 
50 New Zealand First had a number of policy similarities and differences with both National and Labour: 'In 
policy terms, the party was closer to Labour than National across a wide range of policy dimensions, 
especially in the areas of monetary policy, asset sales, education, health, social welfare, immigration and 
Treaty of Waitangi issues; it was, however, spatially closer to National on industrial relations and fiscal 
policy, and equidistant from the two parties on the controversial issues of compulsory superannuation and 
the re-purchase of the Crown's recently sold forestry assets' (Boston and McLeay, 1997: p.218). 
51 Likewise, James argued that once in government, New Zealand First 'dumped the part of the rhetoric -
and support - that was "opposition" and "left", and adopted and promoted the part of the rhetoric and 
support that was "government" and "right'" (James, 1997d). 
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First subscribing to the main directions of social and economic policy. The 
coalition agreement was therefore, 'from its inception, a repudiation of the 
position taken by New Zealand First throughout the election campaign' (Lange, 
1997b).52 
Probably the most important economic compromise that New Zealand First made 
was the abandonment of their economic nationalist stance. This was indicated 
most strongly in Peters' first budget speech in June 1997, when he announced 
that all tariffs would be abolished by early the next decade. The new stance was 
also reiterated by the party's new reluctance to oppose foreign investment. 
Essentially National's open borders economic policies therefore remained intact 
in the coalition government, with only minor changes to foreign investment rules. 
New Zealand First's popularity declined dramatically during this term, partly due 
to the fact that it suddenly became apparent to supporters that the party had no 
core philosophy - it did not stand for any real principles. Although the party had 
managed to bring brand-enhancing and differentiating policies into the Coalition 
Agreement, many of these were ultimately compromised. The decline of New 
Zealand First in 1999 could be found, most of all, in that the party was no longer 
radical. Peters' supporters had voted for what they thought was a party opposed 
to the status quo (especially in terms of immigration, foreign control of the 
economy, and general neo-liberal economics), but then found that once in 
government the party became an apologist for the new order. 
Act New Zealand (1996-99) 
Once elected to Parliament, there was a perceptible shift in Act's focus. While Act 
52 New Zealand First made much of the additional public expenditure that they had managed to negotiate 
into the coalition agreement. However such expenditure was actually quite modest: When allowance is 
made for inflation (of, say, 2-3 per cent per annum), nominal increases of this magnitude will result in real 
expenditure levels remaining virtually unchanged over the three years in question' (Boston and McLeay, 
1997: p.234). 
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probably thought that its first year in Parliament was a time to define the party's 
brand more clearly, the new MPs ended up being identified with trivia, side-
issues and gossip. The populist side of Act emerged early in its Parliamentary 
existence, when Rodney Hide launched his anti-perks campaign. If anything, the 
strategy simply further obscured the party's deeper policy message.53 
In 1997 Act moved to reposition itself as a more socially-conservative party. The 
new strategy did not fit well with their 'progressive-liberal' image. It seemed to be 
a strategy that would undo its relatively successful repositioning of 1996. This 
earlier intelligent repositioning had focused on winning urban-liberal support, 
leaving National to concentrate on the rural and provincial vote (Trotter, 1998a: 
p.13). So although Prebble, when taking the leadership, declared Act 'a credible, 
liberal progressive centre-right party', it soon drifted towards replicating the 
traditional National Party, in seeking the support of the conservative rural voter. 
Related to this, Act's identity and purpose was slowly reshaped and redefined 
away from new ideas and radical reform, and it became 'a party of sense and 
stability' (Campbell, 1996e: p.18). Thus, although it started out as a party 
reflecting the image of Roger Douglas, and therefore attempted to be 'the 
intellectual powerhouse of the right', Act quickly became a moderate shadow of 
its former self (Laugesen, 1997c: p.C1 ).54 
As National moved further into the centre of the political spectrum, Act too gave 
up more of its far-right position. When, in 1998, it released its alternative budget 
policy statement, it omitted unpopular measures such as cuts in social spending, 
53 See: Reid (2001: p.267). 
54 In 1997 Richard Prebble defined what the caucus could now agree on: 'We all agree o~ privatisation, free trade, 
the Reserve Bank Act, the Employment Contracts Act and the rule of law' (Prebble, 1997: p.19). Unfortunately for 
Act, this was hardly a well-defined party identity, nor an identity that differed in substance with that of the two main 
parties. Even when Prebble elaborated on the Act identity, it sounded rather woolly: 'Act's basic prinCiples are that 
the state ought not to do for people what they can do for themselves, and that individuals should have the 
maximum choice in the way they run their lives. We firmly believe in the rule of law and property rights, and free 
enterprise, and rewarding the virtues of hard work, thrift and taking responsibility for your own family' (Prebble, 
1997: pA7). 
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instead advocating only a few asset sales and a tax cut of three cents across the 
board.55 The National Business Review commented that Act's extremes had 
been considerably tempered: 
Gone is the spiritual call to arms of massive spending cuts and a revolutionary social 
programme in the health and education sectors. Instead a round of asset sales ... tax 
cuts and the modest target of paring back future unallocated spending to fund 
them .... A document which at first glance looks macho is actually a major revision of 
the party's position and a revision towards compromise at that. Where were the 
vitriolic attacks on the profligate spending in the coalition agreement? Replaced with 
an acceptance of current (previously lunatic) spending commitments (Molesworth, 
1998c: p.19). 
Another of Act's founding policies was axed in 1998 when Prebble abandoned its 
compulsory savings proposal for superannuation, following a public referendum 
that showed a very similar policy to be clearly unpopular.56 Then in January 1999 
Act released its three-point plan for the economy, recommending a cut in the tax 
rate of three cents, the sale of three SOEs, and the cancellation of all unallocated 
spending. Laugesen commented that 'for Act, this is mild stuff. With Act striving 
not to frighten the voters before the election' (Laugesen, 1999a: p.C2). 
Additionally, the party dropped its demand for National to cut taxes as the price 
for Act's support of its next Budget. Act's alternative budget of that year also 
differed little from that of the National Government in terms of taxation and 
expenditure levels. While the government planned to collect $42,100 million and 
spend $40,900 million, Act stated that if it was the government, it would collect 
$39,419 million and spend $38,409 million - hardly a radical difference (Edlin, 17 
Nov 1999: p.6). Furthermore, in pledging to cut taxes yet spend more money on 
certain areas of health, education, welfare and law and order, Prebble had 
trouble pointing to where cuts would be made to bring about the necessary 
resources, except to say that 'the money would come from reprioritising 
department spending' (Graeme Peters, 1999a: p.2). 
55 See: Laugesen (1998f: p.C2). 
56 In the referendum, 91.8 percent of voters said 'no' to the question: 'Do you support the proposed 
Compulsory Retirement Savings Scheme?'. The official turn-out was 80.3 percent. 
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As it moderated its radical economic positions so as not to be so far outside the 
'new centre', Act took up an increasingly socially conservative programme as a 
radical replacement. Pushing populist buttons on issues such as the Treaty and 
crime meant that Act could moderate its economic message, suiting the new 
consensus that was developing in this area, but at the same time differentiate 
itself from National. Since National had adopted many of Labour's liberal stances 
on social issues, there was a gap in the political market for these conservative 
voters. Furthermore, with the pendulum swinging even further away from the 
hard economic right, Act quickly needed to abandon its more purist messages in 
order to retain support. Emphasising these populist issues was a way of 
deemphasising its neo-liberal founding polices without having to totally abandon 
its founding principles.57 
Green Party (1996-1999) 
The Greens' departure from the Alliance in 1997 saw the re-emergence of many 
of the more conservative Green supporters and members who had been 
alienated from the Green Party's involvement in what they perceived as a hard-
left and socialist Alliance party.58 The re-involvement of the mystics and 
pragmatists led, on the one hand, to a more mainstream and liberal political 
approach and, on the other hand, to a concentration on issues such as genetic 
modification (GM) and environmentalism. The policy developed by the now-
independent Green Party was mostly - but not consistently - to the right of what 
the Greens had stood for as members of the Alliance. In January 1999 the party 
decided on its core policy themes for that years' election: 'safe food (instead of 
57 This is an example of 'saliency theory', whereby 'compete primarily by emphasizing - by manipulating the 
salience of - different issues rather than by taking different positions on the same set of issues' (Klingemann 
et al.,1994: p.xx). 
58 For instance, Wellington City councillor Sue Kedgely publicly celebrated the Greens' departure from the 
Alliance and became more involved in the party. Similarly, ex-Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party candidate 
Nandor Tanczos joined immediately, later declaring his distaste for the left-wing nature of the Alliance, and 
heralding the Green Party as 'beyond left and right' (quoted in Taylor, 1999). 
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genetic engineering), nature conservation and strong communities' (Dann, 1999). 
Before this time the Greens had not strongly associated themselves with 
opposition to genetic engineering. Another highly contentious issue - drugs -
also became associated with the Greens, who began to be characterised as a 
libertarian-left party. 
United Future (1996-99) 
In the 1996-99 parliamentary term Peter Dunne's United New Zealand 
amalgamated with (or 'consumed') a number of minor parties, including the 
pacific islander-based Advance New Zealand, the Asian-based Ethnic Minority 
Party, and the rural-based Conservative Party. The ethnic influence was very 
strong on United at the 1999 general election, with the party's 23 candidates 
representing ten different nationalities, and party policy being published in five 
different languages.59 
The Christian constituent party of United Future, the Christian Democrats 
underwent an important transformation during this period. The party had still not 
coalesced with Peter Dunne's United Party, but it broke away from the Christian 
Coalition, changed its name to Future New Zealand, and abandoned some of its 
more radical policies. The shift began with the retirement of its leader, Graeme 
Lee, after which a major re-organisation and re-orientation began. Most 
significantly, the party changed its name to Future New Zealand, began to further 
downplay its Christian-orientation, and Anthony Walton was elected as new 
leader. Dropping the term Christian from the party name was a central part of this 
moderation, with Walton believing that 'the party cannot afford to be seen as 
extremist, but must promote a comprehensive range of policies "that can make 
this country rock", to win support' (Bain, 2000a: p.12).60 
59 See: Sheppard (1997), and Stonyer (2000). 
60 According to the new Future New Zealand executive director, Murray Smith, The Christian Heritage Party have 
effectively been a morals party and as a result they have not been able to get the numbers they need' (Bone, 
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Summarising Future New Zealand's new political programme, Clifton believed 
that instead of being to the far right of National, the party was merely pushing a 
more bland and cautious agenda than National: 
Future New Zealand, like National, is moderately socially prescriptive, promotes a smaller 
state, low taxes, the Reserve Bank's current monetary settings, lower public spending 
and free-market prices for goods and services, as well as the development of more social 
services from non-governmental organisations. Unlike National, it would promote home 
ownership, superannuation savings and trade development by financial incentives 
(Clifton, 1998f: p.27). 
Meanwhile, the Christian Heritage Party stood alone at the 1999 general election, 
and polled 2.4 percent of the party vote. Party leader Graham Capill later 
admitted that his party had softened its policies in recent years, saying 'We have 
toned down the extremist-type statements. Our original manifesto sometimes put 
things very harshly and lacked compassion. We have tried to balance those 
principles of personal responsibility with care and compassion' (quoted in Bain, 
2000a: p.12). 
The Alliance (1996-99) 
It was in the run up to the 1999 election that the Alliance most substantially 
moderated its policies, motivated by office-seeking intentions on the part of its 
leadership. For instance, in June 1997 Jim Anderton announced to the party and 
public that the Alliance's steeply progressive tax policies would be re-visited due 
to their unpopularity at previous elections. Then in the lead-up to the 1999 
election the party increased the threshold for its first band of income tax 
increases up to $60,000 - in line with the Labour Party - a move which, 
according to party president Matt McCarten, 'effectively neutralised the tax 
2002a: p.30). Smith said that the name change for the Christian Democrats, 'was necessary to distance ourselves 
from the previous, unworkable, coalition and remove any remaining confusion. The previous name created 
incorrect labeling and caused many people to misunderstand the broad scope, intention and perspective of our 
party' (Future New Zealand, 25 Nov 1998). 
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debate in the 1999 campaign' (McCarten, 2000: p.36).61 In line with its softened 
tax proposals the Alliance also scaled back its projected programme of 
government expenditure. 
Going into the 1999 general election the party offered its most moderate election 
programme yet. Even in its key area of trade policy, it was promising to bring in 
less than half the border protection promised at the previous election. Once in 
government the Alliance 'largely conceded the open economy question' (James, 
2000d).62 
1999-2003: Consolidation of the New Consensus 
It has been the capitulation of those minor parties that were once opposed to the 
neo-liberal framework - the Alliance, the Greens, and New Zealand First - that 
has done the most to bring about the new consensus since 1993. James argued 
in 1993 that the considerable differences in the party system were not between 
Labour and National but between the minor parties and the main ones. As 
examples, he gave the fact that the minors opposed 'the Reserve Bank Act and 
the policy constraints it imposes', that they 'dispute much of the evidence of 
constraints on greater use of fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth to get 
jobs faster', and they had fundamentally different tax policies (James, 1992a: 
p.140). By 1999 the gulf between the minor and major parties on such issues had 
narrowed considerably. 
61 The only additional tax the Alliance proposed above Labour's was the addition of two small tax steps at 
$75,000 and $100,000 of income. Significantly, the Alliance's top rate, 47 cents in the dollar on incomes of 
$100,000, was the same as the top personal tax rate of the Howard conservative government in Australia. 
62 See also: James (2000a: p.73). The government even reduced more tariffs than expected or promised: 
'Contrary to the Government's stated policy, it also unilaterally and without consultation abolished tariffs on 
all imports from least developed countries' (Kelsey, 2002: p.39). 
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The election to government of the ostensibly left-wing parties of Labour and the 
Alliance in 1999 was the final move needed to create the full economic 
consensus and thus 'new centre' on the political spectrum. Prior to this the 
parties of the right had already pulled back from promising or emphasising 
fundamental structural change to the economy, and so for a full consensus to 
operate all that was now needed was the parties of the left to demonstrate 
likewise - that although they might have criticised the neo-liberal framework 
when they were in opposition, in government they would not threaten the status 
quo. 
By the 2002 general election, debate about economic direction was noticeably 
missing from the election campaign, as the public turned its attention to other 
concerns.63 The parties themselves made little of economic issues in the 2002 
election campaign, as Easton points out: 'none of Act, the Alliance or the Greens 
- who in quite different ways dissent from parts of the consensus ... chose to take 
their differences to the electors' (Easton, 24 Aug 2002: p.38). Political 
commentator John Braddock also noted the striking consensus on economic 
issues: 
The fact that the 'Corngate' affair has came to dominate the election campaign to the 
exclusion of other issues warrants consideration.... The election contest has been 
characterised by almost complete policy unanimity between the contending parties and 
the absence of any debate on health, education or the growing social polarisation. It 
was left to the Council for Christian Social Services to complain that not one of the 
political parties wanted to discuss the country's rising levels of poverty (Braddock, 
2002b). 
This suggests an increasing consensus on economic policy arising, according to 
Easton, 'from the relative prosperity over the previous three years, plus an 
increasingly widespread agreement that economic policy is going in the right 
direction' (Easton, 2002c: p.38). New Zealand society was therefore finally being 
63 Arguably, it was not so much the public that was not interested in economic policy as that the parties had 
effectively disenfranchised the public by excluding any alternative discussion outside their own narrow 
parameters. 
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brought into the economic consensus that had existed between the main parties 
for over a decade. 
Labour Party (1999-2002) 
Upon its election, the new Labour-Alliance Government was heralded by many 
commentators, opponents and supporters as a genuinely left-wing government. 64 
Yet in its first year there was actually little substantial reform. Despite having had 
nine years to research and fine-tune its policies, during its first term back in 
power Labour largely made up things as it went along, and it was not long before 
the new government had run out of steam. Structurally, the economy was left 
alone, and any reforms dealt only with peripheral matters. The overall economic 
approach was still based on a belief in the market, leading to few reforms.65 Part 
of Labour's corrective strategy was to institute a number of 'regulatory reviews, 
all of which were carefully managed to minimise the shift and maintain the 
market-driven, light-handed approach' (Kelsey, 2002: p.71). As Kelsey has 
argued, most of these reviews were headed by conservatives, generally had a 
very narrow brief, and eventually advocated very little change. 
If there was any anti-market reform, it was merely making correctives to the 
discredited neo-liberal project, rather than actually reversing such reforms. Thus, 
Labour and the Alliance did not actually remove every trace of the Employment 
Contracts Act, nor did they restore strongly progressive income tax scales. 
Labour also showed its fiscal conservatism by producing the first budget surplus 
64 Upton declared that, 'This is the most left-wing government anywhere in the world in the last 25 years -
second only to the Mitterrand government in France, which re-nationalised industries' (quoted in Clifton, 
2000b: p.32). Similarly, James believed that the government was 'more "left" than it projected before the 
election, especially in business' estimation' (James, 2000f: p.77). 
65 For this Easton criticised the government: 'There are some areas where the government has not reversed 
Rogernomics. Competition policy is still weak. Its regulatory regime assumes that there are numerous 
businesses in a market, whereas in New Zealand there are often only one or two. The failure to address the 
inadequacies of the public sector reforms may ultimately be the more damaging' (Easton, 2002a). 
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(of $2.3 billion) since 1996-7. This was partly achieved by reducing state sector 
spending as a percentage of GDP to a 25-year low (Braddock, 2002c). As Trotter 
pointed out, Cullen 'has spent less - as a percentage of our gross domestic 
product - than Ruth Richardson. He has provided fewer resources to health and 
education than Winston Peters. And he has done more for the police and the 
army than Clem Simich and Max Bradford' (Trotter, 2001 g: p.1 0).66 
The cornerstone of Labour manifestos of recent years has been health and 
education, and this has to some extent distinguished Labour from National during 
the 1990s - but under the Clark Government, these areas have been the chief 
victims of Cullen'S fiscal conservatism - with the annual increases in funding 
being far less than the rate of inflation, equating to cuts in real expenditure.67 
Little has changed in health and in 2002 gross health expenditure was actually 
decreased from 2001.68 Labour has continued to use waiting lists to ration health 
66 See also: Easton (2002a), who says 'this government has proved much more fiscally conservative than its 
rogernomic predecessor'. See also: Roper (2000: p.11), who points out that the government outlined how it 
aims to 'reduce government expenditure to, "below 35% of GOP over the next 10 years", "to reduce gross 
debt to below 30% of Gross Domestic Product... and net debt to below 20% of GOP ... ", and to achieve 
surpluses of $763 million in 1999/00, $1.01 billion in 2000/01, $2.1 billion in 2001/02, and $2.7 billion in 
2002/03'. The tight monetary policy has continued (now aimed at 0-3 percent inflation), as has the goal of 
substantial surpluses. In contrast, the Labour Party indicated at the 1996 election that if the party became 
government, it would dramatically increase spending by $6.2 billion over three years. Also see: James: 
(2001 d). 
67 Supporters and critics of the Labour-led administration pointed out that government spending, especially on 
social needs, had increased. However such expenditure increases were not actually SUbstantial. When allowance 
is made for inflation, such nominal increases will result in real expenditure levels in these areas remaining virtually 
unchanged. Even the previous National Government increased expenditure by similar amounts - if not more - as 
was the case in health: 'On a real dollar per capita basis Labour is sPElnding barely more than National did in its last 
year in office. Indeed from 1996 on, National was substantially boosting spending on health. On a real dollar per 
capita basis spending went up 4.5% in 1997-1998, 6.5% in 1998-1999 and 2.2% in 1999-2000. In contrast, 
Michael Cullen's first Budget increased real expenditure on health per capita by just 0.7%' (Harman, 2001: p.20). 
68 After campaigning on the destruction and under-funding of the public health system for nine years, once in 
office Labour was not prepared to provide greater funding. And although the health sector bureaucracy was 
again reorganised, health users did not perceive improved service in terms of shorter waiting lists, or 
reduced cost of health. In 2001 health minister Annette King crowed about a 56 percent reduction in hospital 
waiting lists - until it became apparent that Labour had actually reduced them by cutting patients from the 
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services. In education, the publicly-owned institutions continue to be run-down, 
while the government has increased funding to private education providers. The 
first-term Clark Government defined itself more on three issues that were less 
radical than they appeared: ACC re-nationalisation,69 the new Employment 
Relations Act,l° and tax increases for the wealthy. The government also made 
much of its refusal to carry out further privatisation despite the fact that few 
assets that could be sold remain in state hands?1 
Kelsey has correctly pointed out that Labour has attempted 'to build on, rather 
than revisit, the neoliberal economic paradigm' (Kelsey, 2002: p.51). The 
increased government intervention has not actually rolled back the reforms but 
merely added to them. The main outcome of the first three years of the Fifth 
Labour Government was therefore to consolidate and embed the neo-liberal 
reforms of 1984-99. Despite coming to government on a wave of popular 
opposition to the market reforms, by not making any substantial structural 
lists. Likewise, although Labour's 1999 credit card promised to 'cut waiting times for surgery', in cancer 
radiation treatment the government had to admit that the lists and waiting times had actually got longer 
(Harman: p.20). 
69 Rather than carrying out nationalisation in the traditional sense of the world, the government has merely 
re-regulated the accident compensation market and returned a monopoly to the state provider - they have 
not taken public ownership of any private business. Whether this results in better cover for workers and 
employers is a technical matter that has been painted as an ideological one. Yet it is unlikely that reforms 
will make any substantial difference, and significantly the new government has not reversed the run-down of 
the ACC that has occurred over the years. The ACC payout figures announced by the government were also 
substantially less than those established under the previous Labour Government. 
70 After the new Employment Relations Act was passed, Helen Clark commented: 'This is really a very moderate 
piece of legislation. If I had been implementing this in 1990 I would be labelled as a traitor and a destroyer of the 
trade union movement' (Interview, Morning Report, August 2000). ~ot only did the new industrial law only make a 
few tweaks to the old Employment Contracts Act, it essentially legitimised this previous right-wing industrial 
relations framework. At most, the Employment Relations Act was 'restorative rather than radical' (quoted in Trotter, 
2000d: p.13). 
71 That there are so few assets left to sell was seen in 1999 when Act proposed a list of state assets that 
should be sold it amounted to only three (including TVNZ and New Zealand Post). Furthermore, not only 
does the government seem happy for the currently privatised assets to remain in private hands, but it has 
also essentially brought in privatisation through its sale of the radio frequency spectrum and the likely sale of 
shares in Air New Zealand. 
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changes the Labour Party in government has actually endorsed the framework 
that was established by the Fourth Labour Government and the Bolger-Shipley 
Governments.72 Whilst stabilising the conditions for the continuation of neo-
liberalism, the Clark government has simultaneously been able to claim that it is 
abandoning the neo-liberal framework because it has 'smoothed some of its 
roughest edges, mitigated some of its harshest effects and addressed some of 
the more serious market dysfunctions' (ibid: pp.49-50). This supposed even-
handedness has therefore meant that by the end of its first term in government, 
the Clark administration had made 'the "fundamentals" of tight monetary policy, 
fiscal restraint, trade liberalisation and light-handed regulation' more secure than 
ever (ibid: pp.78-79)/3 
Clark herself has admitted that many of the economic fundamentals of the 
previous National Government have been retained: 
While acknowledging the need to move on and to embrace change, the government 
doesn't intend to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Yes, we have made moderate 
policy corrections in areas like industrial relations, but what is of far greater significance 
are those economic fundamentals which have not changed. For example: the Reserve 
Bank Act has not changed; the Fiscal Responsibility Act has not changed; the 
government has budgeted for good surpluses and will continue to do so; government 
spending is actually decreasing as a proportion of GDP, and; the government is 
committed to promoting open world trade (quoted in Kelsey, 2002: p.51). 
Likewise, in the area of trade and industry the Clark Labour Government has 
actually pushed forward the free trade reform agenda, attempting to negotiate 
free trade deals with Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States. Far from 
72 According to Kelsey, all the actions of the government have 'affirmed that commitment to fiscal austerity, 
light-handed commercial regulation, a monetary policy focused solely on inflation, and trade and investment 
liberalisation' (Kelsey, 2002: p.70). 
73 On evaluating the first term of the Clark Government, Easton suggested that 'its economic policy framework is 
essentially a continuation of the late 1980s, with a few minor modifications: a kinder gentler rogernomics?' (Easton, 
2002b). Easton also questioned whether the government was even a centre-left one, saying that 'No centre-left 
party could have readily engaged with Afghanistan (not after Vietnam) while its economic advisers include many 
rogernomes' (ibid). Easton noted that although the top tax rate had been raised to 39 percent, it was 'still lower than 
the 48 percent of the 1987 election' (ibid). 
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moving New Zealand away from its radical free trade position, Labour has only 
extended it, in what Easton has described as an 'uncritical free trade stance' and 
one which is characterised by 'extremism' (Easton, 2002a}.74 In roading too, 
legislation has been advanced to allow for public-private partnerships in 
infrastructure development - essentially a license for private enterprise to take 
over the provision of public services. By contrast - but in line with Third way 
ideology - the Labour Party ceased to put much emphasis on policies to 
redistribute wealth to ameliorate socio-economic inequality?5 Instead, changes in 
the regulation of industry have been seen as a way to improve the lot of the poor. 
Changing the labour laws fitted this formula, as did re-regulation of the electricity 
and telecommunications markets. 
Prior to the 1999 general election Clark said 'Labour would use government 
business agencies such as Tradenz and business development boards to do 
more to help enterprises boost export performance' (Laugesen, 1998a: p.F2). 
This was entitled the 'active state' approach - an acknowledgement that while 
globalisation could not be defied, the state could help businesses to compete. 
Not surprisingly, then, in government, Labour's attempts at differentiating itself 
from National on the economy have amounted to little, essentially consisting of 
small amounts of expenditure on business initiatives. 
In its time in power since 1999, Labour has been characterised by both an office-
seeking and managerial-reforming approach. As shown above, it has been office-
seeking in the sense of the slavish attention it has paid to public opinion and the 
need to stay near the centre of the political spectrum. The managerial-reforming 
nature of Labour is seen in the maintenance of the general neo-liberal economic 
framework. This maintenance rather than reform has meant that its emphasis has 
74 Also, in terms of trade relations, 'the Government broke its promise to integrate labour and environment 
standards into trade agreements and pursue only reciprocal, rather than unilaterial, liberalisation' (Kelsey, 
2002: pp. 73-74). 
75 However, there has been a very strong push to establish a national superannuation fund, which baSically 
redistributes wealth between adults before and over 65 years old. 
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been more on the managerial side of this concept rather than the reforming 
element. However, some actions taken by the government suggest its continuing 
ability to manage crises with whatever tools necessary, regardless of ideology. 
For example, in taking the majority ownership of Air New Zealand or in buying 
back railway tracks - both of which conflicted with the established economic 
framework - the government was not acting in a highly (left-wing) ideological 
manner but was managing a crisis with the options that appeared most likely to 
avoid the collapse of these strategic national assets. 
The survey of experts located the position of the Labour Party at the 2002 
general election at 5.2 on the 0-10 left-right scale, meaning that they regarded 
the party as a centre party. The range of responses varied between 4 and 7, and 
had a low standard deviation of 0.8. The same survey carried out in 1996 located 
Labour at 4.6, suggesting some movement towards the centre since then. 
National Party (1999-2002) 
The ascension of Bill English to the frontbench and then leadership of the 
National Party was a vital part of the party's moderation in the late-90s and early 
2000s. When he was first appointed finance minister, English used the occasion 
to brand himself and the future of the National Party as moderate. In countless 
interviews he spoke about valuing pragmatism over ideology and addressing 
human need rather than conceptual debates. His language spoke of a whole new 
direction - he wanted to 'back winners' and he thought the state needed to 
contribute to the development of the 'knowledge economy'. Nearly everything he 
said could have come from a Helen Clark or Mike Moore speech. . 
English argued that it would be wrong for the state to retreat further from actively 
assisting business, and that it should invest in the economy through education 
and research. In contrast to his predecessors, Richardson and Birch, English 
developed a positive account of increased social spending. In a distant echo of 
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former leader Jim Bolger's meanderings about 'the decent society', English said 
the government should set out 'to continually build a sense of community'. It 
seemed that English was aware that the market reforms had not delivered the 
prosperity they promised, and that consequently the party had little choice but to 
retreat from a strategy of pushing the reforms further. 76 English also questioned 
the usefulness of cutting government spending, in effect removing the official 
goal of reducing government spending from 36 percent of GOP to under 30 
percent (Laugesen, 1999b: p.A2).77 The ideological quest to shrink the state - as 
pursued by Richardson and to a lesser extent by Birch - had now been 
abandoned, with English commenting that, 'The view you can just shrink the 
government's level of expenditure if you have an ideological commitment to it, I 
don't think is a practical one for New Zealand' (quoted in Laugesen, 1999c: 
p.C2). 
English saw a need to broaden the catchment of the National Party if it was to be 
revitalised and regain the government benches, and bemoaned the elitist image 
of the party. 'There was a smell', he argued, 'that came across the party early in 
the '90s, too focused on the dollars, not worried enough about the people missing 
out. We didn't do enough to challenge those impressions' (quoted in Trotter, 19 
Apr 2000: p.13). He even declared, 'There's a perception that rich people vote 
National, and it's true', adding, 'I hate that. It would do us good to see us drive 
some those people away' (quoted in Trotter, 2000c: p.13). 
The party's election platform of 2002 was by far the most moderate for years. It 
junked any radicalism, and sought only small adjustments to the new status quo. 
The few remaining differences with Labour were narrowed further; especially with 
the dropping of former policies such as market rents for state housing and the 
76 See also: Gamlin (1999h: p.19). 
77 See also: James (1999d: p.17). 
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endorsement of Labour's income-related rents policy,78 as well as the 
establishment of a similar agriculture policy to Labour.79 National's policy on 
student loans was even to the left of Labour's, promising to write down the 
student loans of graduates who work in New Zealand. Furthermore, English was 
promising to increase government spending, prompting Labour to chide National 
for its extravagance. Even the more economically dry National spokespeople 
were moderating their stances.80 Furthermore, 'National's promised tax cuts were 
within the fiscal parameters set out in the last Budget' (Easton, 2002c: p.38). 
Because the party was increasingly similar to Labour in economic policy, National 
had to find other non-economic issues in which to differentiate itself, leading to 
socially conservative policies on issues like law and order and immigration. But 
essentially, National found it impossible 'to contest the middle ground in a way 
that is sufficiently differentiated from Labour's approach without scaring off 
moderate voters' (Gamlin, 2002b). In the 2002 election, National only received 21 
percent of the party vote - its worst performance in its 66-year history.81 
The expert survey for the 2002 general election located National at 7.1 on the 0-
10 left-right scale. The range of responses for National were between 6 and 8, 
with a low standard deviation of 0.6. This location of 7.1 was slightly closer to the 
centre than its 1996 score of 7.3, and also only 0.1 percentage points away from 
New Zealand First. 
78 With little publicity, the National Party adopted Labour's policy of income-related rents for state housing, 
which limits state house rentals to 25 percent of a tenant's income. See: Hubbard and Laugesen (2002). 
79 As one industry observer, Tony Baldwin, noted, 'As far as agriculture goes, National and Labour are 
almost identical. Both parties supported Fonterra, both parties want to promote free trade and strengthen our 
bio-security' (quoted in Pickering, 2002). 
80 Don Brash, for instance, had given a speech a year earlier 'suggested time limits on state benefits for the 
able-bodied, or even scrapping them altogether, and raising the age at which people qualify for national 
super', but now had to declare he had 'an open mind on these questions' (Hubbard and Laugesen, 2002). 
81 National also only 'won' the party vote in 6 of the 22 constituencies that National candidates won. 
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New Zealand First (1999-2002) 
New Zealand First was nearly eliminated from Parliament at the 1999 general 
election - when it won only 4.3 percent of the party vote and only barely held the 
electorate seat of Tauranga - after which the party had a quiet and indistinctive 
two years in politics. Then the fortunes of New Zealand First were revived in the 
2002 election year, when it campaigned on toughened 'law and order' measures, 
whipped up anti-immigrant sentiment and promised to abolish the 'Treaty 
industry'. The party continued to adhere to the economic policy consensus but, 
by rebelling against the consensus on social issues and highlighting issues of 
social disintegration, managed to differentiate itself and provide a lightening rod 
for those still dissatisfied with modern New Zealand society. On election day, 
New Zealand First won ten percent of the party vote - the third highest vote 
behind Labour and National. 
The survey of experts put New Zealand First at 7.0 on the 0-10 left-right scale for 
the 2002 election, which compares to its 1996 location of 5.9, suggesting 
significant movement to the right since then. However, the results for 2002 
ranged between 5 and 10, providing a relatively large standard deviation of 1.1. 
The 2002 standard deviation of 1.12 for New Zealand First was similar to 1996's 
standard deviation of 1.2 based on a range of between 4 and 9 for the party. 
Such relatively large standard deviations reflect how New Zealand First 
embodies the dealignment of class voting and, furthermore, the dealignment of 
economic and social issues. 
Act New Zealand (1999-2002) 
Following the 1999 election, in which Act attempted to mobilise support on the 
basis of a socially conservative or populist platform, the more radical and policy-
seeking faction of Act attempted to pull the party back towards its founding 
principles. Most significantly, this involved installing Catherine Judd - a Roger 
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Douglas nominee who had not previously been involved in the party - into the 
party presidency. As president Judd then instigated the 'Liberal Project' - an 
attempt to develop and reiterate Act as a party of social and economic liberalism. 
In the 2002 general election campaign Act was in a defensive mode - attempting 
to defend its seven percent of the party vote. It therefore made a significant effort 
to rid itself of its extremist image.82 According to James, it tried 'to present a less 
red necked and less radical image than in 1999' (James, 2002f). Policies were 
further watered-down. Act's tax statement now pledged to make only minor 
changes to the income tax - with the top personal rate being dropped to 28 
percent, and the present 19.5 percent rate being lowered to 18 percent 
(McLoughlin, 2002: p.2). 
In a post-election analysis, party manager Graham Watson said that Act's vote-
catching ability might have been limited because Act and National had been 
positioned too close together. Although Watson blamed National for being 
'uncomfortably close' to Act, his comments indicated that Act had failed to 
distinguish itself from others on the right of the political spectrum (Mold, 2002c). 
The expert survey results give slight confirmation to this idea - showing that 
while in 1996 Act was located at 9.1 on the 0-10 left-right scale, but 2002 the 
party was at 8.8.83 
With the continuing decline in the popularity of neo-liberalism and firming support 
for the centrist Third way approach, Act was very obviously swimming against the 
political tide. Rather than being on 'the side of history', as the party might have 
felt when it was formed, Act was now in retreat. It had slowly jettisoned both its 
original policies and its raison d'etre of implementing Roger Douglas' 'unfinished 
business'. Gone were the days when it unashamedly and fundamentally stood for 
'much more extensive deregulation: very low income tax, more private funding 
82 See: James (2002i). 
83 The respondents' responses ranged from 8 to 10, and the standard deviation was 0.6. 
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and delivery of health care, personal choice in education, including private 
providers, low government spending, rapid privatisation of government assets, 
and extensive dismantling of economic and planning regulations' (James, 2000a: 
pp.74-75). Replacing these policies and goals was a pragmatic party that focused 
its pitch, according to James, 'on populist issues aimed at less well-off voters 
who might normally be expected to lean towards Labour: lower taxes (sold as a 
populist measure); cuts in welfare (aimed at stirring "downwards envy" towards 
able-bodied people who were not working); harsher measures against criminals; 
and the Treaty of Waitangi "sunset" targets' (ibid pp.74-75). Prebble now even 
described Douglas' ideas as 'utopian' (Laxon, 1999a). 
Even Act's own president, Catherine Judd,84 was critical of this shift, and outlined 
the decline of radicalism in the party: 
Act was formed to be a party of influence, and our original vision, as outlined in 
Unfinished Business, was to transform the economy and society. It's not surprising that 
after five years in Parliament the Party has lost some of its transformational edge and is 
sometimes known more for a collection of apparently conservative policy stands than as 
a party of vision (Judd, 2001). 
Although Douglas claimed in 2000, 'there is no difference between National, 
Labour, Alliance or New Zealand First, except in matter of degree', it appeared 
that Act also now only differed from these parties by matters of degree (Prebble, 
2000). 
Green Party (1999-2002) 
Between 1999 and 2002 the Green Party was' pulled in both left and right 
directions. Their new independence from the Alliance and new political 
84 Judd, a public relations company director, had previously been employed as an adviser to the Fourth 
Labour Government and then later for the Act party. She never joined Act until about one month before 
becoming president of the party in 2001. Encouraged into the presidency by Roger Douglas, Judd's 
presidency represented an attempt by the more neo-liberal faction of the party to return the policy-pursuing 
strategy. 
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positioning proved successful, and the party won 5.2 percent of the 1999 vote as 
well as the electorate seat of Coromandel. The addition of Sue Bradford, Keith 
Locke and Nandor Tanczos fundamentally altered the political flavour of the 
party. Bradford and Locke, in particular, were of the eco-socialist tendency and 
clearly worked to push the party to the left. During the 1999-2002 parliamentary 
term the Greens became more associated than ever with pursuing social justice 
and peace issues as well as green ones. This was possible because the 
disintegration and moderation of the Alliance allowed the Green Party to 
consolidate its position in the party system by moving to the left. A number of 
policy initiatives and parliamentary manoeuvres showed the Greens to now be 
the most left-wing party in Parliament. For example, the Green Party was the only 
party to show any opposition to sending the New Zealand SAS to Afghanistan. 
Also, a bill was introduced into Parliament in the same year that would have 
restored the Emergency Unemployment Benefit to students, and this was 
opposed by all the other parties including the Alliance. 
The Greens were also the only party committed to the decriminalisation of 
cannabis, and in 2002 Sue Bradford and co-leader Jeanette Fitzsimons joined a 
Waitangi Day protest where Maori activists were demanding sovereignty. It 
seems that the party was cultivating an image of radicalism and seeking to take 
over from the Alliance as the main party to the left of Labour. Mostly this was 
possible because the Alliance had moved so far towards the centre whilst in 
government. With the Alliance vacating this space on the left, the Greens were 
given a free ride to establish themselves as the left alternative to the government. 
And by maintaining a distance from the Labour-led Government, the Greens 
boosted their support at the expense of the Alliance. 
While the Green Party was being pushed to the left and putting a strong 
emphasis on programmatic concerns, in the same parliamentary term the party 
also took on increased office-seeking behaviour, readying itself for a potential 
role as Labour's coalition partner in government. Soon after the 1999 election 
214 Chapter Three: Post-Reform Consensus 
such a coalition with the Labour Party was discussed as a distinct possibility, and 
to that effect 'the Greens invited Labour MP Michael Cullen to address a special 
Party Executive meeting about possible co-operation with Labour' (Dann, 1999). 
Relations with Labour were good, eventually leading them to support the Labour-
led, minority Government, by voting for it on the key issue of confidence and 
supply. While raising the occasional protest, the Greens supported every budget 
and major piece of legislation. In order to prop up Labour, they - like the Alliance 
- had to partly jettison their professed commitments to free education, public 
health and social welfare (Braddock, 2002d). 
Fitzsimons showed how aware she was of the compromising situation the party 
was putting itself in when she admitted her distaste for supporting the 
Government during the war on Afghanistan: 'We are now left expressing 
confidence in a Government that supports the bombing of the desperately poor 
... and [which] has done almost nothing to reduce poverty or invest in tertiary 
education. It is becoming a serious threat to our self-respect' (quoted in 
Armstrong, 2001). 
Despite the left shift, the Green Party was still not particularly left-wing. For 
instance, it still did not put forward a social democratic economic programme. As 
Boston put it, the Greens were to the left of Labour on some things, 'such as 
trade, foreign investment and economic regulations', but on 'various other 
economic and social issues, however, the positions of the two parties are more 
difficult to distinguish, or, alternatively, are harder to locate relative to each other 
on a simple left-right dimension' (Boston, 2000: p.244). James even argued that 
the Green Party had moved away from a hard-left political position, wanting 'a 
new paradigm, marrying middle-class social conscience and communitarianism 
to a spiritual respect for the natural environment. This is not the stolid "red-
green" revisionism of 1980s marxists, still championing a disappearing 
proletariat' (James, 2001 e). 
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The Green vision of society was also becoming more compatible with the neo-
liberal economic framework. After leaving the Alliance, the party gave away its 
more state-centric, collective, leftist policies. As James pointed out in 2002, 'They 
emphasise small-scale economic enterprise and cooperation, especially to make 
a "just" society. But, individualists themselves, they also value the individual. That 
sets them apart from the socialists. Socialists were centralisers. Their social 
democrat descendants are, too. Greens are decentralisers' (James, 2002g). Or, 
as Sue Bradford put it, 'I hate the idea of government bureaucrats telling people 
what to do. I've probably got the same phobia about that as Roger Douglas has' 
(quoted in Conn, 1990: p.108). 
A more liberal approach was clearly evident in the Green Party's tax policy, 
where the party gave away the progressive income and company tax policies 
they formerly advocated as part of the Alliance, in favour of 'shifting the burden of 
taxation from incomes to wasted resources (e.g. via a tax on the carbon content 
of non-renewable fuels)' (Boston, 2000: p.244). Because such consumption taxes 
hit the poor hardest they are classed as regressive taxes and represent a move 
to the right. On the whole, the policy platform that the Green Party put to the 
electorate in 2002 was not a traditional social democratic one. It was clearly one 
that was compatible with the status quo economic regime - one that would add 
on to, rather than fundamentally alter, the existing economic framework. 85 
By 2002 the Green Party clearly neither identified itself as in any way socialist, 
nor did it identify capitalism as being at the heart of the global environmental 
crisis (Roper, 2002).86 Whereas most of the Green Party leaders have come out 
85 Roper points out, for example, that, 'the Greens, unlike the Alliance, are not committed to increasing taxes 
on big business and high income earners' (Roper, 2002). 
86 According to Roper, 'Another reason that the Greens are reluctant to criticise capitalism is due to the fact 
that many of those who support the Greens do quite nicely out of it. Alternative lifestylers are for the most 
part members of what Marx referred to as the petit bourgeoisie - small business owners. The Greens also 
have a lot of support amongst the professional New Middle Class and students. They have very little support 
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of radical and often anti-capitalist traditions,8? none of the policy documents of 
the party contain any kind of critique of capitalism (ibid). Instead of anything 
class-oriented, the party now emphasises the need for government, citizens and 
business to work together to protect the environment, and much of their 
economic policy now advocates the need to help establish and grow small 
businesses. Furthermore, little about Green Party policies deals with reversing 
the neoliberal policy agenda. Instead of focusing on structural change of New 
Zealand society, the Green Party's 2002 election issues were mostly about 'safe 
food, organics, conservation and ecological diversity, anti-free-trade, peace, 
youth, [and] cannabis' (James, 2002a). 
The party's 2002 election campaign was clearly run by the pragmatic 
environmentalists, with the campaign committee dominated by Donald and 
Fitzsimons (Guyon Espiner, 2002a: p.C2). It was not surprising therefore that it 
was centred around single issue opposition to GM, focused on Fitzsimons and 
Donald, and used Sue Kedgley's safe food credentials (Small, 2002b). 
Nonetheless, despite the conservative issues the party chose to campaign on, 
the Greens were viewed as extremists on GM - especially after the corn affair.88 
The expert survey for the 2002 election located the Green Party at 3.1 on the 0-
10 left-right scale, effectively labelling the party as centre-left. 89 As part of the 
amongst the industrial working class. In short, the Green Party of Aotearoa is very much a party of the 
middle classes' (Roper, 2002). 
87 Roper says that, 'Most of the Green MPs have activist backgrounds - Sue Kedgley in the women's 
liberation movement, Rod Donald in the Anti-Apartheid movement, Sue Bradford in the' unemployed workers 
movement and the socialist left, Keith Locke in the Socialist Action League, and Nandor Tanczos who has a 
past involvement with anarchism' (Roper, 2002). 
88 According to James, the 'Greens have played a constructive "realo" game until now. But throwing down 
the GM gauntlet to Labour has made them single-issue "fund is". It casts them as extreme, a cardinal sin, 
along with disunity, in most voters' eyes' (James, 2002e). 
89 The range of scores for the Green Party was between 2 and 5, providing a relatively high standard 
deviation of 1.0. 
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Alliance in the last survey of 1996, the party had shared a more left location of 
2.3, suggesting that the Greens are now more centrist. 
United Future (1999-2002) 
In November 2000 the United New Zealand party merged with the Christian party 
Future New Zealand, taking on the new combined name of United Future New 
Zealand. The Christian party was formerly known as the Christian Democrats and 
had been founded by defecting National MP Graeme Lee. This appeared to be 
little more than an office-seeking marriage of convenience - especially since 
Peter Dunne's United party had consistently pushed an ideology of being 
economically conservative (or right-wing) and socially liberal, while Future New 
Zealand was more defined by being economically left-wing and socially 
conservative. 
The new party fusion was judged by the survey of experts to be located at 6.8 on 
the 0-10 left-right scale.9o Compared to the 1996 results, this was slightly to the 
right of the United New Zealand score of 6.6 and significantly closer to the centre 
than the Christian Coalition's score of 8.1 (which Future New Zealand was a part 
of). 
Many of the socially conservative views of Future New Zealand that created 
headlines after the 2002 general election had in fact been expressed in the past 
rather than in the election campaign, and thus they were not necessarily 
representative of the modern United Future party. Apart from Dunne's general 
slogan of 'common sense' and being 'moderate', United campaigned on the basis 
of vague promises to ease the 'burden' on working families. As well as 
emphasising 'the family' in the campaign, Dunne also made United Future a 
vehicle for multiculturalism. None of the conservative or right-wing views of the 
90 Respondents scores for United Future ranged from 5.5 to 8, providing a relatively high standard deviation 
of 1.0. 
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Christian candidates were allowed into the marketing of the party. The more 
extremist notions and ideas of the Christian party were apparently being 
moderated by the merger with United. This mainstream approach was 
temporarily popular, and in the election United Future won 6.7 percent of the 
party vote, and eight seats. All of the new MPs came from Future New Zealand. 
Significantly, many of the United Future caucus were economically to the left of 
Dunne as well. Deputy leader Gordon Copeland, for instance, had for a long time 
been pushing for more left-wing economic policies. That United Future was 
prepared to support the Labour-led government was a further indication of how 
far the party had moderated itself. While both component parties had previously 
been seen as much more likely to align with the National Party (and Dunne had 
been a Minister in the National Government prior to the 1996 election), in 2002 
they showed no hesitation in supporting the Labour Government. The merger of 
the two parties and United Future's involvement in supporting Labour has 
fundamentally altered and moderated both components of the fused party. The 
ex-United element had become less economically right-wing and the Future New 
Zealand section less socially conservative. 91 
Christian Heritage Party (1999-2002) 
The more irrelevant that the Christian Heritage Party became after 1996 - when 
it came closest to getting into Parliamene2 - the more it moved away from its 
extremist values and policies in order to gain office. By 2002 the party had 
dropped most of its far-right economic policies, and also gave less emphasis to 
its more conservative moral positions. In relation to this shift, party leader 
Graham Capill declared 'We're not changing our stance but it's a question of 
91 After proclaiming himself to be economically conservative and socially liberal when he set up United, 
Dunne leads a party that is now less economically right-wing, but more socially conservative. 
92 In the 1996 election, the CHP combined with the Christian Democrats in the Christian Coalition, which 
received 4.3 percent of the party vote - just below the MMP threshold of 5 percent. 
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emphasis' (quoted in Mold, 2002a). Capill also announced that Christian Heritage 
had broadened its view on many issues, and that 'He wanted the party to be 
judged on its "big ticket" policies like health, education and defence rather than 
just its moral stance' (ibid). 
Probably indicating its increasing office-seeking motivation and its shift from the 
extremes, in 2002 the party recruited the chief executive of Women's Refuge, 
Merepeka Raukawa-Tait. This was very surprising because Raukawa-Tait was 
well-known as being anti-smacking, sympathetic to gay rights, and notorious for 
visiting a Wellington strip club. That the party knew of her liberal stances and not 
only accepted her as a member but also made her the deputy leader of the party 
and an election candidate, spoke volumes about how far Christian Heritage had 
come in recent years and how much further it was willing to moderate. In fact 
Christian Heritage used Raukawa-Tait's selection to indicate its intention to 
'mainline more', focusing on broader economic issues rather than just moral 
values (ibid). 
Like United Future, Christian Heritage focused much of their 2002 election 
campaign on the family, and proposed the establishment of a Commission for the 
Family, something which the Labour-led government agreed to after the election, 
providing further evidence that the Christian Heritage Party was no longer entirely 
outside the new consensus. Nonetheless the party was still painted as an 
extremist one, especially alongside its much more moderate Christian rival, 
United Future. This was reflected in the expert survey for 2002 which located the 
party at 8.2 on the 0-10 left-right scale.93 Unsurprisingly, the 2002 general 
election result - 1.35 percent of the party vote - was Christian Heritage's worst 
outcome in its 13 years contesting five elections. 
93 This score of 8.2 compared to the Christian Coalition's 1996 score of 8.1. The respondents ranged 
Christian Heritage between 6 and 9, producing a high standard deviation score of 1.0. 
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The Alliance and the Progressive Coalition Party (1999-2002) 
Although campaigning in the election to 'keep Labour honest', the Alliance did 
little of this once in government. For instance the party accepted the further 
undermining of social spending without the slightest protest, differentiating itself 
only quietly when Labour signed a free trade agreement with Singapore. The 
Alliance MPs even supported sending SAS troops to Afghanistan - a decision 
that activists opposed, subsequently precipitating the departure of most of its 
MPs. 
In government the Alliance proved to be different from Labour only by degree 
rather than by having fundamental political differences. As James pointed out, 
'Mr Anderton's differentiations seldom run counter to Labour's deeper instincts 
and mostly point in a direction Labour would go if it had the revenue and was not 
constrained by world market forces' (James, 2001c). Some commentators 
suggested that the Alliance leadership was so 'determined to avoid public 
disputes that suggest instability in the coalition and jeopardise the survival of both 
the Government and the MMP electoral system' that they fatally offered nearly no 
differentiation at all (Kelsey, 2002: p.50). 
By 2001 Alliance popular support was at an all-time low.94 Previous high support 
had been based on the Alliance's promises to oppose the privatisation agenda 
promoted by both Labour and National, but with this agenda no longer relevant, 
the party likewise ceased to be relevant. Having abandoned their 'socialist' 
policies in favour of a strategy of marketing government stability and 
reasonableness, the Alliance found that voters 'saw no point· for the party's 
existence. Previously the party was popular because of its freshness, radicalism, 
consistency and principled nature, but after throwing these things away,it 
became irrelevant. The Alliance's continued support of a government that its own 
94 In 1993 the Alliance received 18.2 percent of the vote, in 1996 10.1 percent of the vote, in 19997.7 
percent, and 2002 1.3 percent of the vote. 
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supporters viewed as in being in opposition to Alliance policies fatally damaged 
its support base. 
Formed in order to overturn the new right economic and social reforms of the 
1980s and 1990s, the Alliance found itself in an administration that was 
committed to the continuation of the very policies that the party opposed. A split 
in the Alliance therefore occurred simply because, in government, the party was 
essentially conservative, breaching many of the principles and policies that it was 
formed to advance. The Alliance caucus repeatedly signed up to Labour's 
continuation of Rogernomics-with-a-human-face. Party activists and officials 
became increasingly uneasy that the Alliance was giving a conservative 
government a stamp of left-wing approval. While the Alliance ministers pushed 
Labour slightly more left than they would otherwise have been, the party's real 
legacy in government was to validate Labour's conservatism and protect it from 
left-wing criticism. 
Eventually the right faction of the party left the Alliance and set up the 
Progressive Coalition Party (PCP). The PCP represented the more socially 
conservative and economically moderate side of the Alliance. It was also more 
characterised by an office-seeking orientation, which was part of the reason for 
its split from the Alliance. Meanwhile in the lead up to the 2002 general election 
the Alliance moved slightly leftwards after the departure of its conservative wing. 
There can be no doubt that Anderton's new version of the Alliance is a shadow of 
its former radical self. Any proper analysis of the party's position over time shows 
that the political positions of both the Alliance and the Progressive Coalition are 
much diluted. The expert survey for the 2002 election located the Alliance at 2.7 
and the Progressives at 4.1 on the 0-10 left-right scale.95 These scores are both 
to the right of the Alliance's 1996 score of 2.3. 
95 The respondents located the Alliance between the scores of 1 and 5, providing a standard deviation of 
1.0. The Progressives received scores between 3 and 5 providing a standard deviation of 0.8. 
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Summary 
In the decade between 1993 and 2003 the New Zealand party system has clearly 
been subject to ideological erosion, with each individual party moving towards the 
centre of the left-right economic spectrum. This shift is partly captured in the 
expert survey results. Brechtel and Kaiser's survey for the 1996 general election 
produced a figure of left-right polarisation value of 3.41.96 The survey conducted 
for this thesis (and based on the 2002 general election) has produced a 
polarisation value of 2.07 - which suggests that the degree of polarisation in the 
party system declined by about a third over six years. This declining polarisation 
is due to the following shifts: the Alliance, Greens and PCP all moved to the right 
(by 0.4, 0.8 and 1.8 respectively) and their collective party votes dropped from 
10.1 percent to 9.3 percent. Labour shifted 0.6 points to the right (putting it nearly 
exactly in the centre of the political spectrum), while increasing its vote from 39 
percent to 41.3 percent. National's slight movement towards the centre (7.3 to 
7.1) also reduced the level of polarisation. 
For the full details of the party positions on the left-right dimension, see Table 3.1 
(next page). 
96 For information on the polarization formula used for this calculation, see Brechtel and Kaiser (1999: 
footnote 21). 
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Table 3.1: Party Positions on the Left-Right Dimension 
Mean 2.3 2.7 2.3 3.1 2.3 4.6 5.2 6.6 5.9 
Std. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.1 0.7 
Dev'n 
Range 1-4 4-7 4-7 5-8 4-9 5-.10 6-8 
Experts 17 17 20 14 17 
97 The 1996 figures used in this table for the Green Party are for the Alliance, of the Greens were a part. The figure is included here for purposes of comparison. 
98 The 1996 figures used in this table for the Progressive Coalition Party are for the Alliance, of the PCP was a part. The figure is included here for purposes of 
comparison. 
99 The 1996 figures used in this table for United Future are for the United New Zealand party. However, attention should also be paid to the Christian Coalition's 
figures for that election (which are seen in the CHP column), of which Future New Zealand was a part. 
100 The 1996 figures used in this table for the Christian Coalition of which the Christian Heritage Party was part of. The figure is included here for purposes of 
comparison. 
8.8 
0.6 
8-10 
17 20 
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Part Two: Postmaterialist Consensus and Conflict 
The new consensus has largely centred on economic issues, and therefore party 
conflict in New Zealand is now occurs mostly around non-economic issues. 
These issues can be said to exist on a separate political dimension to the left-
right scale - and one that is not always identified by New Zealand political 
scientists. Most commonly, this non-economic area of conflict is called the 
postmaterialist dimension, and is associated with issues of 'tradition, moral order, 
moral conservatism vs moral liberalism, ecology, materialism vs postmaterialism' 
(Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.?). This spectrum of issues mostly involves 
'societal,101 and 'cultural' issues, but is largely differentiated from economic 
issues through the materialist/non-materialist divide. Whereby economic issues 
such as wages, provision of healthcare, education, and welfare are deemed to be 
materialist concerns, other less tangible issues such as justice, the environment, 
and immigration are considered postmaterialist. 
This alternative dimension is usually interpreted in terms of either the traditional 
left-right continuum or else a simple liberal-conservative dimension, whereby the 
liberal side of the spectrum is associated with progress, modernity, libertarianism, 
and the conservative side is associated with order, tradition, and 
authoritarianism. This spectrum is usually overlaid on the left-right scale so that 
'liberal' equates with 'left' and 'conservative' equates with 'right', and although it 
is true that there is often a strong correlation in politics that makes this appear 
warranted, there is nothing intrinsically related between the two dimensions, and 
there are plenty of examples that contradict it.102 Therefore it seems sensible to 
101 The term 'societal issues' is used by James (1992a: p.140) to encompass this area of issues and 
differentiate it from 'social policy' (such as health and education), which largely fits into the 
economic/materialist dimension. 
102 For example, the Fourth Labour Government was considered to be right-wing on economic issues and 
liberal on postmaterialist (or societal) issues. Generally the New Zealand Party was similar. In terms of 
contemporary politicians, Jim Anderton is considered to be left-wing on economic issues but conservative on 
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regard the two dimensions as separate, and for this reason some theorists 
present the liberal-conservative spectrum in a vertical form so that it can then be 
laid over top of the left-right scale, cross-cutting it to form an X-Y axis or a 
square.103 Such a system allows for a more adequate plotting of Western party 
systems. This section of the chapter also takes this approach in examining the 
growing centrality of political conflict with regard to postmaterialist issues and, 
crucially, how this trend relates to the growing economic consensus. 
Theory about the postmaterialist dimension is most commonly associated with 
Ronald Inglehart, who predicted that as economic deprivation dissipated in 
Western societies, postmaterialist values would increasingly dominate and 
reshape our politics. Certainly the last three decades of New Zealand political 
history have seen the emergence of growing debate around issues such as law 
and order policy, Treaty of Waitangi policy, drug reform, and environmental 
policy. Yet since 1987, New Zealand politics have been overwhelmingly 
characterised by materialism, with political debate being dominated by traditional 
economic-class issues like unemployment, the provision of health and education, 
and increasing inequality. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s successful parties 
have concentrated their campaigns and general marketing on materialist 
issues.104 
Some political commentators and academics expected the introduction of MMP 
to facilitate the establishment of alternative dimensions of political conflict (and 
thus parties). However, according to Barker and McLeay, The first MMP election 
clearly produced little change in the number of issue dimensions represented in 
parliament' (Barker and McLeay, 2000: p.145). Socio-economic issues continued 
to be the main basis for party competition and voting behaviour. Yet in each 
societal issues, while Deborah Coddington is considered right-wing on economic issues but liberal on 
societal issues. 
103 For an example of this method, see: Mulgan (1997a: p.248) and Vowles et al. (1995: chapter eleven). 
104 See: Vowles and Aimer (1993: p.205). 
226 Chapter Three: Post-Reform Consensus 
MMP election there have been strong signals that postmaterialism is playing a 
significant part in New Zealand politics - for example the 4.4 percent support for 
the Christian Coalition in 1996, the five percent support for the Green Party in 
1999, and the importance of the genetic modification (GM) issue in 2002. 
Certainly in the 2002 general election, postmaterialist issues dominated the 
campaign, as most political parties ran campaigns that centred on societal 
issues. In particular, it is indicative that New Zealand First's much-heralded three 
major issues of the 2002 election - immigration, crime, and the Treaty of 
Waitangi - were all non-economic issues. While the party had been formed on 
mainly economic grounds - namely opposition to the neo-liberal policies of 
Labour and National - it was now scoring all of its political points on the 
secondary spectrum of societal issues. That New Zealand First received ten 
percent of the party vote suggested that the postmaterialist cleavage was 
becoming more vital. The Green Party, likewise, ran a 'quality of life' campaign, 
with the centrepiece being opposition to GM - a distinctly postmaterialist issue. 
Act also placed non-economic issues - namely law and order and the Treaty - at 
the centre of its campaign. 
That the postmaterialist dimension of political conflict has been growing in 
significance is further confirmed by the surveys of New Zealand political 
scientists. Since 1996, these have shown such respondents increasingly identify 
this sector of conflict. In Brechtel and Kaiser's survey about the 1996 election, 53 
percent of respondents 'classified New Zealand politics as uni-dimensional, i.e. 
although invited to do so they refrained from mentioning any other policy 
dimension' apart from the economic dimension (B'rechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.?). 
By contrast, in the survey for 2002, only 25 percent of respondents classified 
New Zealand politics as uni-dimensional.105 
105 20 percent of respondents mentioned an additional dimension, 15 percent mentioned two additional 
dimensions, and 40 percent mentioned three additional dimensions. 
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When the 1996 respondents were also asked to estimate the relevance of the 
economic left-right dimension on a five-point scale from 1 (very low importance) 
to 5 (very high importance) they provided a mean value of 4.0, which Brechtel 
and Kaiser classified as 'high importance', concluding that this 'value leaves no 
doubt that the economic left-right dimension fundamentally shapes party 
competition in New Zealand' (ibid). By contrast, for 2002, the survey found the 
mean value of the economic left-right dimension had declined to 3.2 (Le. 
moderate importance). 
The survey for 1996 supported, according to Brechtel and Kaiser, the idea that 
'there is an emerging, yet less important secondary dimension' that they labelled 
as 'postmaterialist' or 'traditional vs new culture' (Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.7). 
This dimension was mentioned by six out of 17 experts (35 per cent), with a 
mean importance of 2.8 (standard deviation: 0.84), (ibid).106 The survey for 2002 
confirmed that this dimension was continuing to emerge as a significant element 
of political competition in New Zealand, as it was mentioned by 13 out of 20 
experts (65 percent), with a mean importance of 3.1 (standard deviation: 0.90). 
Although recently the postmaterialist dimension has been growing in importance, 
there has also been a substantial movement since the mid-1980s towards a 
consensus on the postmaterialist issues as well as economic ones. This means 
that the new centre developing in 1990s New Zealand politics could be said to 
involve a right-wing position on the economy (with the left parties having to 
accept the continuation of the basic neo-liberal framework as established by 
Douglas and Richardson), and a liberal position being adopted on social issues 
(with the conservative parties like National, New Zealand First, Act and United 
Future having to accept the socially liberal framework established by Lange, 
106 In classifying those dimensions put forward by the respondents as being part of a postmaterialist 
dimension, Brechtel and Kaiser used a wide definition that included 'issues such as environmental concerns, 
participation, internationalism, but also moral order, social conseNatism, and religious values' (Brechtel and 
Kaiser, 1999: p.i 0). With reseNations, this study uses the same methodology. 
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Bolger and Clark). Certainly a strong liberal conformity developed amongst 
National and Labour after 1989, and by the mid-1990s most parties - especially 
United, New Zealand First and Act - explicitly defined their ideological 
programmes as 'economically conservative and socially liberal' .107 The shift to 
more liberal societal positions was noted by the experts surveyed by Banducci 
and Karp: 'Instead of the parties moving toward the ends of the political spectrum 
- the liberal side becoming more liberal and the conservative side more 
conservative - all parties have shifted in a liberal direction' (Banducci and Karp, 
1998: p.150). Brechtel and Kaiser's survey also found that 'polarisation on this 
second [postmaterialist] dimension is considerably lower than on the dominant 
[economic] one', with no parties in Parliament being located in the extremes of 
this spectrum (Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.11). 
Yet six years later, when the survey was repeated for this thesis, the spread of 
the parties on the postmaterialist dimension was greater, particularly as some 
parties had moved towards the conservative end of the postmaterialist scale, and 
the Greens now represented the liberal extreme. As the economic consensus 
firmed up in the late 1990s, divergence on societal issues has again opened up, 
since the parties recognised the need to convey some difference to voters. By 
2002, for instance, United Future, New Zealand First and Act had revised their 
positions on many societal issues, thus repositioning themselves as more 
socially conservative. On issues such as welfare, immigration, crime, 
environmentalism and minority rights, most of these parties had been adopting 
populist and conservative positions. 
107 Ex-New Zealand First MP and parliamentary staffer Michael Laws coined the phrase that 'a centre party 
should be "economically conservative but socially progressive" - and quickly instilled such sentiments into 
all Winston's [New Zealand First] speeches and media statements' (Laws, 1998a: p.323). According to a 
media report by Templeton, Peter Dunne sees United as 'being conservative on economic issues and liberal 
on social issues' (Templeton, 2002). Boston et al. (1997c: p.114) have described United as having a 'liberal 
ethos, market-orientated yet socially concerned'. See also: Stonyer (1997: p.61), Hubbard (1999a), and 
Matthewson (1996: p.7). Prebble and Catherine Judd have been inclined to describe Act as a socially liberal 
party, and in 2002 the party seriously considered changing its name to the Liberal Party. 
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Whereas in 1996 there was no party in the extreme liberal end of the spectrum, 
in 2002 this was inhabited by the Greens, with a score of 2.3 on the 0-10 liberal-
conservative spectrum. The next most liberal party was the Alliance, at 3.2 - its 
same location as in 1996. The centre was occupied by the Progressives on 4.9 
and Labour on 5.2 - a significant shift for Labour from 4.2. The United Future 
party was at 6.7, which was 0.9 points more conservative than the United New 
Zealand party in 1996. New Zealand First had become even more conservative -
moving from 6.7 in 1996 to 7.5 in 2002. National, by contrast, was stationary on 
7.2 - slightly less conservative than New Zealand First. Christian Heritage was at 
7.8 - significantly less conservative than the Christian Coalition in 1996 which 
was at 9.0. Act by contrast was judged to be considerably more conservative -
shifting from 6.5 to 8.2. 
For the full details of the party positions on the liberal-conservative dimension, 
see Table 3.2 (next page). 
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Table 3.2: Party Positions on the Liberal-Conservative Dimension 
Mean 3.2 5.2 5.8 6.7 7.2 
Std 1.5 1.0 1.5 1 .. 8 2.2 1.7 1.2 
Dev'n 
Range 1-5 1-4 1-5 1.5- 1-5 3-9 
8 
Experts 6 14 6 13 6 13 6 14 5 6 
108 The 1996 figures used in this table for the Green Party are for the Alliance, of the Greens were a part. The figure is included here for purposes of comparison. 
109 The 1996 figures used in this table for the Progressive Coalition Party are for the Alliance, of the PCP was a part. The figure is included here for purposes of 
comparison. 
110 The 1996 figures used in this table for United Future are for the United New Zealand party. However, attention should also be paid to the Christian Coalition's 
figures for that election (which are seen in the CHP column), of which Future New Zealand was a part. 
111 The 1996 figures used in this table are for the Christian Coalition of which the Christian Heritage Party was part. The figure is included here for purposes of 
comparison. 
8.2 
3.6 1 ;8 
3-10 
6 14 
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Just as Brechtel and Kaiser recommended caution in regard to their results 
(Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.10), the same is true for the 2002 postmaterialist 
data. Firstly, the methodology is not particularly robust - as a number of 
differently labelled dimensions are collapsed into the one scale, and the 
respondents all obviously had different methods and logic for their structuring of 
the dimensions.112 Secondly, the ranges and standard deviations indicate a high 
level of uncertainty and difference of opinion between these 14 experts. Thirdly, 
the ordering of the parties on this dimension is so similar to the economic left-
right scale that its independence is doubtful - as with the 1996 data, 'Differences 
are few and of minor importance' (ibid). The only differences are that at the 
liberal end of the spectrum the Alliance and Green Party swap places (compared 
to the left-right scale), and at the conservative end, New Zealand First has 
swapped places with National. 
In sum, the expert survey suggests the postmaterialist dimension is more 
polarised and relevant in 2002. Firstly this can be seen in that while respondents 
gave this dimension a mean importance value of 2.8 in 1996, by 2002 it was 3.1. 
This was nearly the same as the mean importance value for the economic left-
right scale of 3.2. Secondly, the dimension now has two pronounced polar 
parties, the Green Party representing extreme social liberalism and the Act party 
representing extreme social conservatism. 
The parties' locations on the postmaterialist spectrum is further understood by an 
examination of the parties' orientation to individual societal issues, which often 
reveals significant conflict but few SUbstantial policy differences. The nuclear ship 
issue is probably the clearest example of a radical non-economic policy 
becoming adopted in a mUlti-partisan consensus in the late-1980s and then re-
112 In fact a number of respondents proposed more than one set of party conflicts that fitted into the 
postmaterialist dimension. 
232 Chapter Three: Post-Reform Consensus 
emerging as an issue of conflict about a decade later. The idea of banning 
nuclear ships started out as a minority position in the early 1980s, and 
throughout the 1980s Labour and National were polarised on the issue. By 1990 
popular opinion and the National Party were now on the side of the ban, and a 
strong consensus formed around it. What had been like a 'litmus' test between 
the two major parties thus dissolved into a multi-partisan issue. Yet in recent 
years there has been increasing questioning of this consensus. Richard Prebble 
proposed the reintroduction of US ships in 1997, and since then there has been 
increasing debate - especially from National politicians - about whether the 
policy is unnecessary and harmful to New Zealand's trading interests. 
Defence is an area that is often cited as an enduring litmus test which illustrates 
the substantial difference between Labour and National, yet in this too, the 
parties have shown remarkably little variation during the last decade. Firstly, 
despite what is commonly thought, the two main parties are in basic agreement 
on spending about one percent of GDP on defence. Despite being painted as a 
high spender in defence, during its time in government in the 1990s the National 
Party actually cut spending on defence by 18 percent, while the Labour Party in 
government has actually increased spending (Kelly, 2001: p.20).113 Likewise, 
after the Labour Government decided to axe the Air Force's fighter jet capacity in 
2001, although there was considerable conflict over the decision, no party has 
promised to reverse it.114 
113 According to Graham Kelly, a Labour MP, National 'was cutting at least 18% off the defence budget' and 
there 'was a 50% reduction from the time National took office' (Kelly, 2001: p.20). James also says that the 
'National government set the 1.1 % ceiling, which has conveniently made it in a sense bipartisan (indeed, 
multi-partisan)' (James, 2001 b). See also: Hager (2003). 
114 In fact, the similarities in defence have existed throughout the 1990s, after National accepted Labour's 
position on ANZUS. In 1993 James found few differences: 'There is no great difference in attitude between 
the two parties on our defence and economic relationship with Australia' (James, 1992a: pp.310). The minor 
parties, likewise show little disagreement with the defence framework - for instance James pointed out that 
generally 'the Alliance's wishes for the armed forces' role are close to Labour's, with only minor differences 
of emphasis' (James, 2001b). The Greens, too, now spearhead the argument (and developing consensus) 
that New Zealand needs a viable defence force to intervene in international 'humanitarian' and 'peace-
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On race relations, in particular, most parties developed a socially liberal 
consensus during the 1990s. In fact the new consensus began to form in 1990 
when it gained the strong support of Jim Bolger and Treaty Negotiations Minister 
Doug Graham. Prior to this - and as late as 1988 and 1989 - National leader Jim 
Bolger had attacked the Labour Government's Treaty settlements, but after 
becoming prime minister he claimed the initiative and courage of settling Treaty 
grievances.115 And by the end of the 1990s there was little difference between 
the Labour and National parties on Treaty issues.116 Even when the only 
dissident party on Treaty issues, Act, introduced a bill on the issue, it was 
designed only to shorten the timeframe for Treaty settlements rather than 
actually scrap the whole process (Hubbard, 1999b: p.C6).117 By 2002, however, 
the gap between the Treaty consensus and the parties of the right increased 
again when National, Act and New Zealand First all campaigned against the 
settlement process. 
Immigration had been one of the most contentious issues of the mid-1990s, but 
by the late 1990s an immigration consensus had been reached by nearly all 
parties. Labour set the basic framework in the 1980s 'by abandoning the 
"traditional source" principle and replacing it with skills-based criteria' as well as 
cancelling New Zealand's 'visa-free entry initiative for Tongans, Fijians, and 
Western Samoans' (Hoadley, 2001: pp.501, 502). Initially government policy in 
1991 was to raise net immigration to 20,000 per year, but by 1995 a new policy 
capped 'the number of annual approvals at 30,000 and tightened the investment 
keeping' roles. This was also a conclusion of the parliamentary committee chaired by Act's Derek Quigley, 
who developed a blueprint for such a defence force. 
115 See: Hubbard (1999b: p.C6), and James (19940: p.15). 
116 See Berry (1999), who says: 'Ask the two main political parties whether the Treaty is on their campaign 
agenda and the answer is a definite "no'" - precisely because little difference existed between them'. 
117 James believes the Treaty consensus was bolstered by 'Establishment' support for it: 'The Treaty of 
Waitangi process since 1985 has been sustained by a liberal consensus of the Wellington political and 
bureaucratic elite' (James, 2000a: p.72). Act's bill to impose a time limit was described by James as being 
'relatively mild' (ibid: p.73). 
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and English language requirements' (ibid: p.504). A consensus on this began to 
develop, and even the election of New Zealand First (which had taken a strong 
anti-immigration stance before the election) to government in 1996 changed little 
in this area. Likewise in 1999, with the arrival of Labour and the Alliance in 
government, these policies continued, as well as the general skills-based 
immigration policy set in 1987 (ibid: pp.504, 506). By 1999 a near-consensus in 
favour of moderate immigration had therefore been established. This was 
indicated by the contrast between when New Zealand First raised anti-immigrant 
policies in the 1996 general election and when Peters again raised these issues 
in 2002. In the first case there was a conspicuous reluctance by the other parties 
to defend immigration; in the second case, however, he was strongly attacked by 
all the other parties, including National, Act and United Future. 
On environmentalism, too, virtually all New Zealand political parties went to some 
lengths in the 1990s to illustrate that they were strong advocates of the 
environment. This apparent consensus on environmental issues began to break 
down, however, after the Green Party's election to Parliament in 1999 and the 
rise of GM as an issue. The party system has been relatively divided over GM, 
the requirement to ratify and conform to the Kyoto Protocol, and the issue of 
native forest logging. 
The issue of violence and crime in society has also increased in importance in 
recent years, after a period when crime was not heavily political. In recent 
elections nearly all the parties have adopted hard-line law and order policies.118 
In particular, it seems all the parties of the centre and centre-right have been 
attempting to outbid each other in order to differe'ntiate themselves as the party 
of law and order. National, Act and New Zealand First all took harder lines on 
crime in 2002 than previously. Yet much of their rhetoric was stronger than their 
policies. As James pointed out, in the case of National, its 'promise of "life means 
118 For examples of how nearly all political parties have become more socially conservative on crime, see: 
Guyon Espiner (1999b: p,5), James (1997f: p.19; 2001 a: p,204), and Bain (1997b: p.12). 
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life" applied only to two or three murderers a year' (James, 2002i). Labour has 
also shown little differentiation, and in office, initiated legislation to lengthen 
sentences for serious crimes of violence. 
The emergence of contentious social issues since the late-1990s suggests that 
the postmaterialist consensus that had been developing earlier in the 1990s has 
been breaking down, especially due to a concerted effort by conservative parties 
to differentiate themselves from the parties inhabiting the centre. It seems that 
because the new centre is mostly based around the economic, third way 
consensus, any parties that wish to differentiate themselves must find other non-
economic points of difference. In the past, when polarisation on the main socio-
economic spectrum was greater, the parties could afford to move into a 
consensus on social issues, but once the spread on the socio-economic scale 
shrunk, polarisation on postmaterialist issues was triggered. Most parties have 
chosen societal issues and positions on 'identity politics' as a way of asserting 
points of difference.119 This is especially the case for parties of the right in 
opposition, as they cannot make any progress by emphasising their centrist 
economic policies since the parties to their left have already claimed the 
economic centre as their own. Instead, the parties of the right offer a move to 
more conservative social stances to complement their orthodox economic 
orientation.120 On the left, the parties have also been using postmaterialist issues 
119 Postmaterialist issues have become useful tools for political parties to use to differentiate themselves in 
the electoral marketplace. As Easton argues: 'Off spectrum issues, like law and order, are ways of 
differentiating a party from others in the melee of the centre' (Easton, 2002b). The very absence of 
substantial economic differences makes it all the more necessary for the parties to stress or create the non-
economic issues that differentiates them from other parties. This is particularly important for those parties in 
opposition, as 'an opposition in near-constant agreement with the government would be unlikely to persuade 
the voters to elect it to office' (Cole, 1999: p.172). Crucially, however, much of the dissent that now occurs in 
non-economic policy is more rhetorical than substantial - parties make much of their differences but propose 
policies that under scrutiny are not widely divergent. 
120 As the parties of the right - National and Act especially - edged closer to the new centre of politics and 
abandoned promoting further free-market reforms, they attempted to adopt non-economic policies that 
would differentiate themselves from the parties in government. Such a move to the right on the social scale 
can be seen to complement a move to the centre on the economic scale - or at least to ameliorate its 
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to differentiate themselves. For example, since the late 1990s Clark has been 
using culture in an attempt to differentiate Labour from National. Miller says 
'Since the mid-'80s, both major political parties have been identified with neo-
liberal economic ideas and are trying to shake off those memories. Both are 
having to present themselves as middle-of-the-road while also trying to show 
their differences', which is why Clark took on the cultural affairs portfolio (quoted 
in Catherall, 1999: p.C3). By concentrating on low-budget areas like arts and 
culture, Labour has been able to increase its own profile and distinctive brand 
with little effect on budget restraints. Such an approach allowed the Labour Party 
and Clark to associate themselves with nationalistic concepts such as promoting 
'nationhood' and 'national identity' (James, 2000a: p.71).121 
The use of postmaterialist campaign issues is most obvious in regard to the 
Green Party, which campaigned in 2002 almost entirely on postmaterialist - or as 
they put it, 'quality of life' - issues such as GM and safe foods. Just as Act tried 
to 'convince voters that New Zealand is headed towards complete lawlessness, 
with criminals waiting to pounce at every corner' and New Zealand First pushed 
'the message that disease-ridden immigrants are pouring over the borders 
looking for the promised land', the Greens equally played on fears by suggesting 
'that letting the genetic modification genie out of the bottle could result in mutant 
corn and four-eyed fish' (Mold, 2002b). According to Mold, all the parties have 
been forced by apparent economic satisfaction to search 'around the margins for 
an issue that will resonate with voters and appeal to their insecurities' (ibid). 
blandness for the parties' conservative core vote. For the parties of ,the right, campaigning on societal issues 
also taps into the disquiet about the social dislocation and disintegration caused by neo-liberalism and 
change. As Bale has argued, 'It de-emphasises that aspect of National's policy which puts people off (the 
knee-jerk neo-liberalism), while tapping into the flipside of anxieties about socio-economic change' (Bale, 
2000a). 
121 Similarly, in the mid-1990s the Alliance and New Zealand First have stressed their desire to promote the 
ambiguous policy of sovereignty, which is related to concepts of nationhood and national identity. Act also 
played on concepts of 'values' - epitomised in the slogan 'Values. Not Politics' - to promote a 
postmaterialist element of the party. 
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Part Three: The New Consensus and Centre 
A Negative Consensus 
There are some commentators and academics who view the new era of 
convergence politics in a positive light. To them, the creation of a new centre, 
and the ideological consensus that accompanies it, equates with the end of deep 
conflict. It thus indicates the resolution of problems which originally generated 
such ideological conflict. Likewise, the reorientation towards the centre might 
suggest to some that 'common sense' now drives politics - by ruling out the 
extremes, New Zealand politics has now produced a sensible 'middle way'. This 
is a 'positive value judgement' - that we have reached 'the good society' and so 
there is nothing left to become ideological about (Jaensch, 1994: p.227).122 
Commenting in 1997 on the international 'end of ideology', Peter Mair asserted: 
many of the great issues which once sustained traditional loyalties have now more or less 
been solved. The struggles of the working class for political rights have been won; the 
legitimacy of defending the rights of organized religion has also been accepted, as has 
the legitimacy of the rights of those who reject religious beliefs; a comprehensive welfare 
state has become the norm in most of the contemporary west European democracies, 
and such conflicts over welfare rights as do persist tend to be at the margins of the 
system. The great struggles are over (Mair, 1997: pp.38-39). 
This sort of statement is reminiscent of the postwar consensus of the 1950s and 
60s, which was also misread as indicating an end-state of harmony and the belief 
that popular satisfaction was being achieved. Lipset wrote at that time: 'This 
change in Western political life reflects the fact that the fundamental political 
problems of the industrial revolution have been solved: the workers have 
achieved industrial and political citizenship; [and] the conservatives have 
accepted the welfare state' (Upset, 1960: pp.442-443).123 Similarly, in New 
122 See also: Lipset (1960: pp. 443-444). 
123 Lipset even went so far as to say that 'This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West 
ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to 
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Zealand, John Roberts thought the 'end of ideology' of the 1970s had been 
caused by positive economic conditions: 
It is fair to say that the success of the managed economy of the war and immediate 
post-war period ended the sterile policy conflict about 'free enterprise' and 'socialism'. 
Since the passage of the Economic Stabilisation Act, 1948, there has been no doubt 
that the government takes responsibility for the state of the economy and must arm 
itself with the power to direct activity (Roberts, 1978: p. 71). 
Thus Roberts thought parliamentary politics lacked ideas because there 
appeared to be a decreasing need for them: 'The most recent period of New 
Zealand history is distinguished by the almost total absence of political ideas, or 
definition of national goals. It is also, arguably, the happiest period for the 
greatest number of the inhabitants of a given society known to us in recorded 
history' (Roberts, 1978: p.70). 
Certainly the postwar political consensus was positive in that it was built upon 
economic prosperity.124 Both National and Labour accepted what could be called 
a 'positive consensus' around welfare capitalism and the goal of equity. The 
postwar situation of ideological conformity was produced by optimism, affluence 
and a forward momentum. But the postwar consensus was misread as indicating 
an end-state of harmony and the belief that popular satisfaction was being 
achieved.125 Despite the consensus characterising New Zealand society in the 
political action' (Upset, 1960: p.443). According to Upset the situation was being generated by assumptions 
of increasing prosperity for all and general equality: 'The thesis that partisan conflict based on class 
differences and left-right issues is ending is based on the assumption that "the economic class system is 
disappearing ... that redistribution of wealth and income ... has ended economic inequality's political 
significance.'" (Upset, 1960: pp.443-444). 
124 From shortly after World War" until the early 1970s, capitalism throughout the world enjoyed a 'long 
boom'. This period saw an unprecedented growth in human productivity and wealth. It appeared that 
capitalism had overcome the perpetual crises which had plagued it throughout the 1800s and the first half of 
the twentieth century. This long boom allowed business and government in Western countries like New 
Zealand to be able to afford to fund the continuation and expansion of the welfare state, as demanded by 
the left, bolstered by popular support, and accepted by the right. 
125 The myth of the postwar consensus being due to some sort of end-state of harmony was shattered in the 
late-1960s and 1970s by a massive increase in class conflict throughout advanced industrial democracies. 
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postwar period making politics prosaic and superficial, substantial conflict still 
existed on issues as fundamental as how society should be run. Compared with 
politics today, there was still serious conflict over issues of principle.126 
What is made most obvious by the increasing ideological void in the parties is the 
absence of any 'big issues' on the political agenda. Although New Zealand party 
politics has always been relatively pragmatic, in some periods in the past ideas 
have at least appeared more central, questions about the 'big issues' have been 
on the agenda, and so the concepts of left and right have had more meaning 
than they do today. Generally in the West 'these conflicts were sometimes banal 
and superficial, but often they centred on fundamental differences over how 
society should be run' (Furedi, 1995: p.12). Questions used to be asked about 
the ownership and control of society's wealth, and the production and allocation 
of resources. Nowadays in New Zealand no fundamental questions about society 
are being asked by any of the parties - even the question of unemployment has 
disappeared from public debate, despite its persistence as a social problem. 
There are, however, some very important differences between the 'end of 
ideology' situation in the 1950s and 60s and that of today. Today's strong 
convergence of views is by contrast a 'common negativity' - a defensive 
consensus based around resigned acceptance of the low horizons imposed on 
society by an ongoing economic slump (ibid). While optimism, affluence and a 
forward momentum produced postwar ideological conformity, the current 
ideological void is produced by a lack of affluence, and this new era of politics is 
being driven by lowered horizons rather than an optimistic search for alternatives. 
That the new consensus is a negative one is a view shared by' James, who 
126 For example, prior to this modern period of consensus, there was an expectation amongst the public that 
the two main parties stood for very different things and would implement very different types of policies. 
Therefore in 1972, after twelve years of a National government there were expectations of radical change as 
people believed Labour was different. Likewise in 1984, the public expected that a very different direction to 
be taken by the new government than that of the Muldoon government. By contrast in 1999, few people 
really expected that much would change with the change of government. 
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believes that New Zealand society and the parties of the left have only accepted 
the ongoing existence of the neo-liberal framework out of a sense of realism 
rather than enthusiasm: 
This is light years away from the pact of the third quarter of last century. Then, the 
political elite and ordinary folk shared a positive consensus that desired prosperity and 
regulation, security and taxes. A positive consensus is robust and durable and the politics 
stable. A negative consensus is fragile and volatile and the politics slippery and fickle. A 
negative consensus is acceptance of the status quo, not as an eminently desirable state 
of affairs but as an inescapable reality (James, 2000e).127 
According to James, any political programme outside of the new consensus -
such as an attempt to re-establish the welfare state, or even just opposing the 
open economy - is ruled out as 'a denial of reality' rather than because such 
programmes are undesirable in themselves. Instead, James argues, the centrist 
approach of Helen Clark and Jim Anderton is 'in tune with the negative quality of 
the consensus' (James, 2000e). Therefore in speaking of a 'negative consensus' 
James means the common unhappy acceptance of policies due to the ruling out 
of the possibility of the alternatives; by 'positive consensus' he means the 
common happy acceptance of policy because of a superiority over lesser viable 
alternatives. 
The lack of 'big issues' and the general lack of ideological debate on the political 
agenda is not because the practical issues and problems no longer exist. The 
opposite is the case, with the 1990s being characterised by intractable social and 
economic problems: a permanent layer of about five percent unemployment, 
ongoing economic instability and slump, social dislocation and exclusion, growing 
inequality between rich and poor and between Maori and Pakeha, and so on. It 
seems that the parties have, in effect, accepted defeat on such issues and 
therefore have little to say about the big issues affecting society. There is a 
sense in which the political impasse in this country matches the economic 
impasse that has existed for some time. The exhausted state of party politics 
127 See also: James (2000a: p.69). 
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reflects the huge effect of two decades of economic slump and social decay. If 
the socio-economic system itself is exhausted, parties which are based on it and 
seek to manage it are unlikely to come up with a bold new vision for society. 
The Fragmented and Trivial Nature of Conflict 
In the absence of conflict about important economic issues, since the mid-1990s 
recriminations, personal abuse, and trivia have dominated politics. Bruce Jesson 
noted that in the late 1980s 'the conflict had a point to it. The stakes were large, 
the issues were on a grand scale, not like now' (Jesson, 1995c: p.125). Instead 
the new era of convergence politics is characterised by a predominance of 
'scandals, defections and in-fighting' (Warren, 1997a: pA}.128 Instead of the wider 
issues being up for debate, the first MMP Parliament was preoccupied with 
politicians' perks, MP party-hopping, leadership, or what should be done with 
government buildings. This increase in trivial politics, which is often erroneously 
attributed to MMP, is better understood within the context of the ideological 
convergence and exhaustion of party politics. In the absence of any real 
principle, policies or meaningful debate, other more trivial issues come to the 
fore. Without proper policies to campaign and compete on, and without plausible 
solutions to today's problems, parliamentary politics has transformed further into 
a 'circus' than ever before (Jones, 1997; Laugesen, 1997). 
The fractionalisation of all the parties in Parliament over recent years illustrates 
the decline of ideology and principle in New Zealand politics in that these 
breakdowns have so little to do with ideological principles - the internal party 
splits and debates usually lack any real substance. For instance, there were no 
128 In the absence of political ideas, scandal in advanced industrial democracies has also become a 
substitute: 'Scandal has become a kind of poor substitute for political opposition .... And, in the absence of 
an alternative standpoint from which to criticise, it is difficult to criticise at all. In these circumstances, it 
appears as if the only thing open to scrutiny is the individual behaviour of politicians. It is this shift of focus 
from the wider domain of substantive issues to narrow concerns with the conduct of the politician that helps 
to throw light on the contempory culture of scandal' (Roberts, 1994: p.1?). 
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major political issues involved in the departure of Alamein Kopu from the Alliance 
in 1997, nor in the split in New Zealand First in 1998. These splits are usually 
indicative of a general 'internal weakness rather than a dynamic political struggle' 
going on (Richards, 1992b). In line with party fragmentation, individuals or 
coalitions of individuals are often emerging as the key players, quite separately 
from their parties. This creates the spectacle of high-profile maverick individuals 
dominating political debate. For example, commentators often argue that it is 
difficult to believe that Peter Dunne, Winston Peters or Jim Anderton stand for 
anything much more than themselves. 129 Instead of coherent parties organised 
around different programmes, political life is becoming a contest between 
personalities, cliques and factions that stand for little. Paradoxically it is now both 
a source of their strengths and weaknesses that the parties are so closely formed 
around and associated with their leader's personalities. Therefore they are un-
dynamic because they often stand for little more than what their leaders 
represent. Both New Zealand First and the Alliance (and now the Progressive 
Coalition Party) have evolved around the respective leadership of Peters and 
Anderton and the success and failures of these parties have so often been 
associated with those people. As described in Chapter Six, the actual political 
parties and their extra-parliamentary organisations and memberships are now 
less central than ever before,130 and the style of general election campaigning is 
increasingly presidential. 
Exhaustion of Change and Ideas 
An important element of the new consensus is a conservative attitude towards 
change. The Labour Party has best displayed this' conservatism, . especially in its 
election campaigns where it has promised very little, (drawing on the British 
Labour Party motto of 'under-promise and over-deliver'). In both 1999 and 2002 
the party released a minimalist 'credit card' of commitments that proved 
129 See: Bayliss (1994, 70-71), and Hubbard (1998). 
130 Gustafson (1993: p.80). 
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unmemorable in its details. This gimmick pared down the party's usual huge 
arsenal of policy into easily dispersed sound bites. 
In fact one of the new trends pioneered by the Labour Party in the late 1990s 
was to avoid releasing actual policy.131 Labour under Clark moved towards a 
certain political vagueness. For instance, Clark made a practice of refusing to 
recite manifesto policy (Clifton, 1997d: pp.16-17). While in opposition, the need to 
retain party unity led Labour to postpone its key policy debates. After nine years 
in opposition, therefore, Labour had been unable to come up with much in the 
way of new policy. Often, instead of outlining an alternative to that of the 
Government, Labour displayed its technocratic character in merely promising a 
post-election inquiry into whatever policy area was too contentious to develop 
and release a clear policy on. In 1999 Labour announced inquiries into 
telecommunications, the Residential Tenancies Act, the Education Review 
Office, police procedures for dealing with fraud, as well as 22 other inquiries. 
According to National's count, Labour promised 126 reviews, 58 investigations, 
and 13 'explorations' (National Party, 2000). 
Labour's programme today is therefore some distance away from that of the 
extensive and radical programme that Steve Maharey suggested for the party in 
1992 when he wrote: 'the issues we face as a nation are so big and so 
challenging that nothing less than a genuinely radical political programme will 
suffice. Labour needs a "Big Idea" around which to organise its policies and 
programmes' (Maharey, 1992b: p.14}.132 Maharey would, no doubt, claim the 
Third way as Labour's new 'Big Idea', but this concept has remained somewhat 
131 This trend was arguably pioneered (notoriously) in the 1987 election when Labour did not publish its 
election manifesto until after the election. See: Palmer (1992: p.145), Wilson (1989: pp.134-135), and 
Russell (1996: p.133). However, in 1987 the reasons for avoiding disclosure of policy were somewhat 
devious while in 1999 it was due more to the lack of policy. 
132 Indeed, as Trotter argued, 'What Labour lacks at present is a compelling vision of the future' (Trotter, 1997k). 
Instead Labour essentially became just a health and education party, with little real ideological dynamism. Harman 
later commented that, 'so far there doesn't seem to be any "big idea" emerging from within the Labour Party and 
few stand out MPs' (Harman, 1999a: p.50). 
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confused, and since 2000 has faded out of usage. Such vagueness and 
unassertiveness is in contrast to Labour's legendary historical tradition as 
reformers. As Gamlin stated, 'Labour governments in the past would emerge 
from long periods in opposition and charge into office full of reformist zeal, with 
complete faith in the power of government action to transform society' (Gamlin, 
1999d: p.24). He pointed out that Clark had a conservative and pragmatic 
attitude to reform, as she had stated a preference for implementing changes over 
a three-term government, thus preferring 'longevity in office, as against the do-or-
die idealism of old' (ibid). That the Labour Government's decidedly conservative 
approach to change is exemplified by Helen Clark's often-used line: 'In 
Government, boring is good' (quoted in Small, 2001 c). Ultimately Clark is not a 
visionary (or policy-seeker) - she has been described as being a Keith Holyoake 
more than a Norman Kirk (Easton, 2002b). Likewise Finance Minister Michael 
Cullen is fond of describing Labour's mandate as a vote 'for evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary change' (quoted in Kelsey, 2002: p.69). Similarly, an editorial 
of the NZ Herald accurately proclaimed: 'This Government is the most 
conservative New Zealand has seen since the Holyoake era. Its mission has 
been to calm the electorate after a period of rapid economic change and promote 
modest improvement at a comfortable pace' (NZ Herald, 2002c). Likewise, 
James labelled the Clark government of 1999-2002 as one of 'consolidation', 
noting that in policy and tone the government supplied stability and moderation 
(James, 23 Aug 2002).133 The pragmatism of modern Labour overwhelmed any 
strong expression of belief in anything. As Campbell asked: 'can anyone name 
with complete confidence a single policy that the painfully pragmatic Labour 
leadership of today would defend to the electoral death?' (Campbell, 1999b: 
p.18). This conservative orientation is not limited to Labour -alone. Act, for 
example, has begun placing more emphasis on itself being a party of stability 
133 Sticking to the middle of the political spectrum became the Labour Party's raison d'etre and area of 
expertise. As Clifton said, 'Labour is stuck in the middle, trying to exude middleness with every fibre of its 
being' (Clifton, 1998e: p.19). The party was attempting to be even milder than National: 'However mild and 
hand-wringing the [National] government is about the plight of the poor, Labour is giving itself hernias in its 
efforts to be even milder. Less is more, as far as Labour is concerned' (ibid). 
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rather than change. According to one party manager, 'All our research was 
telling us that our constituency wanted change, but not too much change. They 
wanted us to be different [from National], but not too different' (quoted in 
Heeringa, 1996: p.27). 
Behind the new negative consensus in the New Zealand party system is a 
general exhaustion of ideas and principles. While conflict between the political 
parties does indeed still exist, it is often a conflict that is driven less by political 
principle and programmes than electoral calculation. This is a sign that 
parliamentary parties in New Zealand are not only characterised by an 
ideological convergence, but also by an ideological exhaustion - a situation in 
which the ideological component of the party is less important than electoral 
considerations. This is a climate where office-seeking dominates the parties and 
their behaviour.134 
In the absence of ideology, then, there is a corresponding lack of policies of any 
substance being produced - none of the parties have much of interest to say 
anymore.135 This has been reflected most strongly in the election campaigns of 
the 1990s which have clearly been less about manifestos, programmes and 
policy, and more about leadership and trivialities.136 The 1996 and 1999 general 
elections perfectly illustrated just how unimportant ideas are in politics, as the 
parties' policies played very little role in the election campaigns or debates. For 
example, there was no substantial debate about issues of defence, race 
relations, foreign affairs, law and order or the environment - let alone any clash 
134 Part of the problem is that parties are no longer vehicles for ideas, but often just implement policies devised by 
government departments. As examined in Chapter Eight, political parties increasingly rely on the state to produce 
policies for them, and the parties themselves no longer properly fulfil the classic function of devising policy. 
135 In this new climate there is a tendency for politicians to say nothing rather than risk causing offence. This 
further propels them towards a 'politics without policies' (Jaensch 1994, 243). As a logical conclusion, all the 
parties are attempting to market themselves as 'orthodox' and as 'of the centre' and conversely trying to 
label their opponents as extreme and wanting radical change (Heartfield 1997). 
136 For confirmation of this trend, see Jackson (1991), and James (1997c, 26). 
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between alternative visions of sOciety.137 Most of the parties' election manifestos 
were more concerned with propagating platitudes rather than policies.138 Again in 
2002 - apart from the debate on genetic modification - there was little conflict 
over important issues. 
Most clearly of all in the new era of politics, politicians and parties now lack policy 
dynamism. While parties of the left have largely given up on their traditional 
visions and policies, and have arrived at an accommodation with market 
capitalism, they have yet to construct any new framework of big ideas with which 
to move forward.139 It is not just left-wing ideas which appear to lack relevance 
today, however. The dynamic crusades of Roger Douglas and Ruth Richardson 
have long passed and the once confident right-wing agenda is also all but 
extinguished. The National Party has been in search of self-definition for over a 
decade and is also failing to come up with any new 'big idea' or coherent party 
identity.14o Act, too, is having trouble selling its libertarian policies and is now 
attempting to expand its appeal from that of an 'ideas party' of economic and 
social liberalism to a more pragmatic and almost rural-orientated party of populist 
protest and social conservatism. It seems that the free-market project no longer 
provides confidence for the right-wing and this is reflected in the failure of the 
parties of the right to project any positive view of the future. 
An apolitical culture is also a factor. There has been a popular reaction against 
'big ideas' (partly in response to the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s), and New 
Zealand society favours pragmatism more than ever. Instead of vision, voters 
now desire 'common sense' - a situation that Steve Maharey warned of in the 
early 1990s: 'A simple answer eludes us all at the moment and as a result there 
137 See: Heal (1996b: p.57), and Laugesen (1996b; 1997a: p.67). 
138 A number of commentators have noted the vagueness of the parties' policy prescriptions. In 1995 
Speden examined the increasing meaningless of the parties' propaganda (Speden 1995a, 18). 
139 See: Trotter (1997d), and James (1992a, 1997a). 
140 For instance, in 1997 Jim Bolger enthusiastically raised the concept of 'social capital' as a way to define 
the National Party's identity and purpose, but this quickly vanished from National's lexicon. 
Chapter Three: Post-Reform Consensus 247 
is a tendency to start talking about "pragmatism". There will be a number of 
people within Labour ranks who will think this way in the next few years. They 
have had enough of big ideas. What they will want is down to earth thinking 
producing common sense policies' (Maharey, 1992b: pp.13-14). Unsurprisingly 
then, when Labour arrived in government in 1999 it introduced an agenda that 
was, according to Kelsey, 'ad hoc and palliative. There was no sense of a 
coordinated policy programme, let alone a coherent philosophy or vision that 
underpinned them' (Kelsey, 2002: p.69). This reflects a general 'political malaise' 
in New Zealand society which means that the parties cannot unite their own 
'traditional' supporters. In the absence of any strongly held views or of organised 
political passions, political parties do little more than reflect this. Therefore, far 
from Labour being in the 'radical centre' as Helen Clark maintains, or National 
being 'radical conservatives' as Jenny Shipley used to argue, the major parties 
have few inspiring ideas, let alone a wider vision of a better future. 
Conclusion 
The 1980s and early-1990s was a time of radical reform and a relatively 
polarised party system lacking pOlitical consensus. However, during the rest of 
the 1990s the party and electoral system was re-organised, and by 1999 a new 
policy consensus had developed on economic issues. Most importantly, the neo-
liberal reforms have now been deeply embedded. Yet while polarisation is 
decreasing on the materialist/socio-economic scale, it appears that on societal 
issues (or the postmaterialist dimension), polarisation is again increasing - or at 
least conflict is occurring on this dimension, even if policies aCtually remain 
similar. There appears to be a relationship between these two movements. Most 
political debate in the early 2000s has therefore centred on social issues. 
Today it seems that - despite MMP - there is little difference between the parties 
on all of the big economic issues and even on societal issues the differences are 
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less than the party conflict on these issues would suggest. This situation should 
dispel the idea that an intensification of party competition necessarily increases 
the political choice available to voters, ideologically revitalizing politics. As Kelsey 
has written, 'The re-emergence of party differences in the 1990s created an 
illusion of political choice while stabilising the change' (Kelsey, 1995: p.316). 
Voters are now being offered similar political projects - only they are packaged in 
the form of a fragmented party system. In fact, the differences between the 
parties probably appear bigger than they actually are. This is largely because the 
differences are 'magnified by partisan rhetoric' (Parenti, 1983: p.202). Much like 
other commodified products in the marketplace, the parties have to exaggerate 
their differences. Therefore the very absence of real political differences makes it 
all the more necessary for the parties to stress the ideological differences - or at 
least the ideological symbolism - that differentiates them from other parties. 
However at the same time it would not be accurate to characterise the parties in 
Parliament as being totally the same. The parties still rely to some degree on 
their traditional blocs of class and other societal variations, and therefore require 
some obvious or manufactured differences between them to continue to reinforce 
past loyalties. However, the question that needs to be asked is: Are these 
differences of any significant consequence, or are the similarities of more 
importance than the differences? The following chapter looks at the social 
foundations of party support and how they influence party ideology. 
Section Two: 
Societal Support for the Parties 
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Chapter Four 
Political Cleavages and the Party System 
The previous chapter on ideology in the party system since 1993 introduced the 
idea that party competition is increasingly configured not by materialist-
economic-class issues (that is, by the traditional left-right cleavage), but by 
postmaterialist issues such as conflicts over immigration, prostitution reform, 
nuclear ships, and genetic modification. As a result, a liberal-conservative 
dimension increasingly structures party competition. This chapter explores this 
further by examining the social bases of party support and inquiring into whether 
New Zealand politics is still driven by the traditional class cleavage,1 or whether 
other political cleavages are replacing it. 
The connection between New Zealand's political parties and their social bases of 
support is often stressed by political scientists and commentators.2 This is 
because Labour has traditionally derived most of its support from lower 
socioeconomic voters in the cities, while wealthier voters in both urban and rural 
areas have formed National's voter base. A person's place in society is, 
therefore, often seen as a relatively reliable basis for predicting their likely voting 
habits.3 This relationship between social structure ,and the distribution of votes 
1 The use of the term 'class cleavage' does is not meant to imply that there are only two classes in New 
Zealand society, but that there is a dynamic between them. 
2 See: Milne (1958), Robinson (1967), Mitchell (1969a: p.30), Levine and Robinson (1976: chapter eleven), 
Levine (1979: chapter five), Clements (1982), Wood (1988, chapter eight), Wilkes (1994: p.78), Mulgan 
(1997a: p.273), and Henderson and Bellamy (2002). 
3 Prior to this emphasis on the sociology of voting behaviour, which developed in the 1960s, political 
scientists and commentators were prone to perpetrate the myth that voting was carried out in an almost 
252 Chapter Four: Cleavages and the Party System 
has also been seen as strongly driving the ideologies of the parties, allegedly 
making the Labour Party a left-wing (or socialist) party and the National Party a 
right-wing and free enterprise, conservative party.4 
This chapter challenges the idea that such a relationship between parties and 
social structure still exists, and suggests that party competition is structured less-
and-less by this traditional socioeconomic left-right cleavage. Increasingly, other 
social cleavages (based on characteristics such as ethnicity, gender and 
location) shape party politics - but even these are weak. The notion that Labour 
is a party of working people and National is the party of farming and business is 
thus disputed, and instead, it is shown that these parties, as well as the newly-
established ones, increasingly find their support in all sections of society. 
Therefore, today there is significant evidence of the declining influence of class 
(in particular) and social cleavages (more generally) in shaping voting behaviour 
and the ideology of the parties. This trend plays an important part in the decline 
of the institution of party in New Zealand and the erosion of ideology in particular. 
The wider focus of this chapter is an examination of the interrelationships 
between the cleavages in society and the party system. Cleavages are lines of 
division in society and politics that separate groups that have different attributes. 
This chapter differentiates between social and political cleavages. Social 
cleavages are those based on identifiable traits that divide society, such as 
gender, religion, class, ethnicity, language, and region. Political cleavages are 
classless society. For example, see: Mitchell (1969a: p.30). See also: Jackson and Harre (1969:125), who 
argue, 'New Zealand has no class struggle, no poor, no intellectual tradition, no overt group conflict, little 
self-awareness as a social entity and has sought for similarity rather than diversity' (Jackson and Harre, 
1969: p.125). 
4 For example, Mulgan writes: 'This social cleavage at the axis of the two-party system reflects the historical 
origins of the two parties, with Labour the socialist party of unionists and workers and National the anti-
socialist party of farmers and business people. This divide, which has been reflected in the economically 
left-wing and right-wing orientations of the parties, has provided the basic assumption on which political 
activists and commentators have estimated where each party's supporters are to be found' (Mulgan, 1997a: 
p.272). 
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those based on ideology, attitudes and opinion, and they divide society and the 
party system. The two types of cleavages are interrelated, as often social 
cleavages are politicised (or 'partisised'), hence becoming political cleavages (or 
'issue dimensions'). However, as Dean Jaensch crucially points out, 'not all 
social cleavages become political cleavages, and not all political cleavages are 
reflections of a social cleavage' (Jaensch, 1994: p.41). Put another way, social 
cleavages just divide society, while political ones divide both society and the 
party system. This chapter is essentially concerned with the extent to which 
social cleavages have been translated into political cleavages in the New 
Zealand party system. 
Most writers on this subject have argued that the New Zealand party system is 
overwhelmingly characterised by one dominant cleavage - the left-right class 
cleavage, otherwise referred to as the socioeconomic, economic or materialist 
cleavage. Alternative cleavages are also often identified, such as those based on 
ethnicity, geography and religion. In addition, as Chapter Three illustrated, a 
postmaterialist liberal-conservative political cleavage is also increasingly 
identified - one that might be seen to encompass most of these alternative 
cleavages and broadly represent non-economic societal issues. This chapter 
argues that these alternative cleavages are becoming relatively stronger, and 
that the traditionally dominant socioeconomic cleavage has lost much of its 
potency. Part of the evidence for this is found in the results of the survey of 
experts on party ideology carried out for this thesis in 2003. 
Part One of this chapter looks at the decline of the class cleavage, examining the 
nature of class voting in New Zealand and, in particular, highlighting'the empirical 
research which provides evidence that the links between class and party are 
weakening. It details the electoral relationships between the individual political 
parties and voters defined by class. Following on from this, Part Two examines 
the alternative cleavages to ascertain their impact on the party system and 
whether their influence is increasing with the decline of the class cleavage. This 
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section argues that although no one significant social cleavage has risen to 
replace the class cleavage, a general postmaterialist political cleavage is 
increasingly organising party competition, with issues and differences of values, 
psychology, culture and identity often configuring and shaping party politics. In 
Part Three, some of the implications of the relative insignificance of social 
cleavages for parliamentary politics are investigated. In particular, it argues that 
the increasing detachment of parties from any fixed social bases of support has 
resulted in a reduction of pressure on political parties to act on behalf of a 
particular constituency. This has led to ideological erosion. Because the 
traditional divide between social classes has ceased to be a source of political 
conflict, National and Labour, as well as their satellite minor parties, have been 
separated from their ideological moorings. This change has helped to drastically 
rearrange New Zealand party politics, removing the ideological anchors that used 
to guide the way the party system operated. It is argued that more and more 
parties operate simply as vehicles for groups or teams of politicians seeking 
office. 
The social bases of the party system have been measured in a number of ways 
in New Zealand. A common method is to compare the electoral performance of 
parties in certain localities (electorates or polling booths) with the known social 
characteristics of that location. Those characteristics can be taken from common 
knowledge or more sophisticated sources such as Department of Statistics 
census data. Correlations between parties and social structure can then be 
calculated.5 For example, Labour is said to be a party of the working class 
because it has traditionally performed strongly in those electorates which have 
few employers in them. This is a method used notably by Alan McRobie (1997). 
A second method involves surveying voters. This allows more sophisticated, in-
depth and reliable investigation into the relationship between social structure and 
political parties, as it deals directly with individuals. However, electoral survey 
5 For a critique of this method, see: Mulgan (1997a: p.272). 
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research does not have a long history in New Zealand. Few voter surveys were 
carried out before the 1970s, and none were nationwide. The first useful survey 
was carried out in 1960 by Austin Mitchell of Dunedin Central voters.6 Then in 
1963 R H Brookes and Alan Robinson surveyed the Palmerston North, Karori, 
Miramar and Manawatu electorates? The results were reported by Robinson 
(1967). The first national survey appears to have been carried out following the 
1975 general election by Stephen Levine and Robinson. The results from this 
were reported by Levine and Robinson (1976) and Levine (1979). Since then, 
Stephen Levine and Nigel S Roberts have regularly carried out and organised 
various multi-electorate and national voter surveys at election time (1989; 1991 b; 
1992a; 1997). The most comprehensive New Zealand voter surveys have been 
undertaken by the New Zealand Election Study (NZES). This project has carried 
out large postal surveys of voters after every election since 1987. This data has 
been analysed most thoroughly by Jack Vowles (1987b; 1992b; 1994c; 1998b; 
2000; 2001 ;), who is New Zealand's pre-eminent expert on the relationship 
between social structure and voting. Other researchers using the NZES data 
include Peter Aimer (1992;; 1998), Hyam Gold (1985; 1989; 1992), and Marcus 
Ganley (1997), and their analyses are also referred to in this chapter. Another 
regular and extensive survey involving party choice and social structure is carried 
out by Massey University social scientists Paul Perry and Alan Webster (1999).8 
A number of surveys are also now undertaken for media outlets by polling 
companies. The results from these are also used in this chapter to illustrate the 
argument. 
The issue of the categorisation of class also requires some discussion. The main 
academic approach in New Zealand is to use the dichotomy of manual/non-
manual workers to distinguish between working class and middle class voters, 
6 This survey involved 551 random personal interviews in the two weeks following the 1960 election. Results 
were published by Mitchell (1962d). The survey was repeated in 1962-64, and published in Mitchell (1967). 
7 This survey involved 1555 random personal interviews following the 1963 election. 
8 Their most recent survey, carried out in 1998 and published in 1999, had a sample of 1200 New 
Zealanders from across the country. 
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but as Vowles has pointed out, 'such a purely manual/non-manual definition of 
class voting is open to serious question' (Vowles, 1987b: p.25}.9 However, 
Vowles has continued the manual/non-manual tradition because, 'although 
members of the salariat [non-manual working class] share some of the interests 
of the traditional working class in that they are usually employees, their jobs are 
of a higher status and usually provide greater autonomy and reward' (ibid: p.24). 
This method has been criticised by Shane Hanley: 
This definition is both too narrow and too broad. On the one hand, it excludes all non-
manual workers who are nonetheless wage-workers, and subject to essentially similar 
conditions and interests. On the other hand, the category includes a significant 
proportion of self-employed who do not share these inherent class characteristics. 
These definitions make it impossible to pinpoint how the whole working class votes 
(Hanley, 1988: p.11). 
Some social and political scientists have also rejected class categories in favour 
of a socio-economic gradationalist approach, whereby voters are distinguished 
by income, thus producing groups such as 'high-income earners', 'middle-income 
earners', and 'low-income earners'. For the purpose of this chapter it is not useful 
to ignore the data generated by either the manual/non-manual distinction or the 
gradationalist approach, but such material is reproduced here with reservation. A 
more useful understanding of class in New Zealand is put forward by Brian Roper 
(1991: p.148; 1997), who uses a deliberately expansive and Marxist definition of 
the working class. In this, the working class is defined as those who are under 
the more or less continuous compulsion to sell their labour in order to purchase 
their livelihood. Such a definition includes the majority of white-collar employees, 
who arguably share similar class characteristics. Beyond the working class, 
according to Roper, are a number of other significant classes: 
Within sociology, there is broad agreement that those who exercise effective control 
over the productive resources of society - capital, labour, and land - constitute the 
dominant class in New Zealand society. There is also broad agreement that those who 
9 According to Robinson, writing in 1967, New Zealand's class structure can be described by a group of 
business people, professionals and farmers at the top, 'blue collar' workers, both skilled and unskilled at the 
bottom, and in the middle, a 'buffer-zone' formed by the 'white collar' workers (Robinson, 1967: p.96). 
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are self-employed and own their own small businesses constitute a distinctive 'old 
middle class' or petite-bourgeoisie (Roper, 1997: p.94). 
Using this general approach, political scientist Rob Steven has analysed census 
data from 1976, which showed the existence of a 'ruling class' in New Zealand 
numbering about 10 percent of the population, a 'middle class' of 12 percent, a 
'petite-bourgeoisie' of 7 percent, and a 'working class' of about 72 percent 
(Steven, 1989).10 
Part One: Decline of the Class Cleavage 
The existence and operation of the major parties in New Zealand have 
traditionally been closely aligned with class interests. This was especially the 
case after the 1880s, during which a decade-long depression politicised urban 
manual workers, small farmers, and the landless, leading to the election of the 
Liberal Party Government in 1890.11 With the arrival of the Liberal Party, working 
men - and later women - were finally involved in parliamentary politics and 
elected to Parliament. From this moment on, class was properly part of New 
Zealand politics, with both sides of the class divide represented in Parliament. 
This was reinforced when the Reform Party formed on the right of the Liberals in 
1909 and was dependent upon small North Island farmers and urban 
businessmen. The Liberals' support base later shifted towards commercial and 
10 For a variety of classifications of class in New Zealand, 8edggood (1980: p.72), Steven (1989) and Wilkes 
(1994) provide Marxist interpretations, while Pearson and Thorns (1983) provide Weberian interpretations. 
11 Prior to the establishment in 1890 of the Liberal Party, which was. the first 'modern' political party, most 
'parties' were simply parliamentary factions 'based on sectional or issue differences rather than class 
differences' (Robinson, 1967: p.100). Nonetheless since the establishment of central government in 1856 
these quasi-parties were dominated by the landed oligarchy. Liberal Party politicians, in contrast, were 
particularly aware of the different economic and political interests existing in the new nation and found 
advantage in taking up the side of the poor under universal suffrage. For example, prior to becoming Liberal 
premier, Richard Seddon clearly outlined the ideological division in New Zealand when he said, 'It is all 
nonsense to talk of Liberalism and Conservatism in New Zealand. It is the rich and the poor; it is the wealthy 
and the landowners against the middle and labouring classes' (quoted in Lipson, 1948: pp.68-69). 
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manufacturing interests (and the party changed its name to United), and thus the 
Labour Party emerged as the voice for trade unionists. Then, following the 
election of Labour in 1935, the National Party was formed out of the combination 
of the United and Reform parties.12 By the 1930s then, partisan competition in 
New Zealand was predominately uni-dimensional - organised around economic 
issues and class divisions, with the result that social structure played a crucial 
role in determining party support. 
As elsewhere in the Western world the New Zealand parties' core voter bases in 
the 1930s came to provide their solid long-term backing. These social linkages 
have been theorised as representing a 'frozen party system' - the idea that 
defining moments in the history of a country produce social cleavages which 
become politicised, encouraging the emergence of party systems which reinforce 
and reproduce these cleavages. This was the theory developed in Seymour 
Martin Upset and Stein Rokkan's influential analysis of 1967. They argued that 
political parties that establish their dominance in crucial periods are often able to 
retain their positions in the party system even after the social cleavages change. 
They do this by their skilful adaptation to that change, incorporating new 
cleavages into the original dimensions of conflict. Subsequently, for fifty years 
New Zealand politics orientated to the basic socioeconomic cleavage in which 
Labour and National were in dynamic competition. 
For decades political scientists agreed that politics in New Zealand was nearly 
exclusively either concerned with economic issues or based around the left-right 
class divide. Leslie Upson also noted in 1948, 'Politics in this Dominion are 
concerned with economic problems to the exclusi'on of almost all others. Social 
and moral issues, it is true, have at times entered into the field of party warfare, 
but none of these has ever dominated political controversy' (Upson, 1948: 
12 See: Robinson (1967: p.100), Carter (1956: p.90), and Gustafson (1986). 
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pp.196-197}.13 Half a century later, in the 1996 and 1999 elections, Fiona Barker 
and Elizabeth McLeay found that voters still overwhelmingly chose political 
parties based primarily on socio-economic issues (Barker and McLeay, 2000: 
p.148}.14 Jonathan Boston et al. (1996) also concluded that Labour and National 
'still derive their distinctiveness primarily from socio-economic and related issues' 
(Boston et aI., 1996b: p.58). Likewise, according to Aimer, 'one issues dimension 
- the socioeconomic dimension - over-shadows all others' (Aimer, 2001: p.277). 
It is also noteworthy that in his 1994 multi-country study, Arendt Lijphart 
recognised only the socioeconomic class cleavage operating in New Zealand 
(Lijphart, 1994}.15 Matthew Gibbons, in his content analysis of election 
manifestos between 1911 and 1996, found that the left-right dimension (which he 
says measures economic, redistribution and foreign policy differences) structured 
party competition throughout the period (Gibbons, 1997: p.16). As pointed out in 
Chapter Three, the results of Thomas Brechtel and Andre Kaiser's 1997 survey 
of experts also reinforced the idea that the socioeconomic dimension dominated 
the party system - just over half of the respondents classified New Zealand 
politics as uni-dimensional, and the survey as a whole gave the left-right 
dimension a ranking of four out of five on a scale of relevance (Brechtel and 
Kaiser, 1999: p.7). 
13 Writing in 1969, Austin Mitchell had a similar conclusion, arguing, 'the social cleavage in fact dominates 
the political scene in unrivalled fashion. Without contrary pull, social self-interest becomes the main 
determinant of voting behaviour' (Mitchell, 1969a: p.30). 
14 According to Barker and McLeay, 'In the 1990s, New Zealand voters' primary concerns were with the 
economy, unemployment, and related social concerns such as health care and education' (Barker and 
McLeay, 2000: p.145). See also: Clements (1982: p.151), Aimer (1997: p.193), and Nagel (1998: p.231). 
Miller has also said that 'New Zealand lacks the social. cleavages found in many other multi-party systems' 
(Miller, 1997a: p.39). 
15 Miller has recorded that 'Lijphart has argued, only the ethnic cleavage between Pakeha New Zealanders 
and the indigenous Maori population ... prevent New Zealand from being regarded as a totally homogenous 
society. The party system, Lijphart claimed, was "one dimensional", with the socio-economic factor being the 
key point of social distinction' (Miller, 1997a: p.39). According to Aimer, Lijphart regards New Zealand as 
having 'pronounced unidimensional tendencies' shared in strength only by Barbados and the Bahamas 
(Aimer, 2001: p.277). See also: Lijphart (1984). 
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That class and a basic economic cleavage underpin the way New Zealand 
politics is carried out has become an almost unchallenged assumption for some. 
This is understandable, as for many decades its influence was overwhelmingly 
obvious, especially in that National electorates tended to be those with a high 
proportion of employers whereas Labour held electorates that tended to have a 
low proportion of employers. i6 Furthermore, key party debates and differences 
clearly revolved around socioeconomic or materialist issues. 
Traditionally political scientists have therefore viewed party politics in advanced 
industrial countries like New Zealand as existing in 'alignment' - a term referring 
to the association between the parties that people vote for and the social groups 
or categories to which these voters belong. A class alignment is therefore one in 
which the working class votes overwhelmingly for left-wing and the middle class 
votes overwhelmingly for right-wing parties. A second element of the concept of 
alignment is the idea of some rigidity or loyalty underpinning voting - that parties 
have party supporters (voters who actually identify with the party they vote for) 
rather than just people who vote for the party from time to time.17 
Throughout advanced industrialised nations political scientists have observed a 
breakdown in this alignment over the last four decades - a process and result 
that they label 'class dealignment'. In New Zealand, this class dealignment is 
highlighted when the most widely used method of analysing voting along class 
lines, the Alford index, is applied. This index is calculated by subtracting the 
proportion of the middle class - defined in this instance by the non-manual 
household vote (including farmers) - that vote for the main left party (Labour) 
from the proportion of the working class - defined here as the manual household 
vote - that also vote for that party. A 100 percent score would occur only where 
16 According to Vowles, Labour electorates were also often those 'with a higher proportion of people 
employed in manufacturing than in professional, administrative and other skilled employment' (Vowles et al. 
1995, 16-17). See also: Mulgan (1997a, Chapter Eleven). 
17 For more on voter volatility, see Chapter Ten. 
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all the working class and none of the middle class voted for Labour, while a zero 
score would indicate that the middle class vote for Labour in an equal proportion 
to the working class. According to Vowles' calculations, in New Zealand the 
Alford index has dropped from 30 percent in 1963 (at a time when dealignment 
was already underway) to only 13 percent in 1999, after falling to only 5 percent 
in 1990.18 
Table 4.1: Alford's Index of Class Voting in New Zealand 
Year Percentage 
1963 30% 
1975 19% 
1981 16% 
1984 15% 
1987 9% 
1990 5% 
1993 10% 
1996 9% 
1999 13% 
Source: Vowles (2001: p.176). 
There is a consensus within the contemporary political science literature that the 
influence of class on voting has been lessening since the 1960s, and many 
commentators now question its usefulness for understanding voting behaviour. 19 
Vowles maintains that although membership of social groups 'has an influence 
on voting choice in New Zealand', the 'relationship between structural influences 
and political parties in New Zealand is complex, and weaker than many 
sociologists might expect' (Vowles, 1994c: p.191). Gold agrees, claiming that 
recent trends indicate that 'social differences do influence party choices in New 
Zealand, but only to a fairly modest degree' (Gold. 1992,p.489). According to 
Richard Mulgan, too, 'there has always been a strong tendency for significant 
18 Ganley says that, 'Even if we include the Alliance, as the scale was originally based on all left parties not 
just the largest, the figure increases by only 0.9, still nothing like the earlier figures' (Ganley, 1998: p.12). 
Mitchell also applied the Alford index to statistics from his 1962 Dunedin Central voter survey, arriving at a 
figure of 42 (Mitchell, 1967: p.6). 
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numbers of voters to vote against what might be thought of as their normal class 
interests ... and the number of such voters appears to have been steadily 
increasing since the 1960s' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.274). All of this is not to say that 
the social class cleavage no longer plays any part in structuring electoral 
outcomes, but that it does so to a much lesser degree than in the past. 
Academics sometimes ask whether the party system will revert back to its class 
alignments, again making the socioeconomic cleavage more universal and 
central. Some writers seem to think so, on the basis that dealignment is 
automatically followed by realignment and that there is a dynamism in party 
politics that automatically reinforces and reproduces cleavages of conflict. This is 
certainly possible, but there is no reason to believe that it is inevitable. Instead it 
seems more likely that what is occurring in New Zealand is 'the onward march of 
party decomposition' (Gustafson, 1993: p.73). It remains to be seen whether any 
substantial class realignment is possible in New Zealand society. This chapter 
argues that this is unlikely because the political parties are not encouraging an 
economic/class cleavage by campaigning on those issues. Nor is such a political 
cleavage reflecting an active and overt social cleavage any longer. Instead, other 
social and political cleavages are becoming more prominent. 
There is no doubt that the class alignments created in the political system 
decades ago between party and society still remain partially frozen in the party 
system today, but it is also clear that there is less of a politicised social conflict 
that kindles rivalry between the parties. Instead, New Zealand society has been 
growing less cohesive and more individuated in recent years. This is part of a 
trend throughout advanced industrial democracies. Everywhere, collective 
organisations such as churches and unions have lost societal influence. The 
trend of individualism is in the ascendant and is at odds with the essentially 
19 According to Aimer, 'The weak and weakening relationship between "class" (Le. occupation) and voting is 
by now one of the firmly-established facts of New Zealand electoral politics' (Aimer, 1992: p.333). 
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collective nature of political parties.2o There has also been a noticeable decline in 
class consciousness in New Zealand. That which made individual workers and 
those in other classes feel that they were part of a particular section of society 
has largely gone. The fact that classes still exist in New Zealand cannot be 
disputed, but for various reasons (including the breakdown of the political 
traditions which have prevailed during the past century), fewer people identify as 
being members of their class. This is especially the case for the working class, 
which is made up of people who increasingly experience life and politics as 
individuals, rather than as members of a class with any collective interest and 
strength. Because political loyalty was at its fiercest in class-based 
constituencies, the breakdown of communities means this loyalty is declining. 
This depoliticisation of class is seen in the declining level of traditional working 
class militancy. One indicator of this decline is the sharp fall in strike activity. 
Whereas in 1986 there were 1,329,054 'person days of work lost' in the New 
Zealand economy, by 1997 this figure had dropped dramatically to 24,614 days 
(Statistics NZ, 1998: p.323). Another indicator of the same general phenomenon 
is the drop in union membership. While in December 1985 there were 259 trade 
unions and 683,006 union members (43.5 percent of the work force), by 
December 2002 there were only 174 unions representing 306,687 members 
(21.7 percent of the work force) (Street, 2001: p.355; Dearnaley, 2003). It is also 
noticeable that there has been relatively little class mobilisation in the streets in 
recent years. Despite the incredible reforms of the 1980s and 1990s there was 
remarkably little participation in protest. Even Jim Bolger noted with surprise the 
lack of protests that occurred on the streets in response to his government's 
reforms (Bolger, 1998: p.55).21 
20 According to Bently et aI., 'The rise of individualism, the values of the 1960s, television, economic change 
and a host of other factors are blamed for fostering an atomised world in which people feel less social 
connection and less interest in common issues or collective solutions' (Bently et aI., 2000). 
21 See also: Trotter (1997r). 
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The following section illustrates the decline of the left-right cleavage by 
examining each party's class bases, and showing how this change affects the 
party. 
Labour Party 
For nearly half a century the Labour Party was solidly a party of the working 
class. Established in 1916 as the political wing of the trade union movement, it 
aimed to increase 'the visible, physical presence in Parliament of representatives 
of the working class' (Gustafson, 1989: p.211).22 Although over time Labour was 
successful in broadening its base beyond its core working class voting support,23 
even as late as the 1960s Robinson was pointing out that a 'Comparison with 
English studies suggests that in New Zealand the working class may be more 
solidly pro-Labour than in Britain' and that Labour's support was 'fairly 
homogenous' (Robinson, 1967: pp.96, 101). 
Where survey research exists prior to the 1980s, it points to the Labour Party's 
strong hold over the votes of the working class. Mitchell's 1960 survey of voters 
in the Dunedin Central electorate showed that Labour had the support of 87 
percent of 'unskilled blue-collar' workers and 74 percent of 'skilled and semi-
skilled blue-collar' workers (Mitchell, 1962d: p.176).24 R H Brookes and Alan 
22 The Labour Party deliberately oriented itself towards the working class: 'Labour's strongest appeal is to 
manual workers and lower-income salaried people in terms of such symbols as "the working man" and "fair 
shares" of "just distribution'" (Robinson, 1967: p.1 01). 
23 Although the party's electoral support was initially restricted almost exclusively to working class voters, 
this did begin to change in the late 1920s and early 1930s when the party moved to attract the votes of 
farmers. See: Davidson (1989: p.354). In its first election experience of 1919, the Labour Party received 40 
percent of the vote in the 'constituencies of an entirely urban character' (Lipson, 1948: p.227). Starting in 
1931, however, Labour 'captured many of the rural protest-votes' (ibid). By 1935 Labour's voters were 
described by Lipson as 'trade-unionists (both conservative and radical) shopkeepers, civil servants, 
professional people, pensioners and unemployed, office workers, small farmers, and farm laborers' (Lipson, 
1948: p.231). 
24 Labour had the following support in Dunedin Central: 12 percent of 'upper professional and company 
directors', 25 percent of 'lower professional, self-employed, and business people', 44 percent of 'white-collar' 
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Robinson's 1963 Palmerston North electorate survey also revealed strong 
support for Labour amongst the working class, moderate support amongst 
middle-income earners, and much lower support amongst the more highly-paid 
occupations (Robinson, 1967: p.97).25 The 1975 nationwide survey by Levine 
and Robinson found that 53 percent of 'unskilled workers' voted Labour, 
(compared to only 24 percent for National). Labour also had 43 percent support 
from the 'unemployed' (compared to National's support of 25 percent) (Levine 
and Robinson, 1976: p.139).26 
By the 1980s, however, Labour was obtaining a smaller proportion of its votes 
from its traditional section of the class structure. In his surveying of three 
Auckland electorates in 1984, Vowles found that 'almost 36 percent of manual 
wage earning trade unionists had not voted Labour for three consecutive 
elections' (Vowles, 1987c: p.17). However, most of the working class continued 
to vote for the Labour Party. At the same time the party continued to increase its 
support amongst the middle class. Furthermore, an important element in 
Labour's election in 1984 was the support of the business sector. The party 
leadership had carried out intense lobbying of business, indicating to them that a 
Labour government would be pro-business. At the same time business was 
growing increasingly unhappy with the economic management of Muldoon's 
National Government, and a landmark 1984 National Business Review poll of 
business leaders revealed a majority in favour of a Labour victory (NBR, 2 Jul 
and 'uniform' workers, 74 percent of 'skilled and semi-skilled "blue-collar" workers', and 87 percent of 
'unskilled "blue-collar" workers' (Mitchell, 1962d: p.176). In a follow-up survey two years later, Mitchell found 
that Labour had the following support: 5 percent of 'big sheep farmers, 7 .percent of 'directors of big 
companies, 5 percent of doctors, 15 percent of 'bank tellers', 28 percent of 'teachers', 44 percent of 'clerks', 
62 percent of 'shop assistants', 70 percent of 'foremen', 80 percent of 'carpenters', and 89 percent of 'wharf 
labourers' (Mitchell, 1967: p.6). 
25 This survey used subjective class categorisation, and indicated the following support for Labour: "working 
class", 63 percent; "middle class", 25 percent; and "upper middle", no support (Robinson, 1967: p.98). 
26 Labour had the following support: 6 percent of farmers, 53 percent of 'unskilled workers', 43 percent of 
unemployed, 27 percent of students, 27 percent of 'housewives', and 23 percent of 'professionals' (Levine 
and Robinson, 1976: p.139). 
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1984). Such support also extended to many businesses switching their usual 
donations from National to Labour. 27 
As argued in Chapter Two, Labour's economic strategy in government after 1984 
can be read as an attempt to reconfigure the party's support base using neo-
liberal and socially liberal reforms to attract further middle class support. At the 
1987 general election the reconfiguration strategy was clearly evident and 
proving successful. The influx of former National and New Zealand Party voters 
into the Labour Party's vote meant that the 1987 election was so characterised 
by class dealignment that NZES data showed no correlation between household 
income and party choice in the election, and manual and non-manual workers 
divided evenly between the major parties, although professionals were actually 
more likely to vote Labour (Gold, 1989).28 This class dealignment was starkly 
evident also in the geographical distribution of votes, in that Labour enjoyed 
unusually high levels of support in seats that were either traditionally held by 
National or were marginal, while it lost support to National in many safe Labour 
seats. The fact that the bulk of the working class did not return to Labour in the 
following election was illustrated in the 1990 NZES survey data which showed 
'Labour's normal lead over National among manual workers had wasted away to 
nothing. Thirty per cent of the manual group supported each party' (Aimer, 1992: 
p.334).29 In 1993 Labour's support from manual workers and lower-
socioeconomic voters improved - but not significantly (Vowles et aI., 1995: 
pp.17-24). For example, unionists voting Labour rose from 36 percent to 39 
percent (ibid: p.24). In the 1996 general election Labour continued to attract 
votes from across the broad socio-economic spectrum. McRobie's electorate 
analysis (comparing the election results with census data) showed that compared 
27 See Chapter Seven. 
28 According to Aimer, electoral surveys in 1987 and 1990 pointed out that a substantial dealignment of 
working class voters had taken place, with less than half of those in manual occupations voting for the 
Labour Party (Aimer, 1992: p.334). 
29 In fact, at the 1990 election, 'a quarter of manual workers did not vote, by far the highest proportion of any 
occupational group' (Aimer, 1992: p.334). 
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to other parties, 'Labour's electoral support was much more evenly distributed 
across all [income] quintiles regardless of the sub-variable considered' (McRobie, 
1997: p.171). He concluded that 'Labour's transformation from a party of the 
working class to a party supported by better educated, more highly skilled and 
better paid voters ... is clearly in evidence' (ibid: p.173).30 Also of interest, was 
Ganley's socioeconomic analysis of NZES data on 1996 Labour supporters, 
which found that only 30 percent fell into the category of low income voters, 
compared to 19 percent of National voters and 35 percent of New Zealand First 
supporters (Ganley, 1998: p.25). In line with this, Perry and Webster's 1998 
survey research showed that although there were still differences between the 
social composition of Labour's support and that of other parties, these 
differences are much less pronounced than they used to be. For example, 
Labour only had the support of 39 percent of 'unskilled manual' workers - a 
group who in Brookes and Robinson's 1967 survey gave Labour 87 percent 
support (Perry and Webster, 1999: p.28).31 
During the 1996-99 parliamentary term, while in opposition, the Labour Party 
gained the trust and support of the business community to govern again. An 
important indicator of this was a landmark 1998 business survey carried out by 
the Independent business newspaper which reported that business now felt more 
positive about the election of a Labour-led government. In the survey of 30 
business leaders, all but three said they were 'resigned to - or comfortable with -
30 McRobie also commented that, 'Labour's support was also greater in the upper occupational groups. In 
the less highly skilled occupational categories, however, the reverse applied' (McRobie, 1997: pp.171-172). 
McRobie was also surprised by the 'strength of support for National amongst the semi-skilled and unskilled -
over 36 per cent of the party votes and electorate votes cast by electors in the quintile with the most semi-
skilled or unskilled people went to National' (McRobie, 1997, pp.171-172). 
31 There were only two categories where Labour was able to get more than half of the survey respondents' 
support: 'armed forces or security personnel' (58 percent), and 'never had a job' (53 percent) (Perry and 
Webster, 1999: p.28). Labour also had the support of 32 percent of 'employers or managers 10+ 
employees', 34 percent of 'employers or managers less than 10 employees', 34 percent of 'professionals', 
49 percent of 'skilled manual', 49 percent of 'semi-skilled manual', and 12 percent of 'farmer-owns farm'. 
Overall the survey gave Labour support of 35 percent (ibid). 
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a Clark-led Labour Government' (McManus, 1998: p.12). Likewise, following the 
2002 election the DominionPost reported that 'Labour's resounding victory was a 
sign that the Government had won the respect of the business community over 
its term' (DominionPost, 2002a). The newspaper reported that the Wellington 
Regional Chamber of Commerce was welcoming the re-election of the 
Government, and also said that 'Business leaders spoken to by The 
DominionPostwere unanimous in their support for Labour's victory' (ibid).32 
The social composition of Labour caucuses has also changed significantly since 
the party's arrival in Parliament. In the Labour Cabinet between 1935 and 1940, 
former trade unionists made up ten out of thirteen ministers - and there was only 
one minister with a professional background (Hanley, 1988: p.12). Even by the 
time that the Second Labour Government came to power in 1957, much of the 
working class component of the party had dropped out, and 'only five of sixteen 
ministers had trade unions backgrounds' (Webber, 1978: p.183). Yet in general, 
and as late as the 1960s, the occupational background of Labour MPs still 
differed markedly from National's. By the 1960s, Robinson reported that Labour 
MPs were typically 'from lower-income groups, such as manual workers, 
teachers, and civil servants' (Robinson, 1967: p.102). Making up over a third of 
32 As Chapter Seven (on the sources of party finances) shows, Labour is now the preferred party of 
business. National has always received the huge bulk of donations from business, but in the 1999 election 
year both parties received similar levels, and in 2002 business donated significantly more to Labour. 
According to Labour president, Mike Williams, the corporate donations have been given to the party in 
'acknowledgment that the Clark-led Labour Government has helped create a stable and healthy business 
environment' (quoted in O'Sullivan and Small, 2002). As Chapter Three explores, the Clark Labour 
Government has closely collaborated with business to maintain, a business-friendly economy. Although 
Labour's policies are very similar to National's, where they differ, Labour's are often more in line with 
business. The Labour Party now draws even the support of a number of prominent National Party business 
people. For example, Dryden Spring, a former corporate fund-raiser for the National Party, and former 
chairman of the New Zealand Dairy Board agreed to be the keynote speaker at a Labour Party conference. 
Former Auckland divisional head of the National Party, Ross Armstrong became a close friend and 
supporter of Labour leader Helen Clark, and worked closely with her government. Another champion of the 
party, is a former 'Entrepreneur of the Year' and millionaire vice-chairman of the Business Roundtable, Bill 
Day (Talbot, 2002). 
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the caucus in the late 1960s, the unionists outnumbered the next biggest group, 
the lower professional and lower business MPs, as well as the small group made 
up of farmers (Mitchell, 1969b: p.8).33 Things got worse for trade unionists in the 
Third Labour Government, with ministers from trade union backgrounds 
numbering only six out of 26 (Webber, 1978: p.183). After the 1975 election, 
according to Weber, 31 percent of the Labour caucus were 'professionals', 28 
percent were manual workers or trade union officials, 22 percent were public 
servants, and 6 percent were white collar workers (Webber, 1978: p.193). That 
the working class dominance was being overturned was also obvious in that 
trade unions 'ceased (as of 1975) to be active participants in Labour's internal 
politics' (Webber, 1978: p.191 ).34 The working class influence was also reduced 
with the party's dramatic loss of membership in the mid-1970s. Although 
membership was again built up in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the new 
recruits were mainly drawn from the middle class.35 Thus, although before '1957 
eight or nine of every ten members were manual workers', by 1970 this had 
declined to only one out of every two, with the proportion falling even further 
throughoutthe 1970s and 1980s (Gustafson, 1989: p.210). 
By 1984 the Labour Party as an organisation had a very different social 
composition to that of the First Labour Government, and power in the party was 
increasingly held by the middle class membership, 'which accordingly selected 
candidates and devised policies in its own liberal image' (James, 1987a: p.32).36 
The party had given up on its original goal of promoting working class leadership 
and now acted more to give a presence in Parliament for politicians from the 
33 The candidates in the 1966 general election were also, according-to Mitchell, made up largely of active 
members of trade unions, with 36 trade union candidates and a further 13 candidates who had been 'active 
in those bulwarks of a more middle class unionism, the Public Service and Post Primary Teachers 
Associations' (Mitchell, 1969b: p.10). 
34 See: Chapter Five for details of Labour's relationship with trade unions. 
35 See: Chapter Six, James (1992a: pp.68-69: p.242). 
36 Inverse to the incorporation of the new social liberals into the party, the working class element declined, 
and the new look party organisation became alienating to working class New Zealand. See: James (1993: 
pp.68-69). 
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middle classes. Barry Gustafson has pointed out that of the Labour caucus in 
1984 'almost three out of four MPs came from the professional class, including 
nineteen who had been teachers or university lecturers and ten who had law 
degrees' (Gustafson, 1992b: p.277).37 According to Grant Klinkum, 'The 
proportion of Labour MPs in New Zealand from the professions increased from 
18% to 73% between 1935 and 1984' (Klinkum, 1998: p.86). 
Unsurprisingly, the proportion of current Labour MPs with union backgrounds 
remains low - making up 15 percent of the current caucus,38 which compares to 
almost 90 percent after the first general election that the party conteste~ in 1919, 
and 27 percent in 1972 (Webber, 1978: p.183). Furthermore, although a small 
number of ex-trade unionists still exist in the Labour caucus, there is no 
identifiable trade union faction or agenda amongst the MPs. The relatively narrow 
middle class grouping from which the caucus is drawn means that there is a 
distinct lack of commonality between the party and working class voters.39 
Consequently these MPs are less likely to represent such interests in Parliament. 
As Gustafson has argued, the new type of MPs 'are involved in values issues 
rather than the old bread-and-butter economic issues which the unionists were 
very strong about' (quoted in Venter, 1999a: p.6). The changing social 
background of its MPs has thus altered the very political nature of Labour Party.40 
37 The Fourth Labour Government contained very few MPs who were not from 'the professional middle 
classes: lawyers, accountants, lecturers, teachers, bureaucrats and the like' (James, 1992a: pp.141-142). 
The Labour Cabinet also 'contained, among its twenty memb~Hs, seventeen from professional/semi-
professional occupations, including eight former teachers and six with law degrees' (Gustafson, 1992: 
p.277). 
38 The former trade unionists are Rick Barker, Taito Philip Field, Mark Gosche, Graham Kelly, Mark Peck, 
Paul Swain and Lynn Pillay. Former Lawyer, Lianne Dalziel, also worked for a trade union. 
39 See: Nagel (1998: p.241), who argues, 'they no longer had any visceral identification with poor and 
working class people; their own interests, associations and lifestyles led them to identify with New Zealand's 
affluent classes; and their "leftism" lay in non-economic issues, to which most of them gave priority'. 
40 See: Clements (1982: pp.156-158). 
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National Party 
As the name suggests, National has always claimed to represent all New 
Zealand social classes and regions. To the extent that National has been able to 
realise this claim, it has done so by being a broad catch-all party, with a low 
ideological propensity. Despite its claim of universal representation, the National 
Party has traditionally been most strongly supported by farmers and wealthy 
urban dwellers.41 As shown in Chapter Seven, in the past National has drawn 
much of its financial support from wealthy farmers, manufacturers, and 
commercial interests. At the same time, the party remained distant from working 
class voters. John Roberts noted in 1978 that the pattern was very clear: 'People 
with property or with jobs controlling property seek out and are sought out by the 
National party. The party has little contact with workers, teachers, the lower-paid 
professionals and tradesmen' (Roberts, 1978: pp.74-75). 
That National's support has been very distinctive and class-based is illustrated by 
past voter surveys. The 1960 survey of the Dunedin Central electorate showed 
that National had the support of 86 percent of those classed as 'upper 
professional and company directors', and 67 percent of 'lower professional, self-
employed, and business people' (Mitchell, 1962d: p.176).42 The Palmerston 
41 The National Party was originally formed from a coalition of three different parties with their own electoral 
bases. One part of the coalition - the Reform Party drew its support from smaller farmers and the rural 
service sector. The United Party 'was the right wing of the old Liberal Party', and its support came from 
'urban businessmen, the middle class and some skilled tradesmen' as well as some farmers (Gustafson, 
1997a: p.131). The Democrat Party was much more libertarian, and much like the modern Act party, the 
Democrats emphasised individual freedom and personal responsibility. 
42 National had the following support in Dunedin Central: 86 percent of 'upper professi~nal and company 
directors', 67 percent of 'lower professional, self-employed, and business people', 55 percent of 'white-collar' 
and 'uniform' workers, 15 percent of 'skilled and semi-skilled "blue-collar" workers', and 8 percent of 
'unskilled "blue-collar" workers' (Mitchell, 1962d: p.176). In a follow-up survey two years later, Mitchell found 
that National had the following support: 87 percent of 'big sheep farmers, 86 percent of 'directors of big 
companies, 73 percent of doctors, 47 percent of 'bank tellers', 29 percent of 'teachers', 18 percent of 'clerks', 
11 percent of 'foremen', 7 percent of 'shop assistants', 6 percent of 'carpenters', and 5 percent of 'wharf 
labourers' (Mitchell, 1967: p.6). 
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North electorate survey of 1963 showed that the class alignment was stronger 
when respondents' class categories were subjectively chosen, with National 
voters comprising only 25 percent of those who called themselves working class, 
61 percent of those who called themselves middle class, and 75 percent of those 
who gave themselves the label of upper middle class (Robinson, 1967: pp.97-
98). Similarly, the 1975 nationwide election survey found that National's 
strongest support lay amongst farmers (76 percent supported National compared 
to just six percent who voted Labour), 'housewives' (57 percent compared to 27 
percent for Labour), and 'professionals' (55 percent support compared to 23 
percent for Labour) (Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.139).43 Using data from the 
same study, Levine also argued that the National's middle class basis was 
evident by the higher formal educational attainments of its supporters. Whereas 
only 1.1 percent of Labour supporters had a bachelor's degree or university 
diploma, 6.5 percent of National supporters did (Levine, 1979: p.90).44 
The class division between the major parties began to erode more quickly in the 
1970s and some of National's traditional constituency drifted to Labour. This 
drained the party of its more socially and economically liberal middle class 
membership and leadership. No longer was the party so attractive to the younger 
educated and affluent members, and many joined Labour.45 The party also 'taxed 
away' its urban support base, and lost its monopoly of professional middle class 
support because it was too conservative on social issues like abortion and 
apartheid, and too rigid about defence policies.46 Many small farmers also 
switched to Social Credit, which was becoming a more rural-based party.47 
43 Other occupational groups voting for National included unskilled workers (24 percent compared to 53 
percent for Labour), the unemployed (25 percent compared to 43 percent for Labour), and students (35 
percent compared to 27 percent for Labour) (Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.139). 
44 The Values Party, however, had an even higher numbers of supporters with a bachelor's degree or 
university diploma - 8.3 percent (Levine, 1979: p.89). 
45 See: Kelsey (1995: pp.25-26). 
46 In 1984, according to Harman, 'We saw for the first time middle class New Zealanders voting against 
National.. .. because they were frustrated with inflation, they were frustrated with interest rates and I think 
also they were frustrated by the oppressive tightness of New Zealand society' (quoted in Russell, 1996: 
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By the early 1980s National was having serious problems maintaining strong 
links with its class base. Instead, Muldoon's appeal to what was called 'Rob's 
Mob' and his essentially social democratic intentions 'to protect the New Zealand 
of his "ordinary bloke" had strong appeal to the traditional working class' 
(Russell, 1996: p.28). That the National Party had moved so far away from its 
core support base meant that in 1983 the breakaway New Zealand Party was 
able to be formed successfully on the right of the political spectrum. Like the 
former Democrat Party of the 1930s (and latterly the Act party), the New Zealand 
Party drew support from the liberal middle classes, and finance from wealthy 
urban business and professional interests. 
The erosion of National's class basis was partially because of the decline of its 
farming constituency. As the proportion of farmers in society has decreased, so 
has National's class distinctiveness. Partly as a result of this agricultural decline, 
National has been forced to focus much more on securing an urban constituency. 
Also, just as the Labour Party has had difficulties retaining their traditional 
working class support whilst incorporating the middle class into the party, 
National has increasingly struggled in the 1980s and 1990s to keep farmers 
onside as it targeted working class voters. In fact, as early as the 1970s the party 
started moving 'away from its rural roots to some degree and placed far more 
emphasis on the growth of manufacturing and secondary exports' (Pearson and 
Thorns, 1983: p.144). But National continued to receive disproportionate support 
from the occupational grouping of farmers. On the basis of NZES data Vowles 
reported that in the 1996 election, one of the strongest effects of occupational 
p.15). It was indicative of the declining class distinctiveness of National that they lost the seat of Pakuranga 
to Social Credit's John Morrison in the election. 
47 That small farmers began voting for Social Credit reflected the class division in rural areas that opened up 
at the end of the postwar boom. Social credit's peculiar version of anti-capitalism appealed to small 
business-owners and other small farmers (Miller, 1989: pp.246-49). This points to the problem with the 
category of 'farmers'. While workers are divided into 'manuals' and 'non-manuals', social scientists generally 
ignore the 'small farmer' and 'big farmer' division. 
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class voting lay in the support that National received from 'farmers and other 
agricultural entrepreneurs and managers' (Vowles, 1998d: p.40).48 
In terms of middle class support, National was also having difficulties. Ganley's 
analysis of 1996 NZES data found that National picked up only 10 percent of its 
votes from those earning over $44,200 (compared to Labour's 5 percent and 
New Zealand First's 4 percent) (Ganley, 1998: p.25). He also discovered that 
National and Labour voters were equally likely to be professionals (20 percent of 
their vote), while 13 percent of New Zealand First voters were also professionals 
(ibid: p.27). The 1998 survey research by Perry and Webster also illustrated the 
nature of the support base for National. Although those from the working class 
were much less likely to vote National, when it came to 'employers or managers 
with less than 10 employees' National had only 34 percent of their support, which 
is surprisingly low, especially since Labour had 32 percent support from this 
group. National's support only slightly increased to 39 percent for 'employers or 
managers 10+ employees' - a traditional stronghold of support for the party. 
When it came to 'professionals' National actually had less support than Labour -
32 compared to 34 percent. National easily had the most support from those that 
owned farms, but at only 48 percent, this was considerably lower than the 76 
percent support that Levine and Robinson discovered 23 years earlier (Perry and 
Webster, 1999: p.28).49 
According to the NZ Herald-DigiPoll's 2002 election survey, Labour and National 
received similar levels of support from wealthy voters - of the richest 40 percent 
of society, National won 31.6 percent of the vote - not much more than Labour'S 
28.2 percent (Collins, 2002). Similarly, a 2002 UMR opinion poll showed that 
National had the support of only 40 percent of those earning over $70,000 
48 See also Aimer (1992) who found that in the 1987 and 1990 elections, 'only those in agricultural 
occupations consistently gave more than half their support ... to one party - National' (Aimer, 1992: p.334). 
49 As shown in the section on the Labour Party, an increasing proportion of workers have supported National 
in recent years. Indicative of this was a large number of traditional Labour electorates being won by National 
- for example, in 1990 National's Gilbert Myles won Mt Roskill. 
Chapter Four: Cleavages and the Party System 275 
(compared to support for Labour of 39 percent) (Langdon, 2002).50 Even more 
striking, an NBR poll at the same election showed that only 21 percent of 
professionals and managers supported National (compared to 50 percent 
supporting Labour) (Hill Cone, 2002). Also, where the party used to have strong 
support from 'homemakers' (57 percent in 1975), by 2002, they only had 9 
percent (compared to Labour's 59 percent) (ibid). None of these figures suggest 
that the parties' social bases are remarkably polarised but, instead, that social 
structure is playing a decreasing role in voting. 
In the late 1990s National began to lose its strong employer support. Much like in 
the mid-1980s when the business community grew tired of the Muldoon 
administration, the commercial world was losing faith in Jenny Shipley's 
government and was sufficiently reassured by Labour's business-friendly 
overtures that it was willing to give Labour a chance to govern. The Independent 
newspaper's 1998 survey of employers reported that they believed the National 
government should be voted out: 
Frustrated by a lack of leadership, two years of policy paralysis and inept and rudderless 
government, the New Zealand business community has turned its back on the National 
Party, and Prime Minister Jenny Shipley. Characterising the current regime as confused, 
inert, visionless, unstable and politically opportunistic, most of the 30 business leaders 
surveyed in-depth by The Independent expect an early election (McManus, 1998: p.12).51 
The elite social composition of National MPs has also been changing. 
Historically, the party has drawn most of its parliamentarians from its traditional 
50 A spokeswoman for National said that the party's own polling showed that although National was 'well 
ahead' on support with $77,OOO-plus earners, in the $52,000-to-$77,000 group of earners, support between 
Labour and National was more even (quoted in Langdon, 2002b). 
51 The survey reported that business leaders expected or wanted the defeat of the National Party 
government, believing that 'the government must go - and the quicker the better' (McManus, 1998: p.12). 
One respondent told the newspaper that 'A large number of quite senior business people are completely 
relaxed about a change of government and the [political donations] will reflect that' (quoted in McManus, 
ibid). Donations declared to the Electoral Commission confirmed this point of view. Chapter Seven shows, 
donations from business have been decreasing over the years as National has correspondingly lost its 
natural position as the preferred party of business. 
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core group of supporters: higher-income groups, such as farmers, professionals 
(lawyers and accountants especially), and businesspeople (Robinson, 1967: 
p.102). In 1969, for instance, Mitchell reported on National's candidates for 
election, outlining that 40 percent of the party's candidates were farmers, 24 
percent were 'top professionals' and six percent were company directors 
(Mitchell, 1969b: p.8). In the 1978 general election, John Roberts noted that 
National had 12 business executives standing for the election, together with nine 
lawyers and three teachers (Roberts, 1978: p.74). In the 1990s the parliamentary 
party was gradually becoming dominated by professionals. Farmers only made 
up a quarter of a caucus dominated by those with professional backgrounds 
(constituting about a third of the caucus). 
The move away from its farming constituency was temporarily halted by 
National's heavy defeat at the 1984 general election in which the party lost most 
of its urban seats. The new parliamentary caucus was, by default, almost entirely 
made up of representatives from rural and provincial seats. Of the 45 
metropolitan electorates within the five main cities, National held only seven in 
1984 - and only one of which was outside Auckland (Fendalton). 
Back in power in 1990, the makeup of the first Bolger Cabinet was indicative that 
the National Party was still tied to its rural roots. Thirteen former farmers were 
appointed to the twenty-MP cabinet, together with a further three MPs from rural 
or provincial areas, while there was only one MP included from a metropolitan 
Auckland seat.52 Furthermore, the Prime Minister himself was a farmer and a 
former office holder in Federated Farmers (Vowles, 1992c: p.353). Politically, 
however, the National Government was economically liberal and not overtly 
farmer-focused. By the end of the 1990s, farmers were clearly a decreasing 
influence in politics and society, and in 1999 there were only 14 MPs in 
Parliament who gave their occupation as 'farmer', and 4 of to em were not in the 
National Party (Molesworth, 1999d: p.21). 
52 See McLoughlin (1992a: p.BB), Vowles (1992c: p.353), and Miller and Catt (1993: p.29). 
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National Party historian Barry Gustafson told one newspaper that 'The National 
Party has also become less representative of its traditional constituency. The two 
groups that used to dominate National cabinets, MPs from rich urban seats and 
strong rural electorates, have been replaced by "middle-class, suburban types'" 
(Venter, 1999a: p.6).53 By 1999 Richard Harman was also reporting that National, 
like the other parties, lacked MPs with a business background, saying that the 
party list was 'heavy with lawyers, accountants and doctors' (Harman, 1999: 
p.23). In the mid-1990s, the only National Party ministers with a background in 
business were Philip Burdon and Bruce Cliffe, and by the time the party left office 
in 1999 it had very few MPs with business backgrounds at all (Bedford and 
Martin, 1999: p.15). Likewise, in 2002 Gordon Campbell figured that the only 
National Party candidates with farming experience were 'Bill English, David 
Carter, Gavan Herlihy, Eric Roy, Shane Arden, and ... Brian Connell' (Campbell, 
2002a: p.22). In terms of the extra-parliamentary party as well, the agricultural 
element was weakening in the organisation.54 Although the party elected an ex-
farmer as president in 1989, Geoff Thompson was also a lawyer and had been 
an MP between 1978 and 1984. Since the 1980s, most presidents - Sue Woods, 
Neville Young, John Collinge, John Slater, Michelle Boag, and Judy Kirk - have 
been urban professionals. 
New Zealand First 
Partly because of New Zealand First's ambiguous political identity, political 
commentators have had problems identifying just where support for it has come 
53 See also: Vowles (1992c: p.353), and Kelsey (1995: pAO). 
54 See: Spoonley (1987: pp.229-230), who argues that there has been significant tensions between the 
National Party organisation and its traditional constituencies: 'This cleavage is paralleled by a division 
between the rural and urban sections of the party, as the former has lost much of the dominant position 
within the party organisation .... The antagonisms, as yet unresolved, have affected the membership base of 
the National Party'. 
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from.55 Voting surveys indicate that New Zealand First's support-base is relatively 
dispersed, especially in terms of class, and not dissimilar to most other parties 
(Vowles et ai, 1995: p.26). The final Herald-DigiPoll survey of the 2002 election 
showed that support for the party was very evenly spread across all income 
groups (Collins, 2002). 
There is some reason to believe that the party has, at times, received the support 
of a significant number of low-income workers and beneficiaries. Prior to its 
launch, one survey showed the party to be favoured by 45 percent of those 
earning under $15,000 (Small, 1993a: p.14). Likewise, according to McRobie, at 
the 1996 general election New Zealand First performed best in those electorates 
with both 'the largest number of voters whose incomes were below $15,000 per 
annum' and 'in receipt of benefits other than New Zealand Superannuation' 
(McRobie, 1997: pp.171, 172). In terms of occupation, New Zealand First won its 
most votes in electorates with high numbers of 'skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers' than in electorates with high numbers in 'rural occupations' (ibid). The 
survey research of Vowles et al. at the 1993 election also found that the 'party 
appealed more than might have been expected to manual workers' - 36 percent 
(Vowles et aI., 1995: pp.21, 26). 
In Perry and Webster's 1998 survey research, New Zealand First's socio-
economic support was relatively evenly spread across society. Notable 
exceptions to its overall support of 3.1 percent were high support from the 
category of 'employers or managers less than 10 employees' (4.2 percent), farm 
owners (4.8 percent), and those who had never had a job (5.9 percent) (Perry 
and Webster, 1999: p.28). 
The social composition of New Zealand First's parliamentary representatives is, 
like Act, in business. Richard Harman pointed out in 1999 that the party had 'a 
relatively high percentage of MPs with a business background' (Harman, 1999: 
55 See: Vowles et al. (1998e: pp.209-210). 
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p.23). However, New Zealand First does not appear to have a great number of 
financial or well-known backers. The most prominent patron to date has been 
Bob Jones, who allegedly contributed to New Zealand First's campaign funds in 
its early years (Scherer, 1994b). Most commentators suggest the party is backed 
by small businesspeople.56 
Act New Zealand 
As might be expected, Act's strongest support in the class structure has come 
mainly from wealthy electorates (Vowles, 1998: p.33). In 1996 Act support was 
strongest in higher socioeconomic electorates such as Epsom (22 percent of the 
party vote), Tamaki (16 percent), and Wellington Central (35 percent of the 
electorate vote) (Fraser and Zangouropoulos, 1997: p.49). That the party's 
support was mostly concentrated amongst the rich was also indicated by the fact 
that overall Act performed well in one Christchurch and six Auckland seats which 
were listed in Statistics New Zealand's Electoral Profile as being in the top ten 
richest electorates. McRobie's electorate analysis also showed that Act's support 
was weighted amongst the wealthy: 
When occupation is examined, the success of Act's unashamed appeal to professional 
and managerial groups can readily be seen. Electorates with the largest proportion of 
people in these groups strongly supported Act - at 9.7 per cent (compared with 6.1 per 
cent of the party vote overall) its support was almost twice that of any other quintile 
(McRobie, 1997: p.171). 
In the 1999 general election the party's support again tended towards the 
wealthy. While Act obtained a total of 7 percent of the party vote and 9 percent 
support from both farmers and those earning over' $67,000 per year, amongst 
manual workers it achieved only 3 percent support (Reid, 2001: p.266). Although 
these figure suggest that Act is a rich person's party, in 1999 it still picked up a 
surprisingly high amount of support from low income people. For example, 
despite the party's hard-line election stance on beneficiaries, Act managed to 
56 See: Trotter (1997j), 
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receive a credible 4 percent support from 'those on a benefit' and 3 percent 
support from 'those on two or more' (Reid, 2001: p.266). In fact Perry and 
Webster's 1998 research indicated that Act's support is not significantly varied 
throughout New Zealand's social structure. For example while Act had the 
support of 4.3 percent of 'unskilled manual' workers, they only had the support of 
3.8 percent of 'professionals' and 4.8 percent of farm owners (Perry and 
Webster, 1999: p.28). 
The leadership of Act is clearly from higher socio-economic groups. The 
foundation members of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers group 
included a large number of managers, consultants and economists. Also 
reflecting the party's re-orientation towards the rural community in the late 1990s, 
in the 1999 general election campaign Act put 'more farmers and primary 
producers on its list than National, Labour and the Alliance combined' (NZPA, 
1999p: p.A4).57 
The Green Party 
The Green Party is one of the more elusive parties when it comes to clarifying its 
social base, but in general the Greens are a party of middle class politicians and 
supporters. Certainly the forerunner to the Greens, the Values Party, was very 
much based on middle class support. Levine and Robinson's 1975 survey found 
that Values voters were typically found in the 'middle/upper' part of New 
Zealand's class structure, and on an 'occupational' basis, Values voters were 
typically professionals and students (Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.141). It is not 
surprising, therefore, that in 1990 the Green Party received its highest votes in 
the high-income electorates of Fendalton, Remuera, Eden, Birkenhead, Ohariu 
and Miramar. The Greens have also performed well in semi-rural, middle class 
57 Following the party's 1996 success with rural voters, in 1997 Act moved to reposition itself towards 
farmers - something that MP Owen Jennings had always pushed for. His argument was that farmers, being 
staunch individualists, should be natural Act supporters. 
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seats like Coromandel. An Alliance-commissioned focus group study in the late 
1990s also confirmed that Green support was predominantly middle class: 
the social groups which comprise support for the Green Party are predominantly those 
who in the normal course of events would be expected to vote National. But if the Greens 
did not exist most of their voters would most likely vote either Labour or for one of the 
'fringe' parties rather than National. In the period during which the Greens were in the 
Alliance probably most Greens voted Alliance only because that was where the Greens 
were politically located for the moment (Simpson, 2000: p.7). 
Perry and Webster's 1998 survey showed that Green support was not particularly 
concentrated within any particular area of society. Compared to its overall 2.4 
percent support in the poll, the party did better amongst 'employers or managers 
10+ employees' where they scored 2.9 percent. Within most categories, 
however, the Greens received a relatively evenly dispersed support. For 
instance, amongst farm owners the party scored 2.4 percent support - the same 
as its total (Perry and Webster, 1999: p.28). This evenness of support was 
confirmed by the final Herald-DigiPoll survey of the 2002 election, which showed 
that Green support 'was spread more evenly across all income groups' than 
other parties (Collins, 2002).58 
United Future 
The United Future party is very deliberately a party of the middle class. Its leader, 
Peter Dunne, was determined to establish such a party since the early 1990s 
when he broke away from the Labour Party. He claimed then that his new party 
would target 'middle New Zealand', which he defined as families, mortgage-
holders and those struggling to pay for education apd retirement (Edwards and 
Boyd, 1995: p.7).59 
58 The Greens are thought to have gained a large number of ex-National voters in the 2002 election. The 
Greens' campaign manager, Cate Faehrmann, pointed out, 'the Greens, like New Zealand First, have 
gained tremendously from the National Party's collapse' (Laxon 2002). 
59 See also McLoughlin (1994a: p.41), in which Dunne makes a claim to represent the 'overtaxed, politically 
ignored middle classes'. Also, according to Sheppard (1997c: p.9), Dunne believes his party can represent 
National's traditional small business constituency. 
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The Future New Zealand component of United Future was previously in the 
Christian Coalition - a party that appears to have been relatively class-neutral. 
According to Perry and Webster, the support of the Christian Coalition was 
'rather evenly spread, with little variation across classes' (Perry and Webster, 
1999: p.29). The main exception in their 1998 survey was amongst the category 
of 'unskilled manual' labour, from which the Christian Coalition received 4.3 
percent support, compared to their overall support of 2.1 percent (ibid p.28). 
James noted that, 'Socioeconomically, the occupations listed for the Christian 
Democrats' board of reference paint a picture of small businesspeople, with a 
sprinkling of professionals and bureaucrats ... plus a few ministers of religion.' 
(James, 12 May 1995: p.13). One of the leaders of the Christian Democrats party 
(which is now part of the United Future party) is Brian Pankhurst - the former 
chief executive of Whitcoulls group and former chairman of the Auckland Crown 
Health Enterprise (Heeringa, 1995: p. 79). The 1995 party president, David 
Brown, was 'a former chief executive of the Amuri Corporation and now owner of 
Christchurch-based architectural firm The Design Team' (Heeringa, 1995). The 
then vice-president, David Harrison, was a 'former chief executive of insurance 
brokers Marsh McLennen and now owner of the Wellington-based Centre 
Consulting Group' (ibid). 
When Future New Zealand and United merged and stood at the 2002 general 
election, the new party picked up most of its votes from former Labour and 
National voters. Although United Future won 6.7 percent of the party vote, the 
Herald-DigiPoli showed that the party received the support of only 4.7 percent of 
those New Zealanders in richest fifth of the population, but 9.6 percent of the 
next-highest fifth (Collins, 2002). 
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The Alliance and the Progressive Coalition Party 
Despite common impressions, the Alliance has always had a core middle class 
element to it, and has obtained votes from throughout the class structure. In its 
early years, the NewLabour Party (NLP) always claimed to represent the working 
class constituency that it claimed Labour had abandoned in the 1980s. Senior party 
members, such as Matt McCarten described the NLP as a 'party of the poor' 
(quoted in CPNZ, 1991 b: p.27). The membership of the party reflected this claim, 
with McCarten claiming in 1991 that two thirds of party members were beneficiaries 
(ibid). Certainly in the 1990 general election, the NLP attempted to position itself as 
a party for working class voters,60 and it partly succeeded in this task, performing 
well in predominantly working class seats like Mangere, Avon, Christchurch 
Central, Auckland Central, Westcoast, and Sydenham (Jesson, 1994: p.5).61 When 
the Alliance was later formed, NZES survey research indicated that the new 
grouping failed to attain the same identification as a working class party: 
In traditional terms, the Alliance appears to have been almost 'class-neutral', or perhaps 
more accurately 'class-balanced', in 1993, as a result of the convergence of NewLabour and 
the Greens within the wider Alliance grouping in 1991, and the consequent broadening of its 
constituency beyond anyone of its component parties (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.26). 
In the 1993 election the party won its most votes in predominantly middle class and 
rural electorates rather than working class ones, helping the Alliance receive an 
impressive 18 percent of the vote (Jesson, 1994: p.5).62 Mulgan argued that the 
Alliance was therefore 'unable to make good its claim better to represent 
60 According to Vowles et aI., 'NewLabour had sought to undercut Labour's traditional support among 
manual workers, unionists, and beneficiaries, and also to extend its own electoral appeal to a more diffuse 
constituency of environmentally concerned electors' (Vowles et aI., 1995: pp.25-26). 
61 As Vowles and Aimer have suggested, the NLP 'constructed itself a more class-homogeneous 
constituency than any other party', and their research provided evidence for 'the claim that the traditional 
working class lies at the core of NewLabour's electoral position' (Vowles and Aimer, 1993: pp.161, 164). 
62 According to Sheppard, 'its biggest gains were made not in the three main urban centres, but in the most 
deeply rural and safe National seats' (Sheppard, 1994). Where the party did attract greater urban support, 
this came 'through attracting higher, not lower, socio-economic groups; the post-war generations, 
comfortable with affluent lifestyles, liberal, enVironmentally concerned, etc.' (ibid: p.8). 
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Labour's traditional supporters among unionists and manual workers and was 
almost indistinguishable from Labour in the class of voters it attracted' (Mulgan, 
1997a: p.274).63 
In 1996 the Alliance again did very well in middle class electorates - even 
gaining second place in Hauraki, Franklin, St Kilda and Waipa. The voting 
analysis by Vowles also showed that the Alliance 'had a vote most evenly spread 
across the two main [socioeconomic and geographic] cleavages, although it was 
a little more concentrated in working-class areas' (Vowles, 1998d: p.33). The 
Alliance's own analysis of NZES data for 1996 also confirmed the evenly-spread 
nature of the party's support base: 
The 1996 Waikato study found that the typical Alliance voter in 1996 was difficult to 
distinguish demographically from the general electorate. Alliance support at the election 
was reasonably consistent across income groups, age ranges and locality. There was 
slightly less Alliance support among higher income earners and increased propensity to 
vote Alliance as one moved south, but these variations did not appear to be very great 
(Pagani, 1997: p.1). 
The NZES data for 1999 also found that Alliance support was very diversified. 
Alliance staffer Tony Simpson summarised the findings: 'Broadly speaking, this 
indicated that there is no clear and significant (statistically speaking) co-relation 
between any social indicator and Alliance supporters. Those on less than the 
average wage are as likely to vote for us as those on twice the average wage' 
(Simpson, 2000: p.5). Simpson also noted that the NZES data indicated that 'the 
vel)! poor do not vote for us in significantly greater numbers either. Statistically 
speaking the co-relations in respect of these factors are weak' (ibid).64 Perry and 
63 Vowles et al. also argued that 'the mobilisation of manual workers and unionists into the Alliance by 
NewLabour appears to have been only partially successfully. The Alliance may even have been losing 
ground to Labour by 1993. Its profile, while tilted very slightly more than Labour's towards low income voters 
and beneficiaries, was still less well represented than Labour's among the manual occupations and 
unionised households' (Vowles et aI., 1995: pp.25-26). 
64 Simpson also analysed the electorates that the party obtained the most votes in, commenting that 'There 
is no apparent co-relation between the social characteristics of electorates and their tendency to give us a 
better than average list vote' (Simpson, 2000: pp.5-6). He concluded that, 'What this (and the Waikato study) 
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Webster's 1998 survey also showed that support for the Alliance was relatively 
even across the whole social structure. While the survey gave the party 6.3 
percent overall support, those in social groups who might not be expected to 
support the Alliance did in fact give the party reasonable support. For example, 
the Alliance had the support of 4.3 percent of 'employers or managers 10+ 
employees', 4.2 percent support of 'employers or managers less than 10 
employees', and 4.8 percent support of farm owners (Perry and Webster, 1999: 
p.28). 
Amongst those that represented the Alliance in Parliament (1993-2002), there 
was a strong business and professional background. Jim Anderton often claims 
to have more business experience than anybody else in Parliament, while other 
Alliance MPs also had a business or management background: 'Grant Gillon's 
background is in sales and he also ran a clothing retailer. Sandra Lee was 
involved in a business exporting grapes. Willie Jackson is a former unionist but 
also managed the Manukau Urban Maori authority for a spell' (Bedford and 
Martin, 1999: p.15). Also in the Alliance caucus was a set of lawyers: Matt 
Robson, Laila Harre and Kevin Campbell, as well as two university lecturers: 
Phillida Bunkie and Liz Gordon. 
Part Two: Alternative Cleavages 
It is said that the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system helped perpetuate 
the dominance of the socio-economic dimension by encouraging only the 
strongest cleavage in society to be reflected in the political parties (Barker and 
McLeay, 2000: p.144). Meanwhile proportional representation electoral systems 
such as Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) are said to encourage the 
indicate is that Labour and ourselves draw our voters from the same overall social groups, the only 
significant difference being that the poorest of all groups have a greater tendency to vote Labour than 
Alliance' (ibid: p.6). 
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development of a party system around additional cleavages to the traditional 
socio-economic one. On the basis of this, some commentators argued that 'issue 
dimensions previously suppressed by the unidimensional and bipolar tendencies 
of FPP would emerge in parliament' under MMP (ibid). Because additional 
parties would be represented in Parliament, other issue dimensions and 
cleavages would be fostered or released. In a limited sense this has indeed 
happened, as the current parties in Parliament increasingly operate along 
alternatives to the basic socio-economic dimension. 
As pointed out in Part One, most political scientists have either argued that New 
Zealand lacks more than one significant social cleavage or similarly that the 
economic social cleavage dominates political conflict. This was also the 
conclusion reached by Brechtel and Kaiser after conducting their 1997 survey of 
experts. However, when their survey was repeated in 2003 for this thesis, it 
showed that many additional cleavages are now identified by political scientists. 
As with the 1997 survey, the 2003 survey asked the experts to locate the parties 
on the left-right dimension, to state the dimension's importance, but also to name 
any additional issue dimensions, locating the parties on it, and stating its 
importance. 75 percent of respondents mentioned additional dimensions, up from 
47 percent in 1997. Furthermore, whereas 100 percent of the 1997 respondents 
judged the economic dimension as the most important (on a five-point scale), by 
2003 only 50 percent of respondents characterised the economic dimension as 
the most significant, with the other 50 percent saying that the alternative 
cleavages are either just as important or more important.65 These results suggest 
that the New Zealand party system is increasingly mUlti-dimensional. This shows 
that more attention needs to be paid to the alternative cleavages, and in 
65 As pointed out in Chapter Three, when the 1997 respondents estimated the importance of the economic 
left-right dimension on a five-point scale from 1 (very low importance) to 5 (very high importance), they 
provided a mean value of 4.0. By contrast, in 2003 the survey found the mean value of the economic left-
right dimension had declined to 3.2. 
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particular, the social basis of those cleavages, which are examined in the 
following sections. 
Geographic Cleavages 
New Zealand politics have always been influenced by the spatial cleavages in 
society. These are seen in two ways: regional cleavages and the urban-rural 
cleavage. The first involves the political differences between regions in the 
country, such as the North and South Islands, while the second involves the 
political differences between those living in cities, towns and rural areas. During 
the nineteenth century, parliamentary politics were strongly affected by 
regionalism, but this declined due to the abolition of the provinces in 1876, the 
establishment of strong political parties after 1890, and increased immigration 
and internal migration.66 The major parties, however, continued to have a 
geographical bias in the twentieth century, with Labour being strong in 
Wellington, Christchurch and the South Island West Coast, while National has 
been particularly successful in the central North Island. More recently New 
Zealand First's strongest support base has been in the northern North Island 
(Mulgan, 1997a: p.275), and in 2002 the Outdoor Recreation Party won 5.4 
percent of the party vote in the West Coast-Tasman electorate (despite winning 
only 1.3 percent nationally). Overall, however, New Zealand now lacks any deep 
regional divisions. According to Mulgan, the geographical cleavage therefore 
plays only a very small part in affecting an individual's voting habits (ibid}.67 
66 Regional cleavages had been encouraged in the 19th Century by the nature of the scattered settlements 
and the 'pork-barrel' politics involved. Later, regional loyalties were 'diluted by continuous immigration and 
internal population movements' and after the 1870s, political sentiment was less regionalised (Robinson, 
1967: pp.103-104). According to Lipson, geography has been on the decline as a determinant of New 
Zealand politics ever since the provinces were abolished in the 19th century (Lipson, 1948: pp.44-45). 
67 However, writing in 1979, Levine argued, 'It is important to recognise that there is a strong (and growing) 
regional basis to New Zealand politics' (Levine, 1979: p.91). 
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In contrast to the regional aspect of the geographical cleavage, the rural-urban 
nature of politics is much more important - particularly in the past, with Labour 
predominating in the mainly urban electorates, and National being more 
successful in the provinces, rural towns and scattered settlements.6a RJ Johnston 
asserts that in New Zealand you can better predict how people will. vote by 
knowing where they live than by knowing what class they are: 'The analysis of 
the geography of voting suggests that urban-rural and inter-island cleavages 
have increased during the post-war era .... producing a country that, in electoral 
terms, is spatially more polarized than ever' (Johnston, 1992: p.47). 
It seems likely that the decline in the significance of class as a determinant of 
voting has meant that the urban-rural geographical cleavage has grown in 
relative importance in structuring party politics in New Zealand. Electoral 
geographers Rex Honey and Ross Barnett have gone as far as declaring that at 
the 1987 general election, 'the rural-urban dimension supplanted the socio-
economic one as New Zealand's pre-eminent voting cleavage' (Honey and 
Barnett, 1990: p.87). They noted that the 'rural-urban split became even more 
pronounced', as 'National solidified its margins in the countryside but almost 
disappeared in the major cities' (Honey and Barnett, 1990: p.87). 
Vowles' analysis of NZES survey research from the 1996 general election 
showed that although the urban-rural cleavage continues to be significant, it is 
more so for some parties than others. He found that while support for National 
and the Alliance was evenly spread across the urban and rural categories, the 
other parties had greater variations in support: 
Labour did a little worse in three main centres and in the provincial cities, but significantly 
worse in the rural areas. New Zealand First did best in the towns and the rural areas, Act 
best in the rural areas and significantly worse in the provincial cities and towns (Vowles, 
1998d: pAO). 
68 To a degree, the urban-rural cleavage has been a consequence of the class cleavage because rural areas 
tend to have a large number of employers, due to the fact that most farmers are self-employed. 
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In terms of geography Act's strongest base of support has been Auckland 
(Fraser and Zangouropoulos, 1997: p.52}.69 This geographical bias might stem 
from the fact that the party was formed in Auckland, mainly by Aucklanders. As 
well as performing well in cities like Auckland, the strongest support for Act was 
found in rural areas, although the party was also said to have performed 
'significantly worse in the provincial cities and towns' (Vowles, 1998d: p.40). 
According to Act's own interpretation of the election results, while the party 'was 
strongest in urban areas... [it] also gained a credible share of the rural vote' 
(Fraser and Zangouropoulos, 1997: p.53). 
In the 1999 election campaign it was obvious that the geographical cleavage was 
a much politicised one, and a pronounced political contest existed between urban 
and provincial New Zealand. Many political parties, and especially Act, made a 
strong play for the provincial heartland, as National's former strong grip on it was 
weakening as the party came to be more perceived of as an urban party?O 
However, at the 2002 election it was National's urban vote that collapsed 
significantly, while Act continued to do relatively well in metropolitan Auckland 
rather than rural areas?1 
69 Act made 'inroads in the affluent, mainly National-held seats of Auckland. All seven seats where Act 
gained more than 10 per cent of the party vote were in Auckland' (Luke, 1998c: p.15). While Richard 
Prebble won the electorate of Wellington Central, in terms of the party vote Act did not do nearly as well. 
70 Many commentators suggested that the growing importance and size of urban New Zealand has been 
pushing National to become an urban-oriented party much like the Australian Liberals, leaving Act to mop up 
the provincial vote, much like the rural-based rightwing Australian National Party. 
71 According to the 2002 Herald-DigiPolI, 'Since the 1999 election, National has lost mor~ than a third of its 
voting share in Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington and Christchurch .... [while] Act confirmed its previous 
showing as a city party, scoring most strongly in Auckland' (Collins, 2002). In the 2002 general election, 
National's urban vote collapsed significantly, especially in Auckland, where the number of National voters 
almost halved from 166,000 to 86,000 (ibid). New Zealand First support is also not so evenly dispersed 
when it comes to the geographic cleavage. In 1996, according to Vowles, New Zealand First drew 'more on 
rural electorates, and less from working-class electorates' (Vowles, 1998d: p.33). In that election, 'New 
Zealand First did best in the towns and the rural areas' (ibid: pAO). See also: Mulgan (1997a: p.275). 
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Although it might appear that the geographical cleavage is becoming more 
significant, this is possibly only in relation to the decline of the class cleavage. It 
seems likely that these spatial dimensions have in more recent years probably 
decreased in importance. Certainly the introduction of MMP is likely to have 
further pushed party politics away from a geographic-orientated nature because 
the all-important party vote is not geographically-related, and parties are 
therefore inclined to spend less attention on winning marginal electorates. 
Instead, social constituencies (such as professionals, trade unions or ethnic 
groups) are more important to the parties. 
Ethnicity 
The social cleavage of ethnicity has not been strongly politicised in New Zealand, 
apart from a significant tendency for Maori to vote for the Labour Party. This was 
reflected in Labour holding all four Maori electorates between 1943 and 1993. It 
is also seen in Levine and Robinson's 1975 voter survey which showed that 59 
percent of Maori voted for Labour while only 20 percent voted for National 
(Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.137). However, Labour's grip on Maori loosened 
in the 1970s and especially after 1979 when Labour's Minister of Maori Affairs, 
Matiu Rata, resigned and set up rival party Mana Motuhake. Maori electorate 
support for Labour had been dropping steadily - in 1984 it was 77.6 percent; in 
1987 70.9 percent; 1990 65.4 percent; 1993 49.6 percent; 1996: 28.9 percent; 
but in 1999 it rose again to 48.9 percent (Sullivan and Vowles, 1998: p.173). 
Taking into account those Maori not voting, by 1996 Labour received only about 
20 percent of Maori support (Ganley, 1998: p.13). Significantly, throughout the 
1990s Maori non-voting has actually been higher than the vote for any 
particularly party. By 2002 turnout in the Maori seats dropped to a remarkably 
low 54.4 percent (Collins, 2002).72 In fact Maori non-voting would have been 
72 Between 1990 and 1999 non-voting amongst Maori was 41.5%, 37.4%, 27.3% and 34.3% respectively 
(Sullivan and Vowles, 1998: p.173; Sullivan and Margaritis, 2002: p.67). This means that in the 1999 
election, despite Labour winning all six Maori electorates, only about 32 percent of those on the Maori 
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below 50 percent if examining participation out of those Maori eligible to enrol to 
instead of out of those who did in fact enrol. 
Driving a wedge between Labour and Maori was the emergence of the nationalist 
New Zealand First in the early-1990s. In 1993, Tau Henare captured Northern 
Maori for New Zealand First, and three years later all five Maori seats went to 
New Zealand First. Labour won the seats back in 1999. But even after New 
Zealand First lost its 'tight five' Maori electorate MPs, the party has continued to 
be popular with Maori. In 2002 the party won 15 percent of the party vote in the 
Maori electorates (second to Labour). 
The traditional link between Maori voters and Labour is partly related to the 
association between the Ratana church and the party. This tie goes back to 1935 
when Labour leader Michael Joseph Savage struck an alliance with Tahupotiki 
Wiremu Ratana and his church. But Labour's link with Maori is also related to the 
fact that the vast majority of Maori inhabit lower socio-economic positions in 
society. In this sense this apparent ethnic cleavage has been str<::>ngly class-
related. The tradition of voting Labour was established due to the simple logic of 
voting for a party that purportedly represented the interests of the poor?3 
Likewise, Pacific Island New Zealanders have been overwhelmingly working 
class and have also voted disproportionately in favour of Labour. However, now 
that this voting habit has been established, Maori and Pacific Island support for 
Labour is no longer simply due to this class background, but has become 
strongly reflective of a sense of ethnic loyalty?4 Recent changes in the class-
electoral roll chose Labour. Note that turnout is defined here as a pereentage of those on the electoral roll -
as opposed to elsewhere in this thesis where it is defined as a percentage of eligible voters. 
73 Mitchell has also explained the social influences on New Zealand politics in the 1960s, saying, 'Ethnic 
factors are largely absent. Though new migrants and Maoris are both more strongly Labour than the rest of 
the community, this is in the main a reflection of their social position' (1969: p.30). See also: Sullivan and 
Margaritis (2002: p.66), 
74 Mulgan (1997a), points out, 'Maori and Pacific Islanders support for Labour is not just a consequence of 
the fact that they are disproportionately members of the lower socio-economic groups. Even when class 
factors are held constant, a Maori or Pacific Islander has been more likely to vote Labour than has been a 
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ethnicity structure of society - and in particular the emergence of a significant 
Maori middle class - mean that although Maori continue to be found mostly in the 
working class that still vote for Labour, there has also been a growing Maori 
middle class that vote for other parties on the right. This is reflected in recent 
parliaments by a number of Maori representing parties on the right such as 
National (Georgina Te Huhu), Act (Donna Awatere-Huata), and New Zealand 
First (Tau Henare, Rana Waitai, Tuku Morgan, Tuariki John Delamere, Tu Wylie, 
Winston Peters, Jim Peters, Ron Mark). The Green Party also performed very 
well in the Maori electorates in 2002 (winning 10 percent of the party vote there), 
mainly by winning the support of middle class Maori,75 
Asian voters have never played a significant role in New Zealand politics, yet 
now comprise seven percent of the population. Asian-New Zealand voters are 
said to be significantly attached to the right of the political spectrum, and 
Gustafson claims that in 1996 'over 90 percent of Chinese voters supported 
National' (Gustafson, 1997c: p.145)?6 In 1996 the National Party delivered the 
first ever Asian-New Zealand MP to Parliament, Pansy Wong. In 2002, a second 
Asian-New Zealander, Ashraf Choudhary was elected, this time for Labour. 
Generally the elite of the political parties has become somewhat more ethnically 
diverse. Across most of the parties there has been an increase in the proportion 
of Maori election candidates, which is mainly due to the operation of the party 
lists. Since the introduction of MMP, the number of Maori MPs has also 
Pakeha in the same class position' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.275). How~ver, Sullivan and Margaritis' analysis of 
NZES data for the 1999 election show that, 'Maori Labour party voters did not come from anyone obvious 
social or economic group' (2002: p.77).See also: Vowles and Aimer (1993: pp.34-39). 
75 According to the research of Sullivan and Margaritis based on NZES data, the Greens found Maori 
support amongst those 'more likely to be in comfortable economic circumstances, living in households with 
incomes between $30,000 and $70,000' (Sullivan and Margaritis, 2002: p.79). 
76 In a Herald-DigiPoll with a high margin of error for Asian voting, National was actually 'third among 
Chinese voters with 23.1 per cent, despite having the only Chinese MP, Pansy Wong. Labour and Act each 
won 38.5 per cent of Chinese voters in the poll' (Collins, 2002). 
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increased from six in 1993 to 19 in 2002.77 Similarly, there are now more 
candidates of Pacific Islands and Asian origins. 
Although the ethnic cleavage has been heavily overshadowed by the economic 
left-right dimension, in recent years - especially since the introduction of MMP -
a number of political analysts have suggested that the Maori-Pakeha ethnic 
cleavage is growing in significance and could lead to the establishment of a 
viable ethnic-based party.78 So far all the ethnic-based parties that have 
attempted to get elected to Parliament under their own name have failed. These 
include Maori-based parties like Mana Motuhake (established 1980), Mana Maori 
(registered 1996), Mana Wahine Te Ira Tangata (established 1998), Piri Wiri Tua, 
Te Tawharau (registered 1999), and Mauri Pacific (registered 1999)?9 The failure 
of all these parties suggests that the ethnic cleavage remains weak. Holding 
back such a development is the apparent desire of most of those in ethnic 
minority groups such as Maori to be represented by a mainstream non-ethnic 
party.80 Successful minor parties have attempted to compete on ethnic cleavage, 
such as New Zealand First.81 
Gender Cleavage 
The gender cleavage in New Zealand society plays only a small role in party 
politics. Few political parties or candidates campaign on gender issues, and it 
77 After the 2002 election, New Zealand First had the highest proportion of Maori MPS: 6 out of 13, Labour 
10 of 52, Greens 1 of 9, Act 1 of 9, National 1 of 27 and both the United Future and Progressive Coalition 
had no Maori MPs. 
78 See: Miller (1997a), and Nagel (1994b). 
79 As Sullivan and Margaritis point out, 'Mauri Pacific professed to represent peoples of the Pacific, but was 
essentially viewed as a Maori party' (2002: p.75). 
80 Sullivan and Margaritis (2000: p.182), Sullivan (1997: p.369). 
81 United New Zealand also actively pursued the votes of ethnic minorities in 1999 after merging with the 
Ethnic Minority Party, and becoming 'sufficiently convinced of possible strong support for the party in these 
ethnic communities' (Stonyer, 2000: p.62). The United Party chose a high number of candidates from ethnic 
minorities to stand for it in 1999 - their 23 candidates were made up of ten different nationalities (ibid). 
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appears unlikely that this social cleavage will become sufficiently politicised to 
make viable the establishment of a gender-specific political party.82 Most political 
parties do, however, have gender specific policies, some of which probably 
reflect an attempt to target the gender cleavage. For example, in government the 
Alliance pushed policies like Paid Parental Leave. Similarly in the 1980s the 
Fourth Labour Government set up the Ministry of Women's Affairs and passed 
the Pay Equity Act.83 Certainly Labour has been more attractive to women than 
men in recent years. For example, according to Levine and Roberts' survey 
research, in 1996 Labour obtaining 61 percent of their support from women 
(Levine and Roberts, 1997).84 Analysis of NZES data for 1999 by Vowles showed 
that women were 9 percent more likely than men to vote Labour (Vowles, 2002d: 
p.93). Likewise, according to a Herald-DigiPoll survey at the end of the 2002 
election campaign, Labour had the support of 45 percent of women, but only 32 
percent of men (Collins, 2002).85 
Correspondingly, on the right flank of the political spectrum, it was male voters 
who dominated - Act's 1996 support was very heavily biased towards men, with 
men making up 84 percent of the its vote (Levine and Roberts, 1997). In 1999 
82 In the transition to MMP a women's party was created and momentarily obtained some national 
prominence, but was never heard of again. Then in 1999 Alliance-defector Alamein Kopu set up the short-
lived Mana Wahine Te Ira Tangata, which was a party aimed at Maori women. 
83 Mulgan, however, has commented that Labour's gender strategies in 1990 'appear to have had little 
impact' (1997a: p.275). 
84 However, Labour's strength in attracting the votes of women was largely a negative phenomenon: 'The 
increasing Labour gender gap is the result not of increased female support for Labour, but rather of two 
dramatic slides in male support for Labour from 1987 to 1990, an9 from 1993 to 1996. Female support for 
Labour also slipped over the same period, almost as much as men's from 1987 to 1990, but much less 
between 1993 and 1996' (Vowles, 1998d: pp.33-34). 
85 Traditionally, however, there has been a moderate gender split in New Zealand voting behaviour, with 
females voting more conservatively than males. For example, Levine and Robinson's 1975 voter survey 
showed that women made up 55 percent of National's vote, whereas women voters made up only 46 
percent of Labour's support and only 45 percent of the Values party vote (Levine and Robinson, 1976: 
p.131). The same survey also found that National had the support of 57 percent of 'housewives' (ibid: 
p.139). 
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the party's gender support was still heavily weighted towards males, but had 
improved significantly. According to Vowles, in 1999 Act had 'a 9 per cent vote 
among men but only 3 per cent among women' (Vowles, 2002d: pp.93-94).86 
Although the gender cleavage is relatively insignificant, Vowles noted that 
because 'women were 9 per cent more likely to vote Labour than men' 'this 
gender effect is likely to be as strong, if not stronger, than class' (ibid: p.93). But 
for the rest of the parties, support appears to be gender neutral - with National, 
the Alliance and New Zealand First all obtaining a relatively even shares of votes 
from men and women in 1996 (Bain, 4 Dec 1996: p.2).87 
Compared with other legislatures around the world, the New Zealand Parliament 
has a high proportion of women parliamentarians. The number of women 
representatives has also increased under MMP; the party lists have increased 
the number of female MPs from 21 (out of a 99 MP Parliament) in 1993, to 34 
(out of a 120 MP Parliament) in 2002. The gender split varies greatly across the 
parties, and after the 2002 general election Act and the Green Party had the 
highest proportion of women MPs at 44 percent each. Labour had 35 percent, 
National 22 percent, United Future 13 percent; New Zealand First 7 percent and 
the Progressive Coalition no women MPs. The memberships of both main parties 
have tended to be made up equally of both sexes. According to Alan Ware, the 
approximate proportion of party members who are women in the Labour Party is 
52 percent, and in the National Party, 50 percent (Ware, 1996: p.82).88 
86 Alternatively, Nicola Reid reported that while 7 percent of men voted Act, only 4 percent of women did 
(Reid, 2001: p.266). 
87 In 2002 United Future's voter support was slightly biased towards women. According to a Herald-DigiPoil 
survey at the end of the 2002 election campaign, the party won 6.2 percent support from women but only 4.6 
percent from men (Collins, 2002). 
88 This compares very favourably to all other western European countries where a much lower proportion of 
women is involved. For example, the female proportion of party members at the national level in Sweden is 
30 percent, France 35 percent, Germany 30 percent, Italy 27 percent, and in Britain 42 percent (Widfeldt, 
1995: p.155). 
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Age Cleavage 
The age cleavage has become increasingly politicised since the 1980s, as 
parties increasingly campaign on age-related issues, and thus differences 
between age groups have become relatively more important in New Zealand 
electoral behaviour. There is now a discernable political fracture between young 
and old, and for many commentators this age axis has become a significant 
factor in explaining modern New Zealand pOlitics.89 
Interestingly, the largest group of youth are now actually non-voters. Analysing 
NZES data, Vowles has found that non-voting in 1999 was over twice as likely 
among the youngest age group than the average for all the age groups (Vowles, 
2002d: p.94). After non-voters, the next biggest bloc of young voters goes to the 
Green Party. The Greens have campaigned particularly strongly for the youth 
vote, and there is now a definite age-bias to Green Party support, with 84 percent 
of Green voters being under 40. As well as this, the party's own 2002 research 
showed that 25 percent of 19 and 20-year-olds supported the Greens (Laxon, 
2002). According to the 2002 Herald-DigiPolI, the party had 19 percent support 
from the under-40s but the support of only six percent of those over 40 (and even 
this support is very strongly concentrated in the 50-60 'Values generation' age 
group) (Laxon, 2002).90 
89 Colin James is the greatest advocate of a generation-orientated understanding of New Zealand politics, 
suggesting the existence of a philosophical divide between the generations and arguing that there are three 
parts in the age electorate that constitute three different ways of looking at the world: 'The over-55s, a 
quarter of the electorate, are from Sir Robert Muldoon's time .... The under-30's, also a quarter of the 
electorate, have lived all their adult life under Rogernomics ... Inbetween are those who made - or were 
dragged into - the switch or who were following close behind' (James, 27 Sep 1996e). 
90 According to Tim Bale, who has studied the Greens, the party's 'core support is young people, either in 
tertiary education or just out of it' (quoted in Laxon, 2002). In postwar New Zealand youth have traditionally 
voted in greater numbers for parties of the left and correspondingly the elderly have voted conservatively. 
For example, in Levine and Robinson's 1975 voter survey, the liberal-leftist Values Party obtained over 60 
percent of its votes from persons under the age of 30 years, compared to National's 31 percent support and 
Labour's 30 percent (Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.135). 
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After the Greens, it is the parties of the right that often appeal most strongly to 
youth. In 1993, the National Party made a significant shift to targeting the youth 
vote.91 The success of this strategy was evidenced in 1996 when 'National did 
best among young voters' (Vowles, 1998d: p.35). According to Robert Mannion, 
'more than 40 per cent of 18-29-year-olds supported National. Moreover, young 
voters were the single most enthusiastic block for Jim Bolger' (Mannion, 1996b: 
p.9).92 
In contrast, according to Vowles, 'New Zealand First and Labour voters tended to 
be significantly older than average. In both cases, the probability of voting Labour 
or New Zealand First increased about 2 per cent for each 10 years of age' 
(Vowles, 1998d: p.35). According to a NBR-HP 2002 poll, although Labour had 
an overall 47 percent support, among the under-30 age group it was only 37 
percent but among people aged over 60 Labour had the support of 53 percent 
(Hill Cone, 2002). In 2002 a survey showed that New Zealand First had the 
support of 16 percent of the over-60s (Collins, 2002).93 The Alliance, too, took the 
majority of its support from the older parts of the electorate, and together with 
New Zealand First, at their peak they received half their support from people who 
were retired (Mannion, 1996a). 
Regardless of class, the older generations are now voting for parties which they 
perceive will look after their material interests. Part of the explanation is also that 
91 Internal party polling showed that National's strongest voting block was in the 25-29 age group. According 
to senior National MP, Roger Sowry, 'There's now a constituency there for the party that has not been there 
in the 10 years I've been involved ..... That age group has traditionally stayed well away from the National 
Party' (quoted in Morrison, 28 Aug 1993: p.11). MP Nick Smith also maintained that National was 'in a 
unique position of becoming the natural party for the under-30s voter' (quoted in Munro, 2 Aug 1993: p.2). 
92 Similarly, Act did best in 1996 'among the 35-44 and 45-54 age groups' (Vowlesd, 1998: p.35). 
93 In 2002 United Future's voter support was slightly biased towards older voters. According to the Herald-
DigiPoll survey at the end of the 2002 election campaign, United Future won only 4.3 percent support 
among the under-40s, the support of 6.6 percent of the middle-aged (40-59), and 5.7 percent of the elderly 
(60+) (Collins, 2002). 
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the grey-power generation have moved their support away from National 
because that party broke its promise on the superannuation surtax and also 
reduced pension entitlements. Superannuation has thus become a significant 
political issue. The ageing nature of the population means the issues of the 
'aged' are now politically important. 
The relationship of the Greens and National with youth, and New Zealand First 
and Labour with the elderly, suggests the age cleavage has been incorporated 
into the current party system, but that this dimension is not entirely consistent 
with the traditional class cleavage. It appears very unlikely that any party will 
successfully rise to contest elections on the age dimension of conflict. 94 
Religious Cleavage 
The significance of the religious cleavage in New Zealand was demonstrated in 
2002 when the Christian-oriented United Future party was elected to Parliament 
with 6.7 percent of the party vote. Six years earlier, the Christian Coalition won 
4.3 percent of the party vote (falling just short of entering the first MMP 
Parliament). These performances suggest the existence of a reasonable-sized 
Christian voter base in New Zealand. Yet the religious cleavage has historically 
played a relatively small part in New Zealand politics. Its main expression has 
been in the tendency for Catholics to vote Labour and for Anglicans and other 
Protestant denominations to support National: 
Historically, the two main political parties in New Zealand have drawn from two religious 
streams. The Catholic, Salvation Army and Baptis.t churches - reflecting their base in 
the Welsh and Irish migrant working class - were aligned first with the Liberals, then 
with the Labour Party. The conservative right, as political scientist Barry Gustafson 
says, drew spiritual solace from elsewhere. 'Presbyterians and Anglicans by and large 
94 In the transition to MMP, a party, the New Zealand Superannuitants and Youth Action, was established to 
represent youth and the elderly, but failed to make an impact. 
Chapter Four: Cleavages and the Party System 299 
supported the more conservative parties. The Reform Party that evolved into the 
National Party was violently anti-Catholic' (Campbell, 1998c).95 
Mulgan maintains that in the modern New Zealand party system, 'Support for one 
religion or religious denomination rather than another is not reflected in political 
allegiance, with the minor exception of a slight tendency for Roman Catholics to 
prefer Labour' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.275). There has also been a tendency for 
church-goers in general to vote National or New Zealand First, and those with no 
religious affiliation to vote Labour or the Alliance (ibid}.96 
As explored in the following chapter, the alignments between the mainstream 
parties and the churches are also generally very weak. Neither National nor 
Labour are heavily influenced by the formal involvement of religious party 
members, and only United Future and Christian Heritage have any significant 
links with religious organisations.97 The more morally conservative Christian 
Heritage Party is somewhat identified with the 'reformed churches' - an 
'alignment' that led to the establishment of the rival Christian Democrats in May 
1995 (Boston et aI., 1996b: p.51}.98 In general the decline of mainstream 
95 Levine has suggested that the tendency of Catholics to vote Labour 'may have been attributable to their 
working-class position' and is therefore actually a consequence of the class cleavage (Levine, 1979: p.89). 
96 Writing in the 1960s, Mitchell (1969a: p.30) maintained that 'religious differences are unimportant'. See 
also: Vowles (1998d: pAO), and Gold (1992). 
97 One of the major party components of United Future, the Future New Zealand party was established with 
the target of securing the votes of conservative Catholics and Pacific.lslanders (Boston et aI., 1996b: p.51). 
Party founder, Graeme Lee established the organisation in 1995 after moving 'around the country building 
up the network of Christian leaders and businessmen that was to form the core of the new party' (Heeringa, 
1995: p.83). 
98 The Christian parties - Christian Heritage and Future New Zealand (originally named the Christian 
Democrats) - targeted the Christian and socially conservative vote. According to Heeringa, 'That target 
group represents 250,000 regular churchgoers, moral conservatives scattered throughout pro-life 
organisations and charity groups and a largely conservative Pacific Island population' (Heeringa, 1995: 
p.80). 
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established religions99 has had an impact on the right of the political spectrum -
helping drain parties like National of its ideological substance. 
Postmaterialist Cleavage 
Increasingly it is argued that politics in industrialised democracies is based 
around a set of issues that do not directly relate to the traditional class-economic-
materialist left-right cleavage, but which fit broadly into a postmaterialist 
cleavage, in that they are not concerned with the struggle for material security 
(as seen in conflicts over income, tax, state social support and so forth). This 
rather amorphous and contested concept is strongly associated with Ronald 
Inglehart (1990; 1997), who argues that a 'culture shift' has occurred in the West, 
and voters now have changing priorities. Postmaterialist values - or 'new politics' 
- will increasingly dominate and reshape politics, Inglehart argues, due to the 
decline of economic deprivation. Significantly, this new political cleavage of 
postmaterialism is characterised by identity, values, culture and psychology 
rather than social background. Rather than being understood by the polarities of 
left and right, the terms of liberal and conservative are more useful. In being 
about issues, this dimension still relates to - and incorporates - many of the 
'alternative cleavages' outlined above. Issues relating to ethnic culture, gender 
discrimination, policies on age and so forth are more often postmaterialist in 
nature rather than materialist. In fact, according to Lipset, this postmaterialist 
political cleavage has grown in significance with the decline of social cleavages: 
Cleavages linked to social stratification are no longer the main correlates of a party's 
position on the left or right of the political spectrum. Issues revolving around morality, 
abortion, 'family values,' civil rights, gender equality, multiculturalism, 'immigration, crime 
and punishment, foreign policy, and supranational communities push individuals and 
groups in directions that are independent of their socioeconomic position (Upset, 2001: 
p.62). 
99 Between the 1991 and 1996 censuses, religious denominations fell significantly - with declines for 
Anglicans of 100,284; Presbyterians, 82,761; Catholics, 25,500; Methodists, 17,844; Baptists, 16,542; and 
Ratana, 11,142 (Department of Statistics, 2000). 
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Lipset points out that the postmaterialist cleavage has not been incorporated into 
the existing class dimension of conflict, and as such is not simply a reflection of a 
social cleavage. Postmaterialist issues - for example, abortion or state 
censorship - often crosscut social cleavages rather than reinforce them. lOO 
Nonetheless, there has been some congruence between the parties of the left 
and certain postmaterialist values: 
the parties of the left, although still identifying themselves as social democratic or 
socialist, have largely reconstituted themselves as liberals in the American sense of the 
word, emphasizing postmaterialist themes like environmentalism, e~uality for women 
and gays, minority rights, and cultural freedoms (Upset, 2001: p.62).10 
The parties of the left in New Zealand have emphasised similar postmaterialist 
themes, as well as being associated with liberal stances such as the anti-nuclear 
legislation, anti-racism, 'softer' policies on crime, human rights, and prostitution 
law reform. Meanwhile, the parties of the right have often taken up what might be 
called the 'conservative' side of the postmaterialist cleavage, but this has 
occurred far less uniformly or consistently.102 In many ways the liberals of the 
postmaterialist cleavage have won most of the arguments on postmaterialist 
issues, just as the right-wing have generally won the arguments on materialist 
issues - leading to a consensus that is economically right-wing and socially 
liberal. As this cleavage becomes more politicised there appears to be pressure 
on the parties to incorporate postmaterialist issues into the traditional left-right 
dimension, but this is only ever partially successful. 
In New Zealand there has been some acknowledgement that this kind of 
postmaterialist cleavage increasingly affects party politics. For instance, Barker 
and McLeay believe that a secondary issue dimension already configures 
100 See: Diamond and Gunther (2001 : p.xi). 
101 A different view is put forward by Berman, who argues, 'The troubles mainstream parties faced during the 
1970s, therefore, were best understood as political fallout from this broad shift in values; social democratic 
and labour parties were hit the hardest because many postmaterialists felt themselves to be on the left but 
did not share the traditional left's materialist agenda' (Berman, 1997: p.1 02). 
102 See: Jackson and McRobie (1998: pp.299-300). 
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modern New Zealand politics (Barker and McLeay, 2000: p.145). Colin James 
argues that with the decline of the class cleavage, politics is now 'as much a 
state of mind as a position in society. Politics these days are psycho-social as 
much as socioeconomic' (James, 10 Nov 1999f). He says 'The old "cleavage" 
between bosses and workers, white collar and blue collar, is now cut across by 
other dividing lines on such matters as morals, the environment, feminism and 
Maori rights' (ibid). Some have written about the rise of identity politics, 
suggesting that this dimension is displacing the economic conflict. For instance, 
sociologists David Thorns and Charles Sedgwick say that, 'The politics of the 
1980s were increasingly about the issue of identity rather than class. The key 
groups were women, Maori, peace activists, environmentality, gay rights groups, 
unemployed rights and libertarians rather than class-based organisations' 
(Thorns and Sedgwick, 1998: p.181). Others have identified the rise of 'new 
politics'. For example, in his election manifesto content analysis, Matthew 
Gibbons found that 'there are some new politics issues such as the environment 
and multiculturalism that have become more important since the late 1960s' 
(Gibbons, 1997: p.16). However, overall he concluded that: 
content analysis provides few indications that a new politics cleavage is developing in 
New Zealand politics. Although some postmaterialist issues such as the Environment 
have been emphasised more in election manifestos, there has usually been a 
consensus between the main parties on their importance (Gibbons, 1997: p.16). 
The weakening of social cleavages has opened the way for the development of 
this postmaterialist cleavage. It seems that one result of the decline of the 
traditional class cleavage is that the parties have to find alternative cleavages (or 
enemies) to define themselves against, thus other issues become more central. 
Therefore, on the right, communism (or at least 'creeping socialism') has been 
replaced by issues like crime and immigration as the prime generator of public 
paranoia. On the left, issues of economic inequality are increasingly replaced by 
issues that relate to 'quality of life', such as the environment or cultural diversity. 
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Whereas most of the 'alternative' political dimensions discussed in this section 
reflect social cleavages, the postmaterialist dimension represents a political 
cleavage without any substantial social base. It seems that in the absence of a 
strong social cleavage, parties now need to find other political cleavages on 
which to compete, and the most obvious one is values. Act picked up on this in 
the mid-1990s, with the slogan, 'Values. Not politics'. The increase in the 
significance of this cleavage, and the decline of traditional social cleavages 
signals the decline of politics, as structured by social division. 
Part Three: Implications of the Low Influence of Social 
Cleavages 
Part One of this chapter has shown that the relevance of the class cleavage has 
declined for party politics in New Zealand. Part Two examined the 'alternative' 
social cleavages and found that relative to the class cleavage many cleavages 
based on social groups have become more significant, but that largely these 
dimensions remain weak. No political parties have succeeded by competing 
purely on any of these social cleavages. All the parties have, however, 
increasingly used the political cleavage of postmaterialist issues and values to 
define themselves. This section looks at the implications of the declining 
influence of the class cleavage as well as the failure of alternative social 
cleavages to replace it. 
In general, the detachment of party politics from socii3.1 cleavages contributes to a 
number of negative aspects in the party system, such as the increased volatility 
in party politics (both in terms of party ideology and voter behaviour), and the 
increasingly 'superficial' nature of political conflict. Even more crucially, it plays a 
central role in the ideological erosion of the parties, encouraging increased office-
seeking behaviour, as well as greater centripetal competition. These effects are 
outlined below. 
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Increased Volatility 
The decline in the salience of social class contributes to ideological volatility 
because without the presence of class anchors, each party's programme relates 
more fluidly to broad attitudes within the community. Therefore, the fact that so 
many modern political parties are so 'ideologically slippery' cannot simply be 
explained by the personal office-seeking behaviour (or opportunism) of their 
leaders, but should also be seen as a reflection of the parties' unstable and 
contradictory support bases. Given that the parties are built on the foundations of 
social cleavages, then the transformation in the character of these social 
groupings and their declining electoral relationship to political parties is likely to 
make politics more fluid, leading to different kinds of appeals, styles of 
leadership, different tensions within party organisations, and of course 
fluctuations in policy.103 The decline in politicisation of social cleavages is also 
related to increased voter volatility and general declines in electoral participation. 
David Denver has argued that voter volatility increases in tandem with 
decreasing party alignments: 
Strong party identification acted like an anchor, binding the voter securely to his or her 
party and thus ensuring stability in party support over lengthy periods (and a lifetime in 
many cases). When the anchor is loosened the voter is likely to drift on the electoral sea 
being pushed backwards and forwards by temporary prevailing winds. Electoral volatility 
increases and stability decreases (Denver, 1996: p.177). 
In New Zealand voter ties to a particular party are disappearing (this topic is 
examined in further detail in Chapter Ten). Such loyalty to a party brand used to 
be based largely upon the class cleavage, which meant that in. the 1960s, one 
survey suggested that 79 per cent of voters for Labour and 71 per cent of voters 
for National had never voted for any other party (Mitchell, 1962d: pp.196-197). 
103 See also: Kemp, who argues, 'The stability of the parties has depended, probably to a significant extent, 
on the stability of their traditional bases of support. As these diminish, the result must be to introduce new 
elements of instability into the party system - first of all creating new problems of internal management for 
the party leaders, and possibly also the conditions for future party fragmentation' (Kemp, 1978: p.359). 
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This stability eroded in the late-1970s when, according to James, 'the percentage 
who had voted the same party through just three elections had dropped to 45 per 
cent' (James, 2002f). 
Increase in Non-Ideological Factors 
That class and structural factors were formerly so vital to New Zealand politics 
was reflected in the fact that personalities, trivial issues, and parliamentary 
scandals traditionally played only a very limited role in structuring and configuring 
the way politics operates. Commenting on pre-1975 politics, John Roberts 
argued, 'Political opinion, backed by the evidence of the polls, suggests that the 
predominant influence on political behaviour is party allegiance. The personalities 
of candidates and leaders run a very distant second' (Roberts, 1978: p.93). 
Similarly, writing in 1967, when New Zealand politics was still largely structured 
around class, Robinson argued that this class-focus inhibited the importance of 
personality politics: 'The dominance in New Zealand elections of mass parties 
linked with occupational interests is reflected in the unimportance of local 
personalities and issues in determining election results' (Robinson, 1967: p.111). 
If Robinson was correct, then the logical corollary of the decline of 'mass parties 
linked with occupational interests' is an increased importance of personalities in 
politics. In the absence of social cleavages in party politics - fewer sociological 
phenomena are influencing voting behaviour - so-called 'issue voting' is now 
more important than ever. Certainly in the political science literature there is a 
belief that the influence of issues on voting is greater in periods of class 
dealignment. Voters are now said to be more likely to choose parties on the basis 
of party policy and contemporary issues.104 More than ever, voters are now 
believed to conform to the Downsian model of voting - they consider their 
position on issues and then vote for the party which offers the closest match. 
However, this shift also means that electors make up their minds on the basis of 
trivialities such as leadership charisma, parliamentary scandals and so forth. 
104 See: Levine and Roberts (1992). 
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Therefore, rather than increasing the salience of issues-based politics, the 
decreasing relevance of any social base in New Zealand politics is likely to be 
responsible for the increasing personality-driven politics of the modern age. 
Many political commentators have observed how the less coherent and 
structured nature of contemporary politics has led to an increased attention on 
personality and leadership in New Zealand politics. This is especially the case in 
election campaigns, where the focus of voter interest, media coverage, and party 
marketing has shifted a great deal towards party leaders. Ruth Laugesen, for 
example, has written how, 'With parties and policies in this tangled, overlapping 
state, a befuddled electorate is bound to be drawn to the simpler issues of 
personality and leadership' (Laugesen, 1996b: p.2).105 This increased focus on 
leadership is especially the case for the newer and smaller parties due to their 
undeveloped social bases: 
In particular, electoral support for new parties which have not yet established strong 
social roots in the community is likely to be especially dependent on the public profile of 
their leaders. Thus, the success of the Alliance and New Zealand First was closely 
linked to the popularity of their leaders (Mulgan, 1997a: p.281). 
Without the political parties representing the interests of various social groups, 
there is little delineation between the various shades of mainstream party 
opinion, and thus ideological differences disappear. Instead, MPs appear as 
'personalities' rather than as representatives of counterpoised political 
programmes. Without a social cleavage influencing party competition, there is 
little pressure on politicians to act in the clear-cut interests of any distinct class in 
society. With all sides competing to appeal to the nebulous no-man'!) land of 'statistical 
politics' where the electorate only exists in as far as the latest opinion poll describes it, 
there has been a noticeable tendency for politicians and parties to withdraw from 
contentious issues and policies, and for politics in general to become bland and 
superficial (Welch, 1998: p.694). 
105 See also: Haywood and Rudd (2000), Aimer (1997), and Jackson (1991). 
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Ideological Erosion 
The detachment of political parties from their social constituencies has obviously 
resulted in a reduction of pressure on political parties to act on behalf of 
particular social groups. Gold has argued that the weakening social cleavages 
mean that governments and parties can afford to be less sensitive to certain 
societal interests: 
If voters have become less attentive to certain group differences (occupational class for 
example), governments can afford to be less sensitive to these differences as well. 
Policies previously ruled out because of the group antagonisms they threatened to 
arouse can now become much more acceptable .... policies such as income and wealth 
redistribution, that may have been pursued in response to group demands or in order to 
contain group antagonisms, can now be given a lesser priority, since their electoral payoff 
diminishes once group factors bear less and less on partisanship (Gold, 1989: p.420). 
This was also the conclusion of Jack Vowles and Ian McAllister in their study of 
the neo-liberal reforms carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Labour 
parties in the 1980s. In this they show that it was the detachment of the parties 
from their working class bases of support that, in part, enabled the reforms to be 
adopted: 
These declining numbers of voters within the core support groups for the two parties was 
therefore one factor facilitating the adoption of deregulatory pOlicies. Nevertheless, such 
a strategy could only have been adopted if there was a widespread belief that the 
electoral consequences would not be disastrous. As it happened, the party elites had 
grounds for discounting any possible adverse electoral consequences. In both 
countries ... a process of detachment or dealignment had been under way in which the 
major political parties had become progressively more diverse in their sources of 
electoral support and less dependent upon the support of their traditional social groups 
(Vowles and McAllister, 1996: pp.194-195). 
Vowles and McAllister found that, when compared to the 1960s and 1970s, 
electoral constraints on policy innovation in the 1980s had weakened, and that 
compared to its Australian counterpart the New Zealand Labour Party was even 
'freer to break away from its traditional social moorings' and carry out non-
traditional policy innovations (Vowles and McAllister, 1996: p.200). Likewise, 
according to Honey and Barnett, Labour in the 1980s could afford to restructure 
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industries such as forestry and mining, thereby alienating its voter support in 
areas because the new fluidness of the class cleavage meant that the party 
could consequently pick up 'support from the economic elite of the upper income 
suburbs' (Honey and Barnett, 1990: p.92). Miller also argues that this decline in 
class pressure has had a significant effect, encouraging Labour in the 1990s 'to 
modify its taxation and social spending priorities with a view to broadening its 
appeal among middle-income voters' (Miller, 2001: p.236). 
National's situation has been similar. Between 1975 and 1984, class dealignment 
allowed - or encouraged - the Muldoon National Government to attempt to keep 
the postwar social democratic consensus and welfare state intact. When back in 
government in the 1990s, National first abandoned its core supporters' 
expectations when it refused to abolish the national superannuation surcharge as 
it had promised. Then National essentially halted the neo-liberal reform process 
after only one term, thus going against the demands of its traditional middle 
class, farming and business constituencies. 
This is not to suggest that the parties' support bases no longer have any 
consequences for the parties. Their traditional class moorings do still playa role 
in the policies that parties choose and governments pursue. For example, when 
the Fourth Labour Government came to office 'Few cabinet ministers seriously 
supported their Government's reimposition of compulsory trade union 
membership ... but most believed it was "a price which had to be paid" to a key 
constituency' (Walker, 1989: p.221). Labour refrained from extending the neo-
liberal reforms into other areas such as the labour market for the same reasons. 
In contrast, the sequencing of their neo-liberal reforms meant that farmers were 
the first group in society to have their state subsidies cut. Similarly, when the 
Fourth National Government found itself in financial troubles after taking office .in 
1990, it chose to cut expenditure amongst Labour's constituency rather than its 
own. Richardson's cuts in public expenditure fell hardest on beneficiaries 
because they were calculated to be relatively less damaging to National in 
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electoral terms as few beneficiaries were thought to vote for the party.106 
Likewise, in implementing the Employment Contracts Act - legislation that tilted 
industrial relations in favour of employers - the National Government did not risk 
alienating its traditional support base. Such examples represent the typical way 
that politics used to operate, but can perhaps now be regarded as exceptions to 
the rule. The fact that all the parties can adopt or implement policies that impact 
negatively on their traditional or supposed supporters reflects the fact that such 
political parties are no longer critically reliant on such constituencies. 
The decline of class conflict discussed in Part One means that the distinctiveness 
(or sense of separateness) of parties is less and less apparent. And as they all 
share more and more characteristics, the various parties are finding themselves 
sharing the same electoral market (Mair, 1997: p.135). This decline in societal 
class conflict has reduced pressure on the parties, allowing convergence in the 
political styles of politicians and parties. Having been shorn of their close 
relationships with social groups, parties are now behaving more in terms of 
Anthony Downs' abstract model of maximising political party behaviour which 
takes no real account of politicised social cleavages. Instead, in this model, each 
party aims to win the middle ground support, and therefore parties increasingly 
adopt similar programmes or borrow electorally popular ideas from each other. 
Each party's support is fluidly related to broad attitudes within the community, 
rather than resting on a firm social base. 
Arguably, this decline in the class nature of the parties also depoliticises politics. 
It is in this context that technocratic and managerial forces prevail. This is an 
argument made by sociologist Kevin Clements: 
While some commentators applaud this as a sign that we are moving into a post-. 
industrial society where all problems are defined in technical terms and politics 
becomes irrelevant... in the short term, such a move does increase the power of 
106 See: Trotter (21 Jul 1999d). Interestingly, in the 2002 election, the National Party abandoned its 'market 
rents' policy on state housing, in an obvious attempt to appeal to beneficiaries. 
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permanent technocrats within the public service and in the long term raises fundamental 
questions about the essential differences between New Zealand political parties. If 
parties do not represent specific class interests then their role will become increasingly 
irrelevant since they will begin to converge on all major issues (Clements, 1982: 
p.159).107 
Clements, who was writing in 1982, cited the growing influence of the 
technocrats in the political systems of other countries, and pointed out that where 
they dominated, political parties had 'become a meaningless irrelevance, 
democratic processes are threatened and eventually undermined. In these 
situations, major corporations shape the economic policies of government safe in 
the knowledge that they are unlikely to be put to a democratic test' (Clements, 
1982: p.164). Noting that in New Zealand the Labour Party was pursing an 
increasingly class-less strategy and predominantly selecting candidates that 
Clements described as 'middle class professionals with technical expertise' or 
'technocrats', he forewarned that possibility of a Labour government restructuring 
the economy in favour of the wealthy: 'Unless the Labour Party pursues a 
deliberate policy of ensuring that its technical experts serve the interests of the 
weakest rather than the strongest groups in New Zealand, then technical elites 
will exert a profound influence over the allocation of scarce New Zealand 
resources' (ibid: p.159, 160). 
A decade after that reform process ended, the result of the declining politicisation 
of social cleavages is now a sort of ideological stalemate. While such pragmatic 
tendencies certainly existed before, only now has the declining influence of social 
cleavages helped to create a situation in which these tendencies can exercise a 
decisive influence over the parties. Quite simply, without a politicised societal 
cleavage to encourage rivalry on this dimension between parties, the parties are 
allowed to slip into the tendency towards office-seeking behaviour and 
ideological convergence - as assumed in the Downsian model. It is not 
surprising therefore that Chapter Three found that the policies and ideologies of 
the parties now overlap, leaving an absence of any sharp boundaries. This all 
107 See: Downs (1957: pp.96-114). 
Chapter Four: Cleavages and the Party System 311 
adds to the increasingly meaninglessness of party labels and the old left-right 
dichotomy. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed one way in which the New Zealand parties are 
becoming less connected with civil society. The social constituencies are clearly 
being detached from the parties. This is because of the declining influence of 
class (in particular) and social structure (more generally) in shaping voting 
behaviour. And while class has become less important in New Zealand party 
politics, it is significant that there has been no alternative social cleavage 
emerging to configure and shape the party system. 
The decline of social cleavages has had a number of ramifications that relate to 
the changes in political competition discussed in Chapter Three. The effect of 
these trends, and of the changing perceptions of political interest which 
accompany them, is to produce the phenomenon of convergence in political 
behaviour among parties and individuals on different sides of the old cleavage 
systems. This is in line with Otto Kirchheimer's view in the 1960s that the 
changing nature of political parties is due to the erosion of traditional social 
boundaries. With the weakening of social cleavages that previously underpinned 
stable party systems, parties have been looking to attract voters from whatever 
social groups they can. Changes in party systems have therefore become 
possible as appeals based on social attachment and loyalty to particular parties 
have broken down. These once-strong alignments meant that parties enjoyed 
very strong identities and constituencies, which encouraged a policy-pursuing 
orientation. In 2003 the strength of this relationship is much reduced. Parties now 
find it increasingly difficult to maintain a separate identity and their constituencies 
are much more diverse and fickle in their support. There is little pressure for 
parties to pursue policy and retain any strong distinctiveness. 
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The decline of social cleavages also means that the ability of parties to plausibly 
articulate the interests of civil society and its citizens is up for question. Chapter 
One argued that New Zealand political parties are losing their ability to structure 
issues, and represent and aggregate societal interests. This chapter has pointed 
out that this comes out of the erosion of cleavage politics and the consequent 
weakening of linkages that parties have with social groups. This is an issue 
elaborated on in following chapters. The continued breakdown of the socio-
economic framework has therefore both produced and continued to epitomise a 
new era of politics in New Zealand. In this era the old bipolar support bases and 
processes have been eroded and are replaced by an emerging, but weak, 
postmaterialist cleavage. Yet Brechtel and Kaiser point out, 'postmaterialist 
issues continue to be interpreted in terms of the traditional left-right dimension' 
(Brechtel and Kaiser, 1999: p.24). This chapter has argued that this cleavage is 
actually an entirely different one to the traditional left-right dimension, and 
therefore should not be analysed and measured on the same scale as economic 
issues. 
Changes in society and politics suggest that, at least for the time being, class is 
not the all-dominant cleavage structuring the party system. Moreover, 'although 
political commentators continue to explain New Zealand politics by reference to 
the left-right spectrum, it is becoming more difficult to identify a consistent pattern 
that differentiates left from right. No other grand line of cleavage looks likely to 
replace the declining class cleavage. Without a strong social cleavage operating, 
the differences between parties have narrowed and the parties compete without 
any strong coherence. 
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Chapter Five 
Party Linkage to Societal Organisations 
The relationships between political parties and interest groups, such as trade 
unions and business associations, have been eroding. The parties are more 
autonomous than ever and this has important practical and ideological 
implications for the party system. Political parties have become more remote 
from civil society. Not only are the relationships unravelling between parties and 
social constituencies in the electorate (as examined in Chapter Four), and 
between parties and their potential members (as examined in Chapter Six), but 
the parties also no longer have strong links with societal organisations that 
represent these groups. The erosion of traditional linkages between party and 
interest groups is therefore creating more of a free market for influence, in which 
the numbers of unaligned groups searching for influence have multiplied. The 
political parties compete for their attention and the interest groups compete for 
that of the political parties. Increasingly, interest groups choose to work 
dispassionately with whoever is in government rather than form allegiances with 
any particular political party. 
This chapter examines the nature of the changing Ii.nks between parties and the 
organised social forces that exist in society. This topic has lacked investigation in 
New Zealand. As Jack Vowles has written: 'The relationship between 
membership of single-issue groups and that of political parties is, like many other 
aspects of political sociology in New Zealand, under-researched' (Vowles, 1998a: 
p.14). This chapter makes a case for the importance of these organisational 
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linkages, outlining the linkages of the parties, explaining why these linkages are 
eroding, and analysing the implications of this erosion. 
In recent times it has become fashionable to decry the linkage between parties 
and societal organisations. The classic linkages between business and right-wing 
parties and between trade unions and left-wing parties has come to be seen as 
somewhat insidious. The endorsement of a party by an organised grouping has 
become negatively associated with self-interest and unseemly financial 
arrangements.1 Also, many interest groups take the point of view that they can 
enhance their members' voices by avoiding narrow partisanship, and thus bring 
influence to bear on all parties, whether in government or not. By contrast, if an 
organisation is seen as being aligned to one party, then when that party is 
outside of government, the group is likely to be disadvantaged. 
A good case can, however, be made to justify the party-institution linkages and 
alignments as necessary and complementary to the democratic functioning of the 
political system. Democratic theory, after all, suggests that in connecting the 
state with its citizens, political parties need to be properly rooted in society so 
they can effectively carry out the will of the people and so that the parliamentary 
institution represents all of society. One such way for the political parties to 
remain integrated in society is through their close working relationships with the 
many organised sections of society. The classical conception of party-based 
representative democracy regards political parties as helping link the state with 
society, and part of that linkage occurs through parties having formal and 
informal ties with societal organisations. These relationships also represent the 
fact that different parties have traditionally represehted policies that are attractive 
to different sectors of society. Alignments with interest groups formalise this -
they allow parties to develop links with the societal organisations that represent 
their supporters. 
1 See: Jackson (1978; chapter seven), and Robinson (1978), 
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Close relationships between parties and other organisations are also useful from 
the point of view of the societal organisations that naturally seek to influence 
those who seek to govern. These groups make a considered choice in aiding the 
election of politicians who then might work to secure legislation that benefits that 
group. Developing relationships with parties is an acknowledgment that collective 
action by like-minded citizens is often more effective than the actions of the 
individual. The relationship is also advantageous to the political party, as these 
social organisations not only provide important financial resources, but also 
legitimisation and political and policy guidance. In this sense they provide parties 
with political identity, which they transmit to their members and supporters. The 
societal groups also mobilise their supporters in elections.2 
Definition of Societal Organisation 
In most cases the term 'societal organisation' refers to an 'interest group'. This 
type of organisation is defined here by Richard Mulgan: 
An interest group is to be understood as an organised group representing to 
government the views of those who share a common interest. In this sense, an interest 
group is not the same as a social group with interests, that is, one of the various 
classes, ethnic groups, geographical localities and so on which make up the plural 
society.... Interest groups are formal organisations with a political function, 
organisations which represent the interests of particular groups and seek to influence 
governments to their point of view (Mulgan, 1997a: p.208). 
Within the category of the interest group, two further categories can be 
discerned: 'sectional' and 'cause' interest groups. The first type is best described 
in the quote above, and is 'confined to groups based on an identifiable social 
group with a sectional interest' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.214). Typical examples include 
trade unions and business associations. Cause interest groups, on the other 
2 The alignment to social forces outside Parliament therefore affords some degree of ideological stability to 
the parties. This is evidenced by the current parties in Parliament, all of which have weak relationships with 
most social groups and are at the same time ideologically volatile. The instability of New Zealand party 
politics in recent years can therefore be viewed in the context of the relatively weak alliances and affiliations 
that the new political parties possess. 
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hand, are described as such because they 'are formed to support a particular 
public cause or government policy' (ibid).3 Typical examples include child 
advocacy groups and environmentalist organisations. 
However, the focus of this chapter is not limited to interest groups. It also 
examines well-organised institutions and actors based in civil society but outside 
the normal definition of interest groups. For example, churches, state 
departments, the media, the military or the police are all organised social forces 
that have relationship with political parties. These are by no means always formal 
or strong linkages, but relationships nonetheless. They are organised social 
forces in the sense that they have a certain involvement and influence on civil 
society. Therefore this chapter mainly uses the term 'societal organisation' rather 
than the more limited 'interest group', even though they are sometimes 
interchangeable.4 
Part One of this chapter gives an overview of the changing types of party-
institutional ties. Part Two examines the individual political parties and their 
relationships with societal organisations. Part Three outlines some explanations 
for the disconnection between political parties and organised social groups. It 
argues that the decline of the relevance of the class cleavage plays a central 
role. 
3 See also: Jesson (1992c: p.365). 
4 In contrast to this approach, Keith Jackson includes such groups within a definition of interest groups: 'A 
third category is the institutional group which may include such organisations as local government 
authorities, statutory boards - the Wool, Meat or Dairy Boards - as well as bureaucracies and churches. 
These are formal organisations composed of professionally employed personnel with designated political or 
social functions. All of these different organisations involve pressure group activity in various ways for they 
"articulate" or link different interests together' (Jackson, 1973: pp.87-88). 
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Part One: Old and New Organisational Ties 
When New Zealand's first political party - the Liberal Party - took office in 1890 it 
was backed by a whole array of organised social forces. According to Les 
Cleveland, the Liberals' supporters included 'trade unions, trades and labour 
councils, the Knights of Labour, the unemployed, recent immigrants and land-
hungry people, including a great many small farmers. Also important were the 
supporters of Friendly Societies and craft unions' (Cleveland, 1977: p.13). Over 
the following century, New Zealand's main political parties were all backed by 
various organised sections of New Zealand society. It became widely acceptable 
for interest groups, community organisations and businesses to have partisan 
ties. Yet for the most part, the relationships between parties and other 
organisations have been informal and often covert. The National Party, in 
particular, has had only indirect and informal relationships with societal 
organisations. Nonetheless these informal and less tangible relationships can still 
be significant. According to sociologist Frank Parkin, writing of the situation in 
Britain in the 1960s, the majority of the established institutions of society have 
acted in a way to advantage the Conservative Party: 
Examples of such institutions would include the Established Church, the public schools 
and ancient universities, the elites of the military establishment, the press and the mass 
media, the monarchy and the aristocracy, and finally and most importantly, the 
institutional complex of private property and capitalist enterprise which dominates the 
economic sector... All of which could be said to embody values which are in close 
accord with the ideology of Conservatism (Parkin, 1967: p.280). 
Conversely, the British Labour Party has traditionally benefited not just from the 
trade union movement but also from the roles played by 'urban local government, 
the co-operative movement, non-conformist churches, nationalised industries 
and council house estates' (Debnam, 1990: p.19). The New Zealand 
counterparts of these institutions have often had a similar relationship to the 
National and Labour parties. Charles Bennett, when he was President of the 
Labour Party in 1976, complained of the bias towards the National Party inherent 
in many resource-rich and seemingly independent local and statutory bodies. He 
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claimed that such organisations were dominated by National Party members and 
supporters: 
Organisations like Chambers of Commerce, Federated Farmers, some sections of 
importers, harbour boards, and education boards all added effectively to the stream of 
criticism when a Labour government holds office but they seem to be remarkably quiet at 
the present time [when a National government is in office] (quoted in Cleveland, 1977: 
p.137). 
However, the National Party might also allege that the Labour Party has its own 
institutional strongholds - typically found in various university departments, 
secondary schools, within much of the liberal media, and within the health and 
arts sectors.s But whereas Parkin describes a British situation in which the 
parties are heavily anchored in societal organisations, this cannot, as Debnam 
argues, be said to have existed to the same degree in New Zealand: 
By contrast, the situation is very different in New Zealand because it is a society that is 
less extensively institutionalised. Although the two major parties have represented 
distinctive interests, similar in many respects to the interests represented by the British 
Conservative and Labour Parties, those interests do not have the same depth of 
institutional support, and are not marked off from each other by the distinctive icons of 
divergent sub-cultures, as is the case in Britain. In other words, the two sides are closer 
together in New Zealand, and their central positions are not so institutionally entrenched 
(Debnam, 1990: p.20). 
Furthermore, although both National and Labour have in the past relied on their 
own institutional bases, there has been a blurring of this support in the last two 
decades, together with a decline in the strength of some of these institutions. As 
examined later in the chapter, many of the societal organisations on both sides of 
the party divide have been in decline in recent years. Under attack, or in decline 
as social forces, are the universities, the established churches, medical 
professions, state-owned industries, trade unions and local government 
(Debnam, 1990: p.20). This chapter argues that the decline of many of these old 
societal organisations is both a cause and consequence of the erosion of the 
5 According to Trotter, 'Many on the Right would object that the Left never really needed to establish think 
tanks because most of the History, Political Science, Sociology and Economics departments of our 
universities did the job for them' (Trotter, 199ge: p.17). 
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traditional class cleavages, which tended to preserve the basis of the two-party 
political system. 
Institutional-party relations have been mixed-up by the political, social and 
economic turbulence of the last two decades and they continue to be largely in 
flux. Societal organisations that might be expected to be on friendly terms with 
National can be found on good terms with Labour, and vice versa. Therefore, in 
understanding the New Zealand party system, the old patterns of organisational 
support cannot be taken for granted or simply assumed - each relationship must 
be re-evaluated.6 Both conservative/right-wing and liberal/left-wing institutions 
are no longer nearly as one-sided in their support for a party as they once were, 
and where linkages do exist, they are more complex than in the past. 
Modern Organisational Ties 
Parallel to decline of the traditional relationships between parties and interest 
groups, the parties have actually been developing new relationships. It is 
apparent that many of the modern groups that are aligned to, or have 
relationships with, parties are actually elite-type Organisations that do not 
represent significant social forces in society. These groups are established to 
provide a way around state party financing laws, provide intellectual resources, 
or simply supply legitimacy. They are an attempt to illustrate to voters that a 
particular party has links with civil society and therefore has support in the 
community. The first example of this is 'artificial' affiliated organisations. In lieu of 
the organic links between New Zealand political parties and societal 
6 For example, Trotter has commented that while the education sector once acted in favour of left-wing 
parties, this is no longer necessarily the case: 'It is, however, less common to encounter overt left-wing 
sympathies within the academic caste in the late 1990s than was the case, say, in the 1970s. The demise 
of the Soviet Union, the relentless encroachment of post-modernist thought within the academy, and the 
general hostility of university administrators to academic staff who take their "critic and conscience" role too 
seriously have weakened the universities when it comes to generating "progressive new ideas'" (Trotter, 
199ge: p.17). 
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organisations, the parties are now inclined to manufacture organisations by 
creating groups from within the party that have the appearance of being external 
organisations with discernable autonomy. Often quasi-factional organisations that 
already exist within the party are dressed up as external organisations, therefore 
providing legitimacy to the party or its leadership, because the party is seen as 
having some sort of external organisational support. A classic example of an 
internally-created support group, was Labour's creation of the 'Citizens for 
Rowling' group, which included a number of social 'notables' who campaigned in 
support of the Labour Party in the 1975 election campaign. Ostensibly, this group 
was non-partisan and created to look like it existed outside the party, but in 
reality was set up and run by Labour Party members? Such organisations and 
their relationship to politics are examined in Part Two.8 
A more recent type of societal group that political parties have been 
manufacturing is the American-style political action committee (PAC). As detailed 
in Chapter Nine, these committees are normally established in reaction to the 
laws governing both the donation of funds to political parties and election 
campaign expenditure. PAC's are not very common in New Zealand, but they 
appear to be increasing as parties become more adept at dealing with state 
regulations. The most prominent example is the New Zealand Free Enterprise 
Trust, which has collected substantial donations on behalf of the National Party in 
recent years. Think tanks, another modern form of political organisation, normally 
have a particularly close relationship with political parties, and in other Western 
countries, a wide variety of think tanks are active in politics, producing advice, 
books and reports to the media and politicians. Although think tanks have 
increased in number and significance in New Zealand, they still do not have a 
7 See: Webber (1978: p.195), and Roberts (1976). 
8 Similarly, according to Widfeldt, some parties set up internal/external groups that channel members into 
their parties: 'Most parties have "side organizations" to appeal to particular groups - women and young 
people, for example (Katz and Mair 1992b). 
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strong presence and lack depth and diversity.9 As examined later in the chapter, 
contemporary think tanks include the Business Roundtable and Maxim Institute 
on the right, and the Gamma Foundation, Foundation for Policy Initiatives and 
the Bruce Jesson Foundation on the left. 
Of all the modern organisations replacing interest groups' role in linking political 
parties to civil society it is probably public relations (PR) consultancy companies 
that most epitomise the process. The market research arms of PR firms facilitate 
the politicians in sampling the electorate, targeting the market, and using the 
media to reach it (Jesson, 1989d). Hence the need for parties to have an organic 
reach into civil society is reduced. Similarly, PR firms represent business 
interests directly to the parties (both in government and opposition), and provide 
business with political advice. According to Jesson, 'These political consultants 
have become the new mediators in an age of commercialised politics' (Jesson, 
1992c: p.371). 
Such a shift is part of the long-term 'privatisation' of parties and their activities 
that has been occurring over the last four decades. Certainly since the 1960s 
marketing and public relations techniques have been expanding into New 
Zealand politics, along with a general professionalisation of politics. According to 
Jesson, from this time 'Professionals groomed the contenders - Bob Harvey 
groomed Norman Kirk in 1972, Michael Wall managed Muldoon'S election 
advertising in 1975. Public relations, consultancy and polling became 
increasingly important features of the political process, with a merger occurring 
between politics, business and the media' (ibid: pp.370-371). During Robert 
Muldoon's leadership the National Party started using the firm Allen Fenwick 
McCully, which involved Michelle Boag and current MP Murray McCully. The 
Fourth Labour Government also employed a number of consultancy companies 
9 See: Klinkum (1998: p.424). Trotter has also pointed out, 'Left-wing think tanks have a long and illustrious 
history, reaching back to the British Fabian Society, but are almost unheard of in New Zealand' (Trotter, 
199ge: p.1?). 
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to organise political campaigns - most notably Strategos, Edwards-Cunningham 
Consultants, Communicor, and Consultus.lO Then in the 1990s, the Fourth 
National Government used the firm LogoS. 11 
Paradoxically, while the formal and informal relationships between specific 
societal organisations and specific political parties have been declining, the 
overall political influence of interest groups is likely to be greater under MMP than 
under FPTP due to the greater number of parties now involved in the decision-
making process. Mulgan has argued that interest groups are likely to have 
increased influence under MMP, due to the fact that 'issues are more likely to be 
negotiated between parties in Parliament' and therefore there is more room for 
interest groups to influence MPs' decisions (Mulgan, 1997a: p.226). This has 
also been the finding of Grant Klinkum, who has written, that 'In New Zealand 
since the introduction of MMP there is a greater emphasis being placed by 
interest groups on trying to influence individual Members' (Klinkum, 1998a: 
p.421 ).12 He also noted that, 'With greater contestability of advice under an MMP 
electoral system, the New Zealand State Services Commission predicts a 
possible increase in importance of think tanks and private sector organisations' 
(ibid: p.427). 
Politics is therefore evolving into a more pluralist model, where parties do not 
monopolise relationships with societal organisations. Interest groups still have a 
relationship with political parties, but it is a more informal one and more distant, 
as such groups forge links with a greater range of parties in order to maximise 
10 These firms generally involved people close to, or in, the Labour Party. Strategos involved 'Derek Quigley, 
a former National Cabinet Minister; Rob Campbell, a Labour Party executive member and former union 
leader; and Alf Kirk, a former research officer for the FOL' (Jesson, 1992c: p.371). Edwards-Cunningham 
Consultants, Communicor, and Consultus were, respectively, run by the Labour Party-friendly television 
interviewers Brian Edwards, Simon Walker and Ian Fraser. 
11 See: Jesson (1992: p.371), Johns (25 Nov 1991), and Stephen Harris (1993d: p.14). 
12 Klinkum also believes that 'Small parties or new opposition spokespeople may initially rely on interest 
groups and lobbyists for information' (Klinkum, 1998: p.422). 
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their influence. Essentially interest groups lobby all the political parties and 
provide information resources to them: 
Apart from maintaining links with ministers and public servants, interest groups will also 
try to keep in close contact with the political parties, both inside and outside Parliament. 
Backbenchers can play a critical role in caucus and on select committees and are 
inundated with a constant stream of propaganda material from interest groups .... 
Parties outside government, having only their small parliamentary research units to help 
with developing new policies ... welcome additional input from interest groups, many of 
which have their own professional research teams (Mulgan, 1997a: p.225).1 
This decline in the partisanship of interest groups has important consequences 
for the ideological nature of political parties. This is because the act of sharing 
similar relationships with interests groups contributes to the ideological 
conformity between the parties. By having friendly relationships with all those 
interest groups occupying the strategic middle ground the parties inevitably end 
up being influenced to adopt similar policy positions. The flip side of this is that 
the way modern New Zealand political parties operate leaves them with no 
particular need for a formal engagement with interest groups. As shown in 
Chapter Four, the chase for the middle ground, and the wider electorate, means 
that the parties no longer require formal vertical ties with a particular section of 
society or its organisations. New Zealand's modern electoral-professional parties 
require a quite different form of interaction with society than the mass parties of 
traditional New Zealand politics. 
Societal organisations are now more likely to take a less partisan approach, but 
instead align themselves with particular political models, therefore supporting 
whichever party also supports those ideas. For example, the Trade Liberalisation 
Network (TLN), set up in 2001, is said to enjoy 'strong support from both major 
parties' (Kelsey, 2002: p.42).14 A cause and consequence of the fact that the TLN 
13 In line with this less formal dimension, the former relationship between interests groups and political 
parties has been replaced by an informal relationship between individual MPs and outside groups. 
14 In 2002 the Business New Zealand group criticised all of the parties for their economic policies, although 
they said National and Act's came closest to what was needed to achieve acceptable economic growth 
(Edlin, 2002). 
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is not aligned to any particular party is that neither main party questions the neo-
liberal policy consensus on seeking further free trade arrangements. Similarly, 
sections of the media have traditionally opposed the Labour Party, but this 
pattern broke down in the 1980s when those same media organisations became 
more favourable to Labour due to its economic reforms. According to Mulgan, 
these media organisations have since 'returned to a less obviously partisan 
approach, though they remain generally sympathetic to the restructuring policies 
of first Labour and then National and critical of the economic policies of the 
Alliance and New Zealand First parties' (Mulgan, 1997a: pp.300-301 ).15 
Many interest groups prefer not to associate themselves with a particular political 
party, but seek relations with government departments. Augmenting political 
parties, therefore, are the institutions of the state. Tim Tenbensel has pointed out 
that such relationships are potentially more beneficial for the interest groups 
because of the durability of a relationship with the more permanent institutions of 
the state: 
An example of such a relationship with a government agency is that of alcohol industry 
groups and the Ministry of Commerce. Anti-alcohol campaigners, on the other hand, will 
focus their attention on building alliances with the Ministry of Health (Tenbensel, 2001: 
pp.323-324). 
Likewise, the anti-smoking group Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) is 
allegedly 'funded by taxpayers to lobby government to introduce anti-smoking 
laws' (Coddington, 2001: p.63). Similarly, the pro-logging citizens of the South 
Island West Coast allegedly used the resources and expertise of state-owned 
enterprise Timberlands West Coast to establish the pressure group Coast Action 
Network (Hager, 1999). Among other partisan activities, the Network paid for full-
page advertisements in the Coromandel electorate attacking the Green, Labour 
15 Similarly, according to Jim Anderton, 'The Dominion has an editorial policy to slaughter the Alliance on 
every possible occasion. The Herald says there's no balance of payments problem unless we get an 
Alliance government' (quoted in McLoughlin, 1996). The then editor of the Dominion, Richard Long, has 
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and Alliance parties. In this way the interest groups are building up relationships 
with organs of the state in lieu of political parties. Similarly, political parties are 
increasingly substituting their relationships with interest groups with state 
institutions. For example, in recent years there has been the appearance of close 
party-state relationships between: Act and the Crown Commercial Monitoring 
Advisory Unit (CCMAU),16 National and the Treasury and Reserve Bank,17 
Labour and New Zealand Post, the Green Party and the Environment Ministry 
and Department of Conservation (DOC),18 and Jim Anderton's Progressive 
Coalition Party and Kiwibank and the Ministry of Economic Development.19 It is 
obvious that when in government, political parties have the ability to establish, 
mould or develop state institutions in a way that creates institutional support for 
the party.20 This is an area that warrants further research. 
responded saying that Anderton's 'too glib for TV, so it falls to newspapers to ask the hard questions about 
his balmy policies (quoted in McLoughlin, ibid). 
16 In 2001 the media speculated about links between CCMAU and Act after a number of CCMAU documents 
critical of government policies were released by the party. The leaks resulted in the Deputy Prime Minister 
saying he could no longer trust CCMAU staff, and the Prime Minister calling CCMAU a 'chronic leaker' and 
saying ministers would curtail their dealings with the agency (quoted in Armstrong et aI., 2001). 
17 As an example of the Reserve Bank's close connection with the National Party, Don Brash, the bank's 
governor since 1988, resigned in 2002 and stood successfully as candidate for National. 
18 It would be surprising if there was not a higher than average support for the Green Party in DOC. 
According to Jesson, the department 'is staffed by people with a history of support for conservation causes' 
(Jesson, 1972: p.373). In 2001 the Greens negotiated the Eco-2001 package with the Labour-Alliance 
Government in return for the party's support of the government. The package increased funding for DOC 
and the Ministry of the Environment. 
19 Jim Anderton has remodelled the Ministry of Commerce into the Ministry of Economic Development, and 
this agency has become an important source of pOlitical and bureaucratic support for Anderton and his 
party. Two seconded staff from the ministry are employed in Anderton's ministerial office. 
20 One of the ways that parties in government do this is through political patronage. There are many 
examples of parties appointing sympathetic people (and even party members) to state institutions, thus 
making those institutions more in tune with that party. See: Chapter Eight, Jackson (1973: p.193), James 
(1987a: p.33). and Colin Espiner (2003b; 2003d). 
326 Chapter Five: Party Linkage to Societal Organisations 
Part Two: The New Zealand Parties and their Alignments 
This section sUNeys the individual parties and their relationships with societal 
organisations in the past and present. It attempts to reveal all relationships 
between political parties and societal organisations. Some of these are 
significant, but most are tenuous - especially for the newer parties. 
Labour Party 
The Labour Party has always had numerous formal and informal alignments with 
societal organisations, although the strength of all of these relationships has 
fluctuated over the years. Most obviously, Labour has had a very close 
relationship with the trade union movement, which has provided one of the 
party's strongest connections with civil society. In fact the party started life in 
1916 as the political wing of the union movement, with an affiliate membership. It 
was only later that Labour allowed people to join the party through branches.21 
After the party came to government and introduced compulsory unionism in the 
1930s, Labour had 185,000 union members - a membership level that they 
managed to retain until the 1990s (Gustafson, 1992b: p.274). 
Until the 1970s the unions played a key role in party affairs. The affiliation 
relationship was important, as it gave the party a direct link 'to trade union 
leaders, their problems, worries, anxieties, and their money' (Ovenden, 1986: 
p.30). The affiliated unions were able to exercise considerable power at party 
conferences, due to their strong voting power based on their large paper 
memberships. For example, at the 1967 conference, 'affiliated u"nions exercised 
56% of the vote - their 376 votes compared with 201 votes for branches, 43 for 
LRCs and 7 for the Maori Policy Committees' (Strachan, 1982: p.17).22 
21 See Chapter Six. 
22 Likewise, in 1972 '48 unionists had 393 card votes; the other delegates had 368' (Jesson, 1974: p.1). 
However, rather than using such power for radical ends - as is commonly presumed - normally the union 
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One of the more formal mechanisms for the relationship between Labour and the 
unions used to be through the (now-defunct) Joint Council of Labour - a 
communications forum involving the party and union leaders that met after each 
party conference to make recommendations to the parliamentary Labour Party.23 
Informal channels were also solid and significant. Leslie Upson, writing in the 
1940s described the inter-relatedness of Labour and the trade union movement: 
there is a strong tie-up between the personnel of the trade union leadership and the 
parliamentarians. leading positions within the party, including the chairmanship, are held 
by prominent trade-unionists. Many of the labor ministers have been active in their past 
careers as union secretaries. The executives of the party and the unions hold joint 
meetings from time to time, and, since the labor government has been in power, these 
meetings have been reinforced by the presence of the cabinet. The annual conference of 
the Federation of labor [FOll is held a few weeks before that of the labor party, and 
some of the delegates are the same on both occasions. In practice there has been a 
much closer working relationship between the labor cabinet and the executive of the 
Federation than between the cabinet and the party organization outside Parliament 
(Lipson, 1948: p.248). 
The relationship in the 1950s between Labour and the union leadership was also 
described by Gwendolen Carter as being very close: 'The closest relationship is 
maintained between the [Labour] prime minister, [and] the national executive of 
the Federation of Labor' (Carter, 1956: p.95). Robert Milne wrote in the 1960s 
that 'The links of the unions with the Labour Party are numerous and hard to 
disentangle' (Milne, 1966: p.1 05). Cleveland argued in the 1970s that the 'Labour 
Party is powerfully influenced by its connection with the trade union movement' 
votes were used to support the party leadership against party radicals (James, 1987a: pp.31-32). The 
affiliation of trade unions to the Labour Party was never really a genuine link with working people, but 
primarily united top union officials and party leaders. Thus, although .the party.once claimed to have about 
200,000 affiliated members, this was not a 'real membership'. For example, in 1979 Levine wrote that 'While 
the unions are affiliated with the Labour Party, it is clear that few union members are enrolled, subscribed, 
participating members of the Labour Party' (Levine, 1979: p.72). Likewise, Gustafson has written that 'only a 
very small minority of unionists have actively involved themselves in the party's affairs, usually through their 
concurrent membership of a local branch of the party' (Gustafson, 1989: p.209). Even in the 1950s Carter 
wrote that although the relationship between Labour prime ministers and the national executive of the 
Federation of Labour was normally very close, it obviously involved very few people (Carter, 1956: p.95). 
23 See Cleveland (1977: p.115). 
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and that 'party leaders are continually at pains to show that they are on good 
terms with FOL leadership, particularly at election time' (Cleveland, 1977: p.115; 
p.134}.24 Such could not be said today. For some time, Labour Party leaders 
have been determined to give the impression that they are not under the sway of 
the trade unions. 
The power of unions within the party was enhanced by the number of valuable 
resources they could provide for the party. Union leaders could ensure the 
election campaign occurred without embarrassing strikes, election meetings 
could be organised in the workplaces, and unionists could be supplied for 
canvassing in marginal electorates.25 Perhaps most importantly, at a time when 
the Labour Party derived little in the way of donations from business interests, 
the union's financing was the lifeblood of the party. In the 1940s, for example, 
union contributions were 'the largest, the most regular, and the most dependable 
item in the party revenues' (Lipson, 1948: p.248). As a result of their financial 
contributions 'as well as through their numerical majority' Lipson observed, 'the 
unions inevitably preponderate in all decisions on Labor strategy and policies' 
(ibid). This influence did not last, however, and by the 1980s the party derived 
only a tiny proportion of its election campaign fund from the unions. By the 1990s 
donations from wealthy individuals and businesses heavily outweighed any union 
contributions.26 
The peak of union affiliation occurred about 1979, when there were 'fourteen 
national trade unions and sixty-nine provincial (district) trade unions' affiliated 
24 Cleveland said that there existed 'a degree of common purpose linking the two organisations which is both 
a source of strength, and at times, of embarrassment to them, particularly during bouts of industrial conflict' 
(Cleveland, 1977: p.115). Furthermore, the interaction between Labour and the union movement used to be 
such that, according to Vowles, 'The FOL used to regularly express public support for Labour and urge trade 
unionists to vote accordingly. The strength and substance of that support increased markedly in the period 
prior to the 1984 election, but has declined since' (Vowles, 1992a: p.352). 
25 Gustafson (1989: p.215) 
26 See Chapter Seven. 
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with the Labour Party, providing the party with 200,000 affiliated members 
(Levine, 1979: p.72}.27 By the early-1990s the numbers of affiliated unions and 
unionists had declined substantially, and in 1994 only 51,000 unionists and 
seven unions remained affiliated (Munro, 1994b: p.2). Since then the number of 
affiliated unions has dropped to only five and no current figures are available on 
the affiliated numbers of workers, although they have almost certainly declined 
even further.28 
It is obvious that neither the union movement nor party leadership actually 
attempted to incorporate the affiliate membership into any real involvement in the 
party. In fact it can be argued that the union members - as distinct from the union 
leadership - have played almost no effective role in the party since the 1960s -
despite the fact that they continued for some time after this to materially sustain 
the party. There was certainly never any deep political participation in the Labour 
Party by rank-and-file union members.29 The formal relationship between the 
party and the union movement has been in decline for a long time. Douglas 
Webber argues that the Labour Party ceased to have any real organic link with 
the trade union movement in the 1970s: 
27 See also: Vowles (2002b: p.419), who provides further details: 'In 198245 unions were affiliated to the 
party. They represented between them approximately 30 per cent of union members, 37 per cent of private 
sector unionists and 12 per cent of public sector unionists'. 
28 The only affiliated unions of any real strength are the Engineers and the SeNice Workers Unions. 
Furthermore there is no central trade union body that is affiliated to the Labour Party. The Council of Trade 
Unions, which represents 83 percent of union members and 36 percent of wage and salary earners, has no 
party affiliations (Vowles, 1992a: p.346). 
29 In the 1970s Webber reported that even 'In the Auckland Boilermakers' Union, the most policy-orientated 
of all the party's affiliated unions, only about twelve of 600 members in Auckland City were active in the 
Labour Party in 1975. In other unions, therefore, the ratio of active to affiliated members is probably lower' 
(Webber, 1978: p.195). Part of the explanation for the question of why the union movement has had such 
little influence on its party lies in the essentially weak and flabby state of the union movement due to the 
existence of compulsory unionism in New Zealand since 1936. As Brown maintains: 'affiliated union 
membership may have swelled the party's membership lists and coffers, but it was essentially a dues-paying 
cardboard empire rather than a real measure of active strength' (Brown, 1962: p.216). 
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By 1975, Labour had ceased to be either a mass party or a party of the working class, 
organised or otherwise. Having relinquished or been dispossessed of the power that 
they had once exercised in the party, trade unions ceased (as of 1975) to be active 
participants in Labour's internal politics (Webber, 1978: p.191 ).30 
Certainly over the last three decades there has been a conscious movement by 
Labour Party leaders to limit the influence and role played by the union 
movement within the party. This started in full during the party's 1967 annual 
conference when Jim Anderton, Roger Douglas and Michael Bassett attempted 
to introduce the 'red book' reforms, which would have reduced the voting power 
of unions. They failed, but subsequent conferences between 1975 and 1984 
adopted many of the proposed reforms. In particular, this reform momentum 
continued throughout the 1970s, with the abolition of the multiple electorate 
Labour Regional Committees (LRCs) which amounted to a considerable blow to 
the affiliated unions because the LRCs had for sixty years been a significant 
mechanism for trade union influence. According to David Strachan, their abolition 
'was seen as further separation of the Party from its trade union base and its 
working class traditions' (Strachan, 1982: p.27). In the early 1980s the trade 
union affiliates agreed to a constitutional change that meant their voting power 
would be reduced further (Sheppard, 1999: p.138). Labour leader Bill Rowling 
was particularly keen to weaken the union-party links, and at the 1982 party 
conference he 'encouraged delegates to improve their chances of winning 
elections by breaking away from the unions' (Maharey, 1987: p.73). Again in the 
mid-to-Iate 1980s, the power of the affiliated unions was a contentious issue -
especially for the newly formed internal-party Backbone Club (dealt with later), 
which feared the unions would endanger the economic reforms being carried out 
by the government. The Backbone Club therefore sought to 'democratise' the 
party, by stripping the affiliated unions of their conference bloc vote. 
That the Labour Party became less dependent on and influenced by the trade 
union movement meant that it could more easily implement its neo-liberal 
30 As an example, the Joint Council of Labour 'met on twenty-two occasions between 1952 and 1957 - but 
only twice between 1970 and 1975' (Webber, 1978: p.189). 
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reforms, with less regard for the interests of un ionised workers.31 The history of 
the Fourth Labour Government in office was instructive as to the orientation of 
the party towards its union supporters. For it could not be said that Labour in 
government was sympathetic or willing to act in favour of the interests of labour. 
If anything, Labour Party ministers went out of their way to prove that they were 
not union-friendly.32 Although the Labour Government was reluctant to confront 
labour in a real war, this did not stop it undertaking serious measures to reform 
the labour market. As Colin James points out, the Government did not 'deliver a 
managed wage round when the union movement was on the defensive in 1986 
and it did introduce an element of flexibility and contestability into the labour 
market and in union coverage in its rewrite of the wage-fixing and industrial 
relations legislation passed in 1987' (James, 1987a: p.21). John Edmundson has 
outlined some of the Fourth Labour Government's other anti-union initiatives: 
The Labour Relations Act abolished all unions with membership below one thousand. 
The Act also instituted the principle of competition for membership between unions. 
Labour also brought in new restrictions on the right to strike and gave employers the right 
to sue unions and workers involved in 'illegal' strikes. Government took for itself the 
express right to force strikers in 'essential' industries back to work (Edmundson, 1999: 
p.11). 
All of these actions amounted to a partial deregulation of the market and 
undoubtedly reduced the strength of unions and the ability of unionised labour to 
improve their remuneration - particularly due to the removal of state-enforced 
arbitration.33 Edmundson concludes that 'Labour's policies attempted to avoid the 
outright antagonism of the labour movement while at the same time moving 
clearly and inexorably towards a "free" labour market' (Edmundson, 1999: p.11). 
31 See: McRobie (1992: p.402). 
32 As Labour Party president, Margaret Wilson stated: 'the minister of labour, Stan Rodger; the minister of 
finance, Roger Douglas; and the associate minister of finance; Richard Prebble, who had special 
responsibility for industrial relations, were determined from the outset not to be seen to have been 
"captured" by the trade union movement' (Wilson, 1989: p.95). 
33 See: a (1993: pp.21-22), who points out that 'Partial deregulation of the labour market, particularly the 
removal of state-enforced arbitration in 1987, reduced the influence of unions over wage and salary levels' 
(James, 1993: pp.21-22). 
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Clearly the Labour Party when in government during the 1980s was not a 
particularly union-friendly regime - although its rudimentary relationship with the 
labour movement did force it to make some concessions. Towards the end of the 
Fourth Labour Government, for example, the union movement was able to claim 
some influence upon the Government when the Council of Trade Unions (CTU) 
negotiated a 'growth agreement' with the Mike Moore administration. It is 
significant that this did not occur earlier - as in Australia - which was, according 
to the then party president, Margaret Wilson, largely due to the 'lack of personal 
rapport between the leadership of the Federation of Labour and the 
parliamentary Labour Party' (Wilson, 1989: p.99).34 
As a reaction to their loss of influence, in the late 1980s the affiliated unions 
attempted to assert their power in the selection of election candidates. Having 
failed at the policy level, the unions were seeking to exploit other avenues of 
influence: 
The Labour Party's constitution does allow unions to dominate the selection/election 
process if they choose to 'abuse' their position. In the past a 'gentleman's agreement' 
has dampened down the wilder excesses, but some unions have taken the view that 
because the Government has 'reneged' on traditional Labour Party principles they 
should use every tool at their disposal to fight back (Simon Walker quoted in Sheppard, 
1999: p.25). 
This assault was particularly effective in the 1987 and 1990 elections in securing 
the candidacy and election of some union-friendly MPs. However by the early 
1990s the trade union movement was playing a minimal role in the Labour Party 
and this started to be reflected in 'a series of embarrassing setbacks for 
candidates of the Left' (Sheppard, Jan 1998a: p.215). This decline was also 
related to changes to the party constitution in 1991 that diluted the unions' power 
concerning candidate selection. In other areas, the strength of affiliated unions 
34 Wilson also says the compact failed because it 'was not consistent with the government's economic policy 
of non-intervention' (Wilson, 1989: p.99). For other explanations on the failure of 'the compact' in New 
Zealand, see: Harvey (1992). 
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had also visibly declined. For example, in 1991, the 'unions made up only 68 of 
the 402 delegates at the [party] conference, and held 272 of the 628 
votes' (Collins, 1991). At the 1993 election year congress, the unions held only 
105 of 387 card votes, while in 'comparison, party branches, electorate 
committees and MPs held 250 between them' (Munro, 1993a: p.2). By 2000 the 
five affiliated unions controlled only 56 votes out of 536 (Small, 2000a). 
The union movement's declining influence in the Labour Party is also reflective of 
the declining size and political significance of unions in general. As pointed out in 
Chapter Four, the rate of unionisation has halved between 1985 and 2002. 
Despite the rhetoric about the close connection between workers' organisations 
and the Labour Party, the simple reality is that Labour's structured ties with 
working people have been largely severed.35 Although there are still some formal 
and official links between the Labour Party and the union movement these are 
essentially elite links rather than anything more organic. Although some informal 
links of personnel also exist, these are often exaggerated in the media and by 
Labour's opponents. Organisationally, the link between the two no longer exists 
in any substantive form. Although the affiliated trade unions have continued to 
have representation on the New Zealand Council of the Labour Party, it would 
now be odd or mischievous to suggest that union leaders have any great 
influence within the formal or informal structures of the party. Power within the 
party has significantly shifted, and it now rests almost solely with Labour's 
parliamentary leaders. One example of the CTU's lack of influence within Labour 
was immediately after the 2002 general election when the president of the CTU, 
Ross Wilson,36 called for a continued Labour accommodation with the Green 
35 In this, the case of the New Zealand Labour Party is little different from that of other social democratic 
parties around the world where there has been a trend to distance themselves from organised labour. 
36 The fact that trade union political strength has noticeably declined, is illustrated by the fact that while few 
New Zealanders would be able to name the president of the CTU's as Ross Wilson, the president of the 
defunct FOL used to be a household name. Jackson has pointed out that during the period that Labour was 
in opposition during the early 1970s, 'at times the role of the leader of the federation was virtually that of an 
alternative leader of the opposition' (Jackson, 1973: p.93). 
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Party instead of United Future. Helen Clark rebuffed him and then accepted the 
formal support to govern from the more conservative United Future. 
The gap left by unions has partly been filled by other interest groups. Even as 
early as 1978, Webber noted that 'In the trade unions' absence, other social 
groups have converged upon the Labour Party and turned it into their political 
vehicle' (Webber, 1978: p.189). If by the 1970s the Labour Party organisation 
had withered to that of an empty shell, in the immediate post-1975 period Labour 
reconnected itself with many organised social forces. Of particular note, the party 
organisation became strongly connected with the new social movements growing 
around anti-racism, gender issues, the environment and peace. These 
movements translated into recruits for Labour, helping the party become 
dominated by a middle class membership.37 By 1984 this connection with the 
new social movements was yielding valuable resources for Labour's election 
campaign. For example, the party's 1984 general election campaign was greatly 
bolstered by enthusiastic campaign workers from the peace movement, and 
many of the party's new MPs, such as Helen Clark, had been recruited from that 
movement and other social liberal causes (Jesson, 1989a: p.49).38 
Related to Labour's general eroding links, Steve Maharey pointed out in 1987 
that there was an absence of civil society figures and institutions that might 
otherwise bolster the party's operation in parliamentary politics: 
On the other side of the political fence there is very little. No national paper taking a Left 
line. There are few national spokespersons, like Margaret Wilson, to continue to link the 
37 See: aon (1989: pA8), and Gustafson (1989: p.21 0). 
38 Jesson provides an example of how many of these groups crossed over and were also part of the trade 
union movement: 'The organisation Feminist Teachers became particularly powerful in education, where 
there is a considerable overlap between the unions, the bureaucracy (with many officials having a teachers' 
association background) and the Labour Party (which had large numbers of teachers among its members). 
Maryann Street illustrates the point, having been a member of Feminist Teachers, an official of the Post 
Primary Teachers' Association, a vice-president of the Labour Party, and a friend of the 1984-87 Minister of 
Education, Russell Marshall' (Jesson, 1992c: p.370). 
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Left with welfarism and intervention as if these goals are the end of point of radical 
aspiration. No theoretical journal with mass circulation. No distinct grouping of 
intellectuals who can agree on what being Left means now that Keynesianism (which was 
never Left anyway) has gone. No organisation which can put itself forward as the basis 
for a Left coalition (Maharey, 1987: p.81). 
One might have expected the Fourth Labour Government to have established or 
formed links with a number of supportive institutions through their massive 
reorganisation of the state sector, but this never occurred. It was reflective of 
Labour's lack of institutional relationships, for example, that when appointing 
personnel to the new institutions (various boards, committees, and state-owned 
enterprises), the Labour Government 'had to reach out into National party 
territory' for its appointments (James, 1987a: p.33). Whilst in government the 
party also failed to establish new institutions - like think tanks - that would be 
supportive of the new regime. Instead, they relied on PR firms to try to link the 
party with the public and on business interests for support. Most significantly, the 
Business Roundtable became highly influential on the Labour Government. As 
the Fourth Labour Government implemented the policies favoured by business, 
Labour became the preferred party of the wealthy. In government it worked 
closely with, and was highly influenced by, key businessmen Roger Kerr, Alan 
Gibbs, Ron Trotter, Rod Deane, and John Fernyhough.39 After Labour returned 
to power in 1999, business organisations again became supportive. Vice-
chairman of the Business Roundtable and former 'Entrepreneur of the Year', Bill 
Day, also became a champion of the Labour Party (Talbot, 3 Jul 2002). Even 
chambers of commerce became more supportive. For instance, following the 
2002 election, the Wellington Chamber of Commerce was welcoming of Labour's 
re-election. Business organisations generally credit the Labour Party as being 
economically orthodox and credible. However, since returning to power in 1999 
the Labour Party has had little to do with the Business Roundtable, regarding it 
as increasingly irrelevant and lacking credibility.40 Instead the Clark-Labour 
39 See: Jesson (1992a). 
40 Labour's post-1999 orientation to the Business Roundtable reflected the decline in credibility of that 
organisation. See: Rotherham (2000). By contrast, while in opposition, Labour's finance spokesperson, 
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Government has dealt with organisations that are more in line with Third Way 
ideology, such as the Business Council for Sustainable Development and 
Businesses for Social Responsibility. Nevertheless these organisations are 
probably just as likely to work with any other party in government. 
Some commentators have suggested that in terms of organised social forces 
backing the Labour Party, Maori and Pacific Island groups remain important. Yet 
the fabled Ratana Church link has ceased being anything more than a myth for 
some time.41 In fact by the 1990s, Labour's Maori MPs themselves had only 
tenuous political links with Maori through their organisations - apart from with the 
leaders of those groups. However, some of these Labour-Maori links have been 
partially renewed - especially the tribal relationships, and many of the Maori MPs 
owe their success to the backing of various iwi.42 
The general weakness of all these traditional links has encouraged the creation 
of relationships with more modern and party-manufactered organisations. The 
best example within the Labour Party of a manufactured type aligned group was 
the Mike Moore Supporters Club (MMSC), which Moore established as a 
powerbase for his unstable leadership position between 1990 and 1993. 
Following the party's 1990 defeat Moore had few parliamentary allies, and the 
Labour Party extra-parliamentary organisation was largely aligned against him. In 
November 1992 Moore and his allies subsequently took over a limited liability 
shelf company, named Teamcorp Securities, renaming it MMSC Ltd in January 
1993 (Stephen Harris, 1993f: p.2). The leading figures and directors of the 
MMSC - Clayton Cosgrove, Barry Ebert and Murray Wansbrough - were all 
employees in Moore's own parliamentary office. It'is not known how many actual 
members the MMSC had, but it was not believed to be of any SUbstantial size. 
Michael Cullen, accepted a trip from the Business Roundtable to an economic seminar in Colorado (Trotter 
2000a: p,1?), 
41 For arguments that the Ratana church had no real influence over the party or even its Maori MPs. 
42 For example, MP Nanaia Mahuta won the Te Tai Hauauru electorate with the family/corporate backing of 
Tainui amongst others (Taonui, 1999: p.A1?). 
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The organisation had every appearance of being a cadre type group that 
involved only a cabal of Moore loyalists, rather than a community based semi-
mass organisation. The organisation was involved in elite-type activities rather 
than working at a electorate level. For example in 1992, the MMSC held a 
conference on developing a vision for social progress, on behalf of the Labour 
Party, which was attended by a range of leading intellectuals. The MMSC then 
published a book and a video of the proceedings. Other material published 
included Moore's own best-seller, Fighting for New Zealand, and the Labour 
Party's 1993 election manifesto (Moore, 24 Sep 1994).43 The party also acted as 
a conduit for raising party funds that could be controlled by Moore. 
The creation and operation of the Mike Moore Supporters' Club exacerbated the 
fractious situation in the party, especially after Moore attempted to affiliate the 
club to the party organisation. Had this move been successful, it would have 
given the MMSC a similar status to the affiliated trade unions, whereby according 
to Vernon Small, 'every branch in the country could have MMSC members. The 
voting power could have been immense, and would have been crucial to the 
selection process under MMP' (Small, 1993b).44 Similarly, the right-wing 
Backbone Club emerged within the Labour Party during the late 1980s to foster 
the economic reforms that the Government was carrying out, but was more of an 
organisational and politicking body than an intellectual one.45 Some in the party 
worried that the Backbone Club was becoming 'a party within a party' - an idea 
borne out by the fact that eventually many of its members went on to form the Act 
43 According to Small, the MMSC 'controlled most of the funding, and hence the content, of election material' 
(Small, 1993b). In election year the club also attempted to organise and control important party canvassing 
data. The MMSC signed a contract with the Labour Party organisation to process the canvassing results 
from electorates. To create a database of the canvassing information, the MMSC utilised the computer 
company Cardinal Network, which was owned by a friend of Moore's (Harris, 1993f: p.2). The MMSC 
subsequently sublet campaigning information back to the individual Labour Party electorate organisations. 
44 The Labour Party Council 'fearing the creation of a "party within a party" along the lines of the Militant 
Tendency in the UK or the indigenous Backbone Club, vetoed his proposal' (Sheppard, Jan 1998a: p.216). 
45 See: Sheppard (1999: pp.113-116; p.211), Jesson (1989a), McLoughlin (1990b), and Hine (1995). 
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party.46 Likewise, Jim Anderton's Economic Policy Network within Labour served 
as an organising vehicle for many of those who eventually set up the rival 
NewLabour Party.47 
Since the 1980s there have also been a number of think tanks associated with 
Labour. The Gamma Foundation was established in the early 1990s to help 
foster a reformulation of social democracy. This involved a number of academics 
led by Pat Walsh, a lecturer in industrial relations, as well as trade union leaders 
such as the CTU's then economist Peter Harris. The Foundation released 
discussion papers on the economy and organised two conferences on 'reshaping 
social democracy' (James, 1993k: p.78).48In 1999 the Gamma Foundation joined 
together with unions to sponsor a book entitled The New Politics: A Third Way for 
New Zealand. In 1999 the Foundation for Policy Initiatives (FPI) was set up as a 
think tank in alignment with the Labour Party. According to its leaders, the FPI 
was dedicated to generating 'progressive new ideas that will invigorate public 
policy debate and political thinking' (quoted in Trotter, 199ge: p.17). Like the 
Gamma Foundation, the FPI sought to 'modernise' social democracy - in 
particular focusing on the Third Way concepts of 'industry development' and the 
'active, enabling state' .49 
In the 1990s the Labour Party developed various new formal and informal links 
with other organisations. These included the anti-smoking lobby group ASH, and 
the now-defunct Coalition for Public Health. Another sector group that has been 
46 See: Munro (1988b: p.2; 28 Feb 1990). Later the Labour Party president announced that 'the club was a 
"proscribed", or banned, organisation following a decision by the p'arty's ruling council' (Munro, 1990). The 
Backbone Club later spawned another ginger group, Vision 20/20, which ultimately evolved into Act. 
47 See: Jesson (1989a), and Sheppard (1997a; 1999). 
48 See also: James (1992a: p.269). 
49 At the same time that the FPI was started, the Bruce Jesson Foundation was also launched, with the 
involvement of Noam Chomsky as patron, and David Lange as chairperson, as well as Jane Kelsey and a 
number of other left-wing academics and political activists. Formed in remembrance of political journalist and 
left-wing activist Bruce Jesson, the Jesson Foundation is not closely aligned to anyone party, but was seen 
to attempt to bring the Labour Party and the Alliance closer together. 
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closely linked to Labour in the past is the New Zealand University Students 
Association (NZUSA), and it has been common for leaders of NZUSA to 
eventually go onto political careers with the party. Nowadays Labour is said to 
work closely with a number of other more right-wing interest groups, such as the 
Trade Liberalisation Network (Kelsey, 2002: p.42). 
National Party 
Ostensibly a party of the individual, National has few formal relationships with 
outside organisations. As Anthony Wood has written, 'National is a party of 
individualists in which groups and associations - however friendly their members 
may be to the party - have no voice and no role' (Wood, 1989: pp.228-229). 
Although National has traditionally had many institutional contacts and 
relationships, compared to Labour these relationships have tended to be less 
formalised. Nevertheless, traditionally there have been many powerful institutions 
in New Zealand society that have expressed values in line with those of National. 
Just as the Labour Party leadership used to consult with their counterparts in the 
union movement, in the 1940s Lipson wrote, 'so do National party leaders with 
representatives of the banks, the Farmers' Union, the Manufacturers' Federation, 
and chambers of commerce' (Lipson, 1948: p.250). Similarly, the established 
churches, the media, the military, the judiciary and other elites have all helped 
ensure that National was the dominant political party in the second half of 
twentieth century New Zealand. But now, as all these ties and associations 
wither, the situation is less clear-cut and stable. 
Of all the New Zealand parties, the National Party has traditionally-had the most 
well-connected, organic linkages to society. Their large mass membership was 
the main reason for this. James argues that in the 1950s and 1960s National 
'had a large membership, many of whom were also members of the vast 
interlocking web of organisations that represent, organise and regulate New 
Zealanders at work and play' (James, 1993b: p.93). This integration into the 
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array of organisations had an extremely beneficial effect on party-voter 
communications: 
The result was an effective circle of political information, both shaping the party and its 
policies within the relaxed boundaries of liberal-conservatism and carrying that liberal-
conservative message back out through the networks to a vast proportion of New 
Zealanders in such a way as to suggest that was the 'normal' way to conduct the 
government (ibid). 
Those personal networks have, however, largely been severed. This process 
began during the 1970s and early 1980s, when Muldoon often bypassed the 
party organisation and appealed directly to ordinary voters. Then in the early 
1990s party membership fell dramatically, which also severely curtailed 
National's reach into civil and elite society.5o This reach has also been eroded by 
the neo-liberal economic programme, which through the restructuring and down-
sizing of the state, has removed one of the party's natural advantages, the 
apparatus of the state: 'The withdrawal of the Government from much of the 
detailed administration has also weakened the potential for direct connection with 
and transmission of the National Party's message through the administrative 
boards and committees' of the state (ibid: pp.93-94). Replacing National's deep 
connections with society is an organisational professionalism. As James has 
written, with its networks eroded, the National Party now relies on market 
research: 'The search for the middle ground on which to base administration and 
regulatory decisions is now electronic rather than human', utilising public opinion 
surveys and focus groups (ibid: p.93). 
The decline of National's linkages to society is also clear in the case of farmers. 
Farmers have traditionally been to National what trade unionists were to Labour. 
The official links have been fewer, but a real organic link has nonetheless 
50 The radicalism of the Fourth National Government in the 1990s also served to disconnect the party from 
many of its traditional supporters. Its implementation of radical neo-liberal policies lost it members and 
alienated it from its more conservative allied networks and organisations. The party's strength had 
previously been its all-encompassing conservatism, and by moving so distinctly to the right National lost its 
ability to unite various constituencies. 
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existed. Farmer organisations have traditionally had a very strong relationship 
with New Zealand's conservative parties. The Farmers' Union began life in 1902 
and despite the organisation's motto of 'Principles Not Party', it 'became little 
more than an unofficial extra-parliamentary wing of the Reform Party' after that 
party emerged in 1909 (Bremer, 1993: p.11 0).51 Then when Federated Farmers 
was formed in 1944, it developed a very close, but unofficial, connection to the 
National Party. Norman Kirk famously described the organisation as 'the National 
Party in gumboots', and Austin Mitchell pointed out that Federated Farmers and 
National Party branch meetings often appeared to be 'the same people sitting in 
different rooms at different times' (Mitchell, 1969a: p.41). With the high cross-
over between the memberships of the two organisations, it has been common for 
leaders of the Federation to eventually go onto political careers with the National 
Party (Vowles, 1992a: p.352). 
In government, National certainly advanced the interests of Federated Farmers. 
Largely through the party's sponsorship and the corporatist-type governmental 
processes, Federated Farmers became enmeshed in the state. By 1973 the 
organisation was represented on 67 various statutory and organisational bodies 
(Jackson, 1973: p.96). And just as the Labour Party introduced compulsory 
unionism to the advantage of their allies in the trade union leadership, similarly in 
1972 the National Government introduced a compulsory levy from slaughtered 
livestock to finance Federated Farmers' head office (Vowles, 1992a: p.358).52 
51 New Zealand farmers, according to Graham, 'have never been a. neglected group, nor have they ever 
been forced, as farmers were in Australia, to form a sectional party to express their grievances. In the period 
from 1890 to 1912 the Liberal Party took good account of small farmers demands; in later decades, first the 
Reform Party and then the National Party, despite their connections with urban interests, made it their 
careful business to cater for the farming electorate' (Graham, 1963: p.175). 
52 Alongside the National Party's long-time opposition to compulsory unionism the double standard of the 
compulsory levy was briefly raised when a National government abolished compulsory unionism in 1983. 
Yet the compulsory financial support for Federated Farmers by non-members as well as members has 
continued (Vowles, 1992a: p.359). 
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Various training schemes run by the federation have also been funded by 
National governments.53 
This close relationship has, however, become strained over recent years. Now 
the two organisations are not so closely intermeshed, and another party, Act, has 
forged significant links with Federated Farmers and their supporters. The first 
sUbstantial cracks in the National Party-Federated Farmers relationship 
appeared during the early 1980s, when the farming group grew exasperated with 
National's interventionist and trade protectionist economic framework.54 
Federated Farmers subsequently supported the economic reforms of the Fourth 
Labour Government, a stance which continued to cause problems for the 
organisation's relationship with National, as the party was initially opposed to and 
concerned about the removal of subsidies and the affect on levels of agricultural 
production. 55 
The influence of Federated Farmers within the National Party has also declined 
due to the decline of the size and relevance of the farmers' organisation. Like 
53 See: Wood (1988: p.93), who points out that the National Party in government has even provided financial 
assistance to Federated Farmers: 'Government, for example, in the early 1980s was paying over a rnillion 
dollars a year to Federated Farmers as a contribution towards a farm cadet training scheme'. 
54 As Bremer points out, Federated Farmers became increasingly independent of National: 'Certainly the 
Federation did not consider its hands tied by any National Party links when it formulated its 1984 election 
policy statements, rejecting Prime Minister Muldoon's economic interventionism, and endorsing the free-
market principles espoused by Labour finance spokesperson, Roger Douglas' (Bremer, 1993: p.118). 
55 During the mid-to-Iate 1980s Federated Farmers remained wary that National would return New Zealand's 
economy to an interventionist framework. The party had largely been saying two things at once: some senior 
National MPs expressed their opposition to the effects of the Gov~rnment's economic policies while others 
suggested that a National Government would not do things very differently. It was the question of trade 
protection, in particular, that proved to be an issue of contention in the relationship, with the party divided 
between urban MPs like Philip Burdon, formerly a Manufacturers' Federation activist who favoured a 
substantial degree of protection, and Ruth Richardson, a former adviser to Federated Farmers, who 
favoured rapid tariff removal (Bremer, 1993: p.123). A decade later another political issue that set the 
National Party apart from much of its farmer support base was the determination of much of the 
Parliamentary leadership, and especially Jenny Shipley and John Luxton, to reform the agricultural producer 
boards. 
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trade unions and most other sectoral organisations, the federation has been 
waning for many years. In the early 1950s it had 48,000 financial members, but 
by 1990 this had declined to about 23,000 (Bremer, 1993: p.116). By 2003 
membership was only 18,000 (New Zealand Federated Farmers, 2003). 
Being the traditional 'party of private enterprise', National has also had strong 
links with the organised business community.56 Commerce associations, such as 
regional chambers of commerce in particular, have normally been very 
supportive of the party and it has had a very close relationship with the 
Employers Federation and the Manufacturers Federation (which are now merged 
as Business New Zealand). For example, prior to National's election in 1990, the 
Employers Federation 'played a significant role in developing the party's 
industrial relations policy of deregulating the labour market' (Mulgan, 1997: 
p.226). The links between the two organisations are many. For example 
National's spokesperson on labour relations and later minister of labour, Max 
Bradford, came to Parliament from a senior position with the Employers 
Federation. And in 1996 the Federation provided National with $1.3 million of 
television advertising by promoting the advantages of the Employment Contracts 
Act. Again in 1999 it ran a pro-Employment Contracts Act and anti-ACC 
advertising campaign in the media. 
The Business Roundtable was probably even more influential on National's 1990 
industrial relations policy, and it was generally very influential in National's 1990-
93 term in government. According to ex-National MP and leader of New Zealand 
First, Winston Peters, National's industrial relations policy was actually written in 
1987, 1988, and 1989 by the Roundtable (Scherer, 1995: p:3). Likewise, 
Tenbensel maintains that the Roundtable 'provided many of the ideas that 
underpinned changes such as the introduction of the Employment Contracts· 
56 Private groups of businesspeople have often rallied behind the National Party at election time, particularly 
to provide funds for their campaign. An example of this was Bob Jones' Capital Club, which in the 1970s 
financed and ran large-scale advertising campaigns in support of National (Cleveland, 1977: p.115). 
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Act. .. and the 1991 Budget (Tenbensel, 2001: p.329).57 Since this time, however, 
it seems that National's relationship with organised business interests has 
dwindled again. Many business interests have shifted their loyalties back to the 
Labour Party - although the shift in alignment is not as severe as in the mid-
1980s. More than ever before, business organisations are no longer tied to any 
particular party, and shift between parties as it suits them. 
The National Party does, however, develop relationships with groups other than 
business and farmers. For example, in the 1970s a liberal ginger group, Pol-Link 
was influential within National, attempting to reverse the party's increasing social 
conservatism under Muldoon's leadership (James, 1986a: pp.39-40). Later in the 
post-Muldoonist mid-1980s National's extra-parliamentary leadership sought to 
reinvigorate the party's organisation by creating the National Political Centre, 
which was intended to promote new ideas and concepts for the party. The 
organisers - Hugh Templeton, Sue Wood and Barry Leay - had the objective of 
creating 'something attached to the party but semi-independent' (Klinkum, 1998: 
pp.424-425). A contemporary party-manufactured alignment is National's 
'Bluegreens' environmental policy task force formed in July 1998. Created by 
then Minister of the Environment, Simon Upton, and the Minister of Conservation, 
Nick Smith, this new group was to be an organisation that existed outside of the 
party but would feed ideas, direction and energy into National. The organisation 
was headed by Auckland businessman Rob Fenwick, who was not a member of 
the party but had previously led the (now-defunct) Progressive Green Party. 58 
Similarly, since the late 1990s, National has been closely connected to an 
57 As an illustration of this, Ruth Richardson has written that, 'The Business Roundtabie put a great deal of 
effort into trying to educate Bill [Birch] on the concept of free contracting, with some limited success' 
(Richardson, 1995: p.6S). 
58 The exact relationship of the task force to the National Party was never made public, but press releases 
about it stressed that the organisation was separate to the party and that membership of it was not confined 
to members of the party. The Bluegreens was clearly the property of the National Party, but the task force 
would attempt to create its own identity, aided by its own logo, environmental experts and spokespeople 
from outside the party. See: English (31 Ju11998: p.AS). 
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organisation called the New Zealand Free Enterprise Trust, which is a front 
organisation for the distribution of donations from individual businesses and 
businesspeople to the party.59 The records of the Electoral Commission show 
that the party received $700,000 from the Trust between 1998 and 2001. A 
related organisation named the Southern Free Enterprise Trust also declared 
donations of $86,000 to various National Party electorate organisations. Then in 
2002 the Waitemata Trust, 'a private trust set up to support right-wing parties', 
gave the National Party $123,000 (Venter, 2003b). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, National had ties to various Christian groups. During the 
mid-1980s New Zealand's 'moral majority' group, the Coalition of Concerned 
Citizens, ran a campaign to encourage its supporters - who largely came from 
fundamentalist and evangelical Christian churches - to join the National Party, 
attempt to influence its moral direction, and depose 'liberal' National MPs. 
Encouraged and coordinated by MP Graeme Lee, the coalition decided to enter 
the party following the unsuccessful campaign against homosexual law reform 
(McLoughlin, 1986a: p.1). The next Christian organisation to become involved 
with the party was the internally-created Christian Voice group. The group was 
established with the consent of party leaders in August 1998 'as a special 
interest group with equivalent status to Young Nationals, the women's committee 
and the Maori committee' (Speden, 1999c: p.14). The chairman of Christian 
Voice, John Stringer, had been the campaign director for the rival Christian 
Coalition in the 1996 general election. Seven other Christian Voice members 
stood for the National Party in the 1999 election (ibid). Overall, Christian Voice 
does not appear to playa significant role in the party. 
The National Party has also been advantaged by supportive institutions within 
the state. National has certainly sought to turn various state institutions into 
59 Former party president, Geoff Thompson has said the Trust also funds other organisations and parties, 
but he refused to say which, and no other party has declared any donations from the Trust (Gardiner, 12 
May 2000). 
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partisan institutions - for example positions on the board of the old New Zealand 
Broadcasting Corporation (NZBC) were used for party patronage in the past. 
Throughout the 1960s, according to Keith Jackson, the NZBC Board consisted 
'of appointees who were predominantly National Party sympathisers' (Jackson, 
1973: p.189). 
Privately-owned media have also traditionally been among National's more 
important allies. At the middle of the last century, according to Lipson, the 
National Party enjoyed 'the strategic advantage of controlling virtually every 
newspaper' (Lipson, 1948: p.250). Mulgan and Vowles, too, have argued that 
although the media is not heavily partisan, newspapers and their proprietors 
have generally either favoured National or opposed Labour (Mulgan, 1997a: 
pp.300-301; Vowles, 2002b: p.425). Arguably this media partisanship has 
changed more recently because of the erosion of ideological differences between 
the major parties. 
New Zealand First 
In the tradition of the National Party, New Zeala:nd First has taken up the 
conservative stance against the concept of parties having close and formal 
relationships with organised societal groups. New Zealand First has instead 
claimed to stand for the 'national interest' over that of any particular interest 
group. The party has certainly lacked close relationships with anyone social 
category of voters, let alone organised expressions of social forces in the New 
Zealand electorate. Grey Power has at times been viewed as being supportive of 
the party, and prior to the formation of the 1996 coalition government with 
National, Grey Power often lent a great deal of support to its leader Winston 
Peters. However there has never been any formal relationship between the two 
organisations. 
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New Zealand First has at times attempted to develop its relationship with certain 
Maori institutions. In the lead-up to the 1996 general election Winston Peters 
wisely saw the importance of the local iwi in the Maori electorates, and chose to 
consult with them about the selection of his candidates for those seats. Likewise, 
in Te Tai Tonga, New Zealand First's Tu Wyllie managed, in 1996, to win the 
important backing of the corporate Te Runanganui 0 Ngai Tahu, and this 
relationship was rumoured to be the source of Wyllie's well-funded election 
campaign (Speden, 1998f: p.9). Compulsory donation disclosure only started part 
way through 1996, so the records are incomplete, but they show that Ngai Tahu 
Trust Board chairman Tipene O'Regan donated $1200 to Mr Wyllie's campaign. 
Likewise, the party's Te Tai Rawhiti candidate, John Delamere, received $8000 
from Rotorua's Whakaae Trust (Edwards, 1997b: p.3). 
Act New Zealand 
Unlike many of the new political parties formed during the 1990s that have been 
internally-created parties - parties formed by parliamentarians rather than by 
forces external to Parliament - the Act New Zealand party arrived in part due to 
the urging of a number of societal organisations. Although the leading figures 
who created the party were politicians who had previously been in Parliament 
(such as Roger Douglas and Derek Quigley), the founding members also came 
from think tanks such as Vision 20-20 and the Centre for Independent Studies 
(which involved Rodney Hide and Barrie Saunders). The formation of the party 
was also encouraged by the Business Roundtable, which provided capital 
resources, legitimation, and political guidance.6o One of the main links with the 
Roundtable was Barrie Saunders, a founder-member of Act, who was also a 
public relations consultant for the Business Roundtable (Armstrong, 1993: p.9). 
The current president of Act, Catherine Judd, also works for the Business 
Roundtable through her own consultancy firm, Awaroa Partners (Coddington, 
2001: p.65). Act has also been closely aligned to the Employers Federation, and 
60 See: Mulgan (1997a: p.254). 
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the Federation's communications manager, Andy Gregory, was a foundation 
member of the party (ibid). Similarly, Kathryn Asare, a PR consultant with 
Business New Zealand, is a former press secretary for the party. As shown in 
Chapter Seven, originally Act was funded by a few wealthy individuals rather 
than by a whole layer of businesspeople.61 
Act now cultivates relationships with other societal organisations.62 For example, 
in its attempts to build itself into more of a rural party, Act has picked up farmer 
support that once went to National. The party now enjoys a comfortable 
relationship with Federated Farmers. This is in large part due to the involvement 
in Act of Owen Jennings, who was the president of Federated Farmers between 
1990 and 1993. Other foundation members of the Association of Consumers and 
Taxpayers were Sir Peter Elworthy, another former president of Federated 
Farmers, and Rob McLagan, a former chief executive of Federated Farmers. Act 
also has friendly relations with other conservative pressure groups, such as the 
New Zealand Council of Licensed Firearms Owners. During the 1999 general 
election the Firearms Owners called for a vote for Act because 'Act opposes 
firearms registration' (New Zealand Council of Licensed Firearms Owners, 1999). 
The fact that the party has any relationship with interest groups is remarkable in· 
the context of founder Roger Douglas's anti-interest group stance. In the 1980s 
Douglas argued that the special relationships between political parties and 
interest groups had been a central cause of New Zealand's postwar economic 
problems. He also deeply resented the close relationship between the Labour 
61 For instance, much of Act's early income came from Sky TV millionaire Craig Hea·tly. Many of its early 
business backers were typically of a financier-type - those in the non-productive sector of the economy that 
benefited most from Rogernomics (and who financially supported Labour in 1987) and who also stood to 
benefit from Act's particular brand of economic reform. Of Act's few wealthy financial backers, many are 
believed to be members of the Business Roundtable (Mulgan, 1997: pp.254, 315). 
62 As Act has shifted its political orientation over recent years it has related differently to its extra-
parliamentary institutions and forces. In particular the party has moved away from its finance capital base, 
and so Act does not enjoy the same support from financiers that it once did. 
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Party and the trade union movement. Yet, now, the Act party courts the 
involvement of interest groups as much as - if not more than - any other political 
party.53 
Like the major parties, Act also has at times been aligned to party-manufactured 
social groupings. For example in 1999 a letter was delivered to households in 
Wellington Central announcing the establishment of the 'Committee to Re-Elect 
Hon Richard Prebble as MP for Wellington Central'. Written by one of Act's 
senior party workers, the letter detailed how this group was established in 1996 
by 'a group of local men and women, from all political parties, who invited 
Richard to stand for Wellington Central. Regardless of party politics, we knew 
Richard would be the standout MP for our community' (Zangouropoulos, 1999). 
The committee reformed in 1999 'to ensure that Richard is re-elected as our MP', 
but the letter stated that the committee made 'no recommendation on who should 
be government, that's for your party vote to decide' (ibid). The letter called on 
members of the electorate to join the group and help Prebble campaign for the 
electorate vote. 
Green Party 
While the older parties still retain some interest group relationships, the new 
parties have very few such relationships and certainly no significant formal 
relationships with societal organisations. The Green Party is very typical in this 
regard, standing virtually alone and formally unconnected with the institutions of 
civil society. Yet as would be expected, the Green Party has relationships with a 
63 Act MPs Owen Jennings and Rodney Hide have also fallen foul of public approval, having been implicated 
in separate pyramid-type financial scams. These scandals increased the public's belief that Act was under 
the influence of extra-parliamentary interests. Fo"owing one of these scandals, Act leader Richard Prebble 
remarked that he actually encouraged his MPs to have financial involvement in 'the community'. Other Act 
MPs are involved in a number of business activities in the private sector - for instance Ken Shirley is 
involved in forest management, and Donna Awatere Huata is the part-owner of an extensive market garden 
business. 
350 Chapter Five: Party Linkage to Societal Organisations 
number of environmental groups - such as the Royal New Zealand Forest and 
Bird Society, and Greenpeace. These relationships are due to a shared political 
agenda and the small community of activists involved in environmental politics. 
For example, in 2002, the chairman of Greenpeace New Zealand, Gordon 
Jackman, joined the party's post-election coalition negotiation committee.64 
The Greens also have a number of links with marijuana law reform organisations. 
Two Green MPs - Nandor Tanczos and Metiria Turei - are former members and 
electoral candidates of the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party. The pro-marijuana 
lobby group NORML has also endorsed a vote for the Greens.65 The Greens also 
have strong connections to the Electoral Reform Coalition and anti-GM groupS.66 
United Future 
United Future New Zealand was formed out of two component parties - United 
New Zealand and Future New Zealand. The first was built up with little in the way 
of links with civil society. Instead, it was the classic internally-created party, 
established in 1995 by parliamentarians without prior demand for it by any part of 
the electorate. After the 1996 election - in which United won only 0.88 percent of 
the party vote (but held Peter Dunne's electorate) - the party sought to ensure its 
survival by amalgamating with many of the other minor centre and centre-right 
parties that had been launched to take advantage of the new PR electoral 
system. The first three parties to merge were Advance New Zealand, the Ethnic 
Minority Party, and the Conservatives (formerly the Right of Centre party). 
64 Jackman also stepped down from his position with Greenpeace, saying, 'This role is not tenable in the role 
of chair and trustee of Greenpeace New Zealand', and that he wanted 'to protect the integrity of Greenpeace 
and its ability to operate independently of any political party' (quoted in NZPA, 2002g). 
65 NORML also discouraged support for the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party, arguing that a vote for them 
was a wasted vote, but said that a vote for Act was also acceptable (Orsman, 2002). 
66 Within the Green Party, Te Roopu Pounamu is a Maori network organisation. Established in 2000, the 
membership of Te Roopu Pounamu consists of Maori members of the Green Party and the partners of Maori 
members (Green Party, 2002). 
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Following these mergers, United sought to utilise 'the new ethnic and rural 
networks' to 'bring in two or three per cent of the party list vote' (Sheppard, 1997: 
p.9). The party marketed its 1999 party list on the diverse ethnicity of its 
candidates. As a reflection of United New Zealand's liberal politics, the party has 
also been associated with a website called Wide Awake (www.wideawake.co.nz). 
While not closely linked with the party, this website has the appearance of a think 
tank or interest group, but is owned by United. 
In 2000 United merged with the Christian party Future New Zealand (formerly the 
Christian Democrats), taking on the new name of United Future New Zealand, 
and picking up new links into some of the Christian churches. In its early days the 
Christian Democrats had close links with the conservative Education 
Development Foundation - and the head of the foundation, Bruce Logan, was an 
adviser to the party. Other organisations with links to the Christian Democrats 
included the Life Education Trust, Youth for Christ, the Bible Society, Family Life 
International, the Campaign On Moral Education, and the Strategic Leadership 
Network.67 Then in 1998 when the party changed its name, much of the 
organisation also changed. The leader, Graeme Lee, retired and Anthony Walton 
of 'The Rock' church took over. Walton's church, of· which he is the minister, 
became one of the main organisational support bases for the party. 
The merged United Future party is now dominated by Walton's Future New 
Zealand component, but the alignments with Christian institutions appear to be 
weak.68 Three United Future MPs have strong backgrounds in Christian 
67 Heeringa (1995: pp.80, 83). 
68 It is not hard to understand that the Christian parties have sought linkages with the churches because 
'church networks are stronger and more monied than political parties' (Clifton, 1998f: p.27). However 
according to James, although Future New Zealand had 'networks among the churches and conservative 
pressure groups', there do not appear to be many strong institutional ties between churches and parties 
(James, 1995e: p.13). The vast majority of churches have chosen to remain independent of party politics. 
None of the churches appear to have endorsed United Future, apart from Anthony Walton's own church. An 
indication of this is that in Southland, the Otatara Community Church pastor Dean Comerford made 
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organisations: deputy leader Gordon Copeland was financial administrator of the 
Catholic Church for 18 years, while Larry Baldock and Bernie Ogilvy have been 
directors of the evangelical Youth with a Mission (Campbell, 2002b: pp.22, 23). 
Alliance and the Progressive Coalition Party 
Integrating with the electorate has always been an important stated goal for the 
Alliance. Rather than merely behaving as an elite parliamentary force, an attempt 
has been made to be a grassroots organisation involved in community affairs. 
The Alliance has aimed to be a 'three-year operation' rather than something that 
just interacts with the community at election time.69 The party has claimed a solid 
membership base and a network that is active in the community. However, like 
most other political parties that have established themselves in recent years, the 
Alliance lacks any solid ties with any organised section of society. At the time of 
the NewLabour Party's (NLP) formation in 1989, some of those involved hoped to 
obtain trade union support for the party, but unions had by this stage made 
deliberate decisions to be non-aligned.7o According to Simon Sheppard, 'the 
overriding reason why Anderton failed to take the union movement with him 
when he left Labour was the fact that, in reality, he had almost no chance of 
unravelling the near symbiotic link between the trade unions and Labour Party 
hierarchies. In cold political terms he had nothing better to offer them' (Sheppard, 
headlines in 2002 when he sent an email to 500 people, including his congregation, encouraging them to 
vote for United Future (Arnold, 2002). 
69 The Alliance has been keen to go against the tide in which Matt McCarten puts it, 'Labour and National 
have completely obliterated themselves at local level. All they are is electoral machines that roll out every 
three years' (quoted in Harris, 1993f: p.17). Dave McPherson, formerly an Alliance worker, has also stated, 
'One of the strengths of the Alliance is our heavy involvement in local campaigns. I would hate to become a 
once-every-three-years party which only comes out for election campaigns' (quoted in McLoughlin, 1994c: 
p.64). 
70 The unions that were disaffiliating from the Labour Party were partly doing so in order to become 
unaligned to political parties per se - which was the general trend for all organised sections of society. There 
were, however, many individual unionists involved in the party's creation - in particular, 'nine of the original 
fifteen members of the original NLP National Council were unionists, including Otago CTU President Michael 
Hanifin' (Sheppard, 1999: p.183). 
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1999: p.183). Also, Anderton had a poor relationship with trade union leaders 
and had in the past been ambiguous in his support for their involvement in the 
Labour Party. Yet the Alliance received financial and political support from the 
CTU-breakaway Trade Union Federation and its affiliate, the Seafearers Union?1 
By the time of the 1999 general election the party also received official CTU 
support for the first time, and a $20,000 donation from the Engineers Union.72 
In 2000 the Alliance created its own internal union grouping, 'The Workers 
Alliance', which attempted to fill the large organisational vacuum created on the 
left of the union movement by the dissolution of the NLP and the unification of the 
TUF with the CTU. This organisation never succeeded as few workers ever 
joined it. Certainly it seems that few trade unionists belong to the party?3 Despite 
the Alliance's stated desire to integrate itself into the social fabric of the trade 
union movement, a charge could be made that it has been less than enthusiastic 
in its attempt to align the party with other groups. For example, the Alliance 
rejected a closer relationship with the 5,000-strong Auckland People's Centre, 
when in 1993 it rejected the application for party membership of its chief 
executive, Sue Bradford (Trotter, 1993a: p.10). However the Alliance has 
71 The Trade Union Federation (TUF) was an umbrella group of 14 unions representing about 35,000 
workers. It was seen as being partially aligned to the Alliance - mirroring the CTU's alignment to the Labour 
Party. Most famously, in the 1994 Selwyn by-election the federation backed the Alliance candidate in the 
belief that the Alliance had the best chance of winning the seat off National. Particular unions that have been 
sympathetic to the Alliance have included the Seamen, the Labourers' Union, the Tramways Union, the 
Northern Distribution Union and Wood Industries Union (Harris, 1993f: p.17). TUF itself reunited with the 
CTU in 2000. 
72 McCarten declared that 'Although the Council of Trade Unions' .position was to support a Labour-led 
government, many unions adopted a more even-handed stance, giving financial support to both partners 
and allowing Alliance and Labour speakers equal prominence at union meetings' (McCarten, 2000: p.38). In 
terms of trade unions, the Alliance has claimed that it prefers not to have union affiliates because the party 
believes that unions should maintain their independence. 
73 When the Alliance asked their members to identify the union to which they belonged during the party's 
2000 membership renewal, only about 150 members indicated that they were in a union, suggesting that the 
Alliance had only a small reach into New Zealand's organised labour movement of around 250,000 
(Alliance,2000b). 
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attempted to forge a relationship with the New Zealand Students Association 
(NZUSA), which has been partially successful.74 
The Progressive Coalition Party (PCP) has few links with other organisations. 
Initially it incorporated the Democratic Party, who departed after the 2002 
election. The PCP has been closely associated with the state institutions. 
Kiwibank was a policy initiative of Jim Anderton's, and he has been keen to 
associate his party with it. He has even sent out information on the bank to party 
members and the public asking them to join it. Anderton was also the driving 
force in the creation of the Ministry of Economic Development (MED). As Minister 
of Economic Development, Jim Anderton has a number of staff from MED 
working in his parliamentary office and he works very closely with the ministry. 
Part Three: Explanations for the Disconnection 
As shown in Chapter Four, the old schism of labour and socialism versus ~ 
business and capitalism collapsed in the 1980s and 1990s, and this has had 
significant consequences for parliamentary politics in New Zealand's traditionally 
class-based party system. The decline of the class cleavage in society has 
helped disconnect the old parties of both left and right from their traditional social 
roots, distinctive ideologies and supportive societal organisations. This section 
argues that with class politics on the decline, the community is now less 
characterised by a variety of organisations and is instead becoming more of a 
society made up of atomised individuals who are inclined to participate in public 
life and politics more as individuals than as members of groups. A similar 
argument has been made by sociologist Frank Furedi, in terms of the United 
Kingdom: 
74 As a result NZUSA jointly hosted three student debt summits with Alliance MP Laila Harre when she was 
Minister of Youth Affairs. A number of Alliance members have staffed the association's head office. 
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The erosion of old loyalties and the break-up of the old political patterns have resulted 
from the suspension of class conflict. The suspension of collective conflict between 
workers, on the one hand, and the employers and authorities on the other has also 
encouraged the individuation of political life, a situation in which people think and act 
more as individuals than as members of a group or social class. Many of the old 
constituencies have disintegrated (Furedi, 1995). 
In this sense - the suspension of class conflict - it can be seen that one of the 
overwhelming reasons that New Zealand political parties no longer have strong 
linkages with societal organisations is that organised political social forces and 
movements have dissipated. Collective action has been on the decline generally 
throughoLJt the Western world, and especially in New Zealand where social 
movements and formerly strong extra-parliamentary political groups have 
become shadows of their former selves. According to Vowles: 
Group membership in general was high from the 1960s through to the early 1980s. 
However, the high point of single-issue group activity in recent New Zealand history was 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when anti-nuclear, anti-racist, and environmental 
activism proliferated. Party membership also increased substantially over the period, 
indicating a process of general political mobilisation (Vowles, 1998e: p.14). 
Then during the 1980s and 1990s there was huge political upheaval due to neo-
liberal economic reforms, yet the response from the left in society was minimal.7s 
Organisations on the left went into decline. Perhaps as a result of the economic 
restructuring and lack of resistance, the demoralised institutions of the left are 
now in a poor state, with few having any real significance in modern New 
Zealand society. For instance, CORSO has only a fraction of its 1980s 
prominence, the Coalition for Public Health had dissolved, Halt All Racist Tours 
(HART) is also defunct,76 and the Auckland Unemployed Workers Union is very 
quiet. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s when there were a number of 
significant feminist organisations, there is now none of any prominence. The 
75 By the end of the 1990s the level of public protest was at a relative low. Few people protested about 
anything. Compared to this, Jackson noted that 'In the four years from January 1967 to the end of November 
1970, no less than 339 different demonstrations in New Zealand were reported in the Christchurch Press, an 
average of more than one per week' (Jackson, 1973: p.164). See: Trotter (1995d: p.6), 
76 HART dissolved itself after the African National Conference declared that international sporting contact 
with South Africa could resume. 
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National Council of Women used to represent about 250,000 women through its 
affiliated organisations, but has recently discussed dissolution (Cleveland, 1972: 
p.93; Page, 1996). Similarly, the long-running feminist magazine, Broadsheet, 
ceased publication in 1997. On the far-left, too, the most significant Marxist 
organisations of the 1970s - the Communist Party, the Socialist Action League, 
the Socialist Unity Party, and the Workers Communist League - have all 
disappeared.77 
Organisations that are neither left nor right have also been less than significant. 
Grey Power is about the only social movement to have any real organising 
capacity in relation to elections in the 1990s. Similarly, no Maori groups have any 
long-lasting and significant influence on national politics. Interestingly, the right 
and conservative political groups and institutions have fared little better than 
those of the left. No longer do these organisations hold much sway in shaping 
the political agenda. In particular, conservative and right-wing groups like the 
Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), the Society for the 
Promotion of Community Standards (SPCS) and other far-right or racist C 
organisations are rarely heard of or have much influence in society. The newly-
created Maxim Institute is a morally conservative interest group, but one with few 
apparent connections with political parties/8 
Even the Business Roundtable has faded from public view and now has less 
credibility than before. Between the mid-1980s and early 1990s the Roundtable 
provided many of the innovative ideas and arguments to push through neo-liberal 
77 The most prominent extra-parliamentary left-wing organisations. are now the Anti-Capitalist Alliance, the 
Socialist Workers Organisation, the Campaign Against Foreign Control of Aotearoa (CAFCA), Arena, and 
Global Peace and Justice Auckland. But none of these have any significant membership or relevance. 
Kelsey has acknowledged the lack of the political left in New Zealand: 'New Zealand's political environment 
became so dumbed down, and the left so marginalised, that when even business leaders and economic 
commentators began to concede in the late 1990s that the experiment had failed, no-one was able to 
capitalise on the opportunity. There was a dearth of critical analysis from the media, academics, the 
churches and non-government organisations' (Kelsey, 2002: pp.62-63). 
78 See: Collett (2003). 
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economic reform, yet in recent years it has more often found itself on the losing 
side of battles. This started most famously with the Roundtable's involvement in 
the unsuccessful anti-MMP campaign in 1993?9 According to Bruce Cronin 'the 
Roundtable has been weakened in the 1990s because of the relative economic 
decline of its core, finance sector, membership' (Harris and Twiname, 1998: 
p.182).80 Pointedly the Clark-Labour Government has refused to deal with the 
Business Roundtable while dealing with other non-aligned businesspeople as 
well as less dogmatic organisations such as the Business Council for Sustainable 
Development and Businesses for Social Responsibility. Related to this, in recent 
years there have been many resignations of disillusioned members from the 
Roundtable (Rotherham, 2000). 
Part of the decline in the influence and size of societal groups is simply due to a 
dramatic decrease of the public's willingness to be involved in politics. As 
examined in chapters Six and Ten, there has been a withdrawal from politics by 
the public and New Zealand has shifted significantly from being a society 
characterised by high levels of political efficacy and participation to one where \ 
voter turnout is low and party membership is tiny. Similarly, dissatisfaction with 
public life has also led to a wider disillusionment with other non-political groups. 
Almost all major public institutions from Federated Farmers to the churches have 
been affected by the decline in popular participation. Even some environmental 
groups have been on the decline - for example, between 1985 and 1998 
Greenpeace's membership halved from 60,000 to 30,000 (Hawkins, 1998: p.5). 
While there are still some organisations that can attract a high number of 
members, the nature of this participation is open to question. For example, the 
Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand claims over 40,000 
members and 56 branches, but what level of participation is involved beyond 
79 As Steve Maharey argued, 'the fact that [anti-MMP spokesperson] Peter Shirtcliffe was identified as a 
Roundtable figure made it certain that the campaign would be lost' (Harris and Twiname, 1998: p.190). 
80 Cronin 'argues that evidence of the current weakness of the Roundtable is that it has failed to defeat the 
farming industry over the existence of the producer boards and their statutory monopoly over exports' 
(Harris and Twiname, 1998: p.182). See also Tenbensel (2001: p.329), and Kelsey (2002: p.76). 
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sending in an annual membership fee is not known. Similarly, religious affiliations 
have been declining for decades.81 Long-established mass organisations such as 
the Freemasons and the Countrywomen's Institute have lost large numbers of 
their members.82 Likewise, recruitment levels for the SPCA, the Scouts, Guides 
and Boys and Girls Brigades are now much lower than 20 years ago.a3 New 
Zealand society today is more atomised and individuated, a situation that 
discourages a strong party-society relationship. 
The decline in class politics has, of course, also affected business organisations, 
making them less political. As argued in Chapter Seven, since the 1950s - but 
especially since the end of the Cold War - collective business funding has 
declined, and corporations and wealthy individuals now make donations directly 
to political parties without the aid of intermediary business organisations. 
According to Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, in the UK: 
The system of corporate versus trade union funding of politics probably reached a peak 
at the time when political conflict itself was based predominantly on class lines, with a 
party of business and of the middle classes competing against a party of the workers. ( 
Since the 1960s, the economies of Western countries have developed from an 
industrial to a 'post-industrial' stage (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
The erosion of ideology in the party system also reinforces the severing of ties 
between movements and parties. It can be argued that the encouragement of 
consensual politics creates barriers against the emergence of new ideas and 
movements. Differences and disagreements are minimalised and politics 
becomes less about principles and debate, and more about organisation and real 
81 Between the 1991 and 1996 censuses, religious denominations fell significantly, with declines for 
Anglicans of 100,284; Presbyterians, 82,761; Catholics, 25,500; Methodists, 17,844; Baptists, 16,542; and 
Ratana, 11,142 (Department of Statistics, 2000). 
82 The Freemason's Society is in significant decline, with its membership dropping from 48,000 in 1964 to 
only 14,300 in 2000 (Bone, 2002b: p.29). Similarly, 'Jaycees - once the largest service organisation in New 
Zealand - now has only 16 clubs, and most service clubs have experienced similar problems' (McNeill, 
2002). 
83 The numbers of Girl Guides have dropped from 43,000 in 1980 to just 18,500 in 2003. In the same period, 
the scouting organisation has dropped from 42,558 members to 15,512 (Laugesen, 1 Jun 2003). 
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politick, meaning that parties become less receptive to fresh ideas and new 
social elements. 
Part of the explanation for the disconnection between political parties and interest 
groups or pressure groups can also be found in the rise of anti-interest group 
theory in the 1980s and the subsequent marginalisation of groups representing 
various class interests. Prior to this, governments and parties 'would be 
influenced in their actions by their party memberships and by the lobbying of 
pressure groups. Both provided a mechanism linking the government with the 
elector' (Jesson, 1989d). In this previous era of 'corporatism', certain interest 
groups were recognised by the state to be the legal representatives of the 
economic or social sectors they came from. This framework increased the 
relationship between interest groups and political parties. During the 1950s and 
1960s especially, this relationship was fostered by the ability of governments to 
distribute patronage to their support groups. Naturally both National and Labour 
set up a whole range of subsidies, protective devices and incentive schemes to 
benefit farmers, local manufacturers, unionists and so forth. Through their 
connections with political parties, interest groups therefore often became part of 
'the Establishment,.84 As pointed out earlier, aligned groups like Federated 
Farmers and the Federation of Labour came to be represented on a large 
number of quangos. Thus the leaders of both National and Labour often 
consulted more with interest groups than they did with their own party 
members.85 
84 Jackson (1973: p.94) 
85 Carter argued in 1956, 'As is true of the Labor party in New Zealand, the parliamentary leader [of National] 
frequently consults more with powerful nonparty interest groups, e.g., representatives of the Manufacters' 
Federation and other business interests, than with members of his party organization' (Carter, 1956: p.99). 
Even if no consultation took place, parties and governments would at least make their policy decisions with 
interest group reactions in mind. Jackson, writing in 1973 gave the example of internal government 
decisions like Cabinet allocations: 'Even today, any government making an appointment to the post of 
Minister of Defence, for example, will carefully bear in mind the likely receptions of such a nominee by the 
Returned Services' Association' (Jackson, 1973: p.93). 
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In the 1980s the Fourth Labour Government dramatically changed this 
relationship, adopting an anti-interest group stance and refusing to listen to or 
involve interest groups in the decision making process. This principle related to 
the 'market liberal' model of governance: 'Building on an influential public-choice 
analysis of interest-group politics, the model depicts interest groups as self-
interested "vested" interests seeking special advantages or "privileges" for 
themselves which are contrary to the public interest' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.212).86 
The recent increase in the regulation of political parties has also tended to inhibit 
the linkages between parties and interest groups. For example, the requirement 
of political parties to disclose any large donations received means that the 
financial relationship between parties and other organisations is discouraged, 
due to the disincentive of negative publicity. Furthermore, the Electoral Act 
inhibits aligned groups from carrying out television advertising campaigns in 
support of their preferred party during an election campaign. A good example of 
the problematic arrangement was the refusal during the 1999 general election 
campaign of the Television Commercials Advisory Board (TVCAB) to allow the 
screening of an advertising campaign by the Engineers Union that called on 
voters to change the government.87 Similarly, it is likely that the increasing state 
resourcing of political parties is also having a crucial impact on the parties and 
their relationships with other organisations in civil society (see Chapter Eight). By 
86 Tenbensel argues that, 'since 1984, New Zealand's political elite have taken on board the view that the 
role of interest groups in the political process should be minimalised. They have instituted a range of reforms 
that have quite clearly reduced and constrained the political space within which interest groups can operate' 
(Tenbensel, 2001: p.329). Mulgan has also argued that although interest groups have lost their influence 
with governments, 'Employers and business leaders, on the other hand, have retained their rights of access 
regardless of the party in power. Their support is critical to the overall performance of the economy on which 
any government's popularity depends' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.224). Mulgan: 'Interest group activity and 
influence, however, was not so much reduced as displaced (Mulgan 1994,215). Groups that could not gain 
easy access to ministers as of right turned increasingly to the burgeoning firms of public relations 
consultants for help in getting their message through, via media publicity or informal contacts. New 
organisations emerged which were more attuned to the new discourse of the public interest' (Mulgan, 1995: 
pp.91-92). See also: Vowles (1992a: p.355), and Jesson (1992c). 
87 See: Chapter Nine. 
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providing resources that are substitutable for those resources formerly provided 
by private benefactors, the state provides a disincentive for the parties to expand 
and develop their relationships with societal organisations. 
The increasingly close relationship with the state - built on resources and 
regulations - is changing the orientation of political parties to societal groups. 
Parties have formerly regarded themselves as being societal organisations rather 
than public ones. The distinction is important - a societal institution is one that is 
part of civil society and obviously partisan, whilst a public one is something of a 
governmental one above civil society. It follows on from this that 'public' political 
parties should not be aligned to organised interests in society. By being aligned 
to trade unions or business organisations, modern political parties are seen as 
being sectarian or biased towards a particular group in society rather than being 
interested in the 'public good' as a whole. In this sense, all the New Zealand 
parties are increasingly 'national' parties - as the National Party was originally 
conceived. As shown in Chapter Four, virtually all political parties now purport to 
exist and operate to further the interests of all voters and social groups. To align 
a political party with any organised societal institution is to be seen as being in 
contradiction to the new consensus of 'classlessness' .. 
Conclusion 
Nowadays political parties and interest groups are inclined to see their 
relationships with each other as a hindrance to their operations. Such 
relationships reduce a party's independence and are potentially seen negatively 
by the voting public. But because few deep relationships with interest groups now 
exist, this means parties are less stable entities. They may enjoy increased 
autonomy, but correspondingly they sometimes lack the political coherence and 
ideological stability that they once possessed. The parties are less responsive to 
outside organisations but are more responsive to voters from across the social 
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cleavages. This contributes to an unstructured and confused political 
environment where voters often have trouble navigating the party system. 
The erosion of the alignments with societal organisations is a good indicator of 
the strength of party links to particular social sectors. Combined with the decline 
in party membership numbers and the class dealignment of party-voter relations, 
the divorce between parties and societal organisations means that there is now 
little linkage between the political parties and their key constituencies. The public 
relations industry and their techniques of market research have filled the gap, 
becoming the bridge to civil society that is professional but often insubstantial 
and meaningless. 
The disengagement between political parties and the organised interest groups 
represents yet another element of the breakdown of established ties between 
representative political organisations and their respective class bases as 
discussed in Chapter Four. The decline of the class-oriented institutions that are 
traditionally aligned to New Zealand political parties has had the impact of 
reducing pressure on the parties to act in the interests of any particular class in 
society. Instead of appealing and responding to organised political forces that 
reflect classes, political parties now compete for the votes of middle New 
Zealand individually, guided more by market research politics. The result is that 
political parties have become even more afflicted by ideological erosion, and at 
the same time open more to either technocratic or office-seeking strategies. 
New Zealand's newer political parties are mostly devoid of backing from 
organised social forces and this reinforces that they have started life as elite 
organisations. This chapter has attempted to highlight all the societal linkages 
and has found few of any significance. Rather than being the political expression 
or rallying points of anyone particular organised group or segment in society, the 
new parties have been created from the top down - and often by politicians 
already in Parliament. 
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The roots of the old parties in society have withered, and the new parties have 
not been able to grow new ones. Instead, political parties appear to be little more 
than a collection of individual MPs assisted by cadre-type party organisations 
that use the mass media, state funds and party professionals to communicate 
with society. Rather than having distinct links with society and its interest groups, 
political parties are becoming more and more the representatives of New 
Zealand's 'political class'. 
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Chapter Six 
Party Organisation and Membership 
One of the most obvious ways in which political parties appear to be in decline in 
New Zealand is their inability to recruit and retain members. The party 
organisations have been undergoing a remarkable transformation in recent 
decades, shifting from class-based mass membership parties to small 
professional electoral-focused parties. In terms of their structures and operations 
the Labour and National parties now have little resemblance to their original 
forms or even what they looked like in the early 1980s. Furthermore, the new 
political parties spawned in the 1990s, such as New Zealand First, the Green 
Party, Act and United Future started life with a very different organisational form 
to that of traditional political parties. All of these organisations are characterised 
by centralisation, professionalisation, a concentration of power in their 
parliamentary wings, weak relationships with societal organisations, and - most 
significantly - very small memberships. 
Many theorists view membership numbers as an indicator of the organised 
strength of political parties and the depth of their societal connections.1 A number 
of writers have noted that parties throughout advanced industrial democracies 
1 Party scholars frequently cite decreasing party membership and partisanship as evidence that political 
parties are declining. See: Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984), Sainsbury (1985), Katz (1987), and Messina 
(1995). See also: Bean (1998), who argues, 'Membership of a political party is arguably the most 
fundamental of the various links that tie voters to parties. Without at least some branch members to give it 
an organisational presence within the electorate, no democratic political party could survive. As a result, 
changes in party membership numbers are regarded as a key indicator of whether parties are declining in 
western democracies' (p.1 08). 
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have been facing a membership decline since the 1960s - in both absolute and 
relative terms (Katz 1987; Widfeldt 1992). New Zealand is regarded as having 
had the greatest decline in the OECD. Between the 1950s and 1990s New 
Zealand party membership as a proportion of the electorate fell, according to 
Susan Scarrow, from 23.8 percent to only 2.1 percent - a decline of 21.7 
percentage points. Other notable OECD declines involved percentage point 
declines of 5.9 in France, 8.1 in the United Kingdom, 10.7 in Italy, 12.6 in 
Denmark, and 16.3 in Sweden (Scarrow, 2000: p.90).2 Of the 16 OECD countries 
studied by Scarrow, New Zealand had the third lowest membership ratio.3 
That New Zealand constitutes a particularly advanced case of party membership 
decline can be seen in the fact that whereas the National and Labour parties 
were once able to claim branch memberships of 250,000 and 80,000 
respectively, today National only has about 20,000, and Labour about 14,000 
members. Likewise, the new parties of New Zealand First, the Greens, Act, and 
United Future probably only have about 15,000 members between them. It 
seems that fewer New Zealanders belong to political parties today than at any 
time since the establishment of the two-party system in the 1930s. 
This chapter argues that this membership decline - together with the other 
organisational changes - reflects a significant evolution from the class-based 
mass party model of organising to that of the electoral-professional type, a model 
of party that is dominated by party professionals and is highly focused on the 
search for electoral success, rather than the pursuit and promotion of political 
ideals. This shift represents a decline in the linkage between parties and civil 
society. The modern party structures now playa weak role in connecting society 
to the arenas of state power, thus reducing the extent to which parties function as 
2 Alternatively, according to Tan, as a percentage of the total electorate, membership has declined in the 
following countries from the 1960-69 period to the 1980-89 period: Denmark: 21.1, 6.5; Finland: 19.0, 15.0; 
Italy: 13.0, 10.0; Netherlands: 9.4, 2.9; Switzerland: 25.0,10.0; and UK: 9.4, 3.3 (Tan, 2000: p.7). 
3 Compared to New Zealand's 2.1 percent in the 1990s, Australia and France had 1.5 percent, the UK 1.9, 
Germany 3.2, Switzerland 8.7, Finland 10.5, and Austria 17.1. 
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outlets for, and stimulants to, civic participation. In this situation, parties are 
failing as community-based agents of political socialisation, mobilisation and 
integration. Instead party professionals now mediate the divide between state 
and society, but are unable to fulfil the same functions as the class mass party. 
The fact that these political organisations no longer play the same role in the 
functioning of democracy that they did for most of the twentieth century therefore 
leads to suggestions of decline. By this, commentators and theorists do not 
necessarily mean that parties are disappearing or face extinction, but that they 
are seen to fail in many of their traditional functions and are becoming 
increasingly marginalised. Such a view has become increasingly popular within 
the study of political parties, with various theorists concentrating on different 
features of this decline. The demise has been a central feature of such diagnoses 
of 
organizational 'contagion from the right' (Epstein 1980: 257-60), the spread of the 
'catch-all party' (Kirchheimer 1966), the rise of the 'rational-efficient' party organization 
(Wright 1971), the advent of the 'electoral-professional party' (Panebianco 1988), party 
'cartelization' (Katz and Mair 1995), the 'crisis of the mass parties', and even 'party 
failure' (Lawson and Merkl 1988) (Scarrow, 2000: p.82). 
This chapter therefore extends the focus of this thesis on party decline to 
examine the New Zealand parties as membership-based organisations, asking 
how relevant the mass party model is to the modern party system and how the 
shift to new organisational forms contributes to decline. A focus on this shift is 
important because it seems to be both a cause and consequence of the 
weakening of linkage between citizens and the state (Scarrow, 2000: p.84). It 
suggests that the New Zealand parties are now characterised more by the 
electoral-professional party model, and that an understanding of this model can 
explain much about the ideological erosion in contemporary politics. Part One of 
this chapter looks at the evolution of party types over the last century. Part Two. 
explores the membership history and current details of the individual political 
parties. Part Three proposes some explanations for the decline in party 
membership in New Zealand. Part Four explores some of the implications of the 
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low levels of party membership, arguing that it contributes to the erosion of 
ideology. This section also discusses the relationship between party membership 
and the shift to MMP, and outlines some future possibilities for membership in 
New Zealand. 
Part One: Evolution of Party Types 
Many party theorists detail a number of stages that the Western parliamentary 
party institution has evolved through during the twentieth century. Despite some 
variation, there is a general consensus that at the start of the century an elite-
cadre type of party prevailed, which was then replaced by the mass party in the 
1930s, which was superseded from the 1960s onwards by the 'catch-all' or 
electoral-professional type.4 This section outlines these ideal types and 
discusses how they relate to New Zealand political development. 
The Elite-Cadre Party 
As in other advanced industrial democracies, the New Zealand political parties at 
the start of the twentieth century were typically elite-cadre type parties, in which 
few participated. These organisations were mostly active and prominent at 
election time, when they sprung into life to aid the election of parliamentarians, 
who were generally the people who created the parties. The organisations were 
typically financed by only a small number of wealthy supporters, and led by the 
politicians themselves.5 
4 For example, Maor provides a summary of the transition of parties through a four-stage process: 'elitist, 
electorally-oriented party organisations tended to give way to mass, purposive (Le. pOlicy-oriented) parties, 
which then tended to be replaced by new professional, electorally-oriented, catch-all parties, which were in 
turn replaced by cartel parties' (Maor, 1997: p.112). However, a good argument can be made that this fourth 
party type (the cartel party) is actually only a variant on the third (the electoral-professional party). 
5 In this sense there was really only one proper element to the party - the parliamentary party, as each party 
had no substantial extra-parliamentary organisation. 
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This was particularly the case with the establishment of the Liberal Party in 1889 
and its election to government a year later which provided a watershed in the 
development of party politics in New Zealand.6 The organisation of the party was 
firstly as an 'association', later becoming a 'federation', an elite organisation of 
notables rather than anything resembling a mass membership party. Its 
organisational capacity was clearly directed to facilitate the activities of its 
parliamentary leaders rather than any wider societal function. According to 
Chapman, the organisation was 'more effective at raising sizeable contributions 
from a few and for coordinating party leaders' tours and publicity than for 
gathering membership fees or regularly talking and listening to members out in 
the scattered electorates' (Chapman, 1989: p.18)? 
The establishment of the Reform Party in 1909 clearly mimicked the 
organisational nature of the Liberals, again adopting a top down structure and 
providing the right for the MPs and their elite supporters to formulate the party's 
policies (Chapman, 1989: p.18).8 In a very short period of time the institution of 
the party was integrated into the political culture, and parliamentary politics 
became synonymous with party politics. The party Organisations continued to 
operate essentially as committees of notables, whose main concern was with 
winning elections and returning a team of candidates to public office. That this 
continued for some time was largely because parliamentary politics began to 
develop in a period (1850s-1890) when there was only a limited property 
franchise and, even after that, electoral affairs were largely managed by the 
6 Although it then took a few years for opposition forces to develop themselves properly in response to the 
Liberal Party, it was from this point that political parties became the real basis of the New Zealand 
Parliament. All of these parties were elite-cadre based organisations. Within the parliaments prior to 1890, 
the existence of the party institution was underdeveloped, and although some proto-parties existed from the. 
late 1870s, they failed to evolve into proper parties. The slow development of parties was related to 
backward social conditions, the dispersed nature of the settlements, slow communications, and the politics 
of provincialism (Chapman, 1989: p.15). 
7 See also: Hamer (1988). 
8 See also: Milne (1966: p.169). 
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middle class. As time went on, however, the New Zealand cadre parties adapted 
to universal suffrage, just as Maurice Duverger described the European parties 
doing. But these original parties - the Liberals, Reform, and then United -
essentially remained in their traditional elitist form. 
The Class Mass Party 
The establishment of the Labour Party in 1916 heralded the arrival of a new form 
of party organisation, the class mass party, which would eventually characterise 
all parties in New Zealand. Based on a union-model of organising, the mass party 
model was supposed to be a large body of fee-paying members, who through 
their branches, electorates and conferences, contributed to the democratic 
decisions of the party, such as policy formulation and the selection of candidates. 
This model was therefore characterised by a programmatic emphasis and the 
goal of a large democratic movement. 
Unlike the elite-cadre party that preceded it, the mass party attempted to 
maximise its membership, organising itself primarily in the electorate, where it 
had educative and social functions. The highly democratic nature of the party 
was apparent in that party finance came in small amounts from many sources, 
and an army of activists carried out the party work, such as pUblicity and 
canvassing. The organisation of the mass party was also more centralised and 
more structured than that of the elite-cadre party. For this reason the model is 
sometimes termed the bureaucratic mass party.9 
Significantly, this new party-type was more programmatic than anything that had 
gone before. Whereas the elite-cadre model was preoccupied with electoral 
success, the mass membership party was typically concerned with formulating 
policy and membership participation. The organisation's main function was to 
devise a comprehensive set of policies to present to the electorate, which was 
9 It is referred interchangeably in this thesis as the 'class mass party' or 'mass party'. 
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related to a distinctive ideology. In line with this, because members in a mass 
party were ostensibly interested in matters of doctrine and policy they remained 
active between elections. In its classic form, parliamentary activity and success 
was not the 'be all and end all' in the mass party, nor was it even necessarily the 
final goal. In its heuristically pure form, the principal objective of the mass party 
was to advance an ideological goal, and for many of those involved, the decision 
to participate in electoral activity was merely a tactical one that was seen as a 
means of getting its views across to the community. 
The mass membership party model originated on the left of the political 
spectrum, yet Duverger's conclusion was that, because of the success of left-
wing mass parties, they would be emulated organisationally by their conservative 
opponents who would abandon the elite-cadre model. This did in fact happen, 
and in New Zealand Duverger's 'contagion from the left' meant that the parties of 
the right reconfigured themselves after the 1935 election of the First Labour 
Government, with the resulting body, the National Party, becoming a 
hierarchically-structured, mass member party which was very different to its 
Liberal, United and Reform predecessors. lO 
Throughout the world the new mass membership parties clearly belonged to civil 
society, and according to Peter Mair, 'sought to express and then implement the 
interests of their constituency within public policy' (Mair, 1997: p.125). Strongly 
rooted in distinctive parts of the community, these mass parties were hierarchical 
and disciplined, and emphasized the engagement and involvement of the 
citizenry (Mair, 1997: p.125). In line with this, the success and strength of such 
parties was measured by their relationships with civil society - in particular by 
membership numbers. Attention given to the parties - academic or otherwise -
was therefore focused on both the parliamentary wing and the extra-
parliamentary party made up of members, branches, a head office and its office 
holders. 
10 See: Gustafson (1997c: p.142). 
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Electoral-Professional Party 
Duverger did, however, argue that the process of contagion from the left might 
eventually be reversed, with left-wing parties adapting some sort of cadre-type 
structure. A significant evolutionary change in party types was first noted by Otto 
Kirchheimer (1966) and Leon Epstein (1967), who both saw that the mass parties 
of Europe were - in an electoral sense - becoming obsolete and inferior to the 
political parties of the United States, which were more elite and cadre-like. 
Epstein's Political Parties in Western Democracies (1967) amounted to the most 
significant revision of Duverger. Epstein perceptively pointed out that although 
the mass party ideal-type had become the standard model for both left and right 
parties, its usefulness appeared to have declined, and that eventually, therefore, 
contagion from the right was likely to take place, as the mass membership party 
declined and was replaced by parties that were more exclusively concerned with 
electoral success and organised along smaller and more professional lines. The 
old elite-cadre organisational model was therefore re-emerging, but as a new 
variant of this old party type. 
This is exactly what happened in New Zealand, most notably since the 1960s. It 
is the argument of this thesis that in New Zealand today the mass party type and 
ethos is clearly extinct. None of the parties possess dominant or SUbstantial 
extra-parliamentary organisations. They may still have the legal or official 
appearance or status of authority but they are in reality all greatly subservient to 
the parliamentary wing. In some ways the New Zealand parties still look like 
mass parties in that they have regular members', branches, party conferences 
and so forth, but in practice they all emphasise the role of the parliamentary party 
as being at the top of the structure and the role of the extra-parliamentary 
organisation and membership as the supporters of the parliamentary leadership. 
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It was the effect of the quickly-developing mass media, Kirchheimer argued, that 
was providing party leaders the capacity to market their parties to the whole 
electorate, in a similar way to businesses selling to consumers (Kirchheimer, 
1966: p.192). This was an important part of the emergence of the new party 
model which was termed the 'catch-all party' by Kirchheimer, but which is 
generally now seen within the party literature as being an early form of the 
'electoral-professional party' .11 Kirchheimer is particularly noted for his 
sociological argument that in the postwar period parties have been transforming 
from class-based parties into vehicles with much more heterogeneous social 
support. Kirchheimer argued that modern parties were increasingly attempting to 
attract votes from whatever social groups they could, and this was having a 
highly significant effect on ideological competition.12 In contrast to the class-
based mass parties which behaved almost as electoral pressure groups of 
specific social constituencies, the new electoral-professional parties aimed at 
more immediate success by appealing to a wider market of voters. They 
therefore formulated programmes which were not so strongly partisan or divisive, 
but which could claim to serve the interest of the whole electorate. 
The idea of catch-all parties therefore tied in with the ideas of the 'end of 
ideology' in the 1960s and the weakening of social cleavages that had previously 
been the foundation of stable party systems (Broughton and Donovan, 1999: 
p.4). In line with this, the parties moved from stressing comprehensive 
programmes to emphasising specific issues. The importance of leadership also 
became more emphasised - with parties promoting the technical and managerial 
qualifications of their candidates. 13 This form of party also made for politics based 
around individual political personalities. In this new schema of party politics, 
11 See: Krouwel (2003). 
12 It seems that once in power the party leaders of mass parties have found great reason to shift their 
organisations towards the catch-all model. According to Kirchheimer, the drive for ongoing success pushes 
parties to broaden their appeal beyond their original and distinctive class support (Kirchheimer, 1966: p.190). 
13 See: Maor (1997: pp.106, 109). 
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elections revolve more than ever before around a choice between politicians 
rather than between policies or programmes. 
In this model, according to Moshe Maor, parties are typically responsive rather 
than representative, using 'extensive polling research to formulate many 
presentational strategies aimed at convincing people that their policy platform 
accords most closely with the views of voters' (Maor, 1997: p.106). Kirchheimer 
was particularly critical of this simple reflection of the shifting moods of the 
electorate: 
The instrument, the catch-all party, cannot be much more rational than its normal 
master, the individual voter. ... The voters may, by their shifting moods and their apathy, 
transform the sensitive instrument of the catch-all party into something too blunt to 
serve as a link with the functional powerholders of society (Kirchheimer, 1966: p.200). 
This catchall phenomenon contributes to policy convergence because the need 
to maintain a distinctive constituency through doctrine and policy becomes further 
undermined, thus encouraging 'a waning of the ideological and/or policy 
distinctiveness of the parties' (Katz and Mair, 1997: pp.1 02-1 03). As a result of 
the highly responsive nature of electoral-professional parties, 'Any firm 
commitment to anything beyond a vague promise of "better days ahead under 
us" is antithetic to the style of a catch-all party - it may alienate some voters' 
(Jaensch, 1994: p.243). 
Most party theorists have seized upon only these ideological issues in 
understanding Kirchheimer's thesis.14 The Italian political sociologist Angelo 
Panebianco (1988) argues that theorists have been inclined to over-emphasise a 
sociological reading of Kirchheimer's analysis, concentrating on the shift away 
from class-based support to much more heterogeneous electoral support.15 
14 For although it is thought that the catch-ali party model that Kirchheimer studied was primarily significant 
because of its heterogeneous approach to classes, his new party model was also characterised by 
significant changes in its organisational nature. 
15 See: Ward (1991: p.168). 
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Panebianco's analysis of the electoral-professional party concentrates more on 
issues of organisation. He distinguishes the new party form by its reliance on 
professionals, its use of new forms of communication techniques, and the 
strengthening of the role of leadership. Panebianco has therefore argued that the 
term 'electoral-professional' party is preferable to catch-all party because it 
emphasises the 'professionalisation' of the new model and underlines the crucial 
organisational difference between mass parties and the new party type. In this 
new arrangement, the traditional party office holders are displaced by 
professionals with both technical and political skills, which are of more use in the 
modern media and political environment. The role of professionals not only 
increases in the parliamentary offices of the parties, but also in the extra-
parliamentary party organisation. 16 
The whole function of the extra-parliamentary party organisation changes under 
the electoral-professional model. While the mass party performed an integrative 
and expressive function in society, the electoral-professional party is preoccupied 
with winning elections and therefore more narrowly involved in the recruitment of 
leaders, the legitimation of authority, and generally publicising the parliamentary 
leadership. This means that the activities of the party organisation that were 
previously directed towards the organisation and maintenance of the party in the 
electorate are now overtaken by the mobilisation of support in the electorate at 
large. The role of servicing and organising the party membership and generally 
building the party in the electorate becomes downgraded and secondary to 
winning votes. While this is partly due to the decreasing amount of people 
belonging to the parties, it is mostly because the party leaders have no significant 
roles for members to play and contribute to their parties. The effectiveness of 
professionalisation means that it is far better for a party to put the bulk of its 
resources into electoral-related activity than party-building.17 In general, both the 
16 See: Mair (1997: p.145). The growing professionalism of the parties can be seen in their accumulation of 
capital resources, as examined in Chapter Seven. 
17 Party leaders also have 'less interest in catering for the interests and opinions of the rank-and-file in the 
intra-party decision-making process' (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.3). Leaders are therefore less likely to encourage 
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national office and the membership still have a role in the campaign - but not the 
central role they once had. While they still carry out much of the logistical 
operations of the campaign, they do not generally have the actual control over 
decision-making that they once possessed. In a sense, then, the extra-
parliamentary organisations are now akin to 'service organisations' carrying out 
the demands of the party professionals and politicians in Parliament. Meanwhile 
'the parliamentary party has become increasingly self-sufficient and autonomous 
from the central party office' (Farrell, 1994: p.224). 
The increasing reliance on capital resources instead of labour resources is also a 
key element of the transition from the mass party model to the electoral-
professional party model. Previously, the mass membership party could not 
afford to hire much professional labour and, therefore, offered members policy 
promises in exchange for their involvement (Maor, 1997: p.97). It is partly for this 
reason that such parties were marked by ideology. In contrast, electoral-
professional parties are generally more able to rely on professional labour, 
thereby avoiding the exchange relationship with the membership.18 The necessity 
for modern political parties to have large capital resources - as examined in 
Chapter Seven - is also part of what drives them to the electoral-professional 
model. The campaign technologies of today are very sophisticated, and require 
greater resources of capital than labour. 
Clearly the hierarchy and dynamics of power have been re-arranged. Previously 
the party in the electorate was often as politically powerful as the parliamentary 
wing, and the party officials played a mediating role to ensure that the will of the 
party in the electorate prevailed over the politicians. Under the electoral-
professional model, the party organisation clearly follows the dictates of the 
parliamentary leadership (Mair, 1997: p.145), and the leaders of the 
the traditional-type of representative party structures that 'function as participatory, representative and 
communicative channels in the political system' (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.3). 
18 An examination of the capital resources of the New Zealand political parties follows in Chapter Seven. 
Chapter Six: Party Organisation and Membership 379 
parliamentary wing are both more autonomous and dominant within the party. 
This is largely because they no longer require a strong party organisation.19 
Instead they can appeal to all voters through the link of the mass media and 
other modern campaign resources. Also, with fewer members, the autonomy of 
the parliamentary wings has consequently grown. For example, the parliamentary 
wings of the parties have often taken full control of the policy-making process, in 
which the membership and extra-parliamentary organisation were once reserved 
a key role.2o 
The extra-parliamentary national offices of the parties have also declined 
significantly. Increasingly, Western political parties carry out their traditional 
organising functions from within their parliamentary offices. Certainly in New 
Zealand it is often from Parliament that the parties now create policy, 
communicate with voters and members, create strategy, fundraise, and research 
material for policy. The extra-parliamentary organisations still play a part in 
holding annual conferences, but these have changed a great deal, and are, more 
than ever, showpieces for the parliamentary wing to court the media.21 That the 
conferences are forums empty of any decision-making politics is illustrated by the 
fact that discussion and voting on remits now forms only a minor part of the 
agendas. 
Part Two: Party Membership Numbers 
The most obvious way in which the parties now organise themselves differently is 
in their orientation to membership. A spectacular collapse of New Zealand party 
19 Katz and Mair (1997: p.96). 
20 According to Maor, 'The decline in party membership and party activism during 1960-92 is in stark 
contrast to the growth of autonomy of the parliamentary groups. Individual members seem to be playing a 
subordinate role in policy-making, and their only significant power has been to select parliamentary 
candidates' (Maor, 1997: p.122). 
21 Party conferences are increasingly like US Party-style rallies for leaders. 
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membership began in the 1960s and, despite a recovery in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, has continued to decline. This has meant that the political parties in 
Parliament are now low-membership, cadre-type institutions, which are more 
reliant on the resources of the state and on business donations. 
It is important to clarify exactly what the definition of political party membership is. 
This allows a better idea of the validity of party figures. For the purposes of this 
chapter, a distinction is made between those party members who have joined the 
main body of the party - direct members - and those that belong to an affiliated 
organisation - indirect members.22 It is less common in contemporary New 
Zealand politics, but some Western political parties have affiliated organisations 
that appeal to particular groups - typically trade unions. For the purposes of this 
thesis, only the direct members count as full party members, although 
indirect/affiliate members are also of some interest. The party literature generally 
regards indirect/affiliate members as problematic, mainly because, 'An unknown 
proportion of the indirect members may, in fact, be quite ambiguous in their 
allegiances to the party. There may be cases of indirect members who support 
other parties' (Widfeldt, 1995: p.137}.23 
Even the figures for the direct membership of the parties are questionable. All 
political parties are prone to exaggerate the size of their memberships, as the 
parties like to 'maintain at least the image of a mass party' and members in this 
sense legitimise the parties, showing that they are 'viable channels for political 
representation' (Mair, 1997: p.148). Hence, there are also often reliability 
problems with the claims of the parties about their membership size. In addition, 
22 This has an important implication for the membership figures: for if the affiliate trade union membership of 
the Labour Party is included (which currently pay fees at about ten percent of the cost of ordinary 
membership) then in 1986, for example, the Labour Party could be said to have had about 250,000 
members, whereas the party claimed only 65,000 members. 
23 Blondel has argued for the primacy of direct individual membership in political parties, stating, 'individual 
membership has long been thought to be the basis and main characteristic of modern political parties ... 
membership is held to be the result of the voluntary and indeed deliberate action of individuals wishing to 
show that they approve of a party ideology and programme' (Blondel, 1978: p.145). 
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internal party records are also prone to mistakes, such as multiple recording of 
individuals. A loose definition of membership may have been responsible for the 
incredibly high membership numbers reported by the National Party in the 1950s 
and 1960s and the Labour Party around the early 1980s. Especially in the case 
of National, there is some evidence that the simple act of making a small 
donation to a party canvasser was regarded as bestowing the status of 
membership. In this sense, there is often a blurring of the separation between the 
categories of supporters and members. Also in the case of National, often whole 
families have been enrolled as members, which might suggest a less than robust 
and meaningful concept of membership.24 
There are great difficulties in obtaining internal information about political party 
membership numbers. Because the parties operate in an obviously very political 
environment, they function as secret societies, on guard against the preying of 
their opponents. As numbers decline and remain low, the New Zealand parties 
have become even more guarded about their current membership statistics. 
There have been times, of course, when the parties have declared their 
membership figures,25 or they have been leaked. The validity of these figures, 
however, is often questionable. Not only do parties deliberately exaggerate their 
figures, but some membership figures include people who are merely in affiliated 
organisations,26 while other figures include people who have ceased to pay their 
24 See: James (James, 1994j), who argues that, 'Whole families can be signed up for a few dollars, including 
children who presumably give limited consideration to the pros and cons. Some members, according to 
repeated statements during debates at divisional conferences this year, are "50c members", many are "$1 
members". If all 55,000 claimed members were required to pay Labour's minimum $11 ~ee, National might 
not outnumber Labour as dramatically as it now appears'. See also: Gustafson (1986: p.200). 
25 For instance, in 1985 the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform requested and received information from 
all the main political parties about internal information such as membership numbers. There are also a. 
number of newspaper reports and interviews where party officials have been quoted on membership 
numbers, and the Electoral Commission requests information from the parties on membership numbers 
every three years at election time (when allocating broadcast time and money). 
26 Figures for the Labour Party sometimes include the many affiliated members in trade unions who do not 
constitute ordinary branch members. 
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party dues, and some membership numbers are really only the figures of those 
people on a party's general mailing list of interested or sympathetic voters.27 
There have also been some academic and state surveys which enquire about 
party membership. Such surveys must also be taken with caution as this method 
usually results in inflated membership numbers. According to party scholar 
Anders Widfeldt, this is because, 'it is likely that people who are not willing to co-
operate in a survey are also less likely to be party members, and thus are over-
reported in the sample loss; in other words, a risk that the proportion of members 
is exaggerated' (Widfeldt, 1995: p.141 }.28 
There is some debate in the political party literature about how best to measure 
and compare membership numbers. This chapter is mainly concerned with the 
raw membership numbers. According to Scarrow, using 'absolute membership 
figures may be best for judging the aggregate strength and political capacity of 
grass-roots party organizations, showing whether parties have sufficient 
supporters to maintain some kind of presence at the local level' (Scarrow, 2000: 
p.87). However, there is sometimes a need to frame membership figures for 
some comparison, and so this chapter also makes use of membership measured 
by the ratio of members against votes received by the party (MN). According to 
Scarrow, 'if the aim is to compare particular parties' success in providing 
supporters with an organizational home, it makes sense to standardize 
membership in terms of party vote' (Scarrow, 2000: p.87). Some authors, such as 
Katz and Mair et al. (1992: p.331) 'have dismissed the first two measures as 
27 The meaning of the term 'party membership' and the criteria for membership is also contested. Both the 
Labour and National parties have claimed that they only allow a person into their parties after they are 
accepted by a vote in the party branch in which they live, but the standard practice for enrolling as a member 
is simply to send in a signed membership form with the necessary membership fee. Furthermore, nearly all 
the political parties allow people to join up through the party's website. 
28 A second surveying problem identified by Widfeldt concerns the issue of affiliated membership: some 
affiliated members 'may answer "no" to a question about party membership because they are unaware of it, 
have forgotten about it, or because they do not consider themselves as real members. At the same time, 
however, some [affiliated] members may answer "yes", even if they would really prefer not to be members' 
(Widfeldt, 1995: p.141). 
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unsatisfactory because they do not take adequate account of the context of party 
development and the relationship between organizational and electoral success' 
(Scarrow, 2000: p.8?). Richard Katz and Peter Mair suggest that membership be 
framed as part of the overall electorate, by measuring the ratio of members 
against the whole electorate (M/E}.29 This is the third measure this chapter uses. 
Scarrow says that 'If the aim is to assess the extent to which parties provide 
outlets for citizen political participation, it makes sense to standardize party 
membership in terms of the total electorate' (Scarrow, 2000: p.8?). 
For Scarrow's compilation of the New Zealand figures for this last method (M/E), 
see Figure 6.1 (which is based on the membership numbers in Table 6.1, which 
shows the combined membership figures for all the parties for the last five 
decades). This data suggests a very dramatic fall in party membership in New 
Zealand, from nearly 24 percent of the electorate in the 1950s to only 2 percent 
in the 1990s. According to Scarrow's international comparisons, New Zealand 
parties have been afflicted by a greater membership decline than in any other of 
the 14 OEeD countries she studied. 
Figure 6.1: Membership/Electorate (Scarrow Data) 
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Table 6.1: Aggregate Party Membership (Scarrow Data) 
Year Aggregate Numbers 
1950 288,000 
1960 264,000 
1970 288,000 
1980 167,000 
1990s 50,000 
.. Source: Scarrow (2000: p.89), uSing membership information from Chapman et al. (1962), Levine 
(1979), Milne (1966), and Mulgan (1994). 
A slightly less pronounced and steady decline is plotted by Jack Vowles (2002), 
seen in Figure 6.2 (based on the membership numbers in Table 6.2). This data 
shows that about 22 percent of the electorate was enrolled in parties in 1954, and 
this dropped by about half in the early 1970s, and then declined further in the 
1980s and 1990s. Vowles' membership figures are more detailed than Scarrow's, 
and generally they are very credible, except for the 1996 and 1999 figures, 
supplied by the Electoral Commission which are probably over-stated. The 20-
odd parties registered with the Commission together claimed 153,000 members 
in 1996 and then 132,890 members in 1999. Unfortunately, these totals include 
Labour's affiliate membership, which is not included in the previous figures, and 
probably should not be compared. Therefore included in the Electoral 
Commission's figures of 153,000 and 132,890 were about 40,00030 unionists who 
were 'members' of the Labour Party by way of union affiliation rather than being 
direct members. Consequently, the number of New Zealanders that were direct 
branch members of political parties in 1999 was probably more like 113,000 in 
1996 and 93,000 in 1999. As a proportion of 1999 eligible voters, therefore, party 
membership density was probably about 3.3 percent instead of 4.8 percent, as 
claimed by Vowles. A revised version of these figures is in Appendix A. 
30 According to Vowles, the affiliated membership of Labour in 1996 was about 40,000 (2002b: pA18). 
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Figure 6.2: Membership/Electorate (Vowles Data) 
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Source: Vowles (2002: p.416), using membership information from Gustafson (1986; 1997), Miller 
(1989), RCES (1986), Vowles (1994), and Harris (1997). 
Survey research also confirms these trends, and suggests some similar levels of 
party membership. Figure 6.3 includes the results of surveys carried out by (1) 
Austin Mitchell in 1966, (2) Stephen Levine and Nigel S Roberts over the 1970s, 
1980s and early 1990s, and (3) by the Electoral Commission in 1994 and 1997. 
Mitchell's 1966 survey suggested a membership of 28 percent of the electorate. 
31 Vowles states that the figures for 1996 and 1999 include 'members of Labour's affiliated unions not 
included in the data in 1990 and earlier' (Vowles, 2002: p,416). 
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According to the survey work of Levine and Roberts, about 20 percent of the 
electorate belonged to parties during the 1970s and first half of the 1980s, but by 
1990 this had dropped to only 14 percent (Levine and Roberts, 1992c: p.71).32 
Since then the Electoral Commission's research has indicated numbers to have 
declined further to 6.5 percent in 1994, and then 4 percent in 1997. The survey 
also indicated that 19.5 percent of the voting-age population had previously been 
members of parties (Harris, 1997a: pp.15-16). The survey data is anomalous with 
that of Scarrow and Vowles because the decline in numbers appears to occur 
much later in time. This could be the result of a time lag expressed by the survey 
method, as many of those surveyed may have claimed to be party members long 
after their membership had lapsed. 
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The downward trend in membership numbers during the late 1990s (and through 
to 2002) is also confirmed by aggregate membership figures released by the 
Electoral Commission for Labour, National, the Greens, the Alliance, Christian 
Heritage, United Future, and the Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party. Since 1996 
when the Electoral Commission first began allocating election broadcast funding, 
32 Of the same survey respondents, about 2.5 percent claimed to be members of the Labour Party (Levine 
and Roberts, 1992c: p. 71). 
Chapter Six: Party Organisation and Membership 387 
all these parties have supplied membership information to the Commission, and 
thus it is possible to compare the aggregate figure for these seven parties over 
the three election period. The Commission includes the Greens in this three 
election comparison on the basis that its membership was combined in the 
Alliance's 1996 figure, and it includes United Future on the basis of including the 
memberships of its component parties in the 1996 and 1999 figures. Excluded 
from the comparison are parties such as Act, New Zealand First, and the 
Progressive Coalition Party, all of whom did not submit membership numbers for 
all three elections. As shown in Table 6.3 below, the aggregate membership for 
all seven parties has declined significantly over the three elections, from 115,093 
in 1996 to 83,944 in 2002. It should be noted that these figures include Labour's 
affiliate members. Paul Harris, the chief executive of the Electoral Commission, 
comments further on these figures: 
Of the 7 parties for which we have information for both 2002 and 1999, 4 had falling 
memberships and 3 had increasing memberships. Of the 6 parties (Le. excluding the 
Greens) for which we have information for both 1999 and 1996, 4 had falling 
memberships and 2 had increasing memberships. Of the 6 parties for which we have 
information for 2002 and 1996, 4 had falling memberships and 2 had increasing 
memberships (Harris, 2003).33 
Table 6.3: Aggregate Membership for Seven Parties - Electoral 
Commission 
Year Aggregate Numbers 
1996 115,093 
1999 103,021 
2002 83,944 
Source: Hams (2003). 
The following sections detail the quantitative and qualitative changes in the 
memberships for the individual parties. 
33 In addition, Harris notes 'You can't assume that the same parties rose or fell in each case. In addition, 
whether a party rose or fell can be affected by whether it acquired or lost component parties, e.g. United 
Future NZ and the Alliance' (Harris, 2003). 
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The Labour Party 
Traditionally the Labour Party has had two types of members: direct branch 
members and indirect members in unions affiliated to the party. Typical of social 
democratic parties generally, Labour was established early in the century as the 
political wing of the industrial labour movement, and was therefore actually set up 
and financed by the trade unions - hence their privileged role in the party over 
the following decades. The branch membership component of the party was an 
afterthought, only coming into existence so that the party could make use of its 
non-union supporters. Even by the time the party took power in 1935, Labour 
only had 8300 branch members compared to an industrial membership of 23,814 
(Gustafson, 1992b: pp.274, 275). More recently, the affiliate union membership 
has ceased to have any real relevance in the party, and the only meaningful 
membership figure is that of direct members. 
By the end of its first term in government (1935-38), Labour Party membership 
had surged to 51,174 (Gustafson, 1976a: p.10). However, the story of the party's 
membership since then is that of a membership in decline. According to Barry 
Gustafson, 'despite a temporary resurgence in themid-1950s, Labour's grass-
roots membership became very sparse and withered, dropping to a mere 13,476 
in 1969 (Gustafson, 1992b: p.275).34 In fact, membership as a ratio of the 
electorate (M/E) declined much more drastically. According to Douglas Webber, it 
fell by 85 percent between 1940 and 1969 (Webber, 1978: p.190). Likewise, 
Gustafson has used membership as a ratio of Labour's voters (MN) and 
calculated that during the period 1938 to 1969 membership fell from almost one 
in 13 Labour voters to less than one in fifty (Gustafsonb, 1976: p.10). 
34 Jesson has pointed out that 'Even in Auckland, the party's largest and most important region, there were 
only 2,695 members in 1970, with probably only a few hundred activists and a handful of stalwarts running 
most electorate organisations' (Jesson, 1989a: p.25). A 1971 membership of about 120 in the Wellington 
Central electorate also suggested a collapse in Labour Party affairs (Shand, 1978: p.174). 
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During the first half of the 1970s, the party's membership remained at about 
14,000, and then fell even further after the Third Labour Government's defeat in 
1975.35 By this time the working class component of the party had largely fallen 
out of the membership, as evidenced by the decline in the traditionally large 
working class branches, while the branches in the more marginal (and hence 
middle class) electorates fared better.36 Not only was the Labour Party now 
largely without a working class branch membership, but the trade unions too, 
according to Webber, had either 'relinquished or been dispossessed' of their 
power within the party (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
In the mid-to-Iate 1970s, under the presidency of Arthur Faulkner and then Jim 
Anderton, Labour embarked on a modernisation drive to rejuvenate the party 
organisation. According to the membership figures of Webber and Colin James, 
the branch numbers quickly rose to 55,000 in 1976 and then about 80,000 in the 
early 1980s (Webber, 1978: p.191; James, 1987a: p.32).37 In 1986 the party 
claimed to the Royal Commission on the Electoral System (RCES) that they had 
35 Comparing the dismal state of Labour's membership to that of National's then purported 200,000 
members, Alexander Davidson argued that rather than being classified as a mass party, the Labour Party 
had become 'a cadre party in its organisation, membership and elite recruitment' (Davidson, 1989: p.351). 
Webber also commented that branch membership was so low 'that the party's ability to organise its potential 
supporters for electoral purposes - the most important activity of a pragmatic party - was open to 
considerable doubt' (Webber, 1978: p.190). 
36 See: Webber (1978: p.187). 
37 According to Levine, 'The 1976-8 membership drive appears to have returned the party to its late 1930s 
peak of around 50,000' (Levine, 1979: p.72). James has stated that Anderton was able to increase the 
membership to around 80,000 in the early 1980s, and Anderton himself claims that membership reached the 
100,000 mark in 1981 (James, 1987a: p.32; McLennan and Rentoul, :1989). According to Bain, the numbers 
reached 49,837 in 1981, and Grafton has produced a figure of 65,000 that he claims was the party's peak in 
1983 (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8; Grafton, 1990: p.16). By the time of the 1984 general election, the Labour Party 
was apparently claiming to have 100,000 members (Walker, 1989: p.217), although according to Jesson this 
figure was the amount of people on the party's mailing list rather than actual paid-up members (Jesson, 
1989a: p.46). James has cited the 1984 membership as being 'around 50,000' (James, 1990a: p.66), while 
Kelsey has produced a figure of 45,000 (Kelsey, 1995: p.36). Anderton later claimed that membership at that 
point had actually fallen to 40,000 - a figure also backed up by other Labour Party office holders (McLennan 
and Rentoul, 1989). 
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about 50,000 direct members (RCES, 1986: p.212). Following their re-election in 
1987 Labour's membership declined markedly, according to Gustafson, 'to 
27,000 in 1987 and to only 11,000 by May 1988' (Gustafson, 1992: pp.275-
276).38 The political programme and behaviour of the Fourth Labour Government 
clearly offended many traditional Labour Party members. By 1990 official Labour 
Party records show the membership of the party to have dropped to only 6987 
(Sheppard, 1999: p.215). Labour was once again a cadre party. 
Following the party's subsequent defeat, and throughout the early 1990s, 
membership remained at its previous low levels. James, for instance, cited a 
membership figure of 13,000 in 1991 (James, 1991c: p.17). Then membership hit 
its lowest point in 1994 following the replacement of Mike Moore as party leader 
by Helen Clark, when many of Moore's supporters left the party in the aftermath 
of the bitter struggle (Allen, 1999). Membership figures subsequently hovered 
around the 5000 mark. In fact during April 1994, disaffected Labour MP and 
caucus secretary Jack Elder leaked internal party information which showed that 
membership had declined from 5600 to 3600 (Underhill, 1994a: p.9).39 
In November 1997 it was reported that the Labour Party had recorded a rise in its 
membership from 5,000 to 6,500 (Edwards 1997c: p.7; Herbert, 1997).40 After a 
38 This is also confirmed by party insider Simon Walker, who disclosed that in 1989 'unofficial membership 
estimates stood at around 10,000 to 15,000' (Walker, 1989: p.217). By 1990 'the most generous count', 
James reported, would put the membership at 'around 20,000', but James believed the party had become 'a 
cadre party of a few committed people' (James, 1990: p.66). The large discrepancies between the 
membership figures for Labour in the 1980s illustrate the difficulties in ascertaining reliable membership 
numbers. 
39 As a result, Elder was sacked from his position as caucus secretary, but the party president, Maryan 
Street, did not attempt to deny Elder's figures, instead pointing out that the leaked figures 'were distorted 
because membership renewals had gone out late' (Underhill, 1994a: p.9). Similarly, the party's financial 
report for 1994 shows that $73,090 was received in membership subscriptions that year, suggesting that if 
all members paid the $11 fee, then the party only had about 6644 members (Edwards, 1994). 
40 According to Nick Venter, party 'president Michael Hirschfeld told the [Labour] conference membership 
was up 31 percent on last year' (Venter, 24 Nov 1997: p.2). It was also reported that in 1997 Labour had 
'raised its Maori membership by more than 50 per cent' (Herbert, 1997). 
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decade of falling numbers Labour had managed to reverse the decline, but 
despite the party's success in the polls a significant-sized membership eluded the 
party.41 Despite the many campaigns to revitalise membership numbers, 
Labour's party organisation obtained few new members and has essentially 
remained a cadre organisation. The most recent figure reported is a membership 
of 14,000 (Tunnah, 2002). The Labour Party has gone from apparently having 
one of the largest per capita memberships of any Labour Party in the Western 
world, to now possibly one of the smallest whilst in government. Making the 
assumption that Labour had about 14,000 members in 2002 means that in 
relation to its 838,219 voters Labour now has a very low party membership 
density (M/V) of only 1.7 percent (see Appendix A). 
This history of the Labour Party's membership numbers in this chapter is made 
up from the estimations and statements made on the topic by commentators, 
politicians and the parties - of which there are 109 recorded figures. These 
numbers are found in Appendix B. These estimations and declarations - which 
are of varying reliability - can also be seen on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 
6.4. This graph visually tells the story of Labour's membership rise from its low 
numbers in 1917, rising dramatically in the 1930s, after which it slowly and 
steadily declined through to the late 1970s. It then rose again dramatically to a 
high point in the early 1980s that the commentators have many different figures 
for. After this it fell steadily to very low numbers in the 1990s. The trend line 
imposed on the graph illustrates that the general movement of numbers over time 
has been sloping moderately downwards. 
41 Labour's general secretary at the time, Rob Allen, claimed that Labour Party membership had fallen 
significantly between 1987 and 1996 but had since bottomed out, and the party was experiencing 'a small 
growth incline' (Allen, 1999). He claimed that Labour had a membership exceeding 20,000, and that 
therefore the party had a membership 'probably at least as big if not bigger' than the National's (Allen, 1999). 
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Figure 6.4: Labour Party Membership Estimates 
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There are 34 estimations and statements for the affiliate membership numbers of 
the Labour Party. These numbers are found in Appendix C, and can also be seen 
on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 6.5. This graph shows that like the 
direct/branch party membership, the general movement of affiliate numbers over 
time has been sloping moderately downwards, albeit it with sUbstantial rises in 
the 1930s and 1980s. 
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Figure 6.5: Labour Party Affiliate Membership 
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The National Party 
The National Party was previously the largest voluntary organisation in the 
country, and relative to population, was allegedly once the largest mass 
membership party in the Western world.42 At the height of its membership in 
1960, the party claimed to have a quarter of a million members. This impressive 
figure meant that the party had enrolled close to half of its voters (a membership 
density of 44 percent). National has therefore always been substantially larger 
than the Labour Party.43 As early as 1938 - only two years after the party was 
created - it claimed 100,000 members - nearly twice that of Labour. By 1946 
National boasted 181,000 members, and in 1960 the party peaked at 246,000.44 
In 1962 Austin Mitchell reported that the party's membership was still a 
42 See: James (1987a: p.25), Wood (2001: pp.246-247), and Upton (1994a). 
43 According to Gustafson, at its membership peak, National 'outnumbered Labour's financial membership 
15 to one. Even if the ratio of active members was somewhat less favourable to National, it still meant that in 
most electorates National could call on many more workers to canvass, persuade, raise money, and get 
people on the roll and to the poll than could its opponents' (Gustafson, 1986: p.122). 
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formidable 230,000 (Mitchell, 1962a: pp.21-22). In the following decade, as 
National evolved towards an electoral-professional party model, it lost about 
100,000 members - yet the party's claim of 145,000 in 1972 was still a long way 
ahead of its rival (Gustafson, 1997c: p.139). The health of National was partially 
revitalised in the mid-1970s, when it reached 'at least 170 000 members in 1975' 
- a figure 'more than twelve times as great as Labour's branch membership' 
(Webber, 1978: pp.190-191). According to Tony Wood, National membership 
then reached 200,000 in 1978 (Wood, 1980: pp.131-132). But then in 1980 the 
Colonels' Coup, combined with the emergence of the free-market wing of the 
party, caused a major disturbance within National. And in the early 1980s, the 
party's urban, middle class and liberal base was burnt off by Muldoon's economic 
interventionism and social conservatism (Upton, 1.992b: p.8). As Muldoon 
became more extreme in his economic intervention, the party's reputation as a 
party of enterprise and freedom suffered, pushing the more innovative and 
radical members in the younger age group to leave. Thus in 1984 membership 
dropped significantly to 133,000, and according to James, 'the organisation was 
a shell' (Jesson, 1989c: p.157; James, 1987: p.26). 
During the mid-1980s, membership dwindled as the party had trouble trying to 
find itself politically - coping with the ideological hangover of the Muldoon years 
and the fact that the Labour Party was stealing National's free-market position in 
the party system. At the end of 1985 the party informed the Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System that it had a membership of close to 100,000 (RCES, 
1986: p.214). Then in the late 1980s there was said to be a resurgence of 
membership numbers as the party crystallised as some sort of opposition to 
Rogernomics and the party looked like replacing Labour in gov~rnment. Also at 
this time, the National Party attempted to transform its extra-parliamentary 
organisation into a more modern operation, and this had important implications 
44 According to Tony Wood, 'The success of National as a mass party had continued through its years in 
office in the 1950s. Minimal subscriptions (Two shillings and sixpence) and a loose definition of "member" 
inflated reported numbers' (Wood, 1989: p.224). 
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for membership numbers. This started particularly after the election of John 
Collinge to the presidency of the party in 1989, after which the party instituted a 
technological update of its organisational operations.45 
Although National's membership remained substantially higher than any other 
party's, its decline has nevertheless been the most SUbstantial in recent years, 
especially since 1991. After the election of the Fourth National Government in 
1990 and its implementation of unpopular and un-signalled policies that 
essentially continued the former Labour Government's unpopular programme, 
the National Government became 'the most unpopular government since regular 
polling began in New Zealand' (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.73). As a result, according 
to Paul Goldsmith, 'The party's elderly left en masse, whole branches "fled in 
disgust", uprooting the Party's finances and tearing the heart out of the 
organisation' (Goldsmith, 1997: p.168). Gustafson believes that 'membership 
collapsed within a year from 100,000 to 40,000 and never recovered' (Gustafson, 
1999). Similarly, Jenni McManus claimed that membership had dropped from 'a 
high of nearly 80,000 to only 33,000' in 1993 (McManus, 1993: p.5).46 This 
decline is illustrated by leaked membership figures for the four northernmost 
electorates in 1991. They showed that in the previous 12 months membership 
had fallen from 6,741 to 1,850 - a 73 percent decline (NZ Herald, 9 Nov 1991). 
By the late 1990s National had lost the broad base and mass membership that it 
once legitimately claimed. During Geoff Thompson's presidency (1994-98), the 
downward spiral of membership continued, leading Thompson to warn 'that the 
party ran the risk of selections being hijacked by narrow interest groups unless 
the membership was sufficiently broad-based' (Luke, 2 May 1998: p.19). One 
leading party official, Lindsay Fergusso~, agreed with Thompson, claiming that in 
1998 'some electorates had too few members to select their own candidates' (NZ 
45 See: James (1990a: p.71). 
46 The then National Party president, John Collinge, disputed the latter figure, 'saying membership is 
currently running at around 60,000' (McManus, 1993: p.5). Even Collinge's figure represented a significant 
decline. 
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Herald, 23 Jun 1998). He believed that the, 'Traditional means of recruiting 
members and supporters are not working for us' (quoted in the NZ Herald, 23 Jun 
1998). 
Although no reliable figures exist, it seems that in the mid-1990s total 
membership was somewhere between 20,000 and 50,000. While National MP 
Simon Upton often cited membership figures between 40,000 and 50,000, 
Armstrong reported that 'Some political opponents claim it has now fallen below 
20,000' (Armstrong, 16 May 1994: p.1). By 2001 party membership had possibly 
dipped below 20,000, with the party president Michelle Boag revealing that the 
membership was the lowest it had ever been.47 
This history of the National Party's membership numbers in this chapter is 
informed by the estimations and statements made on the topic by commentators, 
politicians and the parties - of which there are 57 recorded figures in Appendix D. 
These estimations and declarations - which are of varying reliability - can also 
be seen on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 6.6. This graph shows that the 
numbers have declined fairly steady since the 1950s, but especially in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s. 
47 Boag also claimed in October 2001 that 'Membership has gone up by between 15 and 20 percent in the 
last couple of months' (quoted in Black, 2001: p.15). 
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Figure 6.6: National Party Membership Estimates 
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New Zealand First 
The number of New Zealand First members is especially difficult to ascertain. 
The high secrecy of the organisation is such that all internal party information is 
kept as close to the leadership as possible. Early in the party's life New Zealand 
First claimed to have more than 10,000 members, and Winston Peters often 
claimed the party was the second biggest in New Zealand (Scherer, 1994b). 
However, as former New Zealand First MP and adviser Michael Laws explained, 
'Like many of Winston's claims this one also exceeded the straitjacket of 
actuality' (Laws, 1998a: p.347). Laws has also written that while he was involved 
in New Zealand First he had observed that the party organisation was very 
centralised and correspondingly weak throughout most of the country. Laws 
discovered that interested supporters of the party 'had no focus for their energy, 
no representative to lobby local voting blocs and no contact for prospective 
members .... I received bashful reminders that New Zealand First scarcely existed 
south of Taupo with the exception of the internecine Christchurch factions' (ibid: 
pp.337-338). Laws also revealed that prior to the 1996 general election 'the party 
was being inundated with "one-dollar memberships" as potential candidates 
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sought to secure their candidacy selection by enrolling family members, the local 
sports club and the not-so-occasional random phantom' (ibid: p.348}.48 When it 
came to applying to the Electoral Commission for election broadcasting money in 
1996 - and thus submitting the party's membership numbers - New Zealand 
First sought assurances from the Commission that such information would 
remain confidential. It seemed, according to Laws, that the party leadership was 
concerned that the public might discover the true low level of party membership 
(ibid: pp.347-348). In 2002 the party suggested that it had a membership figure 
over 4000 when party president Doug Woolerton claimed the party had more 
members than the Greens (3370) and 'a damn sight more' members than the 
Progressive Coalition Party (2000) (quoted in Tunnah, 2002}.49 
This history of New Zealand First's membership numbers in this chapter is 
informed by only a very small number of estimations and statements made on the 
topic by commentators, politicians and the parties - these are found in Appendix 
E. There are too few estimations to warrant a scatter-plot. 
Act New Zealand 
In 1999 the Act party claimed to have 'probably the second highest political 
membership of any party in New Zealand' (Tate, 1999: p.6). This seems very 
unlikely, but the size of Act New Zealand's membership is very hard to ascertain, 
as there are very few reports about it. Soon after its founding in 1994 - and 
before officially becoming a political party - Act claimed a paid-up membership of 
1000, and by 1995 the party was boasting 3000 members (Scherer, 1994a; Act, 
48 It was also reported that New Zealand First activists in Hawke's Bay were signing up unwitting students of 
a Maori language school as party members. A letter was produced in Parliament 'from the school to 
prospective students which told them that as well as paying their tuition fees the school had also paid their 
$1 membership fee to New Zealand First' (Scherer, 1996d). 
49 The 2002 allocation of state broadcasting money was also partly made on the basis that, according to 
Electoral Commission chief Dr Paul Harris, New Zealand First had 'significantly more members' than other 
parties (quoted in NZPA, 2002d). 
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1995). This claim seems questionable. A leaked 1995 internal membership list for 
the whole of Wellington showed that there were only 216 Act members in that 
region, making a national figure of 3000 appear to be erroneous or exaggerated 
(Parkin, 1995). In 1996 both Richard Prebble and Rodney Hide cited a 
membership figure of 7000 (Prebble, 1996; Kirk, 1996: p.23). 
Act's leadership is also prone to blurring the categories of party members and 
party supporters. After the 1996 general election, Prebble proclaimed that 'Only 
Act campaigned in the old-fashioned way, relying on donations from its 14,000 
supporters' (quoted in NZPA, 1997a), and in October 1999 Prebble claimed that 
Act had 14,000 members (Bain, 1999d: p.8). It seems that the 14,000 figure 
claimed by Act is made up of those who asked to be members, supporters or are 
just on the party's mailing list - which is hardly likely to give Act the second 
highest political membership of any party in New Zealand, as they claimed. In 
2001 Act also claimed a total membership to 5000 after purportedly gaining 800 
new members (Langdon, 2001b: p.2).50 
Instead of modelling itself on a mass-membership party, Act has always had as 
its model the electoral-professionalised design of· a cadre-type party. For 
example, the party always attempted to make full use of computer technology in 
a way that meant it would not need a large membership base. As Brian Arps, 
Act's organisational workshop coordinator in 1994, said of the party's elaborate 
communications system, 'the system would remove the need for mailing, 
envelop-stuffing and the large number of meetings' (Small, 1994b: p.24). 
50 In 2001 Act were still professing their belief that they were second to National in terms of membership 
numbers, after claiming that Labour's numbers had fallen to only 3000 (Prebble, 2001). Prebble also claimed 
that Act had 'easily the largest active membership of any political party' after their survey of party members 
resulted in over 1800 of them replying (ibid). Clearly the party's definition of activism was a very limited one. 
In the same year, 2,027 postal votes were cast in Act's high-profile party president contest. These two 
response levels (1800 and 2027) suggest that the party's membership probably lies at something more like 
3000 than 5000. 
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In his study of Act, Patrick Hine discovered that 'the formal opportunities for the 
wider party membership to exercise some influence over ... policy teams and the 
Board that appoints and oversees them are limited in the extreme' (Hine, 1995: 
p.51}.51 This limited meaningfulness afforded to membership was related to the 
party founders' belief that politicians should not be hamstrung by their extra-
parliamentary party organisations. Therefore, 'In Act, the opinion of the party 
member is publicly accorded no more significance than that of any member of the 
public' (Hine, 1995: p.52). The reasons for joining a party with such a low regard 
and return for its membership are obviously not great. 
This history of Act New Zealand's membership numbers in this chapter is 
informed by the estimations and statements made on the topic by commentators, 
politicians and the parties - of which there are 15 recorded figures in Appendix F. 
These estimations and declarations - which are of varying reliability - can also 
be seen on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 6.7. Although the super-imposed 
trend line suggests ongoing growth in Act membership numbers, the estimates of 
14,000 are very unreliable, if these were removed then the trend would be 
somewhat less upward. 
51 Also, according to Act's constitution, it is the party's Board of Trustees, not the membership at large, which 
selects the leader and deputy leader of the party (Small, 1994b: p.24). 
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Figure 6.7: Act NZ Membership Estimates 
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Green Party 
For most of the 1990s, Green Party members numbered only in the hundreds. 
Soon after the Greens joined the Alliance in 1992, the party was believed to have 
about 500 members and this number grew only slowly in the following years. 
When the Greens departed from the Alliance in 1998 they lost a significant 
number of their members and supporters who decided to stay in the larger party. 
Later in the year, after the Greens had undertaken a recruitment drive, the party 
could still only claim 861 financial members (Speden, 1998d: p.14). Towards the 
end of the 1996-99 parliamentary term, the party was failing to make much of an 
impression on the electorate, and consequently membership numbers dropped. 
While the party told the Electoral Commission that it had 1348 members in May 
1999, it later admitted that the number had dropped to 500 (NZPA, 19991: p.2). 
Then, as the party began going up in the opinion polls leading up to the 1999 
general election, people started joining in relatively large numbers. In the six 
months after the election of seven MPs, membership increased by about 50 
percent. According to Rod Donald, in the few weeks following the election, 'Over 
340 people joined the party' (Donald, 2000: p.56). Numbers steadily grew, and by 
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mid-2000 the Greens claimed 2500 members, and by the time of the 2002 
general election, the numbers were up to 3370 (Tunnah, 2002). In 2003 the party 
has about 4000 members (Taylor, 2003a) 
Although the Green Party has always aspired to be a mass participatory party it 
has done little to bring this about. The Greens have a relatively democratic party 
structure, but in practice involve few activist members in steering the direction of 
the party. For example, even campaign management has been an elite activity, 
as co-leader Rod Donald has explained: 'In January 1999, a small group of us 
met to get serious about election year strategies. The group was made up of 
Wellington executive members and others outside the party who believed we 
could still make it back in' (Donald, 2000: p.50). 
This history of the Green Party's membership numbers in this chapter is informed 
by the estimations and statements made on the topic by commentators, 
politicians and the parties - of which there are 15 recorded figures in Appendix 
G. These estimations and declarations - which are of varying reliability - can 
also be seen on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 6.8. The trend line suggests 
steady upward growth in membership numbers. 
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When the United Party was established in 1995, it appeared to be the ultimate 
elite-cadre type party, set up from within Parliament by MPs rather than by any 
strong social force. As a result it had only a very insignificant-sized 
membership.52 In 1996 it claimed to have only 1789 members. Following the 
1996 election, United membership initially dropped away, but party leader Peter 
Dunne soon negotiated to absorb three other minor parties - the Conservatives, 
the Ethnic Minority Party and Advance New Zealand - all of which had previously 
met the membership criteria set by the Electoral Commission, and were thus able 
to supply United with a substantial number of new members. By 2002, however, 
there were reports that membership numbers had dropped substantially, and 
there was speculation that United had fewer than the 500 members required for 
52 The predecessor to United was Peter Dunne's Future New Zealand (of no relation to the Christian party of 
the same name) - which was set up in 1994 by the defecting Labour MP. Despite Dunne signalling his 
departure from Labour well in advance, when he eventually set up the new party, Future NZ fell short of 
recruiting the necessary 500 members for registration as a party. However when United New Zealand was 
established in July 1995, this new party 'had little difficulty in overcoming the hurdle, passing the 500 
member threshold within its first week of existence' (Jackson and McRobie 1998: p.298). 
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registration with the Electoral Commission.53 The United Party's decline was less 
of a problem, however, because in 2001 it united with the Future New Zealand 
party, which had claimed in 1999 to have 2,800 members (NZPA, 28 May 1999: 
p.2). 
The Alliance and Progressive Coalition Party 
The creation of the Alliance in the early 1990s was supposed to herald the 
resurgence of the mass membership party-type.54 However, the figures that the 
party claimed as membership were a mere fraction of what the traditional parties 
once claimed. According to Alliance president, Matt McCarten, the party 
membership in 1993 was 14,000, and a year later this was said to have 
increased to 22,000 (McLoughlin, 1994c: p.64). Then, in 1995, when the Alliance 
submitted its application to register as a political party with the Electoral 
Commission, it claimed to have 25,000 members. 55 These figures subsequently 
declined as Alliance public support dropped. 
Later, in October 1998, a leaked document indicated membership was (at that 
stage of the year) a mere 6800. Party sources say that by the end of 1998 the 
numbers had increased to about 10,000, and in late 1999 McCarten claimed the 
party had 15,600 members (Sain, 1999d: p.8). In 2000, Alliance sources put the 
party membership at about 6000, and in 2001, this had declined to only about 
5000 members. In 2002 - when the party split - the membership declined to 
around 4,000, much of which departed with the Progressive Coalition Party 
(PCP), Democratic Party, and Mana Motuhake, leaving the Alliance with about 
half that figure. 
53 See: Milne (2002d; 2002f). 
54 See: Harris (1993f: p.17). 
55 There is, however, reason to doubt the validity of these original figures. Certainly the constituent parties in 
the Alliance never had memberships that corresponded to anything like the amount that the Alliance 
claimed. For example, the Green Party was believed to have about 500 members in 1992. The smallest 
party in the Alliance, the Liberal Party, before they dissolved in 1997, allegedly had only 37 members. 
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When Jim Anderton broke away from the Alliance to set up the PCP he was able 
to immediately sign up '1177 members in a week, 80 per cent of them former 
Alliance members' (NZPA, 2002b). About 25 percent of these members also 
belonged to the Democratic Party, which was briefly aligned to the PCP (Young, 
2002e). After the election the PCP claimed a membership of 2,200 (ibid).56 
This history of the Alliance's membership numbers in this chapter is informed by 
the estimations and statements made on the topic by commentators, politicians 
and the parties - of which there are 14 recorded figures in Appendix J. These 
estimations and declarations - which are of varying reliability - can also be seen 
on a timescale scatter-plot in Figure 6.9. The trend line suggests firm downward 
decline of membership numbers. 
Figure 6.9: Alliance Membership Estimates 
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56 Anderton claimed that the PCP's membership made it one of the three biggest parties (Tunnah, 2002). 
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Part Three: Explanations for the Decline 
There are a number of reasons for the declining party membership numbers in 
New Zealand - all of which generally fall into two broad categories: (1) reduced 
supply of members from civil society, and (2) reduced demand for members by 
the parties (Scarrow, 2000). Supply-side arguments revolve around changes in 
society, such as lifestyle and declining political preferences that make 
membership less relevant or appealing to citizens. Demand-side arguments are 
related to changes in the organisation of the parties, and in particular, the shift to 
the electoral-professional model which has less of a demand for citizen 
involvement because of a reliance on party professionals and the almost pure 
focus on elections and the media. 
Diminished Supply of Party Members 
There are many factors impacting on the supply of party members to parties that 
relate to other issues discussed in this thesis. Chapter One argues that New 
Zealand political parties have lost much of their scope to make changes in 
society. This is partly because of the influence of globalisation and partly 
because the parties operate in an institution with increasingly less power -
Parliament. New Zealand governments over the last two decades have 
deregulated many areas of society, and therefore taken away the power of 
parliaments and governments to affect change. According to Upton: 'the 
deregulation of the economy and the liberalisation of social constraints means 
that people need the services of political parties much less. Put simply, politicians 
can peddle much less influence in a world without import licensing, liquor 
licensing or an Albanian-style telephone system' (Upton, 1993c: p.8). It seems 
likely that the parties are therefore, less attractive organisations to join due to the 
fact that they now have less power. 
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Chapter Two (on the radicalisation of the party system, 1975-93) showed how 
unpopular the Labour and National parties became after three finance ministers 
(Muldoon, Douglas and Richardson) pushed their governments in radical 
directions, which led to many members exiting their parties in protest. For 
example, Labour lost the bulk of its membership during the second half of the 
1980s when the Fourth Labour Government rejected its former working class 
orientation and implemented its pro-business economic restructuring. Likewise, 
many of the National Party's moderate and older-age members deserted the 
party in droves following Ruth Richardson's 1991 'Mother of All Budgets', benefit 
cuts and the government's failure to fulfil election promises such as removing the 
surtax on superannuation.57 
Chapter Three (on the erosion of ideology since 1993) gave ideological reasons 
for the decline of partisanship in society. That less ideological polarisation 
between the parties exists, together with a lesser emphasis on their ideological 
components, means that membership is therefore less meaningful. Like any 
product in the marketplace, political parties without 'a unique selling point' inspire 
the loyalty of few. In contrast, during the immediate postwar period, when more 
meaningful differences between the two parties were perceived by voters, it was 
easier to bring people into a party on the basis of the dangers of the opposition. 
As one former National Party regional chairman has said of the period of high 
party membership: 'Those were the days when frightening people with labels was 
easy. Labourites were socialists and that was that' (quoted in Rudman, 1993). 
While a fear and dislike of socialism was a uniting factor for those attracted to 
National, the Labour Party attracted members by playing on the fact that its 
opponent was in the pocket of employers - something Labour can hardly raise 
now that it too is reliant on business support. 
Chapter Three also discussed how under MMP parties continue to cast their nets 
widely for voters. This catch-all strategy is designed to broaden their appeal, but 
57 See: Gustafson (1999), and Goldsmith (1997: p.168). 
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it means that those voters with specific political causes or beliefs are less likely to 
find the New Zealand parties as effective vehicles for advancing them. Such 
parties, with their broad policies and philosophies, and the need to balance 
different views, are claustrophobic and cramping for today's single-issue activist. 
Instead of joining anyone party, people interested in politics are more likely to 
see politics as an electoral supermarket and be volatile, supporting more than 
one party (Upton, 1994a). 
The class dealignment and individualisation of society, discussed in Chapter 
Four, also influences party membership. The New Zealand party system is 
decreasingly based on class cleavages, and the relationships between other 
social cleavages and political parties are particularly weak and unstable. The 
declining relevance of social structure to political allegiances has meant that 
while joining the Labour Party or the National Party may have once been an 
expression of one's class position, changes in the political positioning of the two 
main parties has undermined the class nature of membership. In contrast to fifty 
years ago, it is hard for any party to recruit members on the basis of class 
solidarity, as few people in society still view themselves as members of a social 
class, let alone see those political parties as representing their class. 
Along with the breakdown in class politics, a breakdown of communities in 
general is occurring. This might be termed the individualisation of society, a 
situation in which people - regardless of their 'objective' social class or group -
think and act more as individuals than as members of a group, class or 
community. The changes in housing and work have affected the way that society 
interacts. Closely-knit communities have been weakened, which contributes to an 
individualisation of Iife58 - a situation which does not predispose people to want 
to join political parties or undertake other collectivist or community type activity. 
58 See Gustafson (2001: p.27), who argues that as a result of the neo-Iiberal reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, 'Many individuals became alienated and atomised from the economy, the society, the politicians, the 
political system, others, and even themselves. Civil society fragmented and democracy itself was 
increaSingly questioned.' 
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Chapter Five discussed a general depoliticisation process underway in society, 
whereby people are uninterested in taking part in any political process, or even 
joining non-parliamentary political groups. Similarly, large election meetings are a 
thing of the past. The last mass election rally to be held was in the 1987 general 
election, when 4000 National supporters came to the launch of the party's 
campaign. As Vowles et al. pointed out about the 1993 general election, 'one of 
the largest audiences either of the major parties could muster in 1993 was 
estimated to be no more than 500' (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.56). 
In an anti-political age, political parties have a smaller target market for 
recruitment, as people are less interested in politics. As part of this exhaustion of 
politics, people feel that all politics and ideologies have been tried and failed, and 
it has become fashionable to decry not only political parties but politics in 
general, with criticisms that something is 'too political' or 'too ideological,.59 
Without any substantial political events and movements existing in modern 
society, the political culture dissipates, with negative consequences for party 
recruitment. Politicisation usually occurs in relation to the emergence of political 
issues in society. Hence in the late-1970s andearly-1980s a revival in 
membership occurred at the time of the emergence of several new political 
issues: 
Social Credit - which had membership as high as 22,000 - was mounting a challenge to 
the two-party system, and the nuclear issue, feminism and the environment regenerated 
interest in politics. Polarisation of the electorate over the Muldoon Government's handling 
of the Springbok Tour further politicised voters (Bain, 1999d: p.8). 
59 There is also a lack of trust in the value of collective action, hence an unwillingness to join and become 
active in organisations. In a time of rising levels of political cynicism and feelings of powerlessness the public 
are unlikely to turn to political parties. The fall of Soviet-style communism has also played a strong part in 
producing today's apathetic political nature by teaching the public that "there is no alternative": 'Since 
building a "fairer society" is demonstrably impossible, those who claim to be doing so are either fools or 
rogues. Clearly, politics is not something any self-respecting person should dirty his/her hands with. Denied 
the opportunity to do anything more than administer the free-market status quo, politicians and their parties 
quickly find themselves conforming to the stereotypes of their detractors' (Trotter, 1999j: p.13). 
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These ideas of politicisation, anti-politics and anti-partyism are explored futher in 
Chapter Ten. It is argued that the voting public are sceptical about the integrity 
and honesty of political parties. Related to this, it seems that where New 
Zealanders are still interested in joining organised politics they are now more 
likely to join a non-parliamentary interest group. In fact, the current fragmented 
and disorientated politics is very conducive to single-issue politics - which do not 
fit so well with political parties. In a period when strong partisan loyalties to 
political parties have ended, a new type of politics has emerged based on a type 
of 'shopping for policies' (Economist, 1993a: p.68). In this new environment, 
interest groups often play an expanded role in political debate, often superseding 
political parties. As Upton has commented, 'The cudgels can easily be taken up 
by a few individuals and a media campaign. Some people like the idea of lots of 
media-driven campaigns unconnected with broad political movements' (Upton, 
1993c: p.8). The nature of a political issue that is unconnected to others means 
that the campaign for it is often best served by groups that lobby but neither seek 
office nor the development of a broad political programme. 
There is now a certain social stigma attached to the membership of a political 
party. Just as the act of seeking public office or being a politician has lost 
respectability, so too has the act of being part of an organisation that aids 
politicians and their electioneering. That the whole notion of party politics is held 
in disdain by most of the public means that the social status of belonging to a 
party has been greatly reduced. As explored in Chapter Ten on anti-partyism, in 
recent years New Zealanders have indicated a very low opinion of political 
parties. For example, a 1998 Massey University's survey found that 92 percent of 
adults had either 'very little' or no confidence in New Zealand parties (Perry and 
Webster, 1999: p.15). Disillusionment with politics and parties obviously also 
affects the recruitment of members. A central argument throughout the chapters 
of this thesis is that political parties have become more remote as the parties 
have few roots or connections with civil society. Instead of being the expression 
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of the interests of certain social groups, the parties are, more than ever before, 
the representation of the politicians alone. 
There are also many sociological factors that have impacted on society's supply 
of members to parties. Most obviously, in recruiting members, parties face 
competition from alternative social activities. New Zealand political parties once 
fulfilled a non-political function that is now no longer required - entertainment. 
Prior to the 1970s, when political parties had mass memberships, they were 
largely social organisations at a time when New Zealand society had less to offer 
in terms of entertainment. In this 'golden-age' of party membership in New 
Zealand, there was until 1960 no television and fewer other clubs and social 
activities to be involved in. Since the 1960s, however, a myriad of other forms of 
entertainment and social activities have developed, largely reducing the 
membership of political parties to only those who are highly interested in 
politics.6o According to Electoral Commission research, seven times as many 
New Zealanders now belong to 'leisure organisations' as they do to political 
parties (Harris 1998: p.23}.61 This increased involvement in recreation is partly 
due to the increased affluence and availability of transport in New Zealand 
society. Previously, economic scarcity and geographical immobility had restricted 
leisure activities, making membership of local party branches more desirable. 
The postwar boom improved the availability of transport for the individual, and 
this increased the types of recreational activities available to the community 
(Ware, 1996: pp.75-76). Similarly, changes in living styles throughout the 
Western world also changed the way people interacted and entertained 
themselves: 
60 Loosening social and religious values in Western countries since the 1960s have also made other forms 
of entertainment more acceptable. Previously, the culture of the times also acted in favour of party 
membership because 'social and religious values restricted the kinds of arenas of activity that were regarded 
as "respectable", [and] parties were usually able to meet the criterion of "acceptability'" (Ware, 1996: pp.75-
76). 
61 Of those surveyed, only 4 percent claimed to belong to a political party, while 31 percent belonged to a 
sports club, 24 percent belonged to a community group, and 23 percent belonged to a church (Harris 1998: 
p.23). 
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Suburbanization, housing redevelopments, deindustrialization, and a variety of other 
factors led to the replacement of closely knit communities where people interacted 
extensively with each other by much looser patterns of social interaction. The weakening 
of these kinds of networks meant that, in general, it became more difficult to recruit 
members using solidary incentives (Ware, 1996: pp.75-76). 
As the demands of daily life have increased in the last couple of decades -
particularly due to changing work patterns - many people now have less leisure 
time, and are therefore less inclined to get involved in political activity. In 1993, 
even the National Party's Auckland director, John Tremenwan cited the problem 
of 'people having to devote their time to retaining their jobs' as a factor in the 
declining political party memberships (Rudman, 1993). 
The growth of the mass media has also played a key part in superseding political 
parties. Changes in technology mean that the media now playa strong role in 
mediating information between politicians and the public, where political parties 
used to play that role. Membership of a party used to be the most accessible way 
of obtaining political information and taking part in the political process. With the 
rise of the media and media politics, this avenue is redundant (Bain, 1999d: 
p.8).62 Rather than communicating through a large, active membership, New 
Zealand's catch-all parties now communicate with voters by way of their 
leadership appearing on television. Furthermore, the party organisations are no 
__ longer an important source of political policy and feedback for the parliamentary 
wings: 
Policies are driven by media exposure (television in particular) and opinion polling; their 
detailed execution is driven by the bureaucracy and independent consultants. Inhouse 
party expertise is limited. That's scarcely surprising - there is no perceived need to join 
62 As Upton has written, 'modem communications have steadily increased the flow of information that once 
flowed out through political parties. Television has just about killed meetings dead as a means of 
communicating with voters' (Upton, 1993c: p.B). There are also now a number of alternative sources of 
political information: 'The age of television, the Official Information Act, the Ombudsman and a host of other 
watchdogs mean that political parties can supply little in the way of privileged access to information as once 
they did. The days when people crowded into church halls to hear MPs report on issues of the day have 
gone' (Upton, 1994a). 
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political parties to gain an insight into the political process. Meanwhile, thousands 
believe themselves to be participating in the fate of the nation by way of talkback radio 
(Upton, 1992b: p.8). 
The strength of these sociological explanations is reinforced by the existence of a 
definite generational aspect to the decline of political party membership. Very few 
young people join parties. The Electoral Commission has undertaken surveys in 
recent years that provide figures on the age of party members in New Zealand. 
Their 1994 survey showed that of party members 'three-quarters were over 50 
years of age, and 39 per cent were aged 70 and over' (Harris, 1998: pp.15-16). In 
a sense, political parties have probably managed to retain many of their older 
membership - and some parties have signed up old-age voters due to the 
politicisation of superannuation - while at the same time having a greater 
problem recruiting those people born after 1950.63 
Diminished Demand for Party Members 
Existing alongside the 'diminishing supply' explanation for the decline in party 
membership is an argument that highlights a 'diminishing demand' for 
membership on the part of party leaders. This is closely related to the shift of 
parties towards an electoral-professional form of organisation, which involves 
greater centralisation and professionalisation, all of which increasingly takes 
place in the parliamentary wing. In this situation, the benefits of a large 
membership are no longer so great, especially balanced against some of the 
political and financial costs that also accrue from membership. Party elites 
therefore have a reduced demand and capacity for involving a large membership, 
and subsequently expend less effort in recruiting and retaining members. 
63 A survey by one of the parties in Parliament of nearly 1000 of its members showed that the aged made up. 
the bulk of the party. Those under the age of 30 years made up less than two percent of the membership, 
while those over 55 years-old made up 72 percent (Leaked Document, 8 Jun 2000). Similar trends appear to 
exist in Britain, where the average age of members of the Conservative Party is 62 years, and only five 
percent of members are under 35 (Whiteley et aI., 1994). The British Labour membership, too, had an 
average age in 1995 of 48 (Heartfield, 1995). 
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In previous decades, the recruitment of large numbers of members was highly 
important, due to the capital and labour resources that they would provide. 
However, nowadays when party members leave the organisation their exit goes 
virtually unnoticed by the leadership, as it has little consequence for the 
operations of the party. This is because the resources that members provide are 
now relatively insignificant, a fact which is detailed in Chapter Seven. 
Overshadowing these resources are those now obtained by the parties from the 
state, as explained in Chapter Eight. The generous resourcing of MPs means 
that their offices are in effect superseding the extra-parliamentary party 
organisation in party administration. The logical corollary of this 
professionalisation is the tendency towards the marginalisation of the 
membership. Politicians now hire the highly-skilled and expert to help them 
perform their political functions. These professionals can effectively and 
efficiently accomplish many of the campaigning and organisational tasks formerly 
performed by activists.64 For example: 
If politicians want to communicate with the voters, they can appear on television. If they 
want to raise funds, they can tap friendly foreign businessmen. If they want to sound out 
popular opinion, they can call in pollsters. If they want to devise a policy, they can turn 
to the think-tanks. Who needs amateur party activists when you can employ 
professionals? (Economist, 1993a: p.68). . 
Such a process is definitely evident in New Zealand, and Vowles has outlined 
how policy and communications is typically now constructed: 
the messages of contemporary New Zealand parties are constructed by professionals, 
either employed by the party nationally or contracted to provide such advice at that 
level, and are designed for communication through the mass media, and notably 
television. Public polling and focus group research are used to test party performance, 
64 Also, by essentially incorporating the roles and staff of the extra-parliamentary head offices into the 
parliamentary wings, party leaders have effectively marginalised party members because it was through the 
extra-parliamentary structure that they participated. According to Mair, 'On the face of it, a strengthening of 
the position and of the resources of the party in public office, and the marginalization of, or greater autonomy 
afforded to, the party in central office, would appear to offer little scope for an enhancement of the position of 
the party on the ground. In this sense, we might anticipate that party members would themselves be 
marginalized, being deemed unnecessary, or even ignored' (Mair, 1994: p.13). 
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policies and party rhetoric. Ordinary members and activists play little or no role in this 
work (Vowles, 2002b: p.425). 
Simon Upton, a former National MP, has also shown how members are clearly 
now less relevant or central to the operations of the parties. He says that the 
party membership of National once played a central role in policy formulation: 
Policy was driven by remits that originated at small branch meetings, progressed on to 
the electorate, then the division and finally the national conference. Cabinet ministers 
as late as the sixties were directly influenced by remit debates. The influence of the 
party organisation derived not just from the size of its membership but its quality (Upton, 
1992b: p.8). 
Upton contrasts this to the present day creation of party policy in which rank-and-
file party members play no effective role: 'it bears almost no relationship to the 
way politics are now conducted. Policies are driven by media exposure 
(television in particular) and opinion polling; their detailed execution is driven by 
the bureaucracy and independent consultants' (ibid: p.8). Likewise, in examining 
the Act party's organisational structure, Patrick Hine noted that 'the formal 
opportunities for the wider party membership to exercise some influence ... are 
limited in the extreme' and that 'the opinion of the party member is publicly 
accorded no more significance than that of any member of the public' (Hine, 
1995: p.52). When Ruth Dyson was the president of the Labour Party, she also 
attributed the lack of influence that party members have for the fall in 
membership numbers in her party: 
The policy role of the Party, and our organisational strength are very closely linked. 
People join the Labour Party because of their commitment to policies which they want to 
see implemented. Because the Party was left out of the policy making process more and 
more, our ability to keep and attract members became weaker (Dyson, 1991). 
Similarly, according to a National Party member writing on Michelle Boag's 
website, 'Committees and conferences are dominated by the 'elite' of lawyers, 
accountants etcetera, and we totally ignore a huge chunk of our support base 
and their opinions are not valued' (quoted in Black, 2001: p.15). Therefore, while 
members of New Zealand parties traditionally expected that in exchange for their 
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contributions as members they would have at least some control over the goals 
and activities of the party, this system of exchange has broken down. Yet such 
treatment of party activists has proved to be unsustainable, with many obviously 
ceasing involvement in parties due to the futility of the role. Levine commented 
on this trend in 1979: 
In practice, each party has developed an elite - a small and coherent group - which 
undertakes on a regular basis the management of party affairs. Attempts to acquire a 
large party membership appear to be efforts aimed at identifying voters, securing funds, 
and obtaining campaign workers. Neither party seems prepared genuinely to involve the 
electorate in their deliberations, and no effort is made to recruit members into decision-
making roles (Levine, 1979: p.67). 
This is clearly in line with the electoral-professional model, and thus the 
organisation of New Zealand political parties has changed to the extent that 
nearly all energy and resources are now put to work in the interests of electoral 
performance. Party leaders are therefore less likely to encourage the traditional 
type of representative party structures that 'function as participatory, 
representative and communicative channels in the political system' (Pierre et aI., 
2000: p.3). 
Likewise, advances in technology means that computerised mailing lists, 
automated telephone messages and commercial mail drops have replaced the 
army of volunteers parties once needed. Instead of sending party activists door-
to-door canvassing, professionalised parties are more likely to use paid 
canvassers, consultants, PR specialists and pollsters to carry out telemarketing 
campaigns that yield much more effective results. As well as access to mass 
media, technological progress has also provided the parties with email facilities 
and websites.65 The increased emphasis placed on these' new forms of 
communication and political manipulation means that political parties 
correspondingly put less emphasis and importance on the 'old-style' contributions 
and value of members and activists, and more on trying to buy the latest 
available gimmick (Miller, 2001: pp.233-234). 
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The parties now allow only a small input from rank and file members, and where 
they are involved, the involvement is not very meaningful or fulfilling. Michael 
Laws, for instance, has painted a picture of life in the 1980s extra-parliamentary 
National Party as being very empty and without real power: 'The party were mere 
cannon fodder marching at the behest of the parliamentary wing. Useful for 
organising public meetings, raising money from door-to-door canvassing, 
delivering election year pamphlets and leaflets, but not much else' (Laws 1998a: 
pp.56-57). Laws has also written about how party activists in New Zealand 'toil 
with no prospect of reward or encouragement for their party's cause. Their 
activities are the political equivalent of digging a hole, filling it in again, then 
repeating this process until mortal release' (ibid: p.37).66 
Party membership is made even more meaningless by the lack of internal 
democracy in the New Zealand parties. Despite supposedly democratic 
structures, it is the parliamentary elite of the parties that make the most important 
decisions.67 The fact that the parliamentary leadership ignores even conference 
remits means that there are few membership incentives for those who might be 
mobilised by ideological incentives. As McCarten has argued, 'Party conferences 
in most parties have no power over MPs any more, so why would you waste your 
time' (quoted in Laugesen, 1999f: p.A3). The most overt examples of this 
occurred in the mid-1980s when Labour leaders made it obvious that they would 
not action any proposals passed by their conferences that they disagreed with. 
65 See: Vowles et al. (1995: p.56). 
66 According to one Alliance activist, involvement in the party is very unfulfilling: 'Working for the Alliance is 
not like working for Jesus - you don't get life in more abundance. There is a certain amount of comradeship 
and a little cynical fun to be had along the way, but mostly what you get is boredom - dull meetings, dull 
tasks, dull policy documents to read and duller ones to write' (Pigden, 2001: p.25). 
67 See: Henderson and Bellamy (2002: p.70), who point out that 'while party members in theory have the 
opportunity to be actively involved in formulating party policy and candidate selection, in practice most key 
decisions rest with the party hierarchies. Party conferences are useful for floating policy ideas and parties 
maintain policy committees, but the decisions on policy tend to rest with the party leaders and their 
parliamentary caucus.' 
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For instance, government minister Richard Prebble's stated that the Labour Party 
was 'totally irrelevant to the election undertakings we gave to the New Zealand 
public' (quoted in Sheppard, 1999: p.8). The Labour Party extra-parliamentary 
organisation fought a long and hard battle to be included in decisions about the 
policy direction of their Government. Ultimately they had little influence, although 
in some non-economic policy areas the Cabinet were prepared to allow them 
some say. 
The lack of internal democratic practice extends to the selection of parliamentary 
candidates. While traditional methods continue to exist in terms of selecting 
electorate candidates,68 in most political parties the leaderships have chosen to 
retain the right to choose list MPs. In the formation of the party lists, most parties 
have established 'moderating committees' of party elites that make the final 
decisions about list rankings (Miller, 2000: pp.18-19).69 
In apparent contradiction to these trends, some New Zealand political parties 
have partially democratised themselves by making the possession of 
membership more empowering. Examples include carrying out postal ballots of 
party members for the selection of party lists candidates. The Greens and Act 
ask all their members to rank the list of candidates in their preferred order. The 
members' preferences are then considered by the moderating committees who 
have the ability to make small changes to the Iist.7o For example, in 1996 the Act 
membership voted Donna Awatere Huata into number 37 on the party list, but the 
Act board of trustees shifted her to the winnable position of number four. 
While this relatively democratic list construction process appears to contradict the 
move towards the electoral-professional model of party organisation, closer 
examination of such party changes suggests that they are, in fact, very 
68 See: McLeay (2000). 
69 See also: Miller (2001: p.235). 
70 See: Small (1994b: p.24), Reid (2001: p.265). 
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compatible. Mair argues that the crucial point is that democratisation is being 
extended to the members as individuals rather than to actvists. He says that 'it is 
not the party congress or the middle-level elite, or the activists who are being 
empowered, but rather the "ordinary" members, who are at once more docile and 
more likely to endorse the policies (and candidates) proposed by the party 
leadership and by the party in public office' (Mair, 1997: p.149). Meanwhile 'the 
activist layer inside the party, the traditionally more troublesome layer, becomes 
marginalized' (Mair, 1997: p.149). 
Part Four: The Consequences and Future of Low Membership 
Parties in New Zealand have clearly demonstrated that they can exist more than 
adequately without mass memberships, but the existence of the low numbers still 
invites the question of how well the parties function with this new arrangement. 
For instance, the decline of the membership numbers of New Zealand's political 
parties has some important consequences for party ideology. As Len Bayliss has 
pointed out, the lack of party members means that 'the policies of the major 
political parties lack the authority which is conferred through widespread debate 
by the party membership in both public and private' (Bayliss, 1994: pp. 70-71). 
The lower membership numbers changes the intra-party power structures, 
conceivably allowing leaders to pursue more office-seeking strategies (or, in 
times of state difficulty, managerial-reforming strategies). For example, it means 
that the party elite have increased autonomy in their formulation of policy: 
Many MPs are now professional career politicians, a fair number of whom would be 
equally at home in another party. Such politicians, lacking strong personal convictions, 
keep their eyes glued on the polls to ensure that their publicly expressed views stay in 
line with popular opinion .... The absence of mass membership is seen as a blessing 
since it gives the professionals a much freer hand (Bayliss, 1994: pp.70-71). 
Upton illustrates this same argument with the example of the reforming Fourth 
Labour Government: 
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That Labour MPs and ministers were let loose to play in the Treasury's laboratory is, in 
no small part, a consequence of declining membership. If there were no party members 
turning up to electorate committee meetings, it's scarcely surprising that MPs felt 
unconstrained by the grassroots. The lack of a vibrant party organisation meant that 
some Labour MPs were meeting with just four or five people back home (Upton, 1994a). 
The increased propensity for office-seeking behaviour in low-membership parties 
is because the balance of power is tilted more towards the leadership who are 
often - but certainly not always - more pragmatic and moderate than the rank-
and-file members or activists. There is a strong pattern throughout the Western 
world in which party activists are more ideologically polarised than those that 
merely vote for the party. Such activists tend to push political parties to take more 
radical policy stances, and to be more principled and firm in the pursuit of such 
stances. Previously New Zealand political parties - because they were typically 
labour-intensive - had to 'establish an exchange relationship with potential 
activists by offering them policy promises' (Maor, 1997: p.97). The increasing 
reliance on professional labour therefore relieves political parties of the need for 
such an exchange, thus making them more pragmatic. Regardless of the exact 
ideological result, it is clear that the party elite have greater political 
manoeuvrability, being able to bring about ideological reorientation because the 
control and influence of members are not very strong (Tan, 2000: p.12). This 
means that party leaders are even less restrained in their policy options than 
before. 
There are also fears that a declining membership base means that political 
parties are likely to become increasingly unrepresentative of New Zealand 
society. It can be argued that as membership declines, candid.ate selection is 
increasingly left in the hands of an unrepresentative slice of New Zealanders - or 
the 'political class'. This point is of increased importance under MMP, due to the 
fact that the party organisations now have increased influence?1 Undoubtedly, 
71 Simon Upton has argued exactly this (in an article entitled 'How Tiny, Self-Serving Cliques Could be AII-
Important in Politics'). Under MMP, he wrote, 'an ever-decreasing number of New Zealanders will have an 
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the lack of membership numbers in the parties increases the possibility that the 
parties are vulnerable to small cliques of politicians that are not held accountable 
to a sUbstantial party membership.72 As Appendix A shows, the ratio of members 
to voters is now extremely low, and in a party like Labour, less than one in fifty of 
its voters belong to the party. 
The small size of the party memberships is also contributing to the fact that all 
the parties have trouble recruiting quality election candidates. In 1999, Helen 
Clark admitted, 'We do have trouble attracting good candidates ..... It has been 
an issue. We haven't had a good overall intake since 1984' (quoted in 
McLoughlin, April 1999: p.74)?3 Act has grappled with the problem of finding 
quality candidates from within its small membership by searching outside the 
party. Not only do they advertise in the daily newspapers for potential candidates, 
but also commission a personal recruitment agency for the task?4 
The fact that political parties have such small memberships means that state 
regulation of the party system (as described in Chapter Nine) becomes 
input into who stands for Parliament. The power to nominate the country's leaders lies in the hands of a tiny 
- and increasingly unrepresentative - group' (Upton, 1995a: p.11). 
72 Upton says that, from his own experience, the situation is now so bad that branch 'meetings, rarely 
attended by more than 30 or so people, are, believe it or not, the nerve centre of political activism in New 
Zealand politics' (Upton, 1995a: p.11). 
73 Michael Laws, too, has been very candid about the trouble he had finding quality candidates for New 
Zealand First in the 1996 general election: 'the New Zealand First party faced the unusual quandary of 
having too many prospective MPs and not enough quality candidates .... I bemoaned this state of affairs to a 
senior National Party official with a hands-on role for that party's election campaign. The lament was 
returned - with very few exceptions the quality of that party's candidates was also being undermined by the 
availability of suitable personnel' (Laws, 9 March 1999: p.4). Laws' tale about the National Party is confirmed 
by its then president, John Slater, who said: 'It is getting harder to attract top-quality professional and 
business people' (quoted in McLoughlin, 1999: p.75). He also confirmed that National now takes a more pro-
active approach to candidate selection: 'We put our thinking caps on and consider who might make a good 
MP. But a lot of the people we approach turn it down' (ibid). National MP Bill English has also argued that 
'falling party membership is a concern because it means a diminishing pool of talent from which tomorrow's 
politicians are drawn' (Laugesen, 1999f: p.A3). 
74 See: Simpson (1998: p.42). 
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increasingly necessary. If New Zealand's political parties possessed large and 
dynamic mass memberships they would be less likely to require legislation to 
make them run democratically nor would they necessarily need legislation such 
as the Electoral Integrity Act to control their parliamentarians. Because none of 
the New Zealand political parties have such a membership, they lack an in-built 
check on the ambitions of parliamentarians (Trotter, 2001c: p.14). 
The shift to the low-membership electoral-professional model has also had 
particularly important consequences for the way that the public orientate towards 
the arena of state power. The previous high rate of party membership actually 
helped create a robust connection between civil society and politics: 'Because 
mass parties emphasized enrolment and political education, and because they 
encouraged citizens to extend their political involvement beyond merely voting, 
they broadened the realm of citizen politics and provided concrete links between 
politicians and those they claimed to represent' (Scarrow, 2000: p.79).75 This 
idea of organised parties as vehicles for integrating the electorate was most 
famously articulated by Sigmund Neumann (1956; 1965) who argued that the 
construction of strong links between civil society and the state could counter the 
anomie of mass society. Similarly, Maurice Duverger favoured mass parties 
because he said they contributed to democratic linkage by providing a 'closer and 
more faithful contact between the mass of the people and their ruling elites' 
(Duverger, 1963: p.427). Now with the rise of the electoral-professional form of 
organising, this linkage has been eroded, contributing to a number of negative 
attitudes to public life. The lack of linkage means that political parties have 
increasing trouble aggregating and articulating the varied interests of society 
(Tan, 2000: p.12). 
75 A good definition of the term linkage is provided by Thomas Poguntke: 'the function of linkage has been 
the same since the advent of democratic politics. Parties need stable means of communicating with their 
electorates in order to identify, select and aggregate relevant grievances, communicate them to the highest 
echelons of politics and strive for policies which take account of these political demands' (Poguntke, 1995: 
p.3). 
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Some commentators predicted that the introduction of MMP might reverse the 
decline in membership numbers. The main premise of such arguments was that 
the change in electoral systems would to make New Zealand's essentially 'catch-
all' parties more like niche-orientated parties of principle, which would make them 
more attractive as organisations to join (Jackson and McRobie 1998: p.326). 
Likewise, it was suggested that MMP might increase party numbers because the 
memberships of the parties might have a sUbstantial role in the selection of the 
party list. According to Helena Catt, 'Numbers turning out for the major parties 
had dropped partly because people felt they were not getting anything out of 
being in the party. A changed system would ... mean the parties were more 
democratic. Membership could rise as the parties became more "likeable" , 
(paraphrased in Rapson, 1991 ).76 It does not appear, however, that MMP's 
promise has been delivered. 
If political parties are to increase public participation in them, it might not be via 
actual membership. Already many of the parties are attempting to recruit voters 
into the category of 'supporter,.77 Like other elements of party development, this 
follows the North American model of weak party organisations connected with 
organised supporters rather than 'members'. Other techniques and gimmicks will, 
no doubt, be introduced to increase membership. The American idea of 'the 
primary' election, for example, might be legislated for, to increase participation in 
the parties. Increasingly parties and politicians are also building up large 
76 Similarly, according to McLoughlin, 'Democratic changes could revitalise the political parties. If the law 
requires candidates to be chosen by party members, it will become worthwhile again for ordinary people to 
join parties. The more people who join, the less control will be exercised by the faceless ones in head office 
and the healthier will be our democracy' (McLoughlin, 1993a: p.43). Booker also r~ported: 'Professor 
Richard Mulgan, the pro-party voice on the commission, told the Independent, he hoped MMP would boost 
party membership because parties would become more effective. People would want to belong because 
they could get things done' (Booker, 1995a: p.16). 
77 For example, in 1992 the Labour Party announced the creation of a 'Labour Supporters Club', which was 
to be a group distinct from the general party membership and one without the usual democratic membership 
rights. Trotter argued that this development Signalled that the leadership was content for the organisational 
structure to remain 'reserved for a select group of ideologically homogeneous and organisationally effective 
cadres' and therefore the conflicts inherent in a mass party could be avoided (Trotter, 1992a: p.15). 
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databases of email recipients for their email newsletters?8 Most of these people 
are probably not party members, but such 'supporters' are a possible future 
sUbstitute for members. 
If parties ever become serious about recruiting members again, they will need to 
re-examine the roles that they afford members, particularly in relation to the 
candidate selection processes under the party list system. Alternatively, should 
the parties - and especially National and Labour - want to reconcile themselves 
with the reality of the new low-membership, low-participation environment, they 
will need to restructure their parties accordingly. Formally, the whole 
organisational structures of the parties are predicated on the involvement of their 
memberships, and now that they are all without such numbers, the parties need 
to reassess how they function vis-a-vis their membership. Certainly the parties 
will eventually have to adjust their party constitutions and structures to adjust for 
the new reality of low membership numbers?9 At the moment most of the parties 
still carry out such functions as party conferences, candidate selection and 
branch organisations as if the parties still possessed mass memberships.8o In 
particular, parties in the future are likely to consolidate their empty branch 
networks, and use electorate - or even regional - meetings more. Other more 
sophisticated responses such as integrating sector and interest group causes 
into parties will come about. These ideas have already been under investigation 
by the National Party: 
78 Richard Prebble claims to have 30,000 subscribers to his weekly email newsletter. 
79 A good example of this occurred in 2003 when the National Party decided to lower the minimum number 
of party members that an electorate must have in order to carry out their own candidate selection. In the 
1940s and 1950s the minimum was 2000 (Gustafson, 1986: p.234); From 1996 until 2003, the minimum was 
set at 900, after which it dropped to 200 (Joyce, 2003). 
80 As one conference obseNer noted, 'The trappings of a mass membership party are still there - the huge 
banner dwarfing the speakers, the lunch wheeled out in industrial-sized pots, the earnest picking-over of 
remits' (Boyd, 1995a). Rob Allen of the Labour Party head office has also commented on this: 'I think it's a 
problem in a party that is designed to be a mass membership party - where you have got a variety of 
processes that are based on mass membership, and if you get too small in any part of the organisation then 
things like selections can fall to a fewer group than you might think is desirable, or even some of the policy 
stuff could' (Allen, 1999). 
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[party official, Lindsay Tisch] said the working party was also investigating the concept of 
'cluster groups' to boost membership. That would involve sector groups - for example, 
people working in the health or education fields - being linked to the party, but not 
obliged to take part in day-to-day party work. Apart from providing a wider catchment for 
membership, those in the cluster groups would provide expertise which would strengthen 
policy formation (Armstrong, 1994: p.1). 
Parties have also been looking at ways to make the internet work for the 
organising of membership. For example, Labour party president Bob Harvey 
announced his plans in early 2000 to give the email address of the prime minister 
and ministers to members in order that they would be able to participate in the 
democratic process (Laugesen, 30 Apr 2000: p.3). Likewise, in November 2000 
the new president of the Labour Party, Mike Williams, was reported as saying 
that he 
would look at internal party communications and alternative ways to organise. For 
instance, in large electorates such as the Maori seat of Te Tai Tonga, teleconferencing 
and other new technology approaches might be more appropriate than a branch and 
electorate committee structure. Pressure on people's time and the young's interest in 
new technology might even open the way for "virtual branches," (Small, 2000).81 
Despite these innovative ideas, the reality is that any real increase in party 
numbers will ultimately only come out of an increase in the politicisation of 
society. Attempts to increase membership are often based on superficial 
strategies rather than representing anything meaningful. As Levine argued in 
1979, politics needs to genuinely change before party membership can 
substantially increase: 
To intensify participation in partisan politics requires the scope and meaning of political 
conflict to be widened and personalised. The enlargement of public involvement in politics 
cannot be manipulated into existence, but must emerge out of a renewed awareness of 
the salience of politics, and of the existence of meaningful alternative choices (Levine, 
1979: pp.72-73). 
81 Some political party websites, such as the Green and National parties, now have member login areas 
where internal party information can be displayed and debated. 
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Whether parties should actually want to increase their memberships is an 
important question. For example, it might be asked if it is actually such a bad 
thing that political parties no longer attract members for social entertainment 
reasons. Now parties only draw those who are genuinely interested in belonging 
to a party for political reasons. Having mass memberships meant that the extra-
parliamentary parties risked being flabby and almost apolitical bodies that served 
no real purpose other than self-Iegitimisation. That very few New Zealanders now 
join any of the parties could be seen as a verdict from voters about the state of 
the political parties. It might suggest that the parties have a diminished legitimacy 
for New Zealanders. 
Most commentators still call upon the political parties to make themselves more 
attractive to potential members. For example, Miller suggests the parties need to 
try 'democratising decision-making processes with a view to giving membership 
and activism some value, and providing greater opportunity through the 
candidate-selection process for the revitalisation of the party leadership' (Miller, 
2001: pp.238-239). This is unlikely to happen, and by showing that they can exist 
adequately without large memberships, the political parties have generally made 
the mass party model a thing of the past. New Zealand political parties simply do 
not need large memberships anymore. The new political era does not require the 
old army of canvassers on the ground. Reviving political parties is therefore 
simply not on the agenda or even the wish-lists of party leaders. The parties have 
proven that they can function more than adequately without a membership, let 
alone an active membership. Party membership in 2003 is possibly just an 
anachronism. 
Conclusions 
The mass membership form of the political party is clearly extinct in New 
Zealand. It has been superseded by the electoral-professional form of party, 
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which has the organisational characteristics of a low capacity for membership 
participation and a strong reliance on capital resources and party professionals. 
This chapter has therefore emphasised one side of the transition to the electoral-
professional form of party organisation: the decline in membership numbers. It 
has outlined this transition by showing that membership of the parties has 
become increasingly unpopular in New Zealand, with numbers declining 
substantially in the mid-1960s and again since the mid-1980s. The slump in 
numbers illustrates that, beyond merely receiving votes, none of the parties in 
Parliament have any kind of substantial enthusiastic support. The paid-up 
grassroots membership of both Labour and National is now only a fraction of their 
respective levels of even 20 years ago. 
Although it is generally difficult to establish the exact membership figures for the 
parties, this chapter has investigated the numbers through a variety of sources 
and arrived at the following estimations. As far as can be judged, in 2003 the 
main political parties had roughly the following membership numbers: National, 
20,000; Labour, 14,000; New Zealand First, less than 5000; Act, 5000; the 
Greens, 4000, United Future at least 3000; the Alliance 2000; and the 
Progressive Coalition Party 2000, and other minor parties probably had another 
10,000 members combined.82 In total, therefore, about 70,000 New Zealanders 
belong to political parties. In stark contrast, in 1960 - a time when the electorate 
was half the size it is today - the National Party alone claimed a membership of 
246,000. 
Party membership used to be one of the important linkages between the state 
and civil society. Without it now, the classical democratic view of parties as a link 
between the ruled and the rulers is under strain. The decline means that the 
parties are not performing their participatory linkage function particularly well, and 
it illustrates once again that political parties' ties with society are eroding. This is 
the same focus and conclusion of chapters Four, Five and Seven. This chapter 
82 See Appendix A. 
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has argued that the professionalisation of the parties is one of the key reasons 
for the decline of participation in the parties. In the new model, party members 
are less useful and therefore the recruitment of members is a low priority for the 
party leaders. But it also works the other way, in that the declining number of 
members encourages the parties to professionalise further, producing a self-
reinforcing cycle. 
The story of declining party membership numbers is another version of how 
capital resources have replaced labour resources in politics. Quite simply party 
membership has become largely irrelevant as the style of electoral campaigning 
has shifted towards a more capital-intensive approach. This chapter shows that 
all the New Zealand parties have - to varying degrees - moved on from being 
labour-intensive parties to being capital-intensive parties reliant on professional 
labour. This is also the focus of the next chapter. 
Integral to this process is the commercialisation of political parties. Parties today 
are commodified by professional marketers. The parties today are generally 
professionalised election-oriented organisations. This decline in membership 
numbers and increase in professionalism has led to· weaker party organisations. 
As is argued earlier, such weaker parties are not good for democracy because 
parties are essential to the democratic process in New Zealand. New Zealand's 
electoral system is, however, party-based, which makes the decline of the 
public's participation in them particularly problematic. As Gustafson argues, 'if 
you don't have strong parties, then you limit politics to an elite with money and 
ambition and access. The mass of the population, particularly the relatively poor 
and powerless, become alienated from the system. It is dangerous to the health 
of society' (quoted in Bain, 1999d: p.8). Likewise, Raymond Miller has argued, 
this new era of passive party membership has serious implications for the future 
of New Zealand democracy: 
Unless citizens are given incentives to join up, parties will continue to wither as mass-
base organisations. This may have little immediate impact on their ability to contest 
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election campaigns, particularly given the level of dependency on state and corporate 
funding, as well as on professional expertise. However, over time it is likely to accelerate 
the process of public disengagement and exacerbate feelings of political cynicism and 
distrust (Miller, 2000: p.19). 
This chapter suggests that in moving from mass membership parties to electoral-
professional organisations, the very character of the New Zealand political parties 
have changed. They are increasingly looking like organisations 'of leaders' rather 
than 'of citizens', and their activities look like the enterprise of a political elite 
rather than the functioning of a participatory democracy. 
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Chapter Seven 
Party Finance and Professionalisation 
The broad changes in the organisation of New Zealand political parties in recent 
decades can be viewed in part as reflecting the shift from a labour-intensive use 
of resources to a more capital-intensive regime in which party professionals 
dominate. Chapter Six showed that since the 1960s there has been a shift away 
from the mass membership party model, in which parties' volunteer labour 
resources have been declining. This chapter shows that the corollary of this is 
the increasing importance of financial resources. Carrying out today's 
sophisticated media and public relations functions now requires considerable 
sums of money and expertise. This new electoral-professional model adopted by 
New Zealand political parties means the ways in which parties are materially 
sustained have changed significantly. A new era of political finance has come 
about. 
Where New Zealand political parties obtain their financial resources from is 
largely a mystery, or is at least very misunderstood. According to Austin Mitchell, 
writing in 1962, the parties have 'an obsessive concern with shrouding their 
finances in secrecy' (Mitchell, 1962b: p.77). Forty years later Jack Vowles points 
out that, 'The study of party finance in New Zealand has been practically non-
existent, because parties do not release data for public scrutiny' (Vowles, 2002b: 
p.420). Yet the use of resources is of vital significance to the operation of 
democracy. The answer to the question of 'who supplies the funds to the political 
parties?' is one that demonstrates the nature of modern party politics and its 
ideological conflicts. As Herbert Alexander has argued, 'Light thrown upon 
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transactions involving money illuminates political processes and behaviour and 
improves our understanding of the flows of influence and power' (Alexander, 
1989: p.10). 
By looking at political finance, this chapter shows the significant way in which 
political parties have changed. Traditionally, parties have been kept viable 
through a mixture of funding from party members and the business community or 
trade unions, and these patterns of funding are indicative of where political 
influence lay. Robert Milne wrote in 1966 that, 
the sources from which parties obtain their funds are often suggestive of the policies 
they follow and of which sections in the electorate supports them. The fact that Labour 
is financed mainly by trade unions, and the less open financing of the National Party by 
business and farming groups provides suggestive information (Milne, 1966: p.85). 
This statement no longer accurately portrays the sources of political finance in 
New Zealand. Now, the contributions from individual businesspeople, businesses 
and especially the state play a much greater part in sustaining political party 
activities. This shift reinforces the party elite's decreasing reliance on volunteer 
activity. The pursuit of financial resources becomes more important than the 
recruitment and retention of members, and without such a membership the 
loosening of the ties between parties and key social constituencies is 
exacerbated. At the same time, as parties compete for resources from capital-
rich sectors such as business,1 the gap closes between what different parties 
represent, and all parties can less afford to alienate business, producing 
pressures for homogeneity of party ideology. Moreover, the new financial 
linkages indicate that the nature of modern political parties is one in which 
differences between Labour and National have drastically declined. In general, 
the changes have implications for party decline because they illustrate the 
eroding linkages the parties have with key social constituencies. The changes 
also reinforce the idea that in adopting an electoral-professional organisational 
1 Today, even parties such as the Greens and the Alliance seek and receive business funding - as shown 
later in this chapter. 
Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 433 
style, the New Zealand parties are becoming little more than well-funded groups 
of elites that are not well integrated into civil society, reliant on capital resources 
rather than labour resources. 
The two basic forms of resources used by political parties are capital and labour.2 
The labour resources of a party are generally comprised of the membership and 
party activists, and were seen in Chapter Six to be increasing unavailable to and 
unutilised by the modern parties. The last chapter showed that in the past the 
possession of labour resources has been deemed the most important resource 
for a political party, and this led the parties of the right, such as the New Zealand 
National Party, to imitate the organisational and recruitment structures of the 
mass membership parties of the left. This chapter looks at the capital resources 
(or 'party finances') used by New Zealand parties. It examines where parties 
obtain capital resources from, how they use them, and how important this 
resource is for the operations of modern parties. It argues that since the 1960s 
the relative value of the two resources has shifted significantly in favour of capital 
resources, because parties have invariably become more reliant on capital 
resources as modern media and technology-driven political marketing came to 
the fore. In particular, a number of innovations have been made for 'listening to' 
and influencing voter opinion. Although these methods are very cost-effective, 
they still make political marketing relatively expensive and conversely make 
labour resources relatively redundant.3 Adopted in election campaigns and 
throughout the parliamentary cycle, these advances in technology and expertise 
have thus disrupted the previous balance between capital and labour resources, 
having huge repercussions for the way parties gather and organise these 
resources. 
2 These terms are commonly used in the political party literature. For example, see Ware (1996; chapter 
ten), and Maor (1997; chapter four), 
3 See: Ware (1996: p.297). 
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Part One of this chapter looks at the typical income streams in New Zealand 
politics. The general finances of each individual party are then detailed in Part 
Two. Part Three explores the professionalisation related to changes in party 
finance. 
Part One: Party Income 
The typical income streams for the New Zealand parties can be broken down into 
eight categories: membership contributions, business contributions, interest 
groups, international sources, candidates and MPs, enterprise and funding, 
donations from individuals, and the state. These are outlined below. 
Membership Contributions 
The idea that political parties in this country are democratically resourced by a 
large number of New Zealanders has been around for a long time and is 
repeated continuously by the parties - especially Labour. This notion of mass 
membership finance was reinforced by the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System (RCES) in 1986: 
For the most part, our parties have met their financial needs from small donations from 
their members and supporters. By concentrating on the establishment and cultivation of 
large membership bases, the parties have avoided relying on substantial contributions 
form either the State or a limited number of large institutions or corporations. This has 
had beneficial effects, both in terms of high political participation by ordinary New 
Zealanders and in terms of the responsiveness and representativeness of the parties 
themselves (RCES, 1986: pp.216-217). 
The Labour Party informed the RCES that it derived most of its income from 
party membership (dues, fund-raising drives, donations), followed by business 
donations, and then by trade union affiliates (RCES, 1986: p.213). Again in the 
mid-1990s, Labour's president, Maryan Street, claimed 'we are a Party whose 
financial base is almost entirely dependent on membership activity' (Street, 1995: 
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p.t). In 1999, the party's general secretary, Rob Allen, continued to claim the 
bulk of the party's finances came 
from fundraising of our membership - from the ground up - from your cake-stalls, your 
garage-sales, your raffles. So I would say 60-80 percent in non-campaign years, or 
better, is raised by the party. In campaign year the corporate donations stuff ends up at 
about maybe a quarter of what is spent (Allen, 1999). 
Although there is continuity in the claim that parties are membership-financed, 
there is discontinuity in the reality. All of the recently available evidence suggests 
that, largely because of falling membership numbers and activity, only a small 
proportion of party finances is now raised from members, and if anything, it is 
likely the costs of servicing these members is greater than the contribution they 
make.4 Membership dues are normally only about $5-10. They are kept 
sufficiently low so as to encourage maximum participation.s Compared to other 
Western liberal democracies, New Zealand's level of fees is relatively low and 
yields very little money for the parties. In contrast, it is interesting that the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) in Germany raises about NZ$180 million from its 
membership - averaging a levy of about NZ$200 per member.6 
4 The Alliance estimated that the average cost of servicing each of their members is about $25 per year. 
5 The Labour Party membership fees are $11 for "Single Waged", $6.60 for "Single Unwaged", $16.50 for 
"Family" membership and "Supporters" pay an "Optional Donation". Some other parties have a basic joining 
fee, like United Future ($10), Act ($10), the Greens ($5), and the Progressive Coalition Party ($5). The 
Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party asks for a $10 minimum donation, but accept $5 from the unwaged. The 
Democratic Party has a $10 fee too, but this provides full membership for three years. National by contrast 
has no fixed subscription rate, although some of their regional organisations set their own rate (usually $5), 
and from 2004 the party will set a fee of $5. Similarly, the Alliance asks just for a donation, and the 
Ubertarianz request a $10 suggested donation. In a sense, some of these donations are really membership 
fees, as upon paying a membership fee many parties expect and/or encourage that a donation is provided 
along with the nominal fee. According to the Electoral Commission the minimum fee a party can charge is 
five cents per member. Actual donations from party members probably form a greater income stream for the 
parties. 
6 In the German SPD membership fees are determined by the income of the party member - generally 
calculated at one percent of a member's gross income. By European standards, the British Labour Party has 
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According to international data, parties in Western democracies typically now 
raise less than a quarter of their total income from members' contributions (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1998). In France membership contributions account for about 20 
percent of party income (Miguet, 1999: p.50)? In New Zealand, most parties 
appear to derive an even lower proportion than this. For instance, it was revealed 
in 1993 that of the Labour Party's annual national office income ($1.61 million), 
membership fees ($73,090) only contributed about five percent (Edwards, 
1994).8 
Business Contributions 
Business interests have traditionally played a substantial role in resourcing New 
Zealand's political parties, especially those of the right.9 In the 1970s and 1980s 
the major parties became more dependent on the largesse of business. More 
recently the traditional patterns of business donations have been interrupted by 
the changing ideological nature of the party system and the Labour Party now 
receives similar business funding to National. 
The declining ability of the parties to obtain funds from their members, together 
with the increased professionalisation related to the decline in membership, has 
meant the business community became a much more significant supplier of 
resources. That business interests became the life-blood of New Zealand political 
parties in the 1980s is confirmed by the former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer: 
very low fees, yet at NZ$45 (full fees) and NZ$15 (concessionary).these are still much greater than in New 
Zealand (Linton, 1994: p.43). 
7 Another French writer, Yves Marie Doublet, has calculated the figure at a lower level, saying that 'the 
contributions of the members represent in global [terms] 8.3% of the resources of the parties' (Doublet, 
1999: p.68). 
8 The Labour Party provides a good illustration of the decline of membership funding, as eight years earlier, 
in 1986, it told the RCES that it received about $500,000 per year in branch membership fees. 
9 Writi'ng in 1948, Lipson described National as being 'dominated by the vested interests of property, 
business, and finance' (Lipson, 1948: p.251). 
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Political parties are kept viable by donations from the business community. Financial 
donations from rank and file members are quite inadequate for the day-to-day running 
of a modern political party let alone for financing election campaigns. The 1987 and 
1990 election campaigns of the Labour Party were financed by extensive donations 
from the business community. The Labour Party campaign received at least $3 million 
in 1987 (Palmer, 1992: p.138). 
As well as cash donations, parties receive financial aid from companies in other 
forms. Such benefits-in-kind that are often not disclosed are those company 
resources put at the disposal of political parties such as employees, cars, 
computing systems, and office space. A significant example was the jet that 
business giant UEB provided to the Labour Party in 1987 to transport Prime 
Minister David Lange around the country (Frontline, 1989). The National Party, 
too, allegedly had its campaign plane funded in 1987 and 1990 by the Carter Holt 
company (Dominion, 1995b: p.2). Likewise, during the 1987 general election 
campaign, millionaire-businessman Bob Jones published and distributed 400,000 
pamphlets in support of the Labour Party (Jones, 1990b). 
It is difficult to ascertain the exact levels of business donations to parties. Both 
party and donor usually try to keep their transactions secret. However, since April 
1996 political parties have been required by law to disclose to the Electoral 
Commission all donations over $10,000.10 Although large donations come from a 
number of sources, the Electoral Commission's figures give some indication of 
the level of business support, as most donations over $10,000 tend to be from 
businesses and businesspeople. 11 In the seven-year period since disclosures of 
party donations began, donations over $10,000 have amounted to $7,528,659 
(see Table 7.1). 
10 The $10,000 threshold does not simply apply to single donations, but also applies to all aggregated 
donations from a single donor during a year. See Chapter Nine. 
11 These figures include donations from sources other than business, but a study of appendices P-V 
suggests that business sources make up the bulk of large donations. Some caution is required with these 
figures, however, because the donation disclosure laws have significant loopholes, which means that parties 
might well be receiving substantially larger incomes from business donations than the official figures 
suggest. See Chapter Nine for more on this. 
438 Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 
Table 7.1: Total Donations Declared12 
Year Total 
Donations 
1996* $989152 , 
1997 $466,596 
1998 $309,355 
1999* $3,649,572 
2000 $189,436 
2001 $365,597 
2002* $1,558,951 
Total $7,528,659 
.. Source. The Electoral Commission 4 
Note: Election years are marked with an asterisk. 
These figures - averaging about $1 million per year - do not seem to be terribly 
extravagant. Even in election year, they suggest an average of only about $2 
million is given. In contrast, the Electoral Commission alone allocates over $2 
million dollars to political parties at each election, to be spent on broadcast 
advertising in the few weeks leading up to the election. 
These relatively low donations suggest the idea that political parties are surviving 
only on the largesse of corporations might be something of a myth, and arguably 
such donations are generally becoming less the 'life-blood' of the party system, 
as other forms of funding become more important. Generally in the 1990s, 
corporate funding of political parties appears to have decreased. Both National 
and Labour have reported less interest from big business in making donations. In 
a 1999 interview, the general secretary of the Labour Party, Rob Allen, 
complained that 'the corporate sector has not in any way played a part in 
12 These are the totals of donations over $10,000 declared at the national level. 
13 1996 was only a partial year, as the donation regulations did not start until 1 April. Consequently it is likely 
that many donations for the 1996 election year occurred prior to 1 April to avoid disclosure. For example, it 
was revealed in 2002 that Fay Richwhite made donations of about $300,000 to the National Party in March 
1996. 
14 The Electoral Commission does not publish the donations declared by the parties, but makes the 
disclosures available to the public at its offices in Wellington. 
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elections in the way that they used to' (Allen, 1999).15 Likewise, British party 
finance specialist Michael Pinto-Duschinsky has illustrated this trend by pointing 
out that in Britain, 'The proportion of Conservative central income derived from 
corporations declined from about three-fifths in the 1970s to one quarter in the 
early 1990s' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). This decline in business donations is 
mirrored by a worldwide trend related to the decline in the saliency of class 
cleavages in politics. Business does not act in the same collective fashion that it 
was once more inclined to. The industry associations that have in the past played 
an overtly political role now intervene in politics on a more pragmatic basis, often 
donating to parties with influence instead of the parties that they might be more 
traditionally or ideologically aligned with. Pinto-Duschinsky has also argued that 
since the 1950s collective business funding bodies have had a lesser role in 
funding political parties: 
Corporations are now more likely to contribute on an individual basis and without the 
intervention of intermediary bodies. Advantages that could accrue to the donor business 
itself seem somewhat more likely to be the motive for political payments in the modern 
era than general considerations of class struggle (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
It seems that when class politics was at its height, businesses in Western 
countries felt more obliged to confront what they saw as the dangers of Soviet-
inspired communism, and therefore aided those movements that would counter 
such perceived threats. With the demise of the communist states and the related 
decline of class politics in general, there is less need for business to financially 
back their 'parties of capitalism' .16 Therefore just as fewer citizens today align 
themselves to political parties through membership or stable voting, businesses 
15 See also: Vaughan (2003), who argues that the level of corporate funding has decreased, and one 
explanation put forward is that New Zealand is 'becoming a branch office with many major foreign 
companies relocating the staff who make decisions about NZ offshore' and are therefore less likely to 
donate (Vaughan, 2003: p.?). 
16 According to Pinto-Duschinsky, 'The system of corporate versus trade union funding of politics probably 
reached a peak at the time when political conflict itself was based predominantly on class lines, with a party 
of business and of the middle classes competing against a party of the workers. Since the 1960s, the 
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are increasingly keen to promote an image of corporate political independence. 
This is not just for the benefit of public relations, but also to appease company 
shareholders who increasingly question the economic utility of political 
donations.17 
In New Zealand there has been a definite breakdown in the classic donation 
patterns, and the class-bias in favour of the National Party has become much 
less pronounced, if not reversed. As detailed later in this chapter, Labour is 
currently the main recipient of business donations.18 More significantly, the 
broader trend is for businesses to donate to several parties across the party 
system rather than just to the parties of the right.19 This is something that 
presidents of both National and Labour agreed upon in 2002. National president 
Michelle Boag stated, 'It's clear to me that organisations of a business nature ... 
certainly tend to donate right across the political spectrum. That is my 
experience'. Her Labour counterpart, Mike Williams, declared, 'I think almost all 
of the people who make anonymous donations directly, probably make equal 
economies of Western countries have developed from an industrial to a 'post-industrial' stage' (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1998). 
17 See Fisher (1999b: p.88). This corporate political independence is particularly the case in Britain, where 
surveys covering the late 1980s and early 1990s show that 'only around 12% of the top 1000 companies 
and 6% of the top 4000 companies made a political donation' (Fisher, 1999: p.88). Fisher has also found 
that in Britain 'donations as a proportion of profit have tended to be very small (a mean of 0.1 %)' (ibid). 
18 For a contrasting view see Roper (2000b: p.13), who maintains that donation records show that, 'There is 
no doubt that business did not want a Labour/Alliance victory in the 1999 election.' 
19 Businesses are now less inclined to donate solely to the National Party. According to Mulgan, 'Fletcher 
Challenge donated $50,000 to both National and Labour in 1990' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.254). According to 
Electoral Commission records, in 1997 the National Gas Corporation gave $15,000 to Labour and $35,000 
to National. In 1998, the Natural Gas Corporation gave $27,500 to both National and Labour. In 1999 AMP 
gave $15,000 to both National and Labour. Brierley Investments gave $25,000 to Labour and $50,000 to 
National. Clear Communications gave $15,000 to both National and Labour. The National Gas Corporation 
gave $30,000 to both National and Labour. Saturn Communications gave $20,000 to both. Tower Ltd gave 
$11,000 to each. Transalta gave $20,000 to Labour and $25,000 to National. TV3 gave $25,000 to both 
Labour and National. In 2000 Westpac Trust gave $15,000 to both main parties. In 2001 Westpac Trust 
again gave $15,000 to both parties. Ericsson Communications gave $20,000 to both parties. Contact Energy 
gave $25,000 to both parties. In 2002 Sky City Casino gave $40,000 to both main parties. 
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donations to both major parties' (quoted in Revington, 2002: p.34). Likewise, 
according to the Labour Party general secretary in 1999, Rob Allen, '90 percent 
of the corporates that give to politics give in an even-handed fashion as 
corporate citizens ... And 5-10 percent, not even 10 percent, probably 2-5 percent 
choose to give hugely to one side of politics' (Allen, 24 May 1999).20 Some view 
such even-handedness as an indication of fairness or 'public service' (Mulgan, 
1997a: p.254). There are also alternative explanations which are not related to 
the perceived altruism of business, but to the idea that business interests 
recognise the old models of politics have broken down. In this situation 
businesses opportunistically vary their contributions according to electoral 
circumstances, giving more to National and Act when these parties have a high 
probability of winning power, and to Labour and the left parties when National's 
chances are low. The existence of this pragmatic approach is confirmed by one 
former National Party campaigner who says, 'Businessmen are fundamentally 
pragmatic people and giving money to losing causes isn't something that's high 
on the list' (quoted in Vaughan, 2003: p.6). On the other hand, donations are 
probably given to parties in opposition because - equally pragmatically - donors 
take a longer-term view of 'not wanting to anger the party in opposition because it 
may be back on the treasury benches before too long' (Vaughan, 2003: p.6). 
It is also likely that business donors give in a manner which they believe 
reinforces the new policy consensus. But business donors obviously have 
different views on which parties are within the policy consensus. For example, 
while in 1998 Westpac Trust donated $30,000 to both National and Labour as 
well as a further $10,000 to the Alliance, in contrast the ANZ Bank gave $10,000 
to the National Party, $5000 to Labour, and $5000 to Act. The 'bank refused 
financial support to the Alliance or New Zealand First, saying that it only gave 
backing to parties that supported a market-oriented economy (NZPA, 1998e: 
p.16). 
20 See also: Vaughan (2003), who cites one large company that splits 'its donations in line with opinion polls' 
(Vaughan, 2003: p.6). 
442 Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 
Interest Groups 
As shown in Chapter Five, interest and pressure groups often provide financial 
resources to the political parties that they are in some way aligned with. This 
financial aid comes in other forms apart from donations - aligned groups also 
spend their own money on political campaigns that favour a particular party. As 
Pinto-Duschinsky has pointed out, 'The bourgeois parties receive their most 
significant form of indirect support through large, professional public relation 
campaigns' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). One of the most obvious New Zealand 
examples was in 1975 when a privately organised group, the Capital Club, 
backed by the millionaire Bob Jones, ran a large-scale advertising campaign 
supporting National. Other well known examples include the Employers' 
Federation campaign in favour of the Employment Contracts Act in 1996, and the 
Engineers' Union $300,000 campaign to change the government in 1999. But, as 
was explained in Chapter Five, most interest groups tend to refrain from 
appearing openly aligned to anyone particular political party. The relationships 
between interest groups and parties in New Zealand are normally personal rather 
than formal. It is common that individual members orleaders of an interest group 
will support a particular party in the expectation the party will also support their 
interests. As a result of the weakening alignments and linkages between parties 
and interest groups, the funds from these sources are relatively insignificant for 
the New Zealand parties in the 1990s. For instance, despite the rhetoric and out-
dated tales to the contrary, even the Labour Party obtains only very limited 
funding from the few trade unions still affiliated to it. Interest groups whose 
economic and political interests are more closely aligned with- one party are 
obviously more likely to have a closer relationship - formally or not - with a 
particular political party. But in today's party system, political parties broadly seek 
to serve the same interests as one another, and hence there is little point in 
interest groups aligning themselves to any of the parties, when they can more 
effectively further their goals by pursuing good relations with all parties. 
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International Sources of Income 
When the Cold War was at its height, many Western political parties derived a 
substantial amount of their income from foreign sources - mainly from the United 
States and Soviet Union.21 There have often been rumours of such foreign aid 
being directed into New Zealand parties, and especially that the Communist 
Party of New Zealand (CPNZ) and the Socialist Unity Party (SUP) were funded in 
the past by 'Moscow gold'. As a consequence, in 1980 the New Zealand 
Government expelled the Soviet Ambassador. Recently, with the opening of the 
former USSR's state archives, it has been revealed that the Soviet Union gave 
donations of US$48,200 to the two parties between 1959 and 1973 (NZ Herald, 
1998a).22 
The right of New Zealand politics is not free from such allegations either. In the 
1975 general election, rumours surrounded the funding of the National Party's 
controversial 'dancing Cossacks' television advertising campaign. According to 
Chris Wilkes, there is reason to think that the United States CIA and South 
African business interests provided the money for the campaign (Wilkes, 1978: 
p.220). The 'dancing Cossacks' cartoon advertisements were estimated by trade 
sources to have cost about $200,000, and Wilkes suggests an improper funding 
arrangement occurred: 
21 According to Pinto-Duschinsky: 'After the Second World War, party channels were again used to export 
political influence by both sides in the Cold War. While the Soviet Union continued to back overseas 
Communist parties and other sympathetic organisations (such as selected trade unions, liberation 
movements, and newspapers), the United States and its Allies also made frequent and large-scale 
payments to anti-Communist politicians and parties in countries threatened by Soviet infiltration' (Pinto-
Duschlnsky, 1998). 
22 The SUP leader, Bill Anderson, has said that if any such money was being passed to the party it was only 
'small amounts to cover fares and accommodation for study tours or visits to Eastern Bloc trade union 
institutes' (Barnett, 2000: p.11). 
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National claimed that they had been produced 'at cost' by the American company Hanna-
Barbera, who were willing to experiment with political films. Why an American company 
should be involved in experimenting with the New Zealand political system is far from 
clear (Wilkes, 1978: p.220). 
Since the fall of Soviet-Communism such ideologically-motivated international 
funding is much less typical today and is probably only of very limited influence in 
New Zealand. Certainly there is little information available about donations to the 
New Zealand parties from foreign businesses or individuals. Unlike some other 
countries,23 no law exists against such donations and the large anonymous 
donations that are declared by the parties to the Electoral Commission could 
conceivably be sourced from anywhere outside the country. In fact most of the 
known business donations are from foreign-owned companies operating in New 
Zealand - businesses such as Tower, Transalta, TV3, Westpac Trust, and Clear 
Communications. 
Candidates and MPs 
Many of the financial resources provided for the election campaigns in each 
electorate are provided by the party's local candidates, as traditionally they must 
raise their own money for their campaigns.24 In some parties the successful 
candidates are also expected to contribute to the party's general campaign fund. 
This is often carried out through a requirement for MPs to contribute financial 
resources - normally a proportion of their salary - to the party organisation (often 
referred to as a 'tithe'). The Alliance and Green Party expect MPs to contribute 
about nine percent of their salary,25 and New Zealand First levies its MPs at the 
23 According to (Pinto-Duschininsky, 1997), bans against foreign donations to political parties exist in Brazil, 
Canada (partial ban), France, Germany (partial ban), India, Israel (partial ban), Japan, Malaysia, Poland, 
Russia, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, United States, and Ukraine. 
24 As one Labour candidate wrote in 1978: We received no financial assistance from head office. All funds 
had to be raised locally' (Shand, 1978: p.177). 
25 For this reason, Alliance MPs were sometimes included in the Alliance's donation disclosures to the 
Electoral Commission. These figures ranged between $10,000 and $16,000. Likewise, the Green Party 
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lower rate of five percent (Speden, 1996c: p.2).26 This money helps operate the 
extra-parliamentary party and fund their general election campaigns. 
MPs also use their own personal finance within their parties to obtain advantage. 
For example, MPs sometimes pay for supporters to travel to conferences, and 
within the Labour and National parties this has led to allegations that MPs have 
attempted to buy votes.27 
Enterprise and Fundraising 
Traditionally New Zealand parties have raised much of their income through their 
own enterprise and investment, but this form of income generation is on the 
decline. Such activities range enormously from the fund raising cake-stall of the 
local branch of the party, through to investments in property undertaken by the 
national office. Local electorate organisations carry out traditional fundraising 
activities such as housie nights, fairs, lotteries and raffles. But such sources of 
gaming income were greatly reduced when poker machines were introduced to 
licensed premises in the 1980s.28 In some electorates, parties such as Labour 
and the Alliance have recently raised large sums from these traditional activities, 
but where this now occurs, it is more an aberration than the norm.29 As an 
disclosed donations from some of its MPs for 2002, including a $30,000 donation from co-leader Jeanette 
Fitzsimons. 
26 Act's 2002 fundraising boss, John Boscawen, also emphasises that Act MPs back the party with their own 
money, but does not specify how (O'Sullivan and Small, 2002b). 
27 This was the case at Labour's 1988 annual conference: 'It was claimed some MPs were buying votes for 
[Ruth] Dyson by paying the conference registration fees of absent branches and voting for them. One MP 
was said to have personally spent $640 to back Dyson in her bid for the party presidency (McLoughlin, 
1990b: pp.S7-S9). 
28 Gaming machines have, however, provided some income for the parties: 'A Department of Internal Affairs 
source said $73,000 was declared donated to political parties in 1999/2000 from ... non-casino gaming 
machine proceeds' (Anderson, 2002). Then in 2002 the government introduced the Responsible Gambling 
Bill prohibiting political parties from receiving grants from gaming machines. 
29 See: appendices P-V. Many anecdotal examples exist of declining electorate funding. One documented 
example of the decline is by Vitalis who studied the NLP electorate organisation in Sydenham, and says 
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illustration, the Alliance remains relatively reliant on the fundraising of its 
electorate branches, and in 2000 the head office received levies totalling 
$110,000 from the regional organisations, compared to $38,100 received in 
joining fees and donations (Alliance, 8 Jun 2000). The Labour and National 
parties have traditionally run a number of cake-stall type ventures at their branch 
level, and according to donations to the Electoral Commission, some Labour 
Party electorate branches still raise substantial funds from their local activities.3o 
In the 1990s the Labour Party probably raised only a small amount of money 
from its property management. In 1994 it was reported that the party-owned 
incorporated society, LP Properties, had $400,000 in assets and the electorate 
organisations owned a further $630,000 in property (Underhill, 1994b: p.9). The 
National Party has a number of property investments that are technically owned 
by an entity called 'National Centre Incorporated'. For example, in 1985 the party 
sold one of its properties (a Wellington 10-storey office building) for $5.7 million, 
providing it with a $2 million profit (Dominion, 1989a).31 
Donations from Individuals 
As traditional sources of income erode, the contributions from individual wealthy 
patrons have become increasingly important for all the parties. As New Zealand 
develops more and more wealthy individuals, this obviously gives the parties a 
larger pool of potential major financers. 
that, 'In the past Housie had raised up to $25,000 a year for the Labour Party', but when the same scheme 
continued under the NLP it only provided $6,056 in 1990 (Vitalis, 1992: pp.123, 131). 
30 See: appendices P-V. 
31 The National Party has also run 'affinity' credit cards to obtain income - which has been a common 
money-raising option for many non-profit organisations. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, 'By arrangement 
with a bank, party supporters may use a special version of a major credit card. This will usually carry a 
special party logo and the bank administering the card will remit a small percentage of all purchases made 
with the card - typically 0.25 percent - to party funds' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 15 Sep 1998). 
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In the past, it has been the parties on the right of New Zealand politics that have 
been largely reliant on the patronage of a small number of individuals. For 
example, Robert Milne has outlined how the Reform Party obtained the bulk of 
their financial resources from a few wealthy supporters: 'the Dominion Executive 
of the Reform Party when appealing for funds in the 1920's, used, rather 
casually, to ring up a few key people, some of whom would give as much as 
£1,000 each' (Milne, 1966: p.123). This occurred in the days before mass-
membership type parties, and later Labour and National developed into large 
parties reliant more for their money on a sizeable number of members. Things 
have now, in a sense, turned full-circle and New Zealand political parties are 
again reliant on the patronage of wealthy individuals. In fact, as early as the 
1970s there were signs that contributions from individuals were proving more 
important than grassroots fundraising. One candidate in the 1972 general 
election reported this phenomenon: 
Our attempts to raise funds through a weekly housie evening proved unrewarding. In 
typical Labour Party fashion, however, we held a large fair which netted us over $600 and 
gave us just the financial boost we needed as the campaign drew closer. In fact 
donations began to flow in thick and fast as the campaign got under way. All in all we 
received some $1 500 in donations from individuals. This was a marked difference from 
previous elections when the amount would typically have been less than $100 (Shand, 
1978: p.177). 
Then, in the 1980s, a decline of grassroots fundraising occurred, especially due 
to the increasing attraction and supply of alternative sources of income. This is 
illustrated by ex-Labour Party minister Trevor De Cleene who pointed to the 
advantage of receiving donations: 'You can sell raffles for a trailor-Ioad of 
groceries - but nothing beats a three or four hundred thousand dollar 
subscription' (quoted in Frontline, 1989). Therefore, with the days of the mass 
party over, the modern electoral-professional political parties are often being 
'bankrolled' by a small number of patrons. In 1983-84 millionaire Bob Jones 
almost single-handedly funded the establishment and operation of the New 
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Zealand Party.32 Even the left-wing NewLabour Party received considerable 
backing from a few individuals. In one case, the party claimed to have a pledge 
from a 'Greek socialist fish-merchant' for sums of $10,000 and $50,000 (Phil 
Twyford, 1989). Later in 1999 the Alliance received $50,000 from a supporter in 
Auckland. Similarly, the Labour Party appears to occasionally obtain large estate 
bequests through the Public Trust Office, including one in 1997 for $190,000. 
The party's three most recent presidents have also all been millionaires willing to 
work for the party for little or no financial reward and have connected the party 
with other potential donors of great individual wealth. Act has, in the past, been 
the recipient of large donations from wealthy individuals, including Sky TV 
founder and millionaire Craig Heatly and businessman Alan Gibbs.33 
The State 
The most significant change in political funding is the 'revolution' that has 
occurred in the state funding of the parties in Parliament. Chapter Eight deals 
with this topic in depth, but the most basic details are that the parliamentary 
parties are given budget allocations to pay for the costs of each leader's office, 
spending on research, media relations, and co-ordinating the work of the party's 
MPs in Parliament. The level of funding allocated by Parliamentary Service for 
each party is determined by a number of factors relating to the number of seats 
the party holds in Parliament, what proportion of these are electorate MPs, and 
how many are outside the Executive. The party in government receives 
additional funding through Ministerial Services. 
As Table 7.2 (below) shows, in the 2000-01 financial year' the parties in 
Parliament received a total of $12 million in 'Party and Members Support'. This 
money is used for hiring specialist staff, publishing, postage, and so on. In 
32 Jones was also alleged to be an early major financial backer of New Zealand First, giving the party 
$50,000 in 1993 (Scherer, 1994b). 
33 See: Scherer (1996b), Johns (2001 a), and O'Sullivan and Small (2002e). 
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addition, Table 3 shows a number of other parliamentary services that political 
parties benefit from - such as $13 million spent on executive secretaries, $7.7 
million spent on MP travel, $3.2 million spent on telecommuncations, and $4.2 
million spent on computing and other information services. 
Table 7.2: Party & Members Support (2000-2001) 
Party Budget 
National Party $4,800,902 
Labour Party $4,376,007 
Act New Zealand $1,001,487 
Alliance $810,504 
Green Party $800,504 
New Zealand First $564,994 
United New Zealand $130,163 
Total $12,484,561 
Source: Parliamentary Service (2001). 
Table 7.3: Services to MPs (2000-2001) 
Services in Parliament Expenditure 
Secretarial Support $13,081,600 
Members Communication $3,296,036 
Members' Travel $7,710,401 
Information Services $4,200,594 
Building & Operations Management $14,007,359 
Catering Services $755,359 
Personnel & Accounting Services $572,237 
Policy Advice $194,618 
Total $43,818,204 
Source: Parliamentary Service (2001). 
Part Two: Resources of the New Zealand Political Parties 
In recent years there have been substantial changes to the income streams of 
political parties. An examination of the individual parties provides greater detail 
about the alterations to these patterns. 
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Labour Party 
The modern Labour Party extra-parliamentary organisation typically has an 
annual operational budget of about $2.5 million, and in the last general election 
spent a further $2 million on the campaign. It is now the most well-resourced 
party in New Zealand. It was not always like this. The size of Labour's national 
office has traditionally been small in comparison to National's.34 At the party's 
establishment in 1916 the first party secretary was only provided with 'a lead 
pencil and a postage stamp' and it was not until 1922 that a proper national office 
was actually established (Milne, 1966: p.186). Funding became much more 
lucrative once the party took power in 1935, and after one term in government 
Labour's wealth increased by 900 percent (Gustafson, 1989: p.200). Yet for the 
following decades the party's finances remained relatively meagre. Mitchell 
estimated the income of the party in 1960 to be £16-17,000 (Mitchell, 1962b: 
p.78).35 Party staffing remained small during the 1950s and 1960s. The Labour 
Party national office consisted, according to Milne, of 'the Secretary, an Assistant 
Secretary, and one organizer' as well as an unspecified number of typists (Milne, 
1966: p.186). Out in the electorates, the party also employed a number of 
organisers, varying between one and four in total (Milne, 1966: p.189).36 
34 In 1976 the president of Labour claimed that the party had never had 'the financial resources of National 
which now seemed necessary for the market research and systematic publicity modern politics demanded' 
(quoted in Cleveland, 1977: p.137). See also: Mitchell (1962b: pp.78-79). 
35 In her study of the party organisation in the 1950s, Louise Overacker, found that the organisation had an 
income of £23,000 in 1950-1 and £36,000 for 1951-2 (Overacker, 1957: p.718). Milne suggests that 
Overacker might have included some "double counting" in her figures (Milne, 1966: p.191). He estimated the 
party's income in this period to be no 'more than £15,000 or £20,000 a year' (Milne, 1966: p.191). Milne 
commented on the party's lack of income: 'A symptom of the party's difficulties is a shortage of money, 
which makes it impossible to pay enough to attract good staff for long (as shown by the rush of organizers to 
become M.P.s), or to employ sufficient numbers of staff' (Milne, 1966: p.190). 
36 According to Vowles, 'Labour's staffing was minimal, and not well organised. In 1960, Labour Head Office 
staff were only six, with one organiser based in Auckland. Before 1957, Labour had employed up to five 
organisers but, in government until 1960, had not replaced them' (Vowles, 2002b: pA23). 
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Elections were always a major expense, but not as extravagant as today. In 1957 
and 1960 Labour was able to spend about £2S,000 and £25,000 respectively 
(Mitchell, 1962b: p.79). According to Bob Harvey, who has been centrally 
involved in many of Labour's election campaigns, the 1969 election campaign 
cost just $70,000 (Harvey, 1992a: p.10S). Political competition soon became 
more sophisticated, requiring greater expenditure, and in the 1975 election 
campaign the Labour Party head office spent an estimated $140,000 (Cleveland, 
1977: p.136). 
Labour's membership in its first five-six decades provided a substantial portion of 
the party's revenue - not only through membership fees and donations, but also 
by means of organising fund-raising activities. As David North pointed out in 
1954, 'The Labour Party, much more than the National Party, must use a series 
of fund-raising devices other than the direct request for money. Carnivals, 
dances, raffles and even the sale of baked goods' were used to fund the party 
(North, 1954: p.69). The head office's operations were mostly funded, however, 
by the unions affiliated to the party.37 The size of donations from individual trade 
unions was often considerable. According to Leslie Lipson, union contributions in 
the 1940s were 'the largest, the most regular, and the most dependable item in 
the party revenues' (Lipson, 1945: p.24S). During the late 1950s the union 
affiliate fees raised an average of £13,500 a year for the party (Mitchell, 1962b: 
p.7S}.38 Even as late as 1972, R M S Hamilton reported that the party was 
37 See: Vowles (2002b: p.420), Gustafson (1989: p.209). 
38 The affiliated trade union members have always paid a smaller fee than ordinary branch members of the. 
party. In the early 1960s the branch membership fee was 5s, while the affiliated membership fee was only 
about a quarter of that, at 1 s. 6d. (Mitchell, 1962a: p.17). In 1986 the RCES reported that while the ordinary 
membership of the party paid a membership fee of $10, the affiliation fees were 'paid to head office at a rate 
of 70 cents for every member who voted in favour' of affiliation. In 2003, the membership fee for ordinary 
members was $11, while for the affiliated unions the fee was $1. 
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'dependent for resources on the affiliated trade unions, which provide most of its 
annual budget' (Hamilton, 1972: p.205).39 
When in the 1970s the Labour Party's extra-parliamentary organisation became 
something of an empty shell devoid of a mass membership, this had very 
negative effects for its finances. I n the early-1970s the party organisation was 
operating on a budget of only $30,000-$40,000 (ibid). The party had essentially 
been transformed into an elite-cadre party, and without an effective extra-
parliamentary organisation its finances continued to be poor and its operations 
remained backward.4o Countering this financial decline was an increase in 
business funding. During the 1950s, the Labour Party moved away from a class-
oriented programme of social change,41 and consequently its relationship with 
business (and especially manufacturing) also improved, leading to more 
generous donations from the corporate sector. Mitchell has outlined how wealthy 
individuals and firms began to displace trade unions as the major donors during 
this period: 
Manufacturers had never supported Labour as liberally as they did in the 1960 election; 
some contributions were as large as those of trade unions, and collectively they may 
have totalled as much as a third of the £19,700 donated to the campaign fund (Mitchell, 
1962b: p.79). 
In the late-1970s (following the Third Labour Government's defeat) there was an 
impetus within the party to rebuild and professionalise the extra-parliamentary 
wing - which involved introducing modern technology, making administrative 
processes more efficient, obtaining new and better offices, and hiring more staff. 
39 Anecdotal evidence suggests that trade union donations dropped off in the 1970s. For example, the 
Wellington Central Labour candidate at the 1978 election reported that while his campaign fund had 
received 'some $1500 in donations from individuals', 'Trade unions gave nothing' (Shand, 1978: p.177). 
40 According to Michael Bassett, an MP in the 1972-75 Labour Government, the parliamentary party short-
sightedly ran the party organisation down while they were in government, which meant that after the 1975 
defeat, the caucus 'turned to the party machine to find nothing much there' (Bassett, 1976: pp.302, 303). 
41 See: Chapter Two. 
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This occurred, first under party president Arthur Faulkner (1976-78), and then 
under the presidency of Jim Anderton (1979-84): 
To many within the Party it seemed solving the long-standing problem of meagre financial 
resources was imperative if Labour was going to be restructured into a modern political 
party. The Party needed to get away from the 'twenty-cent raffle' syndrome and develop 
a more systematic and viable method of collecting money. This was essential if Labour 
were to be able to employ additional staff and expertise in order to improve the 
organisation at both national and local levels (Strachan, 1985: p.162). 
Anderton, in particular, took an ambitious and determined approach, focusing on 
both rebuilding the party as a mass membership organisation and 
professionalising it.42 This helped Labour again became a mass membership 
party, and with this the party re-established itself with 'a more viable financial 
infrastructure' which in turn allowed it to professionalise even further (Strachan, 
1985: pp.169-170). For example, in 1976 the party appointed J B Munro as a full-
time fundraiser for 18 months, with the objective of raising $1.5 million for the 
1978 general election.43 One of the initiatives of Munro was the implementation 
of an idea copied off Social Credit - a 'Supporters Fund', which was an 
experiment in direct-giving (ibid: p.5). Then, in 1981, a new Director of 
Fundraising, Mike Williams, was employed on a full-time basis and a new system 
of automatic bank transfer payments, known as the 'Victory for Labour' (VFL) 
programme, was instituted and proved highly successful (ibid: p.167). At its 
height the VFL had 7000 members making monthly contributions (Gustafson, 
1989: p.210).44 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the party organisation cultivated closer ties 
with business as part of its professionalisation under Anderton. Williams, as the 
party's chief fundraiser, set up the first 'scheme to arrange meetings between 
42 See: a (1986: chapter eight). 
43 See: Strachan (1985: p.163), and Cleveland (1977: p.137). 
44 In 1987 the party raised $158,000 through the VFL fund, as well as $410,000 from its 'Vote and Victory' 
levies. In this election year, an appeal also involved members and other supporters giving money and 
undertaking further fund-raising activities which raised $142,000 (Munro, 1988c: p.1). 
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potential big business donors and senior party figures' (Murphy, 1990b). Williams 
told the media that 'donors would be put in touch with ministers and then 
"touched" for donations' (ibid).45 By the time Anderton left the presidency in 1984 
the party's financial position had improved substantially.46 The solid financial 
structures were now in place, and financial pledging by members ensured the 
party had an annual income of about $1 million. Out of this, a building 
programme was launched, which involved the construction of Fraser House in 
Willis St, Wellington, to house the party's head office. Part of this spending 
involved employing 17 full-time staff - 12 working in the head office and five 
organising in the provincial centres (Ovenden, 1986: p.30). 
The 1984 general election cost the head office 'between $600,000 and $700,000' 
(RCES, 1986: p.213).47 Then, in 1987, Labour's expenditure rose dramatically to 
between three and four million dollars. This was over four times what the party 
spent in 1984, and appears to be the highest recorded campaign expenditure in 
New Zealand history. During this period the business community began funding 
the Labour Party on a highly significant basis. At the 1984 election much of the 
business sector was disillusioned with Muldoonism and many transferred their 
45 According to Williams, 'I do not think there is anything wrong with touching a company which has seen a 
minister. Most of them do not even end up giving anything' (quoted in Murphy, 1990b). Williams also says 
that his practice is to ask business donors about any problems they have, and then report 'general concerns 
of the business community to Labour's caucus' (Vaughan, 2003: p.6) 
46 See: Gustafson (1989: p.210), who maintains that by the early 1980s Labour had 'a firmer financial 
foundation than at any time in its history'. Others disagree, saying that Anderton actually achieved the 
opposite by overspending, which led Labour to near-bankruptcy. Strachan, for example, maintains that 
'Despite considerable progress in the organisational sphere during the 1979-81 period, financial problems 
continued to be the "Achilles" heel of Labour Party organisation. Although several attempts had been made 
since 1976, neither the Faulkner nor Anderton administration had been able to create a viable financial 
infrastructure' (Strachan, 1982: p.8). Likewise, according to James, in the 1981 general election the party 
was financially stretched and ended up with a $500,000 debt after the election (James, 1987a: p.40). 
Strachan wrote in 1982 that financial difficulties continued to limit the party organisation's functioning 
(Strachan, 1982: pp.155-156). 
47 According to the Royal Commission, at the electorate level, Labour candidates spent a further $300,000 
(RCES, 1986: p.213). The 1984 expenditure was lower than might have been expected because an early 
election had been called. 
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loyalty from National to Labour.48 Then at the 1987 election, business interests 
contributed over $3 million to the campaign, greatly overshadowing the much 
lesser contributions of unions (about $300,000) and party members (about 
$150,000) (Frontline, 1989).49 
Shortly after the 1987 election business funding dropped off as the share market 
crashed, the Fourth Labour Government started to fall apart, and Labour's 
reforming agenda slowed down. Labour Party financial records show that in 1988 
the party received only $152,200 from business (Munro, 1989d). This decline 
was also reflected in a 1988 Labour Party Council report, which stated that the 
party was suffering from 'the increasing reluctance of the business sector to 
support the party' (quoted in Munro, 1988c: p.1). Business funding did not 
recover until the 1993 election. Between the late-1980s and mid-1990s the party 
organisation was therefore in a particularly precarious financial position. While 
the costs of running a political party were quickly increasing, the drastic decline in 
party membership numbers that occurred while the party was in office produced 
a drop in income through membership fees and fund-raising activity. 
Consequently, as early as 1986, the extra-parliamentary party admitted being 
$260,000 in debt (NZ Herald, 1988b). Although businesses were donating more, 
most of these corporate donations were specifically given to the Labour caucus' 
election campaign fund and not the party organisation.5o Then the party finished 
1987 in financial crisis, with an election campaign deficit of $500,000 (Munro, 
1988a). By then, Labour had an operating deficit of $135,362 and a debt of 
$815,692 (Munro, 1988c: p.1). The party organisation was forced to sell two 
floors of its Wellington Fraser House headquarters as well as property in 
48 See: James (1990a: p.66). 
49 Evidence of substantial corporate funding is provided by ex-businessman Allan Hawkins, who donated 
$250,000. He stated that this 'was probably a fairly common sort of level at that time ..... I knew of others that 
were talking about amounts like that' (Frontline, 1989). See also: Palmer (1992: p.138). 
50 Roger Douglas and other cabinet ministers admitted receiving donations, and this was later confirmed by 
party president Ruth Dyson. Allan Hawkins, for example, said he gave his Equiticorp donation of $250,000 
directly to Douglas (Frontline, 1989). 
456 Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 
Auckland. The financial decline continued, and in the 1988 financial year the 
operating loss climbed to $160,000, and in 1989 the party was $890,000 in debt 
(Armstrong, 1990b; McCulloch, 1989b). 
From 1988 the party started to make fundamental changes to its financial 
arrangements. First, the head office asked its branches 'to raise thousands of 
dollars, on top of levies they already pay, in a bid to wipe out the party's large 
debt' (NZ Herald, 1988b). Cuts were then made in 'grants, salaries, expenses, 
the postage and stationary bill, publicity and advertising' (Dominion, 1989). As a 
result of these changes, in 1989 the party was able to reduce its debt to under 
$400,000 and make an operating profit of $20,000 (Armstrong, 1990b).51 
The party's partial financial recovery was only weak, however, and Labour went 
into the 1990 general election with a serious lack of resources and organisation. 
As the then Labour leader Mike Moore later recalled, 'People would burst into 
tears at meetings ..... There was no money; nothing was organised' (quoted in 
Sheppard, 1999: pp.236-237). Business had switched its support back to 
National, and Moore was reported as saying that the party's campaign fund 'was 
a tenth of its 1987 level, principally because of the loss of large corporate 
sponsors' (Edwards, 1990). In fact Labour's election expenditure was about $1 
million (Gustafson, 1993: p.281). It was also reported that head office staff 
numbers were now 'only two-thirds of the pre-1987 size' (James, 1990a: p.66). 
Labour had been badly affected by the departure of the left and right of the party, 
as those leaving had robbed the party of a great deal of 'the professional 
campaign, fund-raising and networking skill' it previously possessed (Sheppard, 
1999: p.239). 
51 In January 1989 the party sold 'the third floor of its Fraser House headquarters ... for a sum understood to 
be close to $1 million' (Dominion, 1989a). The proceeds of this sale put the party back into the black 
temporarily and by 1990 it had produced a surplus of $451,334 (Kilroy, 1992: p.1). 
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In the early 1990s, business financial support remained low, with business 
donations dropping from $172,100 in 1989 to $140,500 in 1990 and $72,700 in 
1991 (NZ Herald, 1991c: p.3; Mcloughlin, 1992b: pp.57-58). The size of 
membership donations also declined in the 1990s - in 1992 it was reported that 
donations 'from members and supporters were down by three-quarters from their 
1991 level' - from $39,190 to $10,005 (Collins, 1992). Income from branch levies 
also fell from $439,264 to $320,458 (Mcloughlin, 1992b: pp.57-58). By 1991 the 
party's overall financial situation declined again, and the shortfall in income for 
that year was $235,504, leaving its overdraft at $1,119,767 (Kilroy, 1992). 
In 1990 and 1991 the party was still spending nearly a million dollars a year but 
by 1993 this had grown to $1.61 million (Mcloughlin, 1992b: pp.57-58; Edwards, 
1994). However, the party was back in the black again for a year - earning $1.66 
million, which left a surplus of $49,000 compared to a deficit of $36,247 in 1992 
(ibid}.52 The budget deficits had been reversed by a resumption of cost cutting, 
which according to labour's general manager, included cuts in staff costs: 
there was a huge cut to paid staff in the early 1990s. I think we dropped the staff by about 
two-thirds, but even then we were not living within our m~ans. So it required some lifting 
of our income in recent years and some re-financing to make sure that income meets 
expenditure (Allen, 1999). 
The income lift was achieved through business donations, which in the 1993 
election year climbed back up near the one million dollar mark ($964,000) 
(Maclennan, 1996: p.C4). In 1996 the party organisation, under the leadership of 
Michael Hirschfeld, raised $911,000 from the business community (Small, 
2000b). In the 1996 election labour spent $1,279,880 (including $436,400 of 
state funding for broadcast advertising). The following year, $413,000 was 
donated by business (ibid). 
52 According to Brent Edwards, 'In 1992 the balance sheet - current assets minus liabilities - recorded a 
$135,165 deficit. At the end of 1993, an election year, the deficit had been turned into a $27,068 surplus' 
(Edwards, 1994}. 
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According to Allen, the party organisation has run surpluses since 1995, and by 
1999 the party had 'no financial difficulty in an on-going sense at all' (Allen, 
1999). In 1999, Labour's income was $2.5 million, and the party's surplus was 
$182,000 (ibid). In the election of that year, the party spent $1,644,183 (including 
$605,677 of state funding for broadcast advertising). In the late 1990s the party 
organisation continued to employ a person under the title of 'Corporate Fund-
Raising and Sponsorship Management'. Also, Bob Harvey became party 
president in 1999, largely due to his fundraising skills, and he reportedly 
expected to raise about $700,000 from the corporates in 1999 but ended up 
attracting $1,240,000 (Speden, 1999d: p.16; Small, 2000b). Harvey also came to 
complain about being regarded merely as an ATM for the Labour MPs. His 
replacement, Mike Williams, has played an even stronger corporate fundraising 
role. Whereas the president normally visited about 60 or 70 businesses, Williams 
visited nearly 400 in 2001 and then over 500 in the election year, with about 10 to 
20 percent of them promising a donation. According to Williams, typical corporate 
donations averaged between $4000 and $6000 (O'Sullivan and Small, 2002a). 
After being elected to government in 1999 and building up a budget surplus, the 
year 2000 was a very poor financial year for the party, mostly because its 
corporate donors went on strike after the Labour-Alliance Government initially 
pursued a number of 'leftist' policies. It was revealed that while the party had set 
a fundraising target of $350,000 for the 2000 year, it had only achieved a mere 
$50,000 (O'Sullivan, 2000).53 But in 2001 the party recovered, and the corporate 
fundraising target was exceeded four months early (Watkins, 2001; Guyon 
Espiner, 2001 b: p.6). In the 2002 general election Labour spent $2,089,187 
(including $614,722 of taxpayer television funding), which meant that it was the 
biggest election spender. This was the first time that Labour had been the 
biggest spender since 1987 - when the party had last sought a second term in 
53 This low figure is consistent with that provided to the Electoral Commission in 2000 which declared that 
the Labour Party only received $35,000 in head office donations, including $15,000 from Westpac Trust and 
an anonymous donation of $20,000. 
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government, again largely with the support of business. The labour Party has in 
more recent years possibly been the most well-funded party. In the seven-year 
period (1 April 1996 - 31 December 2002) since it became mandatory to disclose 
national donations over $10,000, the labour Party has declared donations 
totalling $2,568,421.54 By comparison, in the same period, Act declared 
$1,284,339, and National $2,114,859. 
Table 7.4: Annual Business Donations 
Year Amount Source 
1985 $190,325 Mcloughlin (1987: p.A 1). 
1986 $282,038 Munro (1989d). 
1987* $3,700,000 Kelsey (1995: p.36).bb 
1988 $152,200 Munro (1989d). 
1989 $172,100 NZ Herald (1991 c: p.3). 
1990* $140,500 Mcloughlin (1992b: pp.57-581. 
1991 $72,700 Mcloughlin (1992b: pp.57-58). 
1993* $964,000 Maclennan (1996: p.C4). 
1996* $911,000 Small (2000a). 
1997 $413,000 Small (2000a). 
1999* $1,240,000 Small (2000a). 
2000 $50,000 Small (2000a). 
Note: ElectIon years are marked with an asterisk. 
The affiliation fees from the trade union movement have become increasingly 
insignificant compared to the money donated from business. In the mid-1980s 
the labour Party received about $190,000 a year from its affiliated union 
membership, but by 2000 its funding was only a fraction of this amount. As early 
as 1990 the trade union contribution had dropped to $141,172, then to $125,712 
in 1991, and then down significantly to $51,025 in 1993 (Edwards, 1994).56 Even 
the Engineers Union - the largest union affiliated to labour - now only 
contributes $20,000. per year, except in election years when it contributes about 
$80,000. When the general secretary of the labour Party, Rob Allen, was asked 
54 See: appendices P-V. 
55 Alternatively, according to Palmer, business contributed $3,000,000 (Palmer, 1992: p.138). According to 
Munro, business gave $352,590 directly to the party organisation (Munro, 1988c: p.1). 
58 In 2003 the affiliations fees from unions probably contribute a similar amount to that in 1993. 
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in 1999, about the degree of dependence the party has on union funding, he 
replied that the party was 'Virtually not dependent at all. The income from unions 
is a very tiny, tiny proportion of funds - almost insignificant' (Allen, 1999). 
National Party 
The National Party has traditionally been a capital resource-rich party, and this 
has in part given it a considerable electoral advantage over the Labour Party, 
helping maintain it as the natural party of government in the postwar period.57 
Unfortunately, details of National Party finances are very difficult to obtain. 
Certainly the party has had a fair amount of wealth - as evidenced by its 
possession of property throughout the country and its employment of a large 
number of organisers. Yet in recent years National's financial advantage has 
eroded, especially because it appears to have lost its monopoly on business 
funding. Consequently, in the 2002 election, the party was easily outspent by 
Labour. 
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From its earliest days the National Party was relatively wealthy and professional. 
In its first general election, in 1938, the party had a budget of £55,000 
(Gustafson, 1986: p.200).58 Of this, £15,000 was spent on hiring three advertising 
agencies to handle pUblicity. In every election since, the party has hired agencies 
and other professionals at election time. Between 1938 and 1972 the advertising 
account remained with the same agency - Charles Haines (Gustafson, 1986: 
p.196). In their 1975 general election campaign the National Party spent about 
$350,000 - substantially more than the Labour Party's approximate expenditure 
of $140,000 (Cleveland, 1977: p.136). Similarly, the budget for the 1978 National 
Party election campaign was reputed to be about $400,000 (Wood, 1980: p.123). 
In the 1984 election campaign the party headquarters spent a total of about 
$600,000.59 For the same year, the party told the RCES that it 'raised slightly 
over $2 million at electorate level (RCES, 1986: p.214). 
The party's relatively substantial wealth has meant that it has traditionally been 
able to maintain a large national headquarters, and in the past most electorates 
also employed paid staff and each of the party's five divisions had offices 
(Hamilton, 1972: p.205).60 According to North, writing in 1954, each electorate 
normally had a full-time organiser and a part-time secretary (North, 1954: p.48). 
He estimated that there were about '100 paid National Party workers, most of 
57 James has calculated that, 'Money and organisation gave National a permanent edge over Labour and in 
elections amounting probably to between 1 and 2 per cent of the vote through four decades till the end of the 
1970s' (James, 1987a: p.25). 
58 According to Gustafson, 'The budget for the 1938 election year was 55,000 pounds of which 21,578 
pounds was for publicity, 15,896 for [the party newspaper] National News, 5, t 1 0 pounds for the travelling 
expenses of M Ps on speaking tours, and 6,416 pounds for salaries, rent, office expenses and meetings of 
the Dominion Council and annual conference' (Gustafson, 1986: pp.200-201). 
59 During this period, the RCES found that, like their income levels, 'National Party expenditure levels ... 
have closely paralleled those of the Labour Party in recent years' (RCES, 1986: p.214). 
60 Mitchell has outlined the staffing advantage the party has had over the others: 'Centrally National has a 
full-time general director, a publicity director, a research director and the necessary office staffs, a marked 
contrast with Labour's central staff of four, including the national secretary and the research officer, and 
Social Credit's of one, the national secretary' (Mitchell, 1962b: p.81). 
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them full time employees' (North, 1954: p.48). National Party historian Barry 
Gustafson confirms this, detailing that at this time, 
There were 10 staff in the Dominion office, 4 office staff and 9 organisers in the 
Auckland Division, 2 and 13 in South Auckland, 6 and 24 in Wellington, 7 and 12 in 
Canterbury-Westland, and 5 and 7 in Otago-Southland. In addition, some 50 
electorates had a professional part-time secretary, usually a local accountant paid an 
honorarium, and many had part-time canvassers paid on a one-third commission of 
money collected (Gustafson, 1986: p.206).61 
Similarly, according to Vowles, in '1960, National had seventeen headquarters 
staff, with about forty-seven organizers employed throughout the country. The 
party's five regional divisions also employed somewhat over twenty 
administrative and clerical staff' (Vowles, 2002b: p.423). By the mid-1960s, 
according to Milne, the number of staff at the headquarters was only 14 (Milne, 
1966: p.180). Certainly during the 1960s National staff numbers declined 
substantially as the party found it uneconomic to employ a large number of staff. 
For instance the party in Ashburton found that 'it was costing $1.57 to collect 
every dollar in membership subscriptions' (Gustafson, 1986: p.210). It seems that 
as membership fell away the cost of collecting the subscriptions was proving 
greater than the amount the organisers and paid canvassers received. Thus with 
the decline of membership, the whole financial nature of the party changed. 
Certainly in the 1950s and 1960s, when party membership was nearly 250,000, 
membership fees must have provided a considerable capital resource base for 
the party. In the 1950s North reasoned that the party's 200,000 members paid 
half a crown each per year in dues, and therefore generated £25,000 (North, 
1954: p.63). Similarly, in 1962 Mitchell put the party's income from subscriptions 
at 'nearly £30,000 a year' (Mitchell, 1962b: p.78).62 Simon Upton' (a National MP 
61 Mitchell wrote in 1962, that the National Party's 'divisions have their own paid organizers, Wellington 
having sixteen, Otago-Southland seven, and the divisions of intermediate size, an intermediate number 
(Mitchell, 1962b: p.81). 
62 Likewise, according to National's Simon Upton, 'membership generated significant income - corporate 
donations were a small percentage of the funds raised to promote the party' (Upton, 1992b: p.8). 
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1981-2000) has also guessed that in the 1970s and 1980s National received 
something like $750,000 in membership dues - using the calculation that 
150,000 members paid $5 each (Upton, 1992b: p.8). As with the Labour Party, 
National continues to claim that it derives much of its money from membership 
fundraising activity. In 1986, the National Party told the RCES that the party 
relied for its income 'primarily on subscriptions and donations' (RCES, 1986: 
p.214). In 2003 subscriptions provide only an insubstantial portion of party funds. 
It seems likely that the party's membership fees alone would not bring in much 
more than $200,000 (assuming 20,000 members paid $10 each).63 
The National Party divisions and electorates also raise a significant proportion of 
the party's income. As well as collecting membership subscriptions, branch 
members are expected to raise a particular cash target to help their electorate 
and divisional organisations pay their levies owed to the party headquarters. 
However, National's truly substantial funding has traditionally come from the 
contributions of farming and business interests.64 Despite the large membership 
of the National Party, North argued in the 1950s that 'the membership dues 
account for only a small portion of the party funds .... Most of the money, 
however, is raised in larger amounts, from business firms, trade associations, 
and prosperous individuals' (North, 1954: p.63). Certainly as membership 
declined after the 1960s, the volume of business donations rose in importance, 
and came to play an even more SUbstantial part of National's income.65 
More recently, however, the natural alignment of the party with business has 
eroded and in the last two decades National's finances have not been so secure. 
In 1984 the party's headquarters was deemed by some to have been 'lamentably 
unsuccessful at fundraising' (Walker, 1989: p.210). Part of National's financial 
63 Although the party does not have a set membership fee, most party divisions charge $5, but also welcome 
donations. The rules have now been changed, and from 2004 membership will cost $10. 
64 See: Hamilton (1972: p.205). 
65 The earlier incarnation of the National Party - the Reform Party - was also overwhelmingly funded by 
large donations (Milne, 1966: p.123). 
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problems at the 1984 general election was due to the fact that the party 
organisation was unprepared for the early snap-election, but the problems were 
mostly due to the unpopularity of the party amongst business. At the 1987 
election, too, National was again unsuccessful in its fundraising, and as a result 
'the party was unable to afford to do more than very limited polling during the 
election campaign' (Vowles, 2002b: p.420).66 In the 1987 election the National 
Party was, according to Denemark, 'strapped for resources. The total budget was 
estimated at between NZ$1 and 1.5 million' (Denemark, 1992: p.168). Following 
the election, the party was forced to sell some of its assets to pay its campaign 
costs (James, 1990: pp.90-91). 
Little is known about what donations the National Party received prior to the 
introduction of compulsory disclosure of large donations in 1996, but in terms of 
income, the party informed the RCES that in 1984 its national office received 
about $220,000 in donations. Income in the party's divisions was estimated to 
yield another $320,000. However the party informed the Commission that in the 
1984 election year they also raised $2 million at the electorate level (RCES, 
1986: p.214). Then in 1988 - a non-election year - the party said that it expected 
to raise $2 million from a fundraising campaign aimed at business houses 
(Riddell, 10 Dec 1988). No doubt, the party has always received a sizeable 
income from farming interests, but as Milne wrote in 1966, 'little detailed 
information is available about contributions from farmers to party funds' (Milne, 
1966: p.115), and this remains the same today. 
The extra-parliamentary organisation puts a lot of resources and effort into 
corporate fundraising. Former party president Geoff Thompson has 'said his 
prime role as party president was to get out and raise funds' (O'Sullivan, 16 May 
2002). Likewise, Michelle Boag was elected as party president in 2001 largely 
66 This lack of market research was confirmed by National's Max Bradford, who said 'We COUldn't afford 
much that year. ... We lost in 1987 because we didn't know where to target effectively' (quoted on Frontline, 
1989). 
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because of her reputation as a PR and fundraising specialist. The party has also 
traditionally hired corporate fundraisers, generally paid on commission. For the 
2002 general election, ex-Finance Minister Bill Birch organised 'a 16-20 strong 
corporate fundraising team' which included businessmen such as Selwyn 
Cushing (O'Sullivan and Small, 2002b). 
The National Party experienced funding problems in the mid-1980s, again in the 
early-1990s, and then in 2002, especially with regard to those donations normally 
received from big business. In the mid-1980s, especially, many business 
interests redirected their donations to the Labour Party, viewing a Labour 
government as being more able to represent their interests. Finances improved 
towards the end of the 1980s, as business interests came back on side with 
National. Therefore the party's 1990 general election campaign was relatively 
well-funded (although the level of expenditure is unknown). Three years later, 
National allegedly spent over $3 million in the 1993 general election (Laws, 
1998a: p.346).67 
In the following year National was reported as having significant financial 
difficulties as membership fell sharply due to the government's unpopular reform 
programme and its series of broken promises. According to Kelsey, business 
donations, too, were low, and 'One National Party strategist complained that 
business had applauded Ruth Richardson's budgets but their chequebooks had 
remained closed' (Kelsey, 1993: pp.154-155). Again in 1996, a decline in 
business donations was reported by the then National Party president, Geoff 
Thompson, which he attributed to the new regulations governing disclosure of 
67 Prior to the 1993 general election, Murray McCully confirmed that the National Party intended to spend a 
considerable sum, saying he expected the party to spend as much as was allowable under electoral laws: 
'We've not been told we want an el cheapo election campaign' (quoted in Harris and Brettkelly, 1993: 
p.1993). One report showed that National were believed to be planning advertising expenditure of about 
$2.4 million (Mandow, 1993: p.3). The party also spent $450,000 in state funding for broadcast advertising 
(BSA, 1993: p.3). 
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donations to political parties (Maclennan, 1996: p.C4).68 In the general election 
of that year, National spent $1,966,444 (including state funding for broadcast 
advertising of $540,377). 
During the late-1990s the National Party was financially comfortable, and in 1999 
the election spending of the party increased by 40 percent to $2,737,353 
(including $597,364 of state funding for broadcast advertising).69 Compared to 
the labour Party, this amounted to a spending disparity of nearly two to one. Yet 
according to a leaked National Party review of its election campaign 'only 87 per 
cent of the party's fighting fund' had been raised for the 1999 election (Watkins 
and Rendle, 2002).10 The heavy campaign spending therefore forced the party to 
go $300,000 into debt (Young and O'Sullivan, 2002). After 1999 the party's 
finances became increasingly unhealthy. Despite great expectations, Michelle 
Boag only raised $1.2 million during her presidency (Young 2002c).11 In the 2002 
general election, National only spent $1,667,118 (including $614,722 of state 
funding for broadcast advertising), which was 39 percent less than in 1999. This 
expenditure was the party's lowest since the 1984 election, illustrating the party's 
financial decline. 
Traditionally the National Party's significant wealth has meant that it has normally 
been the highest spending party in general elections. In the four general 
elections prior to 2002, National has spent more than labour, but it appears that 
this could be changing. The donation disclosure regime which started in April 
1996 also suggests National is no longer the wealthiest party, as the party's 
68 Yet according to one media report, the party raised about $3 million in 1996 (O'Sullivan and Small, 
2002b). This included a total of $350,000 in donations from merchant banker David Richwhite. 
69 However, National's election expenditure declared to the Electoral Commission for the 1999 election may 
have been over-inflated, as the party appear to have included spending on matters (for example travel and 
polls) which was not necessary to declare and which other parties did not declare. 
70 Two months prior to the 1999 general election, a leaked National Party document reported that, 'funding 
for National's campaign is not yet in place', and that 'Fund raising is not easy in the present climate and we 
have to take every opportunity' (quoted in Molesworth, 199ge: p.21). 
71 See also: Maling and Alley (2002). 
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national office has disclosed $2,114,859 in donations compared to Labour's 
$2,568,421.72 The decline is also seen in the decline of staff numbers employed 
by the extra-parliamentary party organisation. While in 1960 the headquarters 
had 17 staff, by 1999 the then party president, John Slater, was claiming only 
seven (Slater, 1999)?3 Likewise, although in the 1950s National had a full-time 
organiser and part-time secretary in every electorate, by 1999, according to 
Slater, 'there might be the odd electorate that for a short, sharp period of time 
bring in someone to go around and do some fundraising on a share of the funds 
basis' but otherwise the party no longer employed organisers (Slater, 1999). 
New Zealand First 
Like most small parties, New Zealand First's extra-parliamentary organisation 
continually experiences financial problems and operates on a very low budget. 
As an example of this, since the disclosure of donations over $10,000 has been 
mandatory, the national office of New Zealand First has disclosed a total of only 
$40,000 received in this way. The high secrecy of the party means that there is 
little information available about their capital resources?4 However, because New 
Zealand First operates on a low budget but remains popular, it often achieves the 
best value for its election expenditure. 
Michael Laws explains in his book The Demon Profession, that when he joined 
New Zealand First in 1996, 'the party had no money' and he believed at the time 
72 See: appendices P-V. See also: Vaughan (2003), who refers to National Party sources who suggest that 
the party is 'cash-strapped' due to low business donations, which is largely because of the departure of 
Michelle Boag from the presidency, the unpopular leadership of Bill English, and the low possibility of 
National entering government in the short-term. 
73 According to Slater, the paid staff included, The chief executive of the party; someone who does all the 
accounting and financial areas. We've got a couple of secretaries, we've got IT people, and we've got some 
strategic people, and at the moment our campaign director is here' (Slater, 1999). 
74 Even Tuku Morgan complained that while he was a New Zealand First MP he was never told what his 
financial contributions were used for. He said that because 'there have been no audited accounts, there's no 
evidence of how that money was being spent or used' (quoted in NZPA, 1998j). 
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its 'ability to raise money ... would be New Zealand First's largest hurdle' in the 
election (Laws, 1998a: p.346). The lack of funds meant that the party was 
'unable to afford any polling or attitudinal research prior to the campaign; no 
commissioned overview, no focus groups, no random telephone polling -
nothing' (ibid: p.363). It also meant that the party had trouble paying for its 
campaigning activities - for example, Laws discloses that during the election 
campaign 'New Zealand First's second promotional pamphlet remained locked in 
a printer's warehouse because the party had run out of money for its distribution' 
(Laws, 1998a: p.368). The party also had a great deal of trouble paying for the 
party's "Spirit of New Zealand" campaign bus?5 However, in the end, New 
Zealand First spent $1,108,310 (including $250,055 of state funding for 
broadcast advertising) on the campaign. This relatively high expenditure meant 
New Zealand First finished the 1996 general election with a substantial debt, 
which by the end of 1997 was rumoured (but disputed by party president Doug 
Woolerton) to be as high as $400,000 (Young, 1998)?6 According to one group 
of ex-New Zealand First party members, the party's council sought to payoff the 
debt by requiring each electorate organisation to come up with $2000 per year 
(ibid). 
As in other parties, New Zealand First requires its local electorate organisations 
and their candidate to raise the funds for local election activities and materials. In 
1996 candidates were billed $1600 for party pamphlets delivered to their 
electorates (Speden, 1996c: p.2). Such costs can amount to many thousands. 
For example New Zealand First's candidate for Rimutaka in 1996, Peter 
McCardle, claimed to have spent $10,353 on his campaign for the seat 
(Edwards, 1997b: p.3). On top of these expenses,"New Zealand First candidates, 
if successful, then have to pay a levy of five percent of their parliamentary 
income in order to payoff campaign debts (Speden, 1996c: p.2). 
75 See: Laws (1998a: pp.348-349), who estimated the cost of the bus campaign at about $250,000. 
76 This lack of funds was probably part of the reason that Peters later attempted to sell the television rights of 
coverage for the 1996 coalition announcement to the Sky broadcaster (Laws, 1998a: p.385). 
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As an indication of the poor state of the party's finances, in 1999 it only spent 
$216,648 in the election (including $108,332 of state funding for broadcast 
advertising - 50 percent of the total). Of all the parties elected to Parliament in 
1999, New Zealand First achieved the best value for its election spending, 
averaging a cost of $2.46 per vote - which compared very favourably, for 
example, to the Alliance's $5.88 per vote. Likewise, in the 2002 election 
campaign, the party ran another relatively efficient campaign, only spending 
$453,888 (including $152,844 of state funding for broadcast advertising) and 
again achieving good value for money ($2.15 per vote) but also suggesting the 
party has few financial backers. 
New Zealand First's low financial resources reflect the party's lack of a 
substantial extra-parliamentary organisation. The small size of the party, together 
with its minimal $1 membership fees has meant that the membership is not a 
substantial source of income for the party. Furthermore, because the party has 
been ideologically antagonistic towards big business, it has always had trouble 
attracting corporate funding?? The party obtains some financial support from 
small-to-medium businesses. In particular, seafood companies appear to have 
been sympathetic; in 1999 the lIam electorate organisation received $1000 from 
United Fisheries, the Waimakariri electorate received $1000 from Seafood 
Incorporated, and the Te Tai Tonga electorate obtained $4000 from Napier-
based Tamatea Fisheries.?8 
77 Much of Peters' personal appeal was based on his crusades against big business. He had campaigned 
against the Business Roundtable, prominent businessman Selwyn Cushing, and a number of other 
businesses. As Michael Laws had argued, 'Peters had burned off possible corporate support with all his 
various parliamentary allegations' (Laws, 1998a: p.346). One exception to this is the support New Zealand 
First once received from Bob Jones; it is alleged that Jones had contributed $50,000 to the party in 1994 
(Scherer, 1994b}. 
78 The party also receives some financial support from Maori organisations - for example in 1999 the 
Rotorua organisation of the party obtained a $10,000 donation from the Whakane Trust and Ngai Tahu Trust 
Board chairman Tipene O'Regan donated $1200 to the Te Tai Tonga electorate in 1996. Also in that year, 
John Delamere received $8000 from Rotorua's Whakaae Trust (Edwards, 1997b: p.3). 
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Like the other small parties, New Zealand First makes good use of state funding 
to carry out their extra-parliamentary activities. In the 2000-01 financial year the 
party received $800,504 in 'party and members support' from the Parliamentary 
Service. One of the party's MPs, Doug Woolerton, also doubles as the party 
president, effectively using the party's parliamentary resources to run the party. 
Woolerton's remuneration is paid for by the state, as is his travel regardless of 
whether or not he is on party presidential or parliamentary business. 
Act New Zealand 
Act New Zealand is sometimes thought to be the most well-resourced party in 
New Zealand. According to Kelsey, writing in 1995, 'Act was estimated to have 
resources equivalent to all the major parties combined with which to fight the 
1996 election' (Kelsey, 1995: p.313)?9 Although this was probably untrue, the 
party certainly started life as a very capital resource-rich party. In one fundraising 
drive in late 1994 Act netted a million dollars (Brown, 1995: p.30), and in 1995 
and 1996 Act secretly received millions of dollars of funds from a small number of 
wealthy supporters. Documents leaked to the Sunday Star-Times showed that 
the party set up elaborate trusts in order to circumvent the newly-introduced 
Electoral Act donation disclosure rules. Large amounts of money were deposited 
into such trusts, but it is unclear as to whether all this money was intended for, or 
paid to, the party. Act's 'Cargill Trust', set up by law firm Buddie Findlay, received 
a total of $6.8 million, of which Act definitely received $2.9 million in capital 
distributions in the period between April 1995 and the end of March 1996 - just 
prior to the disclosure laws coming into effect (Johns, 2001 a: p.A 1). 
79 As another example, according to Mike Williams of Labour, 'You've got parties like Act that baSically 
represent fairly well-off people, and they have a financial advantage over parties like Labour that basically 
represent ordinary people' (quoted in Milne, 2002e). See also: Boston et al. (1997c: p.115). 
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In 1996 the then chief executive of Act, Glen Ashton, said that, 'typical party 
donations came in $3000-$5000 lots, or, from members, at $100-$150 a 
contribution' (Clifton, 1996a: p.3). The income of the party is derived therefore 
not from cake stalls or meat raffles, but mostly from a few wealthy individuals.8o 
The party started life with high expectations for its finances, and in 1995 the party 
president, Rodney Hide, stating that the party was seeking to raise $10 million 
over the following two years, claiming that '$50,000 a year for each of the 65 
MMP electorates was not a lot of money' (Orsman, 1995a). Later the party 
adopted the target of raising nearly $5 million a year by getting its 20,000 
supporters to donate $20 a month to the party (Act, 1995). However even after 
six years of existence the party could still only claim a quarter of its membership 
goal, and it seems unlikely that many of them would donate $20 per month to the 
party. Act therefore continued to be dependent on the subsidies of corporate and 
large individual donations. According to O'Sullivan and Small, Act 'courts wealthy 
backers such as former brewing magnate Douglas Myers, Alan Gibbs and Craig 
Heatley - all now living overseas - property specialist Michael Friedlander and 
Trevor Farmer' (O'Sullivan and Small, 29 Jun 2002). As Act's political orientation 
transformed in the late-1990s the party's financial support-base has also shifted 
away from big business backing. According to Trotter, 'Sources within the party 
report that by far the most loyal Act donors nowadays are farmers - not yuppies' 
(Trotter 1998c). 
The belief that Act still has a very large income is probably untrue; the health of 
its finances has undoubtedly declined and the party is not as flush in cash as is 
often assumed. According to a former chief executive of the party, 'People have 
created this impression that we have a bottomless pit of money, but we don't. We 
need to apply good housekeeping to our resources' (quoted in Clifton, 1996a: 
80 Yet in the original organisational structure devised for Act in 1995, the 600 'sectors' of the party were 
supposed to raise $5000 per year (through monthly pledges of members), amounting to an income of $3 
million per year (Campbe", 1994b: p.15). It does not appear, however, that this projected figure ever 
eventuated. 
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p.3).81 In fact the party organisation has been through some difficult periods. In 
1996 Act cut its operating budget significantly: 
Although still funding extensive travel by its principal spokespeople, the party's chief 
executive is a volunteer rather than a salaried worker, and its head office operation has 
been wound back. Act leader Richard Prebble confirmed he had halved the party's 
head office budget, and was running local campaigns largely on donated equipment 
and volunteer work (Clifton, 1996a: p.3). 
Again, in 2001 the national office operations were severely cut back due to 
funding difficulties. Four out of the five staff positions in its Newmarket office 
were axed including the party's chief executive. A cost-cutting review had 
recommended that Act abandon its corporate structure, use a simple 
administrator and rely more on party volunteers (Young, 2001 c). At the 1996 
general election Act spent $1,746,908 (including $93,739 of state funding for 
broadcast advertising), which was the second largest amount of any party. The 
decline of the party's finances, however, was reflected at the following 1999 
election when the its expenditure slumped to $787,807 (including $129,918 in 
state funding).82 Then in the 2002 general election Act recovered to spend 
$1,792,461 (including $166,903 of state broadcasting money).83 
As well as being dependent on big donations, Act is also highly reliant on state 
funding. Following the 1996 general election Act made a virtue of the fact that it 
had carried out its election campaign without resort to the use of taxpayer funds. 
81 This is an idea also pushed by Roger Douglas: 'It is commonly reported that the party has a bottomless 
war chest full of money but I can assure you this has never been the case' (quoted in the NBR, 1996). 
82 Act has not only spent large amounts of money on advertising during elections, but has also bought 
advertising in non-election years in order to raise its profile. For example, in .1995 'Act spent $300,000 on a 
burst of advertising for its policies' (Campbell, 1996b: p.7). Then in late 1997 and early 1998 the party 
'expended tens of thousands of dollars on two high-profile political campaigns' (Trotter 15 April 1998). The 
1997 publicity campaign alone cost $250,000 (Clifton, 1997e: p.29). 
83 It was reported that party president Catherine Judd 'confirmed the party had doubled its number of donors 
this campaign' (Watkins and Rendle, 2002). This 2002 boost in donations was probably related to the weak 
position of the National Party which showed no likelihood of winning power, while Act was fighting for its 
political life, as it had lost its only electorate seat and opinion polls put the party below the five percent 
threshold. 
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According to newspaper reports, party leader Richard Prebble claimed that 'other 
political parties used the taxpayer to finance their election campaigns, while Act 
relied solely on supporters' donations' (NZPA, 1997a). This statement overlooked 
the fact that the reason that Act did not largely use taxpayer resources in its 
campaign was simply because the party was not eligible for many as it had not 
already been in Parliament. Interestingly, in the following 1999 general election 
campaign, Act used all the available parliamentary subsidies which Prebble had 
criticised in 1997. His claim also disguised the fact that in 1996 the party had 
received $93,739 in state funding from the Electoral Commission in order to 
purchase television and radio advertising, as well as an allocation of 7.5 minutes 
of television primetime to get its message across to electors. In Parliament the 
Act party now has access to ample resources. Its 'Party and Members Support' 
budget for 2000/01 was $1,001,487. During the 1999-2002 parliamentary term 
the party employed 20 taxpayer-funded staff in Parliament, as well as about nine 
equivalent full-time staff in the electorate. 
Act also makes money out of commercial ventures such as the publishing of 
books, of which there have been about twelve (including Richard Prebble's I've 
Been Thinking, and I've Been Writing, Donna Awatere's Zero Tolerance, and 
Rodney Hide's The Power to Destroy). The proceeds from the first book netted 
the party $100,000 (Clifton, 1996a: p.3). 
Green Party 
The election campaigns of the Greens have added weight to the idea that a lack 
of capital resources is no insurmountable barrier to electoral success. In its first 
election, in 1990, the newly-formed party had virtually no money to spend at a 
national level, and candidates had little time to raise money for their local· 
contests. Despite this, the Greens received 6.3 percent of the national vote, and 
averaged about 8.9 percent in the electorates in which they fielded candidates. 
For many years the party continued to operate on a very low income. For 
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instance, in 1992 when it was part of the Alliance it was revealed that the party 
had an annual budget of only $12,487 (James, 1992f: p.11). Since then, its 
finances have improved significantly. Even before it went solo the party 
contributed levies to the Alliance of $23,361 in 1997 and $15,628 in 1998, 
suggesting a larger budget.84 
Prior to the party's first post-Alliance general election campaign, however, the 
finances of the Greens were in a poor state, with Rod Donald saying that by the 
end of 1998 'there was little money in the bank' (Donald, 2000: p.50). In the end 
the Greens had a total income of only $300,000 in 1999 (Small, 2002a), and in 
the election campaign spent a mere $279,168 (including $43,250 of state funding 
for broadcast advertising). They obtained 5.2 percent of the party vote and 
therefore achieved a respectable cost per vote of $2.62, which compared very 
favourably to the Alliance's $5.88 per vote. The following year the party's income 
dropped to just $145,000 (Small, 2001b).85 
By 2002 the party was larger and financially better off. In that year's election 
campaign the party spent the fourth highest amount - $765,035 (including 
$166,930 of state funding for broadcast advertising)~ Green Go-convenor David 
Glendon declared, 'We have had donations from some quite large corporate 
donors' (quoted in Guyon Espiner, 2002a: p.G2). According to Glendon, the 
'business community now acknowledge the Greens as a potentially influential 
force and some have responded by reaching for their chequebooks' (ibid).86 
84 See: appendices Q and R. 
85 The Green Party MPs also own a superannuation scheme, called the Green Futures Superannuation 
Fund, which invests their MPs parliamentary retirement income. In 2001 the fund' owned a house in 
Thorndon and two apartments on The Terrace, which it rented back to the MPs, who 'then claim the rent and 
approved outgoings back from Parliamentary Service under the Wellington accommodation allowance of up 
to $16,000 a year' (Young, 2001a). 
86 According to Donald, the Green Party has received donations 'from West pac, Telecom, Ericsson, Clear 
and Macquarie Bank' (Vaughan, 2003: p.?). He claims that in 2002 it also 'returned two cheques worth a 
combined $20,000 to would-be corporate donors. One was from a gambling company and the other from a 
mining company' (Vaughan, 2003: p.?). 
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Green fundraiser Danna Glendining stated her expectation of receiving $500,000 
in business funding (O'Sullivan and Small, 2002b). 
Meanwhile, because Green Party membership only costs $5, the party's 3000 
members in 2002 would have only generated about $15,000 through fees. Nearly 
half of the party's regular income therefore came from the tithes and donations of 
its seven MPs - about $100,000 a year. 87 Overshadowing such sources, the 
Greens have gained significant state resources from Parliament. Within the 
parliamentary complex the Green Party employs about 16 staff and outside 
Parliament they have about eight equivalent full-time staff paid for by the 
Parliamentary Service. In the 2000/01 year the party received $800,000 in Party 
and Members' funding. 
United Future 
In 2002 eight United Future MPs were elected after the party spent only 
$158,566 (including $75,000 of state funding for broadcast advertising) on its 
election campaign. The party is obviously not a highly resourced organisation. 
For the 2002 year, the party disclosed donations only amounting to $42,200. 
Prior to the formation of United Future, one of its component parties, United New 
Zealand, spent $142,527 (including $93,406 of state funding for broadcast 
advertising - about 66 percent of its expenditure) on the 1996 campaign. Then in 
the 1999 general election, United New Zealand's expenditure declined to 
$96,372 (including $43,333 in state funding). According to United's parliamentary 
head of staff, Mark Stonyer, 'There was also a modest but pleasing level of 
support from the business community' (Stonyer, 2000: p.62). In that same year, 
87 For the 2002 year the Green Party disclosed to the Electoral Commission donations from MP Jeanette 
Fitzsimons of $29,980 and a little over $10,000 each from fellow MPs Rod Donald, Nandor Tanczos and 
Sue Kedgley. The Greens declared a total of $86,000 for 2002 (despite spending $777,300 at the 2002 
election). Since the 2002 election, the Green Party has nine MPs. 
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the other component party, Future New Zealand, spent $96,884 (including 
$17,943 in state funding). There is no available evidence to suggest that any 
churches play an important financial role in this Christian party. Instead, United 
Future has been highly reliant on state resources derived from Parliament. In 
1999, Stonyer said that fundraising was 'probably harder for us than the major 
parties. We struggle for generating corporate donations' (Stonyer, 1999). 
Alliance and the Progressive Coalition Party 
The Alliance is relatively poor in capital resources. While the party has been said 
to have an army of activists available to it, it has had few financial resources 
other than those that it derived from Parliament when it was there. As Rod 
Donald complained in 1997 when he analysed his party's election campaign 
performance: 'Our internal weaknesses contributed to our inability to counter and 
campaign. We had a very small staff at our Head Office in Auckland and in 
Parliament. We had limited money and next to no corporate money' (Donald, 
1997: pA5). Since declarations of donations have become mandatory, the 
Alliance national office has declared donations totalling $562,861, which has 
mainly been made up of contributions from their MPsand constituent parties.aa 
As with most of the new parties, the Alliance has been bereft of institutional 
sources of support. Together with its constituent parties, it has relied mostly on 
its own membership, activists, and MPs for finance. Especially in its early days, 
the party relied upon a volunteer approach to fundraising. Its methods were 
characterised by an amateurism which relied upon traditional methods such as 
raffles and collections but failed to realise substantial funds.' In Parliament, 
however, state funding proved crucial to its operations. Thus, now out of 
88 Most of the Alliance's declared donations have come from either its constituent parties or the tithes of its 
MPs, although the party has received some large donations from both anonymous sources and wealthy 
individuals. 
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Parliament, the Alliance is again financially starved and will struggle to gather the 
capital resources to adequately fight another election campaign. 
It is obvious that the Alliance does not collect much of its capital resources from 
the business sector. In fact, in 1994 Matt McCarten claimed that he had 'never 
received a big business donation' (Mcloughlin, 1994c: p.71). Over the years 
such funding improved, although in 1996 it was reported that the party had 
received a total of only $7000 from businesses in the previous 12 months 
(Maclennan, 1996: p.C4). The Alliance has, however, had a number of 
sympathetic business donors. In particular, manufacturers are often politically 
predisposed towards the party because of its economically interventionist policy 
stance - especially its economic and regional development enthusiasm. Other 
businesses that have given financial support to the Alliance include Clear 
Communications, Westpac Trust, and Telecom.89 Some unions also donate. In 
1999 $20,000 was received from the Engineering Printing and Manufacturing 
Union, on the basis that the Alliance's policies 'were in the best interests of their 
members' (Guyon Espiner, 2001 a: p.C1). Then in 2002 the union declined to 
donate anything, suggesting that the party was unlikely to get back into 
Parliament. Instead the union made a donation of $19,000 to the Progressive 
Coalition Party (in addition to its regular large donation to the labour Party).90 
According to one media report, 'About 90% of the Alliance's income comes from 
its members' (Maclennan, 1996: p.C4). Yet, as the party has had less than 
10,000 members in recent years, membership fees and donations do not yield a 
89 In the case of Westpac Trust, the $10,000 donation made in 1998 to the party was pr;bably made out of 
'fairness' together with donations made to the Labour and National parties of $30,000 each. Clear 
Communications, in contrast, possibly support the Alliance because of the party's hard-line stance against 
the monopoly market position of Telecom. But after being elected to government in 1999, the Alliance also 
received a $20,000 donation from Telecom that was probably an acknowledgement that the party was now 
in government and therefore capable of influencing the regulation of the telecommunications industry. 
90 Again, these examples reinforce the pragmatic idea that donations tend to be provided to parties that have 
a high chance of being elected to government. 
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considerable amount.91 Within the party, electorate branches raise their own 
election campaign funds locally. According to McCarten, speaking in 1993, this 
meant that each electorate raised 'between $10-30,000 to pay for local campaign 
expenses and election material (leaflets, posters, etc) supplied from the Alliance 
"centre'" (CPNZ, 1993). 
While in Parliament the Alliance made very effective use of its parliamentary 
resources, and these became central to its operations. Chapter Eight shows that 
in contrast to the third of a million dollars that the extra-parliamentary unit 
expected to raise in 1999, in the same year the state provided nearly a million 
dollars of funding to the Alliance leader's office and nearly half a million dollars to 
the Alliance's electorate office operations.92 In the 2000-01 financial year the 
Alliance received $810,504 in 'Party and Members' Support' from the 
Parliamentary Service (Parliamentary Service, 2001). Ministerial Services also 
provided the Alliance with a budget of about $2 million to run the offices of its 
ministers. In 1999, the Alliance had 71 staff - nearly all of whom were paid by the 
state (McCarten, 1999b). 
In its first general election in 1993, the Alliance spent less than $500,000 (plus 
state funding) (Boyd, 1996: p.5). Three years later, in 1996 the party spent 
$810,008 (including $251,949 of state funding for broadcast advertising). In the 
1999 election year, the Alliance's campaign cost $939,694 (including $193,983 of 
state funding for broadcast advertising), making the party the third biggest 
spender in the election. In the 2002 general election the Alliance was the second 
lowest spending party in Parliament (after United Future), with a budget of just 
$215,234 (including $100,000 of state funding for broadcast advertising) - a 
91 The Alliance has run a number of innovative party member donation schemes. For example, in 1998 the 
"A"iance Victory Shares" was launched, which was a lottery-type fund-raising scheme in which party 
members purchased shares that put the share-holder into a monthly draw to win a percentage of the money 
that had been paid into the scheme. 
92 According to A"iance party president Matt McCarten, the Alliance's 'budget is $1 million p.a.' (McCarten, 
1999b). 
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figure that was less than a quarter of its previous election expenditure. The 
decline reflected the party's 2002 split. McCarten said that the split and 
subsequent dispute over funds 'effectively paralysed' the Alliance and 'People 
stopped sending their money in because they didn't know where it was going' 
(quoted in Watkins and Rendle, 2002). 
After breaking away from the Alliance in 2002, the Progressive Coalition Party 
(PCP) raised $300,000 in six weeks. According to the party's president, Marty 
Braithwaite, 'businesses donate because they approve of Anderton's regional 
development work' (O'Sullivan and Small, 2002b). The Democratic Party, which 
was initially involved in the PCP, only raised seven percent of that figure (Young, 
14 Oct 2002). For the election, the PCP spent $271,307 (and the party was 
ineligible for state-funded election broadcasting allocation). The party disclosed 
to the Electoral Commission donations amounting to $105,000 for 2002. 
Part Three: Professionalisation 
At the heart of the shift from mass parties towards the electoral-professional 
model is the increase in paid party employees. As discussed in Chapter Six, this 
party professionalisation is the flip-side of membership decline in New Zealand 
parties. There is a 'chicken and egg' type question as to whether the trend 
towards professionalisation and away from the more traditional activist-orientated 
model is due to the declining ability of the membership to carry out their 
traditional activities, thereby necessitating professionalism, or conversely that 
professionalisation has led to membership decline by effectively superseding the 
membership with the use of techniques which are superior to the traditional ones. 
It seems that the shift to the electoral-professional model is changing for both 
these reasons and the declining membership and the increasing 
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professionalisation reinforce each other.93 There can be no doubt that in New 
Zealand much of the work traditionally carried out by traditional party bureaucrats 
and party activists is now being carried out by party professionals and 
consultants. 
According to Alexander Tan, professionalisation involves the increased 
'employment of experts and consultants, the increasing number of staff and 
personnel in central party organizations; and the use of communications 
technologies' (Tan, 2000: p.55).94 Party professionals can be distinguished from 
party activists and office holders by four key characteristics: 
(1) They are paid employees or contractors rather than volunteer labour; 
(2) They need not be members or supporters of the party; 
(3) Their careers will encompass work for organisations other than the party; 
(4) Their skills are in media, policy, marketing, administration and the like. 
These professionals are often people who do not originate from within the extra-
parliamentary structures, and hence do not have the same ideological 
background and beliefs as the traditional bureaucrats and activists. Primarily they 
are carrying out their political functions for financial reward. They are also 
characterised by expertise in a field, such as communications, administration, 
research or policy development. They write speeches, design pamphlets, 
undertake secretarial work, answer phones, devise policy, liaise with the media 
and so on. These professionals are generally employed for the duration of the 
parliamentary term and work in the parties' parliamentary offices. Other 
professionals hired by the parties are temporary contracted consultants used 
particularly at election time. These include . public relations and image 
consultants, direct marketers, focus group organisers, specialists in market 
93 According to a, 'a main impetus for the [professionalisation] innovations has been the decline of the mass-
membership party with myriad volunteers and loyal adherents to spread a party's message to voters, and 
feed back their reactions' (James, 2001: p.201). 
94 See also: Farrell and Webb (1992), and Katz and Mair (1995). 
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research, computer specialists, television interview trainers, advertising 
agencies, and demographic researchers (James, 2001 a: p.203; Hope, 2001: 
p.317).95 Sometimes these professionals take up a large proportion of 
expenditure. In the 1987 election campaign the Labour Party allegedly spent over 
a million dollars on opinion polling alone (Frontline, 1989). 
An important part of this professionalisation is the fact that the professionals are 
often based in the parliamentary offices of a party rather than the extra-
parliamentary headquarters. The most obvious examples of these people are the 
many media-communications staff that work in Parliament writing news stories 
on behalf of the party politicians. Because these professionals are paid for by the 
state, this situation amounts to a system of state funded professionalisation of 
the parties. As outlined in Chapter Eight, the parliamentary parties are given 
generous resources which are invariably used for party political purposes. There 
has been rapid growth in the numbers of such party media professionals. Until 
the 1970s, ministerial staff were generally career bureaucrats from the public 
service. Press secretaries, for example, were seconded from the Department of 
Tourism and Publicity. The Third Labour Government initiated a new process in 
which professionals from outside of the public service were hired and aligned 
with particular ministers (Brown, 1996: p.65). Then the Fourth Labour 
Government entrenched this arrangement. It brought 'in close political allies, or 
recruited people from business, or from television and the newspapers' 
(McQueen, 1991: p.66). 
Since then, the numbers have grown substantially. While in the late 1980s the 
Labour Government employed twelve journalists as ministerial advisers, this was 
soon substantially surpassed by the following National Government whose 25 
95 While most of these consultants also work in industries other than politics, sometimes they are specialists 
devoted to pOlitical marketing alone, and therefore work in the political systems of a number of different 
countries. The most prominent example in New Zealand is the Act party's contracting of Gavin Anderson 
and Koortlang from Australia for their 1996 and 1999 general elections. 
482 Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 
ministers used 32 media officers (Hope, 2001: p.314). Over the following years 
the numbers of media professionals employed by the parties rose even further. 
By 1993, the Labour Party, according to David Lange, had four times as many 
media staff in opposition than the party had had in 1984 (Lange, 1993}.96 Then 
by 1998 there were 48 media professionals working for all the parties, and on top 
of this the parties in Parliament employed another 30 researchers (Bain, 5 Nov 
1998: p.9). As detailed in Chapter Eight, the number of staff working in ministerial 
offices has increased from 45 in 1989 to 232 in 2002. The 2003 Parliamentary 
Telephone Directory lists 247 staff as working in the ministerial offices. Table 7.6 
provides more information on the staffing numbers of the parties in Parliament. 
The numbers need to be taken with caution, as the directory is not a definitive 
record of current staffing levels - unfortunately there is very little publicly-
available information on state funded staff working for the parties. 
In 2003, the Labour Party has the most staff working for it in its parliamentary 
and electorate offices - about 375. This included about 235 staff working in 
ministerial offices and the Office of the Prime Minister (but not including the 
separate Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet). It also included a further 25 
96 According to Hope, 'From 1993 to 1997, the total number of party press secretaries rose from thirty-two to 
forty-two (an increase of 31 per cent). The number of press gallery journalists fell from fifty-nine to forty-five 
(a decrease of 24 per cent), (Hope, 2001: p.318). 
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executive secretaries mostly working for backbench MPs, 12 in Labour's 
research unit, 3 in the Government Communications Unit, and a small number of 
administrators. Collectively Labour MPs also employ 97 equivalent full-time staff 
in their electorate offices. Compared with the parliamentary offices of the parties, 
their head offices outside of Parliament are somewhat less well-staffed. Labour's 
extra-parliamentary office, for example, has only nine employees (Allen, 1999).97 
National has the second highest number of staff - about 99. In the Leader's 
Office there are 7 employed, while in the research unit and IT section the party 
has 11 staff, the media unit has four staff, and an 'advisory' unit employs 3. 
Compared to this, the National Party headquarters outside of Parliament have 
about seven staff (Slater, 1999), although its divisions employ an additional and 
unknown number of staff.98 The Green Party has the third highest number of 
staff, with 9 executive secretaries, the equivalent of 9 electorate agents, and 14 
working in the parliamentary offices on media, policy, research and 
administration. By comparison, the Green Party head office employs just 2. New 
Zealand First has a research unit of 3 and a Leader's Office of 7, helping make 
up a total staff of 31. The next biggest is Act, who in 2003 employs about 29 
taxpayer-funded staff in its parliamentary and electoral offices.99 In its extra-
parliamentary head office, the party initially employed ten fulltime paid staff, who 
mostly had a background in marketing (Brown, 4 Mar 1995: p.26). Such staff 
included former Saatchi and Saatchi executive David Walden, who became Act's 
first chief executive; and the former national director of marketing at Coopers and 
Lybrand, Pauline Hughes, who was Act's director of communications for a time 
97 The party organisation also has few funds to contract in professionals - evidenced by the statement by 
Michael Hirschfeld, the party president in 1997, that Labour was disadvantaged in its competition with 
National in its 1996 election campaign due to its lack of consultants (Hirschfeld, 1997: p.33). 
98 In 2003 the National Party decided to revamp its organisation, centralising its decision-making and 
financial administration from the divisions to the headquarters, and therefore many of the divisions' jobs 
could be expected to shift to Wellington. 
99 In 2003 it was discovered that a number of Act's electorate staff also worked in Parliament. See: Chapter 
Eight. 
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(Booker and Evans, 1995: p.12; Brown, 1995: p.30). The party has also 
employed other professionals with 'backgrounds in the 
advertising/media/marketing milieu', such as Scott Woolley, Simon Carr and 
Keith Davies (Hine, 1995: pp.43-44). Carr has commented that upon joining the 
Act team he discovered that 'The place was crawling with communications 
professionals' (Carr, 1997: pp.90-91). By 2001, however, the extra-parliamentary 
party had declined to only one staff member. The United Future party, in 2003, 
has about 22 state funded staff. Of these, 5 work in the Leader's Office, 4 in the 
party's research unit, 9 as electorate agents, and 5 as executive secretaries. 
In the 1990s, even the more traditional Alliance was modernising and 
professionalising its operations, hiring 'spin doctors, market researchers, polling 
agencies, advertisers, and other communications professionals' (Hope, 2001: 
p.317). In 1997, Rod Donald - then an Alliance MP - reported: 'We are 
professionalising, growing from a small family firm into a mid-sized company. We 
have more technology, more staff, and we are doing more planning' (Donald, 
1997: p.46). In their media unit during the late 1990s the Alliance had six 
employees, including a former Paul Holmes radio show producer, John Pagani, 
and a former Public Service Association boss, Tony Simpson. The Alliance 
research unit had five employees. The Alliance's Electorate Liaison Unit, which 
was located at Parliament, had four employees, including Alliance president Matt 
McCarten. Carrying on in Parliament, the Progressive Party has a total of 16 
staff, of which 12 work in Jim Anderton's ministerial office. 
The press secretaries working in Parliament are also normally former journalists, 
and are usually without any previous ties to the party they work for. For instance 
by 1993 the majority of the National Government's thirty-two press staff 
(allocated to twenty-five ministers) were ex-journalists. These ex-journalists are 
often from the parliamentary press gallery - for example in 1993 the Dominion's 
Mike Munro pointed out that there were then nine ex-gallery journalists working 
as press secretaries (Munro, 20 May 1993). A couple of years later Munro 
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swapped sides too, to work for Helen Clark. He has since been followed into 
party work by former political editor of National Radio, Richard Griffin; former 
political editor of the Evening Post, John Goulter in 1999; and former Dominion 
editor Richard Long in 2003 - all of whom joined the National Party staff.1Oo 
As an illustration of the fact that the parties are not terribly concerned with the 
partisanship of the professionals that they hire, Munro pointed out that before 
being hired by the leader, 'Clark didn't even ask me if I was a member of the 
Labour Party' (quoted in Clifton, 27 Dec 1997: p.29). Likewise, when Goulter 
joined the National Party's staff, he was reported as insisting 'that at no time has 
anyone asked him who he votes for' (Johns, 1999: p.65). Even Long would only 
say he was in 'broad sympathy' with the National Party (Roger, 2003}.101 
It is also noteworthy that some of the political party professionals have 
extraordinary degrees of influence within the parties. As Ruth Laugesen has 
pointed out, this differentiates modern party professionals from traditional party 
workers: 'While the backroom kingmakers have always been around in the 
established parties, today's kingpins have emerged from the reliance that new 
under-resourced parties have to place on a few committed individuals' 
(Laugesen, 1996c: p.13). Therefore, although ~ot necessarily household names, 
the professionals behind the scenes of many of the parties are becoming 
acknowledged as important players in the direction and operations of the parties. 
Since the mid-1990s, people like the Alliance's John Pagani, Labour's Heather 
Simpson, New Zealand First's Michael Laws, National's Richard Griffin, and Act's 
100 Other significant journalists that have recently worked for the parties include Sue F~ley, Tim Grafton, 
Brian Edwards, Patricia Herbert, and Helen Bain. 
101 Party staff increasingly switch between parties too. For example, in 2003, Rob Eaddy, who was formerly 
the National Party's chief of staff, was appointed to that role with United Future (NZ Herald, 2003b). Other 
examples include Peter McCardle (ex-National MP and ex-New Zealand First MP) working as the head of 
Act's research unit, Neil Kirton (ex-National, and ex-New Zealand First MP) working for the Alliance, and 
Sue Foley (who worked as press secretary to Mike Moore when he was Leader of the Opposition), then took 
up the same job with Bill English in 2001. 
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Simon Carr were all seen to be more important than MPs.102 By contrast the 
party presidents during this period have come to be considered increasingly 
insignificant - no political commentators have talked much about the influence of 
John Slater and Judy Kirk (National), Mike Williams (Labour), Doug Woolerton 
(New Zealand First), Catherine Judd (Act), Ian Stephens, David Clendon, and 
Catherine Delahunty (Greens), Marty Braithwaite (Progressive Coalition Party). 
Where the presidents have been high profile and seeking strong influence -
Michelle Boag (National), Bob Harvey (Labour), and Matt McCarten (Alliance) -
they have suffered severe resistance and fallout from the party MPs as a result. 
The party professionals clearly do have a lot of influence over policy. For 
instance, Laugesen has outlined how during the 1990s, Labour's Research Unit 
Executive Director, Heather Simpson, not only oversaw Labour's policy, she 
wrote 'most of it herself with input from shadow spokespeople and more junior 
staff members' (Laugesen, 1996c: p.13). Similarly, much is made of the influence 
that Margaret Pope had on the direction of the Fourth Labour Government from 
within the Prime Ministers' office when she was David Lange's speechwriter. 
Michael Laws has also admitted to being virtually solely responsible for the 1996 
rewrite and re-direction of New Zealand First's economic policy (Laws, 1998a: 
pp.323-331). Within the Alliance during the 1990s, it was well known that it was 
the head of their media unit, John Pagani, who wielded the greatest influence on 
leader Jim Anderton, and therefore upon the whole party. 
The role of professionals is not only changing in the parliamentary offices of the 
parties, but also in the extra-parliamentary organisations. In a previous era, the 
activities of the head offices were, according 'to party theorist Peter Mair, 
'directed towards the organisation and maintenance of the party on the ground (a 
102 For example, Jane Clifton commented in 1997, 'MMP's first tumultuous year makes for familiar reading, 
but there's a subtext. It was shaped by Richard Griffin ... and three rival major party press chiefs. At times, 
the four operated as unelected MPs' (Clifton, 1997e: p.28). She also pointed out, 'The Alliance's John 
Pagani is the only true believer among the spin doctors. The others insist on a non-party "professional 
communicator" label' (ibid: p.29). 
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key concern in the mass party)' but are now 'increasingly directed towards the 
mobilization of support in the electorate at large' (Mair, 1994: p.13). This is 
certainly the case in New Zealand where organising the membership of a party is 
now an insignificant role due to the insignificant numbers of people belonging to 
the parties. 
Professionalisation is especially advanced in terms of electioneering. The 1987 
general election is regarded by some as representing the arrival of the modern 
and professionalised campaign to New Zealand politics. The Labour campaign in 
that election was certainly a turning point in regard to the employment of market 
research professionals. The Labour Party strategists based their campaign 
decisions and marketing designs heavily on a sophisticated opinion polling 
system. This new elite of media specialists and other experts are now playing a 
major role in every element of the campaign - from deciding the campaign issues 
through their market research initiatives to organising media coverage. For their 
1999 election campaign, the Labour Party even paid $70,000 for an 'events 
professional' to organise their campaign launch at the Auckland Town Hall 
(NZPA, 19990: p.12). 
An obvious and basic example of the relationship between the use of labour and 
capital resources in a party's election campaign is in the distribution of written 
material to voters. While parties have traditionally had activists deliver their 
pamphlets, leaflets and manifestos to voters' letterboxes, this is now changing. 
To a certain extent traditional delivery still occurs, but there is a growing trend 
towards the use of commercial direct-mail techniques that appears irreversible. 
According to Alan Ware, 
Leafleting requires a lot of people to distribute the propaganda; direct mail solicitations 
today may require very little labour, but considerable sums of money for postage. (Lists 
of potential recipients can be bought from various sources on computer disks, and 
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envelopes can be addressed and franked by computer, so that only a small number of 
people are required for such an operation) (Ware, 1996: p.308).103 
The employment of advertising agencies is one of the most obvious examples of 
the professionalisation of the parties' campaign activities. The increase in 
professionals and consultants involved in electioneering is also obvious in a 
physical sense, as Bob Harvey has noted: 'As the cavalcade has grown, where 
Norman Kirk and Sir Keith Holyoake would move around the country with maybe 
a secretary only, now twenty advisers cram a private plane. Motorcades and 
bodyguards are now part of the New Zealand political scenario' (Harvey, 1992a: 
p.109). 
One of the main reasons that parties need to professionalise is because their 
whole connection with society has changed and thus they need expertise in order 
to create new ways of linking with voters. A whole host of trends makes for a 
difficult campaigning environment: old allegiances have broken down; traditional 
party ideologies have become confused, new and minor parties now threaten the 
more established ones, young people do not vote with their parents, and voter 
turn-out has dropped. The rules of the game have thus changed, and parties can 
no longer rely on established methods and linkages to communicate with voters 
and win their support. In this environment the parties have sought to employ 
professionals to utilise superior organisational and communications skills to 
connect with an increasingly volatile electorate. Similarly, professional aid is also 
required by modern political parties due to the fact that voters are now somewhat 
antagonistic, untrusting and cynical towards New Zealand political parties (see 
Chapter Ten). This anti-party feeling means that selling a political party is now a 
lot harder and requires new ideas and more sophisticated and subtle methods -
which is the area of expertise that the party professionals provide. Also, because 
103 This is also illustrated by United New Zealand's Mark Stonyer, who rejects the need for a large 
membership carrying out the traditional party activities like delivery of party propaganda: 'This is the 90s -
with that sort of stuff you can send all your electioneering and other mail-outs to a mail centre who will print, 
fold, envelope, seal, stamp and distribute for you for the same price as a postage stamp' (Stonyer, 1999). 
Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 489 
general elections are now a 'privatised' event - as opposed to a public one -
parties need professional advice on how to communicate with a distant public. 
Whereas the public used to attend election rallies in large numbers, take public 
meetings seriously, and generally participate in the campaign, they now stay in 
their homes or seek alternative entertainment. There is a widespread 
disengagement with politics by electors, and it is the job of the professionals to 
connect and communicate with these electors. Parties cannot rely on such 
passive campaigning methods as TV advertising, but need to get proactively in 
contact with the public. Party activists, it seems, have failed at this task or are no 
longer able to perform it because of their declining numbers. Hence more than 
ever before the political parties have to go to the electorate, as the voters are not 
participating in the campaign by choice. The parties therefore deliver themselves 
to the voters through computerised mailing lists, commercial mail drops, more 
innovative television and so on (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.56). It also should be 
pointed out that party professionals are now more useful and valuable because 
elections under MMP are more of a national campaign (for the party vote) rather 
than a local one in which local activists organise marginal seats. 
The shift towards electoral-professional parties, with the growth in party 
professionals, can also be read as an indication of the essential weakness of 
contemporary parties, rather than their all-powerfulness. As David Lange has 
commented on the exponential increase in media employees in the 1990s, 
'Journalists have no cause for anxiety. The presence of paid mouthpieces in 
such numbers is not evidence of the Government's ability to manipulate the 
news. It's a measure of its weakness' (Lange, 1993).104 In this way, the 
employment of a party professional may signal that the current parties have little 
104 Yet the growing professionalism of the parties is also disturbing the balance of powers that exist between 
the parties and the media. According to Maharey, 'politicians are operating in a more sophisticated way and 
with more resources at a time when journalists are stretching to do even a basic job' (Maharey, 1992: p.96). 
The number of media professionals employed by the political parties in Parliament now outnumbers those 
employed as journalists in the press gallery. By 1998 the 48 media professionals working for all the parties 
now outweighed the 45 journalists working in the parliamentary press gallery (Bain, 5 Nov 1998: p.9). 
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of interest to say and therefore need to invest in media specialists to dress-up 
and disguise their emptiness. The dominance of the professionals is also a 
reflection of the changed nature of the election debate, as politics has been 
shifting away from issues, ideology, and policies towards personalities and 
superficial politicking. The parties therefore need people who can specialise in 
making headway in this environment. Media and communications experts are 
clearly better at this job than party activists. 
Crucially, the need to professionalise also comes from the simple fact that 
professional methods are now superior to the traditional. As senior National MP 
Murray McCully has argued, 'The advantage that a skilled professional can score 
over an enthusiastic amateur is now quite significant' (quoted in Harris, 1993b). 
Media-orientated strategies are now quite simply the 'most effective and efficient 
tools for disseminating their propaganda - much better, for example, than relying 
on amateur door-to-door canvassers or speaking at the local town hall' (Rudd, 
1989: p.35). The move to professionalism is also due to the growth of the 
importance of the electronic media. Inevitably the consequence of campaigns 
dominated by the electronic media is the desire of political parties to increase 
their own professional expertise for using the media. As Atkinson has argued, 
'New Zealand politicians gradually came to realise that, since television could not 
be avoided, they would need help in coping with it, particularly at election times' 
(Atkinson, Dec 1989: p.98). And, of course, when one party professionalises, it 
encourages a similar reaction from the others, leading to an inflation of 
professionalism in the campaign: 'As soon as communications specialists started 
supplying it to them, election campaigns began to take on the now-familiar, more 
visual style of "media walkabouts" and "camera 'opportunities'" . (Atkinson, Dec 
1989: p.98). Therefore a vicious circle of increasing professionalism is created. 
The consequences of professionalised media-centred politics are, of course, 
quite considerable. Most importantly, there is a policy dimension - in the sense 
that policy can be more inclined to lose its prominent role in campaigns. As Steve 
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Maharey has argued, whereas politicians used to spend much of their time on 
issues of policy, 'the constant search for publicity takes precious time away from 
these essential tasks of a politician' (Maharey, 1992a: p.94). His own experience 
led Maharey to believe that 'media handlers become more important than policy 
advisers' (ibid: pp.94-95). 
Critics have argued that the value of professionals to political parties is 
questionable. This is apparent in the stories that Simon Carr of Act has written 
about the chaos and mistakes made inside his party due to its over-reliance on 
professionals during its start-up period. Carr maintains that professionals are not 
the best advisers for politicians: 
the advertising people thought advertising was the most important thing about Act that 
would impel the message into the hearts and minds of the voting public. The 
researchers thought they could characterise our constituency and reveal their hot 
buttons so they could be played like a pianola. Natually enough, the computer people 
thought the demographic databases would reveal everything; the membership people 
thought the membership was most important. The membership would take our 
interesting message in pyramid teams through the country in three million face-to-faces; 
and most of the ten managers, with every justification, thought the management was 
the critical element in the equation (Carr, 1997: p.93). 
According to Carr, Act's mistaken over-professionalisation was the result of the 
party having fallen victim to 'delusions of grandeur' (Carr, 1997: p.93). Although 
professionalisation was seen as the common sense and smart way for the party 
to develop, according to Carr, it was a false belief in terms of Act. 
This raises the question of whether money - the key element of the modern 
electoral-professsional party - is really as essential to New Zealand politics as is 
commonly assumed. There is no doubt that a party that has ample capital 
resources is advantaged over its opponent that has fewer. And there is no doubt 
that these capital resources can be employed in very effective ways in which 
labour resources can not. However, some good arguments might be made that 
these resources are over-rated and an over-reliance on them might be a 
handicap. First there appears to be very little evidence in the party literature to 
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show that the greater expenditures of money produces greater electoral success. 
The effectiveness of advertising for political parties is especially questionable. 
Jeff Gamlin has commented that the 'Conventional wisdom about the influence of 
election campaigns tends to be confined to the extent to which they confirm an 
already established trend' (Gamlin, 1999f: p.22). In their extensive study of 
whether increased party spending at the national level has been electorally 
significant in British election between 1959 to 1994, James Forrest and Gary 
Marks concluded that 'campaign advertising has a reinforcing rather than a 
persuading role for the stable voter but a persuading or at least guiding role for 
the volatile voter' (Forrest and Marks, 1999: p.100). Further evidence of the 
ineffectiveness of political advertising is supplied by Carr. After Act spent 
$300,000 on a round of advertising in 1995, Carr reports that the party's support 
actually dropped by nearly three-quarters (Carr, 1997: pp.86-87). 
Certainly in the recent New Zealand elections there does not appear to be a 
strong correlation between parties increasing their spending and their votes 
increasing. In fact the correlation is possibly the opposite. Appendix 0 suggests 
that spending greater amounts on election campaigns appears to simply raise 
the average cost per vote for the parties. For example, National increased its 
expenditure in 1999 by about 40 percent, but received fewer votes, which meant 
that its cost per vote rose from $2.80 to $4.35. Act has also achieved very bad 
value for money, spending $13.82 per vote in 1996, $5.41 per vote in 1999 and 
$12.36 per vote in 2002. Another party of the right, United New Zealand spent 
$7.81 per vote in 1996 and then $8.63 per vote in 1999. By contrast there are 
plenty of examples of parties finding success after spending only small amounts. 
For instance, in both 1990 and 1999 the Green Party spent only very small 
amounts for a significant return. In the later case, they achieved a cost per vote 
of only $2.62. The party then became wealthier and was able to more than 
double its expenditure at the following election, but this meant that the cost of 
each vote rose to $5.38. Similarly, New Zealand First has generally spent only 
small amounts on campaigning and has been relatively very successful. For the 
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general elections between 1996 and 2002 it has achieved low costs per vote of 
$4.01, $2.46, and $2.15. 
The story of the rise and fall of the Alliance party provides a good example of 
how the resources of a party do not necessarily determine electoral success. 
Formed in 1991, the party had few capital resources in its early years, especially 
because it had access to very few parliamentary resources. At the 1993 election 
it spent about $500,000, and gained its highest vote - 18.2 percent. At the next 
election it increased its expenditure to $800,000, but its support declined to 10.2 
percent of the vote. From this point the party had access to millions of dollars in 
taxpayer-funded resources, and it also had improved private funding, which 
meant it could spend about $940,000 at the 1999 election. Yet its vote declined 
further to 7.7 percent. However, because it went into government with Labour, it 
received a substantial boost in resources through parliament. Such resources 
then became part of a vicious internal dispute, and in the following election the 
party received only 1.3 percent of vote (after spending about $215,000). This 
story suggests there is a correlation between the party's increased 
professionalisation and its decline in popular support. Although this might not be 
a real correlation, it does point to the irrelevance of professionalisation in 
determining electoral success. Moreover it suggests that other political factors 
might be more important than professionalisation in explaining political success. 
For instance an argument might be made that the Alliance's decline mirrored the 
party's erosion of ideology. Likewise, it might be argued that the party was 
adversely affected by the erosion of its membership and the decreased 
involvement of activists. All these factors may have played a part in the party's 
demise, and they are all related in the sense that they relate to the shift towards 
the electoral-professional party model. 
It is possible that high-spending election campaigns are also counterproductive in 
that voter perceptions of party wealth and its association of lucrative funding are 
probably negative. The classic example in recent times was the 1993 campaign 
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against MMP by the Campaign for Better Government group, which was 
lucratively funded by big business and generally regarded negatively for this 
reason. Voters can also easily be turned off by too much exposure to political 
advertising. As Simon Carr has pointed out, advertising professionals working for 
parties, 'fail to recognise that advertising combines all the things voters most 
dislike about politics and about advertising - slick, costly, boastful and almost 
certainly untrue' (Carr, 1997: p.87). This is possibly why there has been a trend 
by many of the parties to trade on a more folksy and traditional campaigning 
image, utilising street corner meetings, and so forth. In the 1990s there was 
somewhat of a resurgence in the use of traditional campaign techniques, which 
meant that parties across the political spectrum were fighting elections with 
different mixes of labour-based and capital-based techniques. This made for an 
interesting juxtaposition between parties using traditional campaign techniques 
and those using sophisticated modern ones. One example of this contrast is the 
gradual substitution of door-to-door canvassing by pamphlet mail-outs. 
Denemark found that 'telephone calls and home visits by canvassers were 
obviously rarer phenomena in 1996 than the receipt of campaign pamphlets and 
letters' (Denemark, 1998: p.87). In the same election, the Alliance, in contrast, 
went against the trend to visit fewer homes in their campaigns, with the party 
estimating that it made '100,000 home visits, 65,000 of which were in leader Jim 
Anderton's electorate, Wigram' (Denemark, 1998: p.87). 
Following the 1993 general election, Alliance campaign manager Dave 
Macpherson claimed that low-tech campaign methods were superior to those of 
the high-tech campaign: 
Good old fashioned door-knocking and street corner and soapbox meetings were starting 
to have an effect [for the Alliance campaign]. Labour and National concentrated on so 
called high-tech campaign tools: phone surveys, polling, whistlestop leaders tours, and 
expensive newspaper advertisements. To us they were pretty ineffective .... Also highly 
effective in a low-tech way was the campaign by Jim Anderton. Meetings were held in 
most electorates. A restrained approach to the media circus was mentioned as a big plus 
in public feedback (Macpherson, 1994: p.20). 
Chapter Seven: Party Finance and Professionalisation 495 
Macpherson may have been right, because even the main parties later began 
utilising more traditional methods of campaigning. For example, the street corner 
meeting again became popular with candidates from the Labour and National 
parties. However, the adoption of these activities is often not out of merit for the 
method but as a publicity gimmick, an attempt to get positive media coverage of 
the fact that the party is using the traditional method, or to show that the party still 
has roots in the past. As Ware has put it, 'earlier forms of campaigning create 
expectations among voters about how parties should interact with them, so that 
parties which fail to do so may lose support' (Ware, 1996: p.307). Consequently, 
some degree of door-to-door canvassing, public meetings and so on persist in 
the face of developments in such methods as direct mail and websites, that 
communicate with voters more efficiently and/or effectively. These are fairly 
limited however. 
It also needs to be noted that although capital resources are becoming 
increasingly central to the functioning of the extra-parliamentary organisations, 
the amounts are still relatively low in New Zealand. For example, despite the 
centrality of advertising and its ever-increasing employment, political parties still 
spend fairly small amounts of money on advertisements relative to their 
commercial counterparts. Disregarding money donated to the parties' election 
campaign funds, the overall picture is that the main two parties have routine 
incomes of about two million dollars, while most of the smaller parties have 
something less than half or a quarter of this amount. Those figures cannot be 
considered high. For instance, with a budget of about $2.5 million, the Labour 
Party probably spends about the same as a small primary school.105 
105 In comparison, the three main German parties have incomes of about NZ$240 million, NZ$210 million 
and NZ$40 million even without counting state funding (Linton, 1994: p.22). Arguably, the low amounts of 
expenditure in New Zealand are reinforced by the limit on party election expenses - See Chapter Nine for 
more on this. 
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Despite the centrality of advertising and its ever-increasing employment, by 
advertising industry standards the political parties do not spent a great deal of 
money on election advertising. Certainly political parties still spend fairly low 
amounts of money on advertisements relative to their commercial counterparts. 
Prebble has argued that most parties' 1996 campaigns were extraordinarily 
cheap by international standards, pointing out that 'McDonalds spend more 
money on TV ads in a month than the biggest parties spent in their total 
expenses on everything' (quoted in Scherer, 28 Jan 1997). Likewise, United 
leader Clive Matthewson was quoted as saying that 'Kellogg's, Nestle and 
Unilever spent far more on television in a week than his party's $93,000 
allocation over four weeks' (National Business Review, 23 Aug 1996). It needs to 
be pointed out that an estimated total of $1.4 billion was spent on advertising in 
1998 (Barclay, 2 May 1999: p.A6).106 The amounts that New Zealand political 
parties spend are therefore, in the context of total advertising spending, fairly 
insignificant. Even in the last week of the high-spending 1999 general election, 
the biggest spending political party, National, was ranked as only the 1 ih biggest 
spender of the week, spending $177,969. The Chief Electoral Office spent 
considerably more, buying $420,700 worth of advertising (National Business 
Review, Dec 1999).107 Combined spending on campaign advertising for the 2002 
election was still relatively small at $7,674,990, or about $3.78 per party vote 
cast. This compares well against Australian political party spending of about 
NZ$5 per vote in federal elections (Forrest and Marks, 1999: p.1 00). 
This section shows that professionalisation is a central feature of modern New 
Zealand political parties, and this involves a reliance on capital-intensive 
operations and staff. Yet the importance of professionalisation has possibly been 
overestimated by the parties, and in many ways suggests a weakness on their 
106 Of this, according to AC Nielsen, Lever Rexona New Zealand Ltd spends $32.7m on television 
advertising, Telecom $28.9m, New Zealand Lotteries Commission $21.3m and McDonald's $17m (Barclay, 
2 May 1999: p.A6). 
107 For the week to November 20 1999 (NBR, 1999a). 
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part. The possession and use of large capital resources is not necessarily the 
crucial determinant of democracy in New Zealand. As will be shown in Chapter 
Nine, this point has important implications for the issue of state regulation of 
political parties. 
Conclusion 
In 1966 Milne commented that, 'Very little has been published on [party] finance, 
but the information available indicates that the position is radically different from 
what it was in the days of the Reform Party' (Milne, 1966: pp.175-176). 
Moreover, since Milne's time the use of financial resources by political parties 
has changed even more. Most significantly, there has been a reduction in the 
traditional class pattern of donor-party relations. The Labour Party is no longer 
reliant on trade unions and party members for its financial resources, just as the 
National Party no longer has a near-monopoly on business funding. An important 
theme of this chapter has therefore been the increasing homogeneity of party 
finance. This is an important change because the fact that the parties are less 
strongly financed by distinct societal interests obviously has implications for the 
parties' ideological influences and loyalties. Such a change should also be seen 
as a further element of the parties' eroding linkages with civil society examined in 
previous chapters. 
Attention has also been drawn in this chapter to the increasing amounts of 
money being expended by New Zealand's modern professionalised parties. The 
cost of operating a party and participating in elections is now very significant. 
This chapter has shown that campaign expenditure has risen significantly since 
the 1960s, largely related to the shift towards the electoral-professional party 
type, which involves the increased employment of professionals at the same time 
as the amount of income from party membership fees and activity decreases. 
This has indicated a change in the balance between capital and labour resources 
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in politics. The professionalisation of party organisations therefore represents a 
sUbstantial change in the activities and nature of politics in New Zealand. Yet 
despite this change, this chapter has also suggested that the amounts of money 
involved in New Zealand politics are still not as extravagant as they might 
appear. Furthermore, this chapter also calls into question whether the 
professionalisation of parties really is as advantageous to the individual parties 
as is commonly accepted. 
One of the most important points that arises out of this chapter is the fact that the 
bulk of the parties' financial resources are provided by the state via Parliament. 
Obviously a hidden form of state subsidies to New Zealand's political parties has 
existed for a long time. But this is changing, as the funding becomes more 
entrenched and generous. The state's provision of generous resources allows 
the parties to avoid the conundrum of the increasing costs of professionalisation 
together with the erosion of both party membership and links with civil society. 
There is a sense, therefore, in which the financial problems of the parties are 
merely a symptom of a more serious transformation of the organisational and 
political nature of the parties. This phenomenon of state funding is examined in 
the following chapter. 
This chapter has attempted to solve the 'mystery' of party finance in New 
Zealand by compiling and making sense of virtually all available and significant 
information about the parties' capital resources. There are still substantial gaps in 
the accounts of the individual parties in this chapter, and this suggests that 
further research is required. This will, however, only be useful if greater access to 
internal party records can be obtained. 
Section Fou r: 
The State-Party Relationship 

Chapter Eight: State Resourcing of Parties 501 
Chapter Eight 
State Resourcing of Parties 
It is not commonly realised that the most important source of resources for 
political parties is now the state. The vast bulk of the resources provided to 
political parties come via the backdoor of parliamentary funding. MPs receive 
resources intended to permit them to carry out their legislative duties and serve 
their constituents - activities such as research, paying for office expenses, 
consultation with the public and so forth - but much of this is used for partisan 
political purposes, electioneering, and organising their parties. It has been 
calculated that each ordinary MP costs the state about $750,000 a year while 
ministers cost about $2 million each (Sain, 1998a: p.9). Much of this constitutes a 
considerable source of indirect public funding of the parties. This is a major shift 
from the past, when the bulk of party resources came from their membership 
base or from organisations aligned with the party, such as trade unions and 
businesses. As Chapter Seven has shown, less party funding now comes from 
these sources, as the parties have only minuscule memberships and their 
traditionally-aligned organisations contribute relatively little. As a result, New 
Zealand political parties have shifted from a reliance on membership, business 
and union contributions to a more autonomous exist~nce in which parties behave 
more as 'virtual government departments'. 
Following on from previous chapters investigating the decline of the linkages 
between political parties and civil society, the following two chapters examine the 
increasing relationship that New Zealand parties have with the state. This 
chapter details and explains the considerable resources that the parliamentary 
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parties receive from the state, and argues that the dominant political parties have 
been able to manipulate the relationship with the state to their own ends -
producing a relationship that is not conducive to a healthy and dynamic party 
system. It shows how the parties are becoming embedded in the state at the 
expense of their traditional role of aggregating and representing societal 
interests. While the closer relationship encourages the parties to have increased 
independence from traditional groups in civil society, this chapter shows that 
conversely the parties become more like state funded and ideology-free 
bureaucracies. Following this, Chapter Nine examines the increase in state 
regulation of political parties. 
This state-party relationship is now a key one for every party in Parliament, yet it 
has lacked analysis in New Zealand. Party scholar Peter Mair has made a similar 
point in terms of the study of parties throughout the advanced industrialised 
world: 
the understanding of party organizational change and adaptation requires us to pay at 
least as much attention, if not more so, to the linkage between party and state as it does 
to the linkage between parties and civil society. At the same time, however, it is also clear 
that it is precisely this particular linkage which has tended to be either ignored or 
undervalued in previous assessments of party change and stability, which ... has tended 
to focus almost exclusively on party relations with civil society (Mair, 1997: p.139). 
Despite this lack of attention, it is acknowledged that in every country of the world 
the state provides money to political parties in the form of direct grants, 
contributions to election expenses, or parliamentary funding. While state funding 
of political parties is not entirely a recent phenomenon, it is only in recent years 
that it has reached such large proportions and significance. Throughout the 
twentieth century, parliaments everywhere have increased' the resources 
available to legislators, and since the 1950s, this funding has started to be 
directed at party groups and candidates. 1 It appears that, around the world, 
1 Pinto-Duschinsky offers the example of the American territory of Puerto Rico as possibly the first 
democracy to introduce state-funding of political parties. Then in 1959, West Germany introduced its first 
direct subsidy system (Pinto-Duschinsky, 21 Sep 1998). Sweden and Denmark started schemes in the late 
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parties have turned to state resources to replace declining civil society resources. 
This has coincided with the transition from the mass party model to that of the 
electoral-professional party, which brings with it an increase in the cost of 
electioneering together with a decline in income from membership and corporate 
and union donations. 
Within the Western world, countries can be divided into two basic categories of 
state funding. First, there are countries that provide direct and overt forms of 
state subsidies. These include Germany, France, Australia, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Austria and the Netherlands.2 In these countries, sizeable subsidies are 
provided directly to the political parties for the express purpose of electioneering 
and organising the party. The second category involves those countries where 
for the most part generous subsidies do not officially exist, but the parties are 
very well funded by stealth under the guise of parliamentary funding. According 
to Pierre et al. (2000: p.20), this category is represented by Ireland and Britain, 
and this chapter argues that New Zealand also belongs in this group of countries. 
This chapter also critiques such funding regimes. Part One outlines the 
considerable indirect forms of state funding in New Zealand. Part Two then looks 
at how these resources are utilised, arguing that they are often used for party 
political purposes, and therefore not always as they were intended. Part Three 
then discusses the implications and problems of state funding, especially as it 
relates to the central argument of this thesis - that parties decreasingly have 
1960s, the Netherlands in 1972, Italy in 1974, Greece in 1984, Spain in 1987,.and France and Portugal in 
1988 (Linton, 1994: p.12). By the late 1990s nearly all European countries - including the emerging Eastern 
European democracies - had adopted state aid to political parties. 
2 The following countries have a substantial system of direct state funding of political parties and candidates: 
Australia (A$14.2m); Canada (CAN$30.5m); France (FF105.6m); Germany (DM332.2m); Italy (91Billion 
Lire); Japan (Yen 30.9 billion); United States (US$92.2m) (Pinto-Duschinsky, 10 Sep 1998). The most 
extreme model of direct state funding of election campaigns is in the US, where the Presidential nominee of 
each party may be eligible for a subsidy of at least $US20 million, and 'In the 1996 election, the Democratic 
and Republican Presidential nominees each received public grants of $61.8 million' (Klein, 1999: p.114). 
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genuine links with the social constituencies of civil society, a decline which is 
causing ideological erosion. 
Part One: Types of State Funding in New Zealand 
The New Zealand system of state funding provides both direct and indirect forms 
of resources to the parties. These are outlined below in sections on each. 
Direct State Funding 
The only direct form of state funding in New Zealand is the money and 
broadcasting time provided by the Electoral Commission to political parties for 
their election broadcast advertising. For the last five elections, the amount has 
remained the same - $2.1 million. In 2002 the Electoral Commission divided this 
funding up amongst 14 parties, with the Labour and National parties receiving the 
majority of the allocation - 30 percent each ($615,000), and the Greens, Act, 
New Zealand First, receiving lesser amounts of eight percent each ($166,300), 
the Alliance five percent ($100,000), and the other eight parties sharing the 
remainder ($175,000). The Commission also distributed 94.5 minutes of 
broadcasting time on Television New Zealand (TVNZ) and Radio New Zealand 
(RNZ). The division of these resources is based on the criteria of: the parties 
most recent election and by-election performances, their numbers in Parliament, 
their number of members, recent opinion poll results, and the need to give all 
nation-wide parties a fair chance to promote their policies. 
See Table 8.1 (next page) for full details of the 2002 general election broadcast 
allocations. 
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T bl 81 2002 G I EI f B d f All f • 
Party Final Allocation Actual TVNZlRNZ TVNZlRNZ 
Expenditure Opening Address Closing Address 
(minutes) (minutes) 
Labour Party $617,331 $614,390 12 4 
National Party $617,331 $614,722 12 4 
New Zealand First $166,930 $152,844 8 2.5 
Act New Zealand $166,930 $166,903 8 2.5 
Green Party $166,930 $166,930 8 2.5 
Alliance $100,380 $100,000 6 2 
United Future $75,284 $75,284 5 1.5 
Christian Heritage $75,284 $71,240 5 1.5 
Outdoor Recreation $25,000 $24,972 4 1 
Aotearoa Legalise Cannabis Party $25,000 $16,595 4 1 
Mana Maori Movement $12,500 $11,278 0 0 
One New Zealand $12,500 $12,386 0 0 
NMP $12,500 $12,498 0 0 
Libertarianz $5,000 $5,000 0 0 
[RNZ admin fee] $2,100 $2,100 
Total $2,081,000 $2,047,142 72 22.5 
Source: Electoral Commission (2003: p.35) 
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An additional form of direct state funding was proposed by the Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System (RCES) in its 1986 report. It argued that 
post-election funding to parties should be calculated on a sliding scale based on 
voter support. Those winning more than four percent of the vote in an electorate 
would receive $1 per vote, up to 20 percent of the vote. The votes won between 
20 percent and 30 percent would yield 50 cents each, and a cut-off would apply 
at 30 percent. If the RCES scheme had been adopted and its payouts adjusted 
for inflation, today the scheme would payout nearly $3 million per election, with 
Labour and National each receiving about $750,000 of this? More recently, some 
have suggested that New Zealand adopt the Australian state funding scheme. 
Since 1995 the Australian federal state has provided parties with annual funding 
of A$1.58 for each vote received at the most recent election, and in 1998 handed 
out a total of A$34 million (MMP Review Committee, 2001: p.89). If adopted in 
New Zealand, such a scheme would cost about $4 million.4 The Chief Executive 
of the Electoral Commission, Paul Harris, favours extending the direct funding of 
political parties, and in 2002 called for a 'fundamental re-examination' of the 
current broadcast funding scheme. Harris suggested such a review needed 'to go 
beyond considering improvements to the current allocation regime' and should 
look at implementing the RCES's proposed funding of parties (Harris, 2002b). 
The Labour Party has been a long-time supporter of a system of state funding, 
and in 2000 resurrected the RCES proposals for direct state funding, arguing that 
the alleged public unease over parties being funded by large unsourced 
donations meant that state funding was an urgent necessity. In its submission to 
Parliament's select committee reviewing the MMP system, Labour argued that 
anonymous donations to political parties should be banned, and a system of 
direct annual state funding of parties should be introduced to compensate for any 
3 The Electoral Commission has calculated that after CPI adjustments, the costs of the RCES scheme 
would have been $2.79 million in 1996, $2.54 million in 1999, and $2.81 million in 2002 (Harris 2003b). 
4 In Germany the state reimburses the political parties about NZ$6 for every vote they receive, which if 
applied to New Zealand would cost about $12 million a year (Gardiner, 2000). 
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reduction in private funding that might result from the ban. Likewise, the 
Progressive Coalition Party supports extending state funding. The Green Party 
also welcomes extended state funding, favouring the Australian system (Milne, 
2002e). It says that such funding could combine resources currently provided 
through Parliament, so that the direct state funding 'could be used for campaign 
costs as well as parliamentary budgets' (NZ Herald, 2003a). The Act party, in 
arguing for a radical bulk funding model for parliamentary resources, essentially 
favours this as well. The National Party, however, has always opposed any 
extension of direct state funding, stating that taxes should not be collected for 
political activities.5 New Zealand First has also opposed public funding, with MP 
Brian Donnelly saying, 'It really runs contrary to the New Zealand way of viewing 
democracy and the whole political system' (quoted in Milne, 24 Aug 2002). 
There are some good arguments in favour of direct state funding. Certainly if the 
state is going to fund parties, it is best to do so in a transparent and logical way, 
and this is afforded by direct state funding. In this way, mechanisms can be 
designed that minimise the negative effects of state funding. For instance, by 
allowing a tax rebate on party donations or by providing dollar-for-dollar donation 
matching, parties would still be encouraged to seek financing from the electorate, 
and thus not become totally divorced from their constituencies.6 
It is unlikely that increased direct state funding for political parties will eventuate 
in the near future. This is partly because of the public's disdain for political 
parties? In other countries, the introduction of state aid has usually occurred at 
5 This, however, is not the unanimous view within the party, and Geoff Thompson (the pa~ty president 1994-
98), stated that he favoured increased financing of political parties by the state. Thompson said that such 
state funding is the outcome of 'clamping down' on private funding through more rigorous rules on disclosure 
of donors (Gardiner, 2000). 
6 See: Geddis (5 2002b). 
7 See: Chapter Ten. Also, when the government last considered the issue - in 1989 - fearing a public 
backlash, it decided against introducing a comprehensive scheme of direct state funding, as Prime Minister 
David Lange believed it would appear 'tawdry and grasping' (quoted in NZ Herald, 1989a). 
508 Chapter Eight: State Resourcing of Parties 
times when there has been substantial public confidence in the integrity of 
parties.s Before any comprehensive system of state funding becomes politically 
acceptable in New Zealand, politicians will need to convince the public that they 
and their parties are worthy of more taxpayer money, and that they can be 
trusted to spend it properly and competently. At the moment, however, voters are 
more likely to believe that they should not be required to fund the activities of any 
party. It is also unlikely to happen because the parties are relatively satisfied with 
the status quo of indirect parliamentary state funding, and are therefore unlikely 
to push hard for more open subsidies, unless this source of funding becomes 
politically unsustainable.9 
Indirect State Funding 
Most of the taxpayer-funded resources provided to parties in New Zealand come 
under the category of indirect state funding because these resources are not 
given directly to the party organisations but instead to the parliamentary wing of 
the parties under the guise of helping the MPs carry out their parliamentary or 
ministerial activities. Officially, such financial support is not known as state 
funding for parties, but as 'parliamentary funding,.l0 In order to carry out their 
parliamentary functions, the parties and their MPs are provided with funding and 
services that cost in excess of $40 million per year. 
Parliamentary funding is distributed to the parties by the Parliamentary Service 
and Ministerial Services. The Parliamentary Service is the more significant of 
these two bodies, administering Parliament, its MPs and their offices. In 2000/01 
8 See: Linton (1994: p.112). 
9 In recent years the use of parliamentary resources by parties and MPs have increasingly come under the 
scrutiny of the public and media. This is elaborated in Part Two. 
10 When Prime Minister David Lange announced in 1989 that a comprehensive system of state funding 
would not be introduced, he claimed there was already an indirect form of state funding: 'It happens every 
time I answer a letter from a worried constituent. The Government pays the stamp, the Government types 
the letter; it does that whether you are in Opposition or in Government' (quoted in NZ Herald, 1989a). 
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the Parliamentary Service had a budget of $85.6 million (Small, 2001 a). 
Ministerial Services is a separate body that provides resources to MPs in the 
Executive. In 2001, Ministerial Services provided the governing parties with $15.5 
million to employ ministerial staff (Alliance, 2000). It also funds the Prime 
Minister's Department, which in 1995 cost $5.7 million (Boyd, 1995b). Both 
organisations come under the organisational umbrella of the Parliamentary 
Services Commission, which is controlled by the parties. The Commission is 
made up of the Speaker of the House, the leader and shadow leader of the 
House, and a representative from each party in Parliament (or two 
representatives in the case of parties with over 30 MPs). 
Parliamentary resources are distributed through the following four main 
categories. These categories all differ in the degree that they are converted into 
political resources for the parties, which is explored in the following section. 
(1) Party and Member Support: 
The Parliamentary Service provides each party in Parliament with an annual 
funding for 'Party and Member Support'. In the 2001/02 parliamentary year, each 
party was given the following amount: Labour: $4.9 million; National: $4.8 million; 
Act: $1 million; Green Party: $0.8 million; Alliance: $0.8 million; New Zealand 
First: $0.6 million; and United New Zealand: $0.1 million (Parliamentary Service, 
2002).11 In total, Party and Member Support amounted to $13 million. This 
funding is made up of the following three categories: 
(1 a) Leaders' Funding: Each party leader is allocated $57,176 per year for each 
MP who is not a member of the Executive. This funding pays for the costs of the 
11 The allocation of this category of funding is partly based on the number of MPs outside of the Executive 
(Le. not ministers). Labour and the Alliance received proportionally less money in this category because 
these parties had MPs receiving their resources from Ministerial Services. Together, the category of Party 
and Member Support adds up to $111,176 for each list MP who is not a member of the Executive, and 
$132,176 for each constituency MP who is not a member of the Executive. 
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party leaders' office staff in Parliament. The total paid to the parties in 2001/02 
was $5.4 million.12 
(1b) Party Group Funding: Every party is allocated $20,000 per MP, to cover the 
costs of research on portfolio issues, as well as parliamentary party management 
(the whips' office staff and operating costs). In 2001/02, a total of $2.4 million 
was paid to the parties. 
(1c) Members' Support Funding: The parties are allocated $34,200 per list MP 
and $55,000 per constituency MP. This is to cover the cost of operating out-of-
Parliament electorate offices, printing, postage from Parliament, advertising, and 
technology purchases. In 2001/02, the parties were paid a total of $2.2 million for 
this category.13 
Source: Parliamentary Service (2002). 
(2) Services to MPs: 
In Parliament, the parties receive additional. services provided by the 
Parliamentary Service, which in 2000/01 cost $28.2 million. 'Services to MPs' is 
made up of the following categories. 
12 The 2002 review of parliamentary resourcing recommended increasing Leadership funding for parties with 
up to and including nine non-Executive MPs by $50,000 per party (Dineen et aI., 2001). 
13 The 2002 review of parliamentary resourcing recommended raising these amounts to $45,000 for a list 
MP and $65,000 for a constituency MP (Dineen et aI., 2001). 
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(2a) Secretarial Support: The largest single resource that the state confers on 
political parties is the provision of secretarial staff in Parliament and in MPs' 
electorate offices. MPs are entitled to at least two full-time staff: an executive 
secretary in Parliament and one further electorate secretary for list MPs and two 
electorate secretaries for constituency MPs. The budget for this in 2000/01 was 
$13 million.14 
(2b) Members' Communications: MPs and their parliamentary staff have 
unlimited access to free telephone services and stationery. MPs are also 
provided with a mobile phone. This funding is entitlement-driven (Le. the 
expenditure is uncapped), which means that MPs have unlimited access to 
means of communication. On top of parliamentary postage privileges, MPs are 
also provided with a monthly stamp warrant of $85. The 2000/01 budget for 
'Members' Communications' was $3.3 million .. 
(2c) Members' Travel: All MPs and their spouses are able to travel by air, taxi 
and rail within New Zealand for free. In the 2000/01 financial year, MPs spent a 
total of $7.7 million on travel. These resources are entitlement-driven. A full 
breakdown of the travel budget is no longer released, but in 1997, funding from 
the state allowed MPs to spend 'an average of $85,681 on self-drive and VIP 
cars, $25,963 on domestic air travel, $7390 on international travel and $6901 on 
taxis' (Guyon Espiner, 1998a: p.1). 
(2d) Information Services: A number of useful information resources are provided 
within Parliament. These include the Parliamentary Library and its research 
services, and access to many computer communications systems and 
information accessories such as the internet. The budget allocation for this in 
2000/01 was $4.2 million. 
14 Of the 2001/02 budget, $4.8 million was spent on parliamentary executive secretaries and $8.0 million on 
out-of-Parliament staff (Dineen et ai., 2001). 
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The Parliamentary Service also spends a further $15 million on maintaining and 
operating the parliamentary complex, as well as providing catering. 
Table 8.3: Services to MPs (2000-2001) 
Services in Parliament Budget 
Secretarial Support $13,081,600 
Members Communication $3,296,036 
Members' Travel $7,710,401 
Information Services $4,200,594 
Building & Operations Management $14,007,359 
Catering Services $755,359 
Personnel & Accounting Services $572,237 
Policy Advice $194,618 
Total $43,818,204 
Source: Parliamentary Service (2001). 
(3) MP Salaries and Allowances: 
Each year the Parliamentary Service spends about $14 million on MP salaries 
and allowances (Parliamentary Service, 2002). Backbench MPs receive about 
$83,000, ministers receive about $145,000, and the prime minister earns 
$216,300.15 The allowances are widely considered generous by private sector 
comparison, and once factored into the total remuneration, the whole MP salary 
package is considerably bigger than it appears. For example, in 1999 journalist 
Helen Bain applied private sector calculation and rules to the salaries and 
produced an alternative estimation of the total salary packages: 'The poor 
underpaid backbencher, listed as earning $83,000, actually earns a salary 
package of $201,000. Cabinet ministers, with an official salary determined by the 
Higher Salaries Commission of $145,000, receive a package worth $330,000. 
15 Until the end of the nineteenth century MPs did not receive a salary or travel allowance, but only £1 for 
each day at Parliament. According to David McLoughlin, 'it was not till 1947 that parliament was recognised 
as a fulltime career and not the preserve of persons of independent means' (McLoughlin, 13 Feb 1988: 
p.16). 
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The prime minister, listed as earning $216,300, has a salary package of 
$445,000' (Bain, 199ge: p.17). 
(4) Resourcing of the Governing Parties: 
The resources available to a party in government are especially considerable. 
There are four discernable categories of resources that are of potential party-
political use. 
(4a) Staffing and offices: Staffing entitlements are much greater for the governing 
parties because Ministerial Services provides MPs in the Executive with extra 
staff to deal with their ministerial portfolios. In 2001, Ministerial Services provided 
funding of $15.5 million, of which Labour Party ministers received about $12 
million and Alliance ministers $3.5 million (Ministerial Services, 2001). 
(4b) Publicity resources: Governments are able to undertake significant 
advertising campaigns. For example in a six-month period during 2000, the 
government allegedly spent about $6 million on pollsters and advertising 
agencies (NZPA, 2000a: p.2). 
(4c) Government expenditure: Through government expenditure parties can 
reward and reinforce their support. This ranges from the 'pork-barrel' politics of 
spending money on developments in order to find favour from a certain 
constituency through to the awarding of government contracts to specific 
supporters. 
(4d) Government appointments: Parties can reward their supporters by 
appointing them to positions on state agencies and enterprises. The government 
of the day has the ability to appoint supporters to more than 3000 positions on 
about 400 boards and agencies (Colin Espiner, 2003a). 
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The Principle Source of Income 
For most parties, state resources are now their principal source of material 
support. Most other financial resources are relatively insignificant. As detailed in 
Chapter Seven, the income that the New Zealand parties derive from civil society 
is very small - the two major party organisations have annual incomes of about 
$2 million, while the smaller parliamentary parties have incomes of less than a 
third of this figure. In election years, income from civil society increases 
somewhat to fund the election campaigns but, even then, remains relatively low. 
It is worth comparing the level of state funding and private funding for the 
individual political parties under MMP. The funding arrangements differ for every 
party, but the Labour Party and the Alliance provide examples of both a major, 
well-established party and a minor, younger party. In terms of resources from 
civil society, the Labour Party has more recently been the most well-funded 
party. In all, the extra-parliamentary Labour Party organisation appears to 
operate on a budget of about $2.5 million per year. Compared to this, the 
Parliamentary Service provides the parliamentary wing of Labour with $5 million 
in Party and Member Support alone. The Labour parliamentarians also receive 
about $12 million worth of Services to MPs, and Labour ministers currently 
receive nearly all of Ministerial Services' staffing budget of over $15 million. 
These lucrative resources greatly overshadow the party organisation's finances. 
The Alliance case has been even more pronounced. As shown in Table 7.4, the 
Alliance listed its total income (for both wings of the party) in 2000 as $3,870,500. 
This paid for the salaries of 66 staff and operated '24 Alliance offices both inside 
and outside of Parliament (including ministerial offices). About 94 percent of this 
income ($3,620,500) was listed as coming from either the Parliamentary Service 
or Ministerial Services and only $250,000 was listed as coming from the extra-
parliamentary organisation. Significantly, these figures also excluded 'Non 
budget Parliamentary and Ministerial services provided (e.g. rent, power, 
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computer support, research and library services), MP travel and allowances, 
Parliamentary Services provided phone lines and cell phones' (Alliance, 2000). 
Much of this $3,870,500 income obviously has to be spent on parliamentary and 
ministerial activities, but as shown later in this chapter, a lot of the funding is also 
used for party-political purposes, and in many cases party organisational work. 
Source: Alliance (2000). Note: these figures do not include money paid for those taxpayer-funded 
items that are not paid out the parties' budgets, such as rent, power, computer support, research 
and library services, MP travel and allowances, phone lines and cellphones (Alliance, 2000). 
Although it varies considerably between individual parties, it is clear that the state 
in New Zealand provides the parties with the vast majority of their income.16 In 
terms of the numbers of staff employed by the parties the parliamentary units 
have conSistently outstripped that of the national offices. As Chapter Seven 
showed, the size of the extra-parliamentary party offices have dwindled. While it 
is difficult to ascertain the exact number of staff employed by the party 
organisations, it appears that Labour employ about 9 staff; National, 7; Act, 2; 
and the Green Party, 2. In strong contrast to European party systems, the 
overwhelming majority of party staff in New Zealand are now paid for by the 
state. In Europe, Mair reports that despite the great increases in state subsidies it 
is 'still only in a minority of countries ... that the overall numbers employed in the 
16 This compares very highly against other state-funded party systems. The following figures are the 
percentages that the state subsidies make up of total party income for various countries in 1989: Sweden, 
47 percent; Germany, 74 percent; Norway, 45 percent; Italy, 39 percent; Austria, 25 percent; and Finland, 84 
percent (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.14). However some caution needs to be applied in making direct comparisons 
with these figures as they deal with direct funding regimes, unlike New Zealand's indirect scheme. 
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parties' parliamentary offices now exceed those employed in the central [head] 
offices' (Mair, 1994: p.9). This difference between New Zealand and Europe 
shows that even in its undeveloped and 'indirect' form, the state-funding 
arrangements for New Zealand parties is particularly advanced. 
Part Two: Party-Political Use of Parliamentary Resources 
Most of the resources conferred by the state are not actually provided to political 
parties per se, but either to individual MPs or party leaders. These resources are 
officially intended for the non-party purpose of carrying out the official functions of 
an MP. Yet, as this section shows, they are used to conduct activities that are to 
all intents and purposes party-political tasks, including basic electioneering. After 
all, with opinion poll results frequently in the media, election work now tends to 
be undertaken throughout the whole parliamentary term. Hence, while election-
related work has historically been considered and classified as an extra-
parliamentary function, it is now the main activity that occurs within Parliament. 
Even the RCES recognised that the resources of an MP are ultimately used by 
their parties: 
While these entitlements are provided to the MPs themselves as aids to the fulfilment of 
their parliamentary functions, they are available throughout the year and are of 
considerable value to the political parties for campaigning and other purposes (RCES, 
1986: p.210). 
This section looks at each category of parliamentary funding outlined in Part 
One, examining how it is used and converted into party political resources. It is 
important to realise that these categories are somewhat artificial in that they are 
based on official funding streams, whereas the parties often combine them for 
various purchases. This means the funding is not entirely used in the way that 
this categorisation might suggest. 
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(1) Party and Member Support 
Elected parties have parliamentary and electorate offices that are well-funded by 
the budget of 'Party and Member Support'. Below is an explanation of how the 
component resources are used for political purposes. 
(1 a) Leaders' Funding: 
The $5.4 million paid annually to the parties to run their leaders' offices is a 
resource that can be used very flexibly for all sorts of political projects. As an 
example, party websites are built and maintained from within Parliament. Mark 
Stonyer of Peter Dunne's United New Zealand parliamentary office has explained 
how his office was able to use Leaders' Funding to set up the party's website, 
which has been an important part of United's membership recruitment: 
Probably most new members have come via the internet. We have an internet page for 
United that has an enquiries page on it. Because it is funded through our public 
allowance - from our Leaders fund - this pays for our internet site maintenance. So you 
can't mention rnernbership or donations. So it just says 'Enquiries' and if you want to 
know rnore you just fill out this, and it comes to here basically. And from there they get 
the 'Positions' statement.. .. From there that is where the membership comes in from. And 
people will ring, contact us, and write. And they just flow in that way. We don't actually 
have a huge organisation out there gathering in membership (Stonyer, 1999). 
A number of other political party and MP websites have also been created and 
maintained with the aid of Parliamentary Service funding (New Zealand Infotech 
Weekly, 2001). Act freely admit to developing their party website with 
parliamentary resources and employing an electorate agent to spend 16 hours a 
week maintaining the site (Prebble, 2003). The Leaders' Funding can be used for 
purchasing other political technology. For instance in 1993 Mike Moore used his 
Leaders' Funding to install a broadcast studio in his Christchurch home so he 
could better participate in talkback radio (McGregor, 1996c: p.82). 
The Leaders' Funding appears to be used mainly to employ staff. The staff 
resources of the opposition parties have increased dramatically in recent 
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decades. In contrast with the modern opposition offices, in the late 1960s 
'Labour's leader Norman Kirk relied upon the support of a messenger, typist and 
personal private secretary' and it was not until 1974 that an opposition leader 
was able to employ a press secretary (Klinkum, 1998a: p.407). However, by the 
early 1980s, the Leader of the Opposition had six support staff, and by 1990, 
there were nine, with a budget of over $700,000.17 Opposition resources then 
multiplied over the next two decades, particularly following the publication of the 
Parliamentary Service-commissioned 'Hunn-Lang Report' in 1990. This review of 
the requirements of the opposition parties found that although the prime 
minister's office employed a number of specialists there was no equivalent for the 
Leader of the Opposition to use for policy formation. The Hunn-Lang Report 
identified this as an area of support necessary for the formulation and 
dissemination of policies by the opposition (O'Sullivan, 1999). The report 
recommended the appointment of six additional media positions as well as 'a 
sum of NZ$100,000 per annum to buy in computerised information services and 
to commission work from the private sector' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.408). 
Generally, the leaders' staff are engaged in marketing their political parties, and 
although this activity is normally done surreptitiously, there was one example in 
2000 where the Act party advertised to employ someone at Parliament 
specifically to 'market Act's policies'. Commenting on this advertisement, the 
General Manager of the Parliamentary Service, John O'Sullivan, suggested that 
all parties already hired staff to carry out similar functions, with the difference 
being that 'other parties use such titles as "communications coordinator" for 
similar positions' (McLoughlin, 2000b: p.3). Yet it is obvious that a person 
occupying an 'advertising/marketing' position for a party in Parliament is carrying 
out party-political work. Much of the resources provided to parties are given on 
17 See: Klinkum (1998a: pA08), and Vowles (2002b: pA23). How these resources are used for political 
purposes, can be seen from the way in which Ruth Richardson, as opposition finance spokesperson, was 
given 'improved resources, including secondment of a Treasury official to her office' which she used to 'set 
about constructing an alternative economic vision which would surpass [Roger] Douglas's for ideological 
purity' (Kelsey, 1995: pAO). 
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the basis that they are for developing party policies, yet it is clearly spent on 
selling their policies. Grant Klinkum has pointed out how prior to the 1990 
election Jim Bolger blatantly used his Opposition Office budget for selling rather 
than developing policies (Klinkum, 1998a: pA09). This shift towards political-
oriented staff has been recognised by Claire Guyan, particularly in terms of press 
secretaries: 
The role of the parliamentary press secretary has changed dramatically over the years. 
Until 1984 they were strictly public servants drawn from the Tourism and Publicity 
Department. That system changed under the fourth Labour Government which in 1984 
began hand-picking press secretaries and employing them under contract. The role 
became more political as ministers looked for sympathetic press secretaries to manage 
their media profile. It was the birth of the 'spin doctor' (Guyan, 1997: p.11). 
(1 b) Party Group Funding: 
One of the most useful resources available to the political parties is the 
parliamentary research units, which altogether employ about 30 staff in 
Parliament and are paid for by Party Group Funding. The units were set up in 
1970 in line with the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Salaries and 
Allowances. Crucially the units were established 'under the direct control of their 
respective parliamentary leaderships' which makes them answerable to no-one 
outside the party and thus likely to tend towards involvement in party-political 
work (Klinkum, 1998b: pA20). Originally, each of Labour and National's units had 
a director, two researchers, and two support staff, but within three years the units 
had expanded to employ ten full-time staff each, and in 1978 Social Credit was 
also granted a researcher (Klinkum, 1998a: p.108, 109; 1998b: 421). In 1993, 
and then again in 1994, both the National and Labour units were given an 
additional staff member - taking them to 12 staffers per unit (Klinkum, 1998b: 
pA21). After 1996, New Zealand First had three full-time researchers and a 
director, the Alliance three full-time researchers, Act one full-time and one part-
time researcher and the United Party one full-time researcher (Klinkum, 1998b: 
pA21 ). 
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The research units were originally established for supporting MPs with their 
parliamentary work, but their prime role appears not to be research, but the 
marketing of their political parties. Essentially they are state-funded party 
propaganda units. In his study of the units, Klinkum found that 'There are a range 
of overtly political functions in which research units engage', and 'the work is 
mainly of a blatantly political nature' (Klinkum, 1998a: pp.230, 215). The research 
units have performed valuable functions for their MPs, but often focus more on 
putting out information to the public than simply researching information for their 
MPs. For example, Klinkum found that 'Generic material specifically produced for 
newsletters was heavily political and often worked up to a point where the 
Member needed only to put their name over it' (ibid: p.185). Hine (1995) also 
found that during the 1980s the National and Labour research units had been 
diverting their resources into party organisational work, and in particular into the 
publication of political broadsheets - National's research unit put out Notes from 
the Hill, and Labour's published The Month That Was (NZPA, 1989b). Since the 
1990s, many other partisan publications have been produced from Parliament. 
For example, the official email newsletter of the Young Nationals, The New Write, 
is produced from National's research unit. Likewise, during the time the party was 
in Parliament, the Alliance offices produced the Alliance Activist which was 
compiled and printed using parliamentary resources, but posted to party 
members using party money (O'Sullivan, 2001: pp.4-5). Similarly, the Act party 
parliamentary office produces Richard Prebble's Letter from Wellington, which is 
emailed out to 30,000 voters, and reads like a party political broadcast. The 
Greens' parliamentary office also publishes email newsletters - such as 
Justpeace, which is put together by both party activists and parliamentary staff. 
Part of the research work of the units sometimes even includes writing or 
researching books for MPs. For example, 'It is believed that Karin Beatson in the 
National Research Unit helped Muldoon to write a book on the New Zealand 
economy. Mike Moore would request everything the Labour unit had on a subject 
such as value added exports and produce a book based on that material' 
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(Klinkum, 1998a: p.132). When he was a Labour MP, Richard Prebble, 'arranged 
for the Labour unit to ask questions in the House which elicited material which 
Roger Douglas then used in his book "Unfinished Business'u (ibid: p.166).18 
Staff in the research units also undertake many organisational tasks that would, 
in most countries, be performed by the extra-parliamentary head office: 
Another example of assistance to the party is at candidates' conferences prior to 
elections. There is also evidence of direct support of party electorate committees 
obtaining occasional support from research units. There has been a steady stream of 
material from the research unit to National Party headquarters and to the divisions over 
the years. While employed by the research unit Simon Walker helped organise the 
Labour Party annual conference (Klinkum, 1998a: p.146). 19 
The units also carry out opinion polling. Because the Labour Party's extra-
parliamentary organisation has generally lacked the funds to undertake such 
work, the task has nearly always fallen on the research unit, which pioneered 
polling work in 1977.20 By 1999, the Labour Party's polling was still carried out 
18 Research unit staff have even been known to intervene directly in the political arena as part of their job, 
such as impersonating the public on talkback radio: 'A fairly unusual type of assistance provided to Members 
involved a Labour researcher ringing talkback shows with "patsy" questions while the Member was being 
interviewed' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.132). 
19 According to Nick Venter, 'Over the past three decades, election-related support has included using 
research unit staff to train volunteers in electorates for party polling work, coordinating some national-level 
polling work, and providing a range of advisory and information support services to candidates who are not 
sitting members' (Venter, 1999b: p.2). 
20 According to Klinkum, 'Considerable time was spent by the Labour Research Unit from 1977 on polling 
work. Leaving aside 1987 when the Labour Party was awash with corporate contributions, the party has 
typically had very little funding for polling' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.195). Klinkum has outlined how 'The national 
polling which occurred in 1984 was coordinated by the research unit and carried out by volunteers using 
telephones in Members' offices' (ibid: p.196). The polling work of the research units has been well-utilised in 
making political decisions: 'One example of overtly political polling was polling undertaken to help [the 
Fourth Labour Government] cabinet determine whether Koro Wetere as Minister of Maori Affairs should 
resign over the Maori Loans Affair .... Another example involved a director of the Labour unit going to 
Christchurch to coordinate a random sample telephone poll to determine whether sitting Avon Member, 
Mary Batchelor was popular in the context of a challenge being mounted by a trade unionist on the 
candidacy for the seat. The parliamentary party leadership approved the trip and results of the polling were 
taken to caucus and used to make a particular argument' (ibid: p.197). 
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from within Parliament (Allen, 1999). Likewise, most other parties carry out 
opinion polling from within Parliament. For example, Mark Stonyer has outlined 
the United New Zealand's occasional use of polling: 'We have done a bit of 
polling nationally for our own sake from the parliamentary unit here. We polled a 
thousand people over the whole country with a health survey' (Stonyer, 18 May 
1999). 
Since the late 1980s the research units have become more involved in election 
work.21 Not surprisingly, the parties have always sought to conceal their 
inappropriate use of the units, and Klinkum found that researchers 'would 
generally seek to link activities such as travel and any type of project which might 
arouse suspicion, to an MP to give the activity legitimacy' (Klinkum, 1998a: 
p.218). Control of the units has often suggested a strong extra-parliamentary 
influence. Certainly in the past, National's research unit has been controlled by 
the party whips together with the party organisation's General Director who 
'considered the director of the National Research Unit to be an employee and as 
such would meet with [him] on virtually a daily basis, and would expect the 
director to do party work where necessary' (ibid: pp.144-145). According to 
Klinkum, in no sense did the General Director 'view the unit as being 
independent of the party, financially, philosophically or administratively' (ibid: 
p.145).22 Many of those who have worked in the units agree that the nature of the 
work is better described as propaganda rather than research: 
21 See: Klinkum (1998a: pp.144, 198). 
22 It is also apparent that the research units do not generally carry out the ordinary servicing of MPs. Klinkum 
found 'there is little evidence that the backbench Member has. ever really been the main recipient of 
research unit support in New Zealand' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.128). As an example of this, a 1992 memorandum 
from the National Research Unit decreed that individual Members warranted sixth and last attention of the 
unit, well behind that of the party organisation (ibid: p.129). This level of service to backbenchers is reflected 
in the dissatisfaction of MPs with the research units: 'According to one National Member there is "simply no 
way" that a backbencher receives the $20,000 of research support which is nominally tagged to each 
Member but is paid to the research unit' (ibid: p.222). A Parliamentary Service survey of all MPs in 1995-96 
also found that 'only 54% of Members felt that they received adequate service in respect of quantity from 
their research units' (ibid: p.224). 
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The director of the National unit in 1996 said that unit work is not about research at all, 
although the term research is a handy label, but rather about telling the public what the 
government has achieved. This emphasis is reflected in the structure of the staffing within 
that unit: of eleven staff, only six are researchers while five are in secretarial and 
publications work. There is full-time work for at least one desk top publisher. All this 
underlines the point that the propaganda rather than in-depth research on policy issues is 
at the heart of research unit work (ibid: p.208).23 
(1c) Members' Support Funding: 
Members' Support Funding (otherwise known as 'out-of-Parliament funding') was 
introduced in 1984 to provide resources for MPs to operate their electorate 
offices (Henderson and Bellamy, 2002: p.106). As part of this role, MPs could 
use the funds to advertise their services to constituents. The Parliamentary 
Service lists acceptable promotional purchases as: 'Advertising in newspapers or 
other publications; Fliers and newsletters; Signage; Entries in public telephone 
directories; Material intended for public distribution (without charge) such as 
business cards, fridge magnets, pens etc; Radio and T.V. advertising; Websites' 
(Parliamentary Service, 31 Oct 2001: p.8). Therefore all the parties frequently 
use parliamentary budgets for printing and distributing leaflets. A recent example 
involved Labour distributing tens of thousands of free postcards promoting the 
party's new youth website (Taylor, 2003d). In 2003 the National Party also used 
$7000 of its parliamentary budget to print 205,000 leaflets to distribute to Labour-
held and marginal National seats around the country asking the public for 
feedback on policy issues (Taylor, 2003b). Such leaflets used a 'push-polling' 
technique, whereby questions are asked of voters, but the questions are in 
themselves the messages designed to devalue political opponents.24 
23 Klinkum has also questioned the appropriateness of allowing the units to carry out electoral tasks: 'is it 
appropriate that research unit staff have undertaken polling work in electorates, travelled to electorates for 
marginal seat support work, assisted in drawing up party platforms, serviced joint parliamentary party/extra-
parliamentary party campaign committees and supported candidates who are not sitting members? 
(Klinkum, 1998b: p.427). 
24 See: Evans (1995: p.18). 
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Traditionally these budgets have also been used by MPs to fund 'small 
advertisements in local newspapers to promote their constituency services' 
(McLoughlin, 2003c). More recently the boundaries of permitted advertising use 
have been stretched. For example in 2003, United Future bought about $80,000 
worth of full-page colour advertisements in daily newspapers 'to report on how it 
says it has made MMP work since the last election' (McLoughlin, ibid). The 
permitted use of parliamentary budgets was also stretched in 2003 by National 
and New Zealand First when they purchased about 50 high-visibility outdoor 
advertising billboards. The billboards featured pictures of their respective leaders, 
Bill English and Winston Peters, with campaigning slogans, and were estimated 
to cost about $180,000 (Milne, 2003b). Similarly, the Green Party used 
parliamentary funding to manufacture hundreds of 'No War, Just Peace' placards 
during protests against the war in Iraq (NZPA, 20030). 
The Green Party has also made effective use of its out-of-Parliament staffing 
allocations, rejecting standard constituency work in favour of organising Green 
Party political campaigns. For instance, in 2002 the party employed a 'cannabis 
law reform co-ordinator' from its out-of-Parliament budget. A Green 
spokesperson described the job as 'promoting or co-ordinating and researching 
work' on drug law reform (quoted in NZPA, 31 Oct 2002). The party said it was 
also looking to employ 'up to six other policy co-ordinators including in the areas 
of safe food, ground-based pest control, sustainable agriculture, and social and 
economic justice' (NZPA, 2002j). Despite such work centring on policy and 
research instead of constituents, the Parliamentary Service said that the position 
was 'a sensible use of the money because the party was an issues-based party 
of list MPs rather than constituency MPs' (ibid). 
It seems that today, more than ever before, the role played by all MPs in the 
community is party-political, and all the taxpayer-funded resources associated 
with their role are being directed to such ends. Therefore, regional party 
organisers (previously paid for by the party organisation) have been replaced by 
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Electorate Agents (paid for by the Parliamentary Service), and the electorate 
offices are now de facto regional party headquarters.25 This was an issue noted 
by National Party stalwart John Jensen in a 1999 newspaper article: 
Have you recently visited your local Alliance office? The Green Party headquarters? How 
about the Act office in your electorate? Or a meeting place for New Zealand First? How 
many New Zealand First party activists do you know in your suburb? The contact for Act 
in the Hamilton phone book is the electorate office maintained by the taxpayers for list 
MP Ken Shirley in Tauranga. And so it goes on. The minor parties run on a shoestring, 
with much - if not most - of their activity operated out of the offices of their MPs (Jensen, 
21 Jan 1999). 
It is an open secret in Parliament that these taxpayer-funded electorate offices 
operate as party offices geared to organising the party locally, and working for 
either the re-election of their MP or an increase in the local party vote. At the 
most obvious level this can be seen in the offices being painted and branded as 
party offices, complete with party colours and logos. An extension of this is the 
'mobile electorate-office' - which has become popular in recent years. Richard 
Prebble, in Wellington Central, embraced this thoroughly with the use of a 
number of vehicles including the purchase from Japan of a custom-made 
electoral truck, which could be used as an electoral office for appointments in 
residential areas or as a platform for public speeches and general campaigning. 
(2) Services to MPs 
(2a) Secretarial Support: 
Of the approximately 1200 staff who work in Parliament and electorate offices, 
about 307 fulltime equivalents provide secretarial'support for MPs (although 
there are even more staff in ministerial offices). This SUbstantial staffing resource 
is a recent phenomenon. Amongst the reforms of the Fourth Labour Government,. 
25 According to Vowles, 'Funding for offices outside of Parliament is given on the basis of service to 
constituents, but obviously provides organisational infrastructure that will inevitably be used for party political 
purposes' (2002b: p,424). 
526 Chapter Eight: State Resourcing of Parties 
Geoffrey Palmer increased the staffing entitlements of MPs. Whereas once there 
was one secretary to two MPs, this was increased in the 1980s to one each. Out 
in the electorate, MPs had no budget to hire electorate secretaries and therefore 
'the spouses of MPs were often forced to become unpaid electorate secretaries 
who had to sort out the day-to-day problems of constituents' (McLoughlin 1992a: 
p.138). 
Even MPs' parliamentary executive secretaries are often involved in highly 
political work. According to one former director of the National Party's research 
unit, 'one third of the executive assistants are involved in writing speeches and 
preparing press statements' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.343). However, it is the 
electorate staff who are often more heavily politicised. 
The Act party, in particular, has made good use of out-of-Parliament staff for 
organising and marketing itself. A minor scandal in 2003 over Act's electorate 
office funding revealed that its parliamentary researchers and press secretaries 
often work on split contracts, being paid to do most of their work as out-of-
Parliament support staff. For example, under this arrangement, Act's head of 
research, ex-Cabinet Minister Peter McCardle, was supposed to be an electorate 
agent for 32 hours a week - ostensibly working out of Richard Prebble's Pipitea 
8t house in Wellington - and also a researcher working in Parliament for only 
eight hours a week. Act's out-of-Parliament funding of about $400,000 per 
annum was supposed to be used by its MPs to service the electorate, yet media 
reports suggested this money was really paying for political research and 
marketing. Outside Parliament, the MPs' offices and their electorate agents are 
supposed to work not as party members, but to help constituents with whatever 
local problems or issues they have - much like a high-powered Citizens' Advice 
Bureau. This arrangement is good for the public but, as Act figured out, it is not 
an effective vote-winning use of state funding, and the party was better off using 
that money for more political tasks, as it does in Parliament. 
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The problem for all the parties is that these budgets are officially ring-fenced for 
helping constituents. However, as Act Chief of staff Christopher Milne admitted, 
'We looked at the strait-jacket and said, "Right, how can we use it to our best 
advantage?'" (quoted in Young, 6 Mar 2003). Their answer appeared to have 
been to set up sham offices in both Wellington and Auckland and have Act's 
'electorate agents' actually based in Parliament in Wellington or on the same 
premises as the Act head office in Auckland. There they work as researchers, 
marketers and party organisers. The electorate agent scheme is thus a 
sUbstantial state subsidy for the party organisation. Act effectively turned its 
various state funding entitlements into one large fund from which the party could 
spend as it liked. This 'bulk funding by stealth' essentially removes the previous 
restrictions that were intended to stop the money being spent on blatantly party-
political activity.26 
(2b) Members' Communication 
Communication technology is especially useful for MPs and parliamentary staff to 
promote and organise their parties. For example, when in Parliament, Alliance 
staff used Parliament's teleconferencing facilities for party purposes without even 
involving any MPs (O'Sullivan, 2001: pp.5-6). The party was also caught out in 
1998 for supplying parliamentary phone cards to party activists (NZPA, 21 Nov 
1998). Other parties also use the resources for such purposes. 
Postal privileges are commonly used for political purposes, and there are plenty 
of cases of parties using the parliamentary frank to send out party material. One 
example was Act leader Richard Prebble's use of parliamentary letterhead and 
free postage to write to booksellers asking them to help promote his book, I've 
26 Previously, Act had been quick to highlight the misuse of resources by other politicians as a way of 
pushing its perk-busting image. Prebble even criticised the Alliance in 2001 for manipulating its 
parliamentary resources, saying, 'It's part of Alliance philosophy - they have great difficulty distinguishing 
between public money and their own' (quoted in Milne, 2001c). However, it now seems that Act has a similar 
difficulty. This episode showed that Act, too, valued the lucrative state funding to subsidise its campaigning. 
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Been Writing. According to a newspaper report, the General Manager of the 
Parliamentary Service, John O'Sullivan, said 'in general MPs were permitted to 
use the service to inform the public on policy issues of the day' (Colin Espiner, 
1999: p.9). Another example concerns a mail out from Helen Clark's office in 
1994, encouraging the public to attend a Labour Party conference (Rapson, 
1994). This use of parliamentary postage epitomises how such resources 
potentially replace party activist labour. The decline in party membership and 
activism has obviously impacted severely on the ability of parties to deliver their 
propaganda. According to ex-Cabinet Minister Simon Upton in the 1980s the 
parties in Parliament began to rely heavily on Parliamentary Services funded 
delivery of propaganda - with MPs bombarding 'constituents with "personalised" 
communications, offering assistance and proffering carefully sanitised party-
political information - all at taxpayers' expense' (Upton, 1987: p.11 0). 
(3) MP Salaries and Allowances 
Although, strictly speaking, the remuneration of MPs is for personal purposes, 
parts of these resources are undoubtedly redirected into party-political use. MPs 
are often expected to pay a substantial proportion of their parliamentary salary 
into party coffers. For example, Alliance, Green and New Zealand First MPs are 
expected to pay a portion from their salary to the extra-parliamentary party 
organisation.27 Parliamentary allowances also involve significant amounts of 
money - for example, the commercial accommodation night allowance pays up 
to $160 per night for accommodation when the MP is away from home ($180 per 
night in Auckland). 
These resources are widely used in elections and by-elections. For instance, in 
the Taranaki-King Country by-election of 1998, Brent Edwards reported that 
27 As explained in Chapter Seven, the Alliance and the Green Party expect MPs to contribute about nine 
percent of their salary, and New Zealand First levies its MPs at the lower rate of five percent. This money 
helps operate the extra-parliamentary party and fund general election campaigns. 
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parties were 'spending thousands of dollars of taxpayer money to run their by-
election campaigns' mainly by sending their MPs to the electorate to campaign. 
These MPs' travel, accommodation, expenses and salary were paid for by the 
state (Edwards, 1998a). Because such costs are not included in the $40,000 limit 
on expenditure, Edwards noted that 'In effect, it allows parliamentary parties to 
spend thousands of dollars more on campaigning than those parties not 
represented in Parliament' (ibid). Chief Electoral Officer Phil Whelan said that 
'Spending taxpayer money on flying MPs in and out of the electorate was a "grey 
area" and could be challenged if anyone made a formal complaint about the 
issue' (ibid). Christian Heritage Party leader Graham Capill complained that 
these resources meant the parliamentary parties had 'every advantage that a 
minor party like ours does not' (quoted in Edwards, ibid). 
Very seldom is the use of these resources reported in the media or taken up by 
the funding bodies that provide them. However, the issue of unlawful use of 
parliamentary resources for electoral purposes arose during a Serious Fraud 
Office investigation of list MP Donna Awatere Huata in 2001. She spent 35 days 
during the 1999 election campaign in the Auckland Central electorate, for which 
she was the Act candidate, and claimed the parliamentary away-from-parliament 
allowance. She denied that she was in the electorate on party business (despite 
it occurring during the election campaign), and the Serious Fraud Office decided 
not to prosecute (Young, 2001 b). 
(4) Resourcing of the Governing Parties 
(4a) Staffing and offices 
A number of the staff that work for ministers are not public service employees 
but, according to Richard Shaw, political appointees who are engaged in partisan 
activity on behalf of their minister: 
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ministers employ private staff who provide an alternative source of advice, and whose 
particular task it is to offer explicitly political, or partisan, advice. (Contract staff are also 
likely to be responsible for what is sometimes referred to as 'political risk management' 
(or 'spinning'), something that is certainly not a core public service function (Shaw, 
2001: p.153). 
The provision for this type of resourcing increased under Muldoon, when he set 
up both his own Prime Minister's Department and, more importantly, a small 
advisory group (of ten to twelve members) of experts seconded for approximately 
two-year terms from both the private and public sectors (Henderson, 2001: 
p.111 ).28 The private office of the prime minister then went from having ten staff 
when David Lange became prime minister, to about 20, and then to 27 under 
Geoffrey Palmer.29 Staff numbers continued to increase, and according to Sarah 
Catherall, when Jenny Shipley was prime minister she 'set a record for having 
the biggest crew of communication staff and media advisers yet hired by a prime 
minister' (Catherall, 1 Nov 1998: p.A 7). In her media team alone, Shipley had 
eight staff, compared to her predecessor's communications team of three.30 At 
the same time, Shipley also had about 15 policy advisers (Henderson, 2001: 
p.112). 
The number of (non-seconded) staff in ministerial. offices has also increased 
dramatically. Between 1989 and 1997, their number rose from 45 to 145. 
According to Shaw, the cost of employing these private staff had nearly tripled, 
reaching $7.4 million, or $57,000 per employee (Shaw, 2001: p.153). After the 
election of the Labour-Alliance Government, ministerial staff numbers again 
increased further - from 198 to 220 (Peters, 12 Jul 2000: p.2). In 2002, there 
were 224 staff, made up of 47 Alliance ministerial staff and 177 Labour 
ministerial staff. After the 2002 general election, the staff numbers rose to 232, 
and the government was also accused of trying to hide the true cost of staff 
28 The advisory group of public and private-sector secondments plays a significant role in filtering which 
major policy decisions should be considered by the Cabinet (Bingham, 18 Mar 2000). 
29 See: NZ Herald (1989c), and Catherall (1998: p.A7). 
30 See: Bain (1998a: p.9), and Laugesen (1998e: p.A3). 
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working in ministerial offices by using more staff on secondment from 
departments (TV One News, 2002b).31 
At the most obvious end of the spectrum, the staff in ministers' offices are used 
for ongoing party campaigning rather than simply for the minsterial functions that 
they are supposedly employed and paid for by the state to undertake. Yet the 
use of ministerial staff in campaigning has only a recent history. This is in 
contrast to the observations of David S North who, writing in 1954, noted the 
limited use of civil servants by government ministers in the general election of 
that year: 
Contrary to the American practice, the National Party had to rely completely on its 
volunteer and paid workers in the campaign; they could not expect any assistance from 
the patronage employees who are such an important asset in America to the party in 
power. However, Ministers do have private secretaries, and the campaigns of Cabinet 
members must have been aided by their government staffs. The very slight incidence of 
civil servants working on the campaign on government time can be shown by a story in 
Standard of October 27, 1954. The Labour organ was furious because two members of 
the Prime Minister's department were travelling with him on the campaign tour, and one 
of them hand-delivered a news release to one of the Christchurch newspapers, surely a 
rather minor offence. A little later in the campaign Standard charged that members of the 
Government Publicity Department were writing political news releases, a statement that 
was vigorously denied (North, 1954: pp.51-52). 
While this was noteworthy in the 1950s, such election work is completely 
commonplace today. 
(4b) Publicity resources 
Through undertaking publicity campaigns that promote new government 
programmes, the party in government can promote'its policy or management of 
an issue. Although such propaganda is officially intended to benefit citizens, 
'there is frequently little to distinguish this task from that of conducting 
propaganda intended to help the re-election of the governing party' (Pinto-
31 Since Labour came to office in 1999, secondments have gone up by 60 percent, with the salaries being 
paid for by government departments (TV One News, 2002b), 
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Duschinsky, 15 Sep 1998). This trend has become especially well-utilised since 
1987 when the Fourth Labour Government spent millions of dollars selling 
government initiatives to the public. According to David Denemark, a series of 
'unpaid ads' disguised as government public service messages 'carried decidedly 
pro-Labour messages on taxes, job training schemes and crime' (Denemark, 
1992: p.177).32 The Fourth Labour Government became the most heavily 
marketed government in New Zealand's history. This led the National Party to 
claim that in the 1987 general election it had been outspent by 10 to 1.33 
Between 1987 and 1990 the Fourth Labour Government is said to have spent 
$114 million on advertising (Hope, 2001: p.314).34 Unsurprisingly, when National 
came into government in the early 1990s, it too took advantage of this 
promotional opportunity.35 The public clearly regard such government spending 
as party-political. According to an NBR-Consultus Insight poll on the health 
32 Political scientist Joe Atkinson criticised the tax-funded advertising campaign, as it was 'never merely 
informative' (Atkinson, 1989: pp.1 00-1 01). According to a newspaper report, the Auditor-General agreed: 
'Auditor-General Brian Tyler investigated the [tax changes] campaign, and criticised it for not meeting 
standards of objectivity and balance. He questioned whether the amount of money spent on the campaign 
was justified, and said the tone, content and presentation was designed to enhance the Government rather 
than explain the tax changes' (Evening Post, 1989). 
33 National MP Simon Upton expressed his disapproval at the time: 'Perhaps the most disquieting 
development of recent years has been the increasing attempts of politicians to use the enormous resources 
of the state to publicise party-political programmes in the media .... At first it was just cabinet ministers 
appearing in advertisements for state-controlled products and glossy booklets produced by the Government 
Printer. Now it is the widespread use of public relations consultancies, press secretaries and other experts to 
co-ordinate the government's media relations and public image. All this has nothing to do with the proper 
business of government' (Upton 1987: p.11 0). 
34 Atkinson has reported that, 'According to figures supplied by the then Minister of Tourism and Publicity, 
the Hon. Jonathon Hunt, the New Zealand Government spent $30 million on public relations and advertising 
campaigns between late 1987 and July 1989' (Atkinson, 1989: p.1 01). After that, according to Harris, the 
Labour Government spent $66 million on advertising and PR in its second term (Harris, 1993d: p.14). 
35 McLoughlin reported in 1993 that 'National has been spending millions of dollars of taxpayers' money on 
television about neighbourhood police, skills training, the health reforms and other issues its opinion polling 
has shown swinging voters are worried about. The strategy has worked' (McLoughlin, 1993b: pAS). For 
example, the National Government spent nearly $2 million on advertising for a promotional campaign about 
ACC reform, and a further $2.87 million on a health reform campaign (Campbell, 1996c: p.7; Atkinson, 
1993c: p.93). 
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reforms campaign, '75% of respondents regarded the campaign as a "waste of 
taxpayers'" money, aimed at helping National win the election' (Harris, 1993d: 
p.14). Furthermore, not only did National renege on its pledge to set up an 
independent watchdog but the party also refused 'to answer parliamentary 
questions on government advertising and PR spending' (ibid). Adding to this 
propaganda output, the National Government also constructed a prime 
ministerial communications unit, which was otherwise known as 'the good-news 
machine'. Another trend is for the parties in government to hire public relations 
firms to handle publicity for the government. For example, in 1991 the National 
Government paid the PR firm Logos $384,000 to handle the pUblicity for the 
release of its annual budget (Johns, 1991). 
(4c) Government expenditure 
It is often accepted within politics that the governing parties are entitled to what 
has traditionally been known as the 'spoils of office'. In particular, they are able to 
provide public employment and business contracts to political supporters, 
including those who have contributed financial resources to the party. The fact 
that parties are in control of the levers of the state also means that they are 
sometimes able to transfer some resources from the state to themselves when in 
government. As Martin Linton has pointed out, 'While in theory the finances of 
the party and the government are kept in watertight compartments, in practice 
there are a number of grey areas where a governing party can transfer money 
from one pocket to another' (Linton, 1994: p.2). There have also been occasions 
when governing parties have been accused of using their privileged access to 
taxpayers' funds to grant public contracts to party donors. Bob Harvey has 
alleged that the National Party's advertising agency for the 1975 general election, 
Colenso, was rewarded with government accounts as a result of helping National 
win the election (Harvey, 1992a: p.106). A similar claim was made in the late 
1980s about the Labour Party in relation to its 1987 advertising agency, which 
was also Colenso. It was alleged that the agency had wiped the party's debts 
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from its 1987 election campaign in exchange for the awarding of lucrative 
government contracts for advertising campaigns.36 Likewise, in 1999 allegations 
were directed at the National Government, suggesting that the advertising 
agency Saatchi and Saatchi had offered to undertake the party's campaign at a 
greatly discounted rate if the government awarded Saatchi and Saatchi a 
particular contract. 37 
Many other allegations exist of parties using their position in government to 
return financial favours to party donors. For example, the Fourth Labour 
Government established the Union Incentives Scheme, through which over $1 
million was distributed to various unions.38 Again, in 2001 the Labour-Alliance 
government gave more than $700,000 to unions from the Employment Relations 
Education fund, which National MP Murray McCully claimed was a front for 
generous government donations to the union movement (NZPA, 2001a: p.2). 
Other favours can also be distributed. For example, Lipson contended that 'the 
sale of honours' was practised in New Zealand during the 1920s (Lipson, 1948: 
p.247). Again, in the 1980s and 1990s there appeared to be a correspondence 
between the awarding of honours and the donors to the party in government. 
36 The NZ Herald reported that 'The Prime Minister, Mr Geoffrey Palmer, last night confirmed that the Labour 
Party's national executive had discussed the awarding of Government contracts to its former advertising 
agency Colenso as a way of paying off the Labour Party's campaign debts' (NZ Herald, 30 April 1990). 
There is some uncertainty of the exact details of the trade-off, but 'the chief executive of Colenso confirmed 
that the party's campaign debt had been paid after it came to an arrangement with the agency over 
settlement. .... Mr MacDonnell acknowledged that Colenso did not receive the full $500,000 it was owed, but 
would not disclose what the final figure was that the Labour Party settled' (NZ Herald, 30 April 1990 - cited 
in Williamson, 1999). See also: Collins (1990: p.3), (Frontline, 1989). 
37 See: Bain (1999). One successful advertising contractor has confirmed that contracts have been 
negotiated on the basis of relationships between politicians and agencies. Grant Common of Network 
Communications was reported as saying that contracts are 'based on who you knew and on top-down 
political influences' (quoted in Harris, 1993d: p.14). Similarly, the NBR reported that advertising agencies 
that they spoke to admitted that despite preferring not to take on political campaigns, they 'took the accounts 
in the hope of reeling in the favours down the track' (Harris and Brettkelly, 1993: p.1993). 
38 It was revealed in Parliament that the Government gave 'grants to 24 unions totalling $1,087,005.45, 
mostly for computer equipment' (NZPA, 1990). 
Chapter Eight: State Resourcing of Parties 535 
Among those major donors on Fourth Labour Government's honours lists were 
Sir Ron Trotter, Sir Robert Jones, Sir Ron Brierley, and Sir Michael Fay. Some of 
the Labour Party's 1987 donors also did very well out of the Labour Party's 
subsequent $14 billion dollar privatisation programme. The series of sell-offs 
provided a further opportunity for Labour in government to provide payoffs or 
favours to businesses friendly to the party: 
Among those in the queue were many who had bank-rolled Labour's return to office. 
Some of them were already asserting their influence on the boards of SOEs even before 
the move to sell prime public assets. So who got what? Allan Hawkins for Equiticorp got 
New Zealand Steel, Sir Ron Trotter for Fletcher Challenge picked up the Rural Bank and 
Petrocorp, Sir Ron Brierley got 'our Airline' Air New Zealand and badly wanted the BNZ. 
The BNZ instead went to merchant-bankers Fay-Richwhite. And as consultants in the 
sales process, firms like Fay-Richwhite and Jardins - firms with ex-Treasury officials on 
their staff - earned millions of dollars from the public purse (Frontline, 29 April 1989). 
(4d) Government appointments 
It is apparent that, when in government, parties use the resources of the state to 
reward their party supporters - or disarm their enemies - through appointments 
to state positions and other similar forms of patronage. New Zealand has 
traditionally had a large number of advisory boards, state-owned enterprises and 
other government agencies (or 'quangos') to which political parties in government 
can appoint their supporters. In 1973 Keith Jackson counted 'some 2,400 
patronage appointments (other than civil servants) to be made by governments' 
(Jackson, 1973: p.193). Although the restructuring of the Fourth Labour 
Government in the 1980s reduced many of these positions, there are many 
examples of the Labour Party using its position in government during the 1980s 
to reward individuals who had been supportive of. its reforms (James, 1987a: 
p.33). Similarly, in government the National Party was able to stock the myriad 
state boards with its own party members. In the mid-1990s Winston Peters 
issued a list of 55 people he said had been appointed to various positions 
'primarily because they are, or have been, National Party leaders and activists' 
(quoted in Kilroy, 1996b: p.1). Peters suggested that in employing 'party hacks 
and political cronies' National was using state funds to payoff political debts 
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(ibid). Then in 2002 one newspaper counted 41 party supporters appointed to 59 
senior posts in Labour's 1999-2002 term (Colin Espiner, 2003b). Similarly, in 
2003 Colin Espiner 'counted 50 Labour supporters in 69 senior positions in the 
present term' (ibid). In his research at a similar time, ex-prime minister Geoffrey 
Palmer found that positions on quangos had grown to over 3000, with 900 
appointments being made each year to about 400 bodies (Colin Espiner, 2003a). 
According to Espiner, New Zealand governments continue to use patronage as a 
political resource, especially in giving party members appointments. However, 
one change is that the current Labour Party in government has appointed senior 
National Party members to senior positions. Examples include former National 
Party president Neville Young, former National Cabinet Minister Doug Graham, 
former National Prime Minister Jim Bolger, and former National electorate 
chairman Wira Gardiner (Colin Espiner, 2003b). Used in this way, political 
appointments are probably equally a political tool, as they are designed to disarm 
rather than empower the government's opponents.39 
Use of Parliamentary Resources in Election Campaigns 
The parties clearly have access to a whole host of state-funded parliamentary 
resources that they can employ throughout both the parliamentary cycle and their 
election campaigns. As Richard Prebble acknowledged in 1997, 'The whole 
system is designed by MPs to subsidise their campaigns' and make it difficult for 
outside parties to compete (quoted in NZPA, 1997a). He pointed out that during 
the 1996 campaign the incumbent National Government used state funded 
television advertising, but was also able to use' ministerial cars, rental cars, 
accommodation and daily allowances in campaigning. Prebble said, 'The 
National Party electoral officers alone cost $455,000 in salaries and about 
$390,000 in expenses. The true cost of National's campaign would be over $4 
39 For instance, appointing Jim Bolger to head Kiwi Bank would have made it harder for National to attack 
the initiative and also been embarrassing for the post-Bolger National Party leadership. 
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million' instead of the $1.4 million claimed by National to the Electoral 
Commission (ibid). It is also no coincidence that parliamentary budgets are more 
heavily used in the lead-up to election day.4o 
The professionals employed within the parties in Parliament - paid for by the 
state - are clearly working for the re-election of their various parties throughout 
the parliamentary cycle. This is most blatantly the case in the run up to election 
day, when according to Klinkum, the state pays for staff to travel to electorates 
for marginal seat support work, undertake polling work for the electorates, assist 
in drawing up party platforms, service joint parliamentary party/extra-
parliamentary party campaign committees and support candidates who are not 
MPs (Klinkum, 1998b: p.427). 
Other researchers have drawn similar conclusions. In their study of the 1996 
general election campaign, Cousins and McLeay found that incumbent MPs 
enjoy a sUbstantial campaigning advantage over their challengers due to these 
taxpayer-funded resources: 
Parliamentary incumbency clearly gave some candidates the advantage given that the 
Parliamentary Service Commission could provide the funds for material such as MPs' 
electorate newsletters, information on how to vote in the new electoral system and 
calendar cards .... There is no doubt whatsoever that sitting MPs left much higher paper 
trails than the other candidates (Cousins and McLeay, 1997: p.90). 
There is no doubt that effective campaigning in parliamentary elections can be 
expensive, especially for candidates challenging state-funded incumbents. As an 
illustration of this, National's 1999 Rimutaka candidate, Stuart Roddick, 
estimated that running for Parliament cost 'about $30,000 in lost income and 
other expenses' (Peters, 1999b: p.2). He pointed out that much of this amount is 
not incurred by incumbents, who have access to other public resources to 
expend on their re-election, such as a fully-paid salary while campaigning, as 
well as a campaign office and paid campaign workers in the form of an electorate 
40 See: Parliamentary Service (2002), and NZPA (2002m). 
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office and staff. Political parties with sitting MPs therefore have a huge 
advantage over parties that are trying to win seats or vying for the party vote. 
It is in by-elections, particularly, that parties use their parliamentary resources for 
campaigning. The Alliance's Matt McCarten, a veteran of a number of such 
campaigns, argued in 2003 that only parties with parliamentary resources could 
afford to compete effectively in by-elections. He speculated that renegade 
National MP Maurice Williamson could not afford a by-election, because 'All the 
parties will pay for it up to the maximum [allowable spending limit] ... and on top of 
I 
it is all the taxpayer-paid stuff; leaders will be in 'there, their staff will all be in 
there, media staff, a campaign manager, a canvassing person, an office person, 
a billboard captain' (quoted in Watkins, 2003c). 
As a result of the campaign resources originating in Parliament, there has 
undoubted been a shift towards the parliamentary wings running the election 
campaigns. Traditionally, in Labour and National, the extra-parliamentary head 
office of the party was the main driver of the campaigns. Even the minute detail 
of campaigns used to be planned by the head offices. For example, Bruce Brown 
commented on Labour's 1957 campaign that, 'In each case itineraries and 
travelling were arranged by head office, and accommodation, hall bookings and 
pUblicity by the local organisation. Head office also issued a series of speakers' 
notes' (Brown, March 1958: p.18). Likewise, 'Labour's national advertising, 
Press, screen and poster, and the preparation of policy pamphlets (as distinct 
from candidates' personal propaganda and the like) was the responsibility of 
head office' (ibid: p.19). Similarly, J E Colechin noted of the Social Credit 
campaign in the same election that 'Speakers at the League's election meetings 
were provided with two manuals issued by the Dominion headquarters' 
(Colechin, 1958: p.46). 
More recently this has changed, as parliamentarians have gradually sought a 
greater role in the campaign planning. For example, in 1984 the National Party 
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established for the first time a campaign committee, and this comprised only one 
representative from the party organisation - the party president Sue Wood. The 
other members were 'Jim McLay, Jim Bolger and one caucus representative' 
(Levy, 1985: p.6). Certainly by 1996 control over the National Party's campaign 
had shifted totally into the hands of the parliamentary leadership, with Roger 
Sowry nominally in charge. Jane Clifton commented that National's 'campaign 
talent was either anonymous or non-existent throughout the last election 
campaign, because, whatever any of those designated as campaign strategists 
decided should be done was overruled on the hoof by ... Yes, Jim Bolger, who 
said and did exactly what he felt like on the day, every day' (Clifton, 1999a: 
p.15).41 In 1987 Labour also moved the co-ordination of the campaign from their 
head office to Parliament, where Mike Moore took command. All of this contrasts 
strongly with the situation a quarter of a century earlier, when Bob Harvey's 
advertising agency worked for the extra-parliamentary Labour Party and was 
able to ignore the wishes of the leader, Norman Kirk. According to Harvey, Kirk 
'personally ordered us to withdraw the campaign, we told him to get stuffed. We 
treated him as the leader of a political party, while the client for the election was 
the Secretary, John Wybrow, and the caucus advertising committee' (Harvey, 
1992a: p.104). 
The parliamentary complex in Wellington is not only becoming the site for the 
quasi-headquarters of the New Zealand parties but also their media units, 
research units and so forth. This is a significant point because the research units 
and other electoral functions of the parties have historically been located in the 
extra-parliamentary premises and have been funded by the party organisation. 
Robinson, for example, gives details of the National Party headquarters' 
provision of campaign material to candidates in the 1957 election: 
41 In 1999 a small cabal continued to control Labour's campaign, with Mike Williams as the Campaign 
manager and Dunedin North MP Pete Hodgson masterminding the strategy (Anderson, 1999: p.29). Colin 
James reported, 'Labour's strategy was devised by leader Helen Clark, consulting a small group of trusted 
advisers, and a campaign committee directed day-to-day activities' (James, 2001 a: p.200). See also: Vowles 
(2000: p.153). 
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Speakers received considerable assistance from the National Party Research 
Department which during the year had sent out numerous reference notes to members 
and candidates on political issues. For example, some notes gave information on the 
costs of Labour and Social Credit proposals, and National Party policy regarding certain 
issues. While some candidates would be able to go ahead without the services of the 
Research Department, most find it of considerable value and a great saving of time in 
preparing campaign speeches. Many of the notes had been prepared for members for 
use in the Parliamentary session, but this did not impair their usefulness later as much of 
the work of the session was relevant to the campaign (Robinson, 1958: p.35). 
Political scientist Joe Atkinson has pointed out that by 1993 party presidents 
were also being excluded from involvement in the campaign: 
Even party presidents find themselves increasingly on the outer, or playing a separate 
game. That was Margaret Wilson's experience with the fourth Labour government, and it 
appears to be John Collinge's lot with the present National one. The trick for the party 
president is to keep control of the campaign purse, which may afford them some leverage 
for their own agenda. Otherwise they are liable to be powerless (Atkinson, 1993b: p.122). 
This point was illustrated again in the 1999 campaign when Labour Party 
president Bob Harvey publicly voiced discontent about the organisation of 
Labour's campaign, complaining that the extra-parliamentary party had become 
'simply an ATM machine' (quoted in the Dominion, 1999d: p.2). As in 1996, the 
1999 Labour Party campaign was co-ordinated from within leader Helen Clark's 
office. Also, during the modern election campaigns parliamentary staff are 
routinely on the strategy committees of parties as part of their parliamentary jobs. 
For example, the National Party's 2002 general election campaign committee 
included Tim Grafton (director of strategy), Tina Symmans (communications 
director), Sue Foley (press secretary to Bill English) - all of whom were paid by 
the state, and some of whom were not even party members.42 Likewise, the 
Green Party's 2002 campaign committee included their parliamentary media 
42 Sue Foley is not a National Party member - see Watkin (2002). Tim Grafton is a former journalist working 
as an adviser to the National Party leader. Similarly, although a central figure in Labour's election campaign, 
Mike Munro has no history of involvement in the Labour Party - see Clifton (1997e: p.29). 
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chief Allen Walley and parliamentary researcher Roland Sapsford (Guyon 
Espiner, 2002a: p.C2), once again, both paid for by the state.43 
The extra-parliamentary wings still sometimes play a considerable role in the 
campaign, but not the leading role that they once had. Some of them carry out 
many of the logistical operations of the campaign, but they do not have the actual 
control over decision-making that they once possessed. As in other countries, the 
head offices have become little more than 'campaign organisations' (Farrell, 
1994: p.224). 
Use of Parliamentary Resources for Organising the Party 
Not only are parliamentary resources used for electioneering purposes, but they 
are also used to help run the parties' extra-parliamentary organisations. In order 
to take advantage of the many lucrative forms of state resources available, the 
functions of the party organisation or their national offices are now increasingly 
carried out both in Parliament and MP electorate offices.44 As McLoughlin has 
pointed out, 'Cash-strapped parties like New Zealand First, the Alliance and 
Labour would probably collapse without the parliamentary lifeline to covert public 
funding of their party machines' (McLoughlin, 1997a: p.32). Moreover, it is also 
worth noting that in contrast to the traditional parties, the newer parties like New 
Zealand First, the Alliance and United Future barely even present the fagade of 
pretending to have a physical national office outside of Parliament's office 
43 Others on the committee were party leaders, Rod Donald and Jeanette Fitzsimons, party co-convenors, 
Dave Clendon and Margaret O'Brien, and party development co-ordinator Liz Thomas (Guyon Espiner, 
2002a: p.C2). In the campaign the chief press secretaries are in charge of reading the political pulse of the 
electorate. They are part of their parties' campaign teams and they communicate with their teams daily. 
According to Watkin, these two spin doctors playa central part in political strategy: 'Here and now, at the 
pinpoint of an election campaign, Foley and Munro are playing a pivotal and influential political role' (Watkin, 
2002). 
44 This is an international phenomenon - for example, according to Pierre et aI., 'In Denmark, the national 
party organisations moved part of their staff to the parliamentary secretariat when subsidies to parliamentary 
staff were introduced' (2000: p.?). 
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buildings.45 The parliamentary offices of the MPs have now even replaced their 
extra-parliamentary headquarters as the meeting places for many party 
organisation meetings and election strategising. For example, as Audrey Young 
noted, the 2002 National Party campaign strategy committee 'met weekly at 
Parliament until the election campaign' (Young, 2002c). Parliamentary rules allow 
party volunteers and officials to be given access to offices to carry out their 
activities assisting the parties. 
Part of the reason for the increasing dominance of the parliamentary offices over 
party head offices in campaign organisation is because the parliamentary 
leadership no longer desperately need the services of autonomous central and 
local party organisers. The essential functions in modern elections are provided 
by the media advisers, opinion polling experts, and advertising experts and 
general parliamentary staff employed out of state funding. In part, therefore, it is 
the evolution of modern communications that makes the old-style party 
headquarters somewhat redundant.46 Even overtly extra-parliamentary activities 
are largely organised by parliamentary staff. For example, parliamentary staff 
commonly organise, attend, and carry out duties at party conferences as part of 
their parliamentary job.47 
45 When asked if United had any sort of headquarters outside of Peter Dunne's parliamentary office, chief 
adviser Mark Stonyer, answered: 'no ... but one of our members has a sort of office-cum-garage in Auckland' 
(Stonyer, 18 May 1999). Similarly, the Alliance disestablished its national office in Auckland in 1997, then 
operated out of its parliamentary offices in Wellington and elector(:lte office in Auckland (O'Sullivan, 2001). 
Tracking down the New Zealand First office is difficult, and their website only has parliamentary contact 
information. The Act office is on the same premises as its Auckland electorate offices. The Green Party 
national office shares office space with an electorate office in Wellington. 
46 According to Pinto-Duschinsky, 'Now that television has come into almost every home, party leaders no 
longer need the services of local party organizers. The essential skills in modern elections are those of 
media advisers, opinion polling experts, and advertising men' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 27 Aug 1998). 
47 For examples of media reporting parliamentary staff organising or working at party conferences, see 
Watkins (2003b), 
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This trend to base party-political national office operations in parliamentary 
offices is a relatively new one that became established in the 1990s. In fact it was 
reported in 1989 that the establishment of the NewLabour Party was being 
carried out from within Jim Anderton's parliamentary offices: 
Ever since the New Labour Party sprang up, Jim Anderton's office and that of his 
secretary, Sally Mitchell, have been used as a de facto headquarters. As a result, the 
rooms have been turned into everything from a clearing house for donated cheques and 
loose dollar bills, to the party's public relations nerve centre (Dominion, 1989b). 
The Alliance's time in Parliament (1993-2002) presents an interesting case study 
in the use of state resources. Following the election of its 13 MPs in the general 
election of 1996, the party closed its Auckland-based head office. It subsequently 
set up the 'Electoral Liaison Unit' (ELU) within the Alliance's parliamentary 
offices, which was otherwise known as the 'head office' within the party.48 The 
Parliamentary Service funded the ELU and employed six staff (including the party 
president and the general secretary) who looked after party matters such as 
membership issues, correspondence, website management, party conference 
organisation and campaign strategy (O'Sullivan, 2001: p.2). The resources for 
the unit came largely from the Leaders' Funding obtained by the party. 
Connected to the ELU were 11 regional out-of-Parliament Alliance offices funded 
from Members' Support Funding (ibid). 
It is also common for parliamentary staff to look after the communications of their 
extra-parliamentary parties. Often email correspondence to the party is answered 
from Parliament, and party free-phone numbers are serviced from there too. The 
most recently publicised example was when Jim Anderton and his faction broke 
away from the Alliance to establish the Progressive Coalition Party, and used 
their parliamentary offices and resources as the base for establishing the party. 
In particular, one staff member, employed on the Alliance's parliamentary payroll 
without a job description, was answering calls to the 'Jim and Sandra hotline', 
which was taking donations for the breakaway MPs (Langdon, 2002a). At the 
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same time Anderton wrote to hundreds of people that his office had dealt with. In 
an obvious politicisation of a ministerial office, he used a database, compiled by 
his ministerial staff, of people who had written positively to him as deputy prime 
minister, inviting them to be involved in his new but unlaunched party (Milne, 
2002c). 
The Act party has also used staff to establish and maintain a sophisticated 
database, into which it feeds data it receives back from its extensive direct-mail 
campaigns (McLoughlin, 2003d). Act also constitutes an interesting case study in 
the use of state resources. As outlined elsewhere in this chapter, Act appears to 
be one of the most adept users of parliamentary resources for party-political 
purposes. Most famously, it had its electorate agents working in Parliament 
instead of in the electorate. The deeper significance of this scandal was that Act 
had been using taxpayer-funded resources for party-political purposes because it 
could not afford to fund these political functions itself. For although Act is typically 
thought of as being the most well-resourced party in New Zealand, as Chapter 
Seven has shown, it has been struggling to raise money since the tide went out 
on new right ideas. Consequently, the party organisation has been through a 
financial crisis, and in 1996 it had to slash its head office budget in half. Then in 
2001, the head office operations were again severely cut back, with four out of 
the five staff positions being axed. This was driven, no doubt, by the realisation 
that many of the political and organising functions of the head office could be 
shifted to the 20-odd taxpayer-funded staff in Parliament. The savings could then 
be used for Act's surprisingly large $1.7 million election campaign in 2002. 
The Parliamentary Services Commission Rules 
The criteria and parameters of how parliamentary resources can be used by the 
parties are made by the Parliamentary Services Commission (PSC), which is the 
cross-party parliamentary body that controls the Parliamentary Service and 
48 The author worked in the ELU during 2001. 
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Ministerial Services. It is therefore a case of the recipients of the resources 
devising the rules on how they themselves can use them, something which might 
usually be viewed as a conflict of interest. As MP Jim Anderton has pointed out 
to Parliament, 'It is not a good look for political parties to design schemes for 
party funding to get around the laws that they themselves are responsible for 
making' (quoted in Sunday Star-Times, 6 May 2001: p.A2). This 'poacher as 
gamekeeper' situation appears to have led to a lax and dubious regime where 
parties are easily able to convert the lucrative resources into political tools. A 
1999 review of the Parliamentary Service, however, suggested that every three 
years there should be an independent review of parliamentary resourcing. In the 
eyes of the General Manager of the Parliamentary Service, this proposal sought 
'to address this issue of this perception of parliamentarians making decisions in 
their own interests when they are the recipients of the result of their decision-
making' (O'Sullivan, 1 Jun 1999). The first such review took place in 2002 and its 
brief did not contain anything about addressing the PSC's conflict of interest. In 
fact, of the review panel's three participants, one was an ex-Labour MP and one 
was an ex-National MP. It is not surprising, therefore, that it recommended large 
increases in funding for the parties, and gave the clearance for a trial of bulk 
funding arrangements. 
The Parliamentary Service and Ministerial Services have a difficult role in 
administering the rules for what is effectively a covert system of state funding of 
parties and politicians. The two administrative bodies have little autonomy from 
the political parties as they are both controlled by the PSC. In 2003, the new 
General Manager of the Parliamentary Service, Joel George, 'said the rules were 
"pretty permissive" but they were set by MPs and it was up to MPs to change 
them' (Taylor, 2003d). This typifies the position of the administrators - they do 
not have the power to make or adjust the rules about the use of resources, but 
merely have to work with the rules made by the parties. In a sense their role is 
one of 'corruption management', in that they are expected to allow the parties 
who make the rules to misuse the funding for party-political purposes. 
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The rules developed by the PSC are supposed to distinguish between 
parliamentary business and party-political business - a distinction described by 
former Prime Minister and Attorney General Geoffrey Palmer as 'unreal' because 
'most of what goes on in Parliament is party political' (Palmer, 1992: p.139). 
Former Parliamentary Service General Manager John O'Sullivan has admitted 
that there are grey areas in the rules about the use of taxpayer resources, and 
that 'separating parliamentary business from party business was often difficult' 
(Laugesen, 1994c: p.1). In fact, it could be argued that not only are there grey 
areas, but that the whole parliamentary offices and resources are predominantly 
dedicated to party-political work rather than carrying out the neutral servicing of 
members of Parliament. Although the use of parliamentary resources for party-
political activity is officially prohibited, the PSC actually has a very narrow 
definition of what constitutes party activity. The rules simply say that resources 
cannot be used to solicit money, membership, or votes. This vague rule still 
allows a very wide use of the resources. 
The use of billboards by parties in 2003 illustrates that they can easily solicit 
votes simply by avoiding the use of the directive to 'vote' for the party. Instead, 
National's taxpayer-funded billboards featured the campaign slogan 'One 
standard of citizenship for all', and New Zealand First's billboards had a photo of 
Winston Peters, with three fingers raised and the slogan: 'Immigration's up, 
Treaty costs up, crime's up; had enough?' A spokesperson for the Parliamentary 
Service confirmed such billboards corresponded with the rules (McLoughlin, 
2003d). The PSC rules are designed to be vague enough to allow parties 'to 
promote a policy' which, strictly speaking, these billboards did. According to the 
parties, the resources can also be used for the 'testing of policies', and therefore 
National said its 2003 billboards were being used to 'to test one of National's key 
messages - one standard of citizenship for all' (NZPA, 20030). Commenting on 
it, Labour Party president Mike Williams said, that the parliamentary rules must 
be 'incredibly loose' (quoted in NZPA, ibid). Progressive Coalition leader Jim 
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Anderton was amazed at the new development: 'It looks remarkably like 
electioneering to me but as long as you don't ask for votes or ask for money, you 
can do it' (quoted in Milne, 2003b). Anderton added that his party would have to 
consider using parliamentary resources to purchase billboards too. 
In the same way, the narrow definition of party political activity also allows 
parliamentary leaflets to be sent out that heavily promote a party and allow the 
recruitment of members. They do this by asking voters to send back a 
parliamentary freepost reply if they want to know more about the party. Likewise, 
the rules allow newspaper advertisements to be purchased that appear little 
different to those purchased in election campaigns. For example, United Future's 
2003 full-page advertisements outlined reasons to support the party and ways to 
contact it, albeit without actually saying 'Vote United Future' or 'Join United 
Future'. Green Party co-leader Rod Donald was clearly of the view that although 
the ads did not breach the rules, they were 'party political propaganda being paid 
for by taxpayers' (quoted in McLoughlin, 2003e). Donald also said, 'Political 
parties are asking for trouble when they highlight the lack of rules in this way' 
(ibid). 
The rules about such expenditure state that the advertising must relate to 
parliamentary business and not promote the party. Certainly to the voters viewing 
these various forms of propaganda, the advertising would have the appearance 
of being paid for by the political parties rather than being state-funded material 
dealing with parliamentary business. The advertisements, leaflets and billboards 
are all heavily branded with the respective parties' colours and logos. In respect 
of this, the Parliamentary Service rules only say that where parliamentary-funded 
advertisements use party logos, they must also either include the MP's 
parliamentary contact details or display the Parliamentary Crest (Parliamentary 
Service, 2001: p.9). For instance, Act's website, Richard Prebble's Letter from 
Wellington email newsletter, and Act's campaign/electorate buses all incorporate 
the Parliamentary Crest because they have been funded by the Parliamentary 
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Service. The crest is supposed to be the same size as the party logo used and 
the logo 'should not be the dominant feature' (ibid: p.6). Generally, however, this 
rule appears to be disregarded or inadequately observed. 
The Parliamentary Service appears to take little interest in containing this trend. 
Furthermore, while the Parliamentary Service recognises that the party research 
units undertake party work, it is unconcerned about this use.49 It seems that the 
Parliamentary Service turns a blind eye to staff doing party work, partly because 
it realises they have little power to exert any control over the misuse. As Klinkum 
points out, the way that the rules have been set up, the Parliamentary Service 'is 
beholden upon the parties in Parliament to ensure that resources are used for 
the intended purposes' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.214). Now the rules appear to be 
becoming even more flexible. For example, since the late 1980s the research 
units have been given control of their own budgets, and this occurred, according 
to Klinkum, 'Partially in recognition of the fact that the General Manager was 
unable to exert any control and therefore unable to take responsibility for 
research unit spending' (ibid). 
In addition, despite the rules against operating electorate offices as party offices, 
the Parliamentary Service takes little interest in the rules being broken, yet the 
misuse is far from secret. It is common for party activity (including electioneering) 
to be carried out in conjunction with electorate offices. For example, during the 
2002 election, Progressive Coalition Party candidate (and Alliance parliamentary 
whip) Grant Gillon advertised in his electorate newsletter for volunteer help with 
his election campaign, saying, 'If you would like to help with the campaign please 
contact my Northcote electorate office' (Gillon, 2002). The Parliamentary Service 
also allows MPs to share their electorate offices with party organisations. In 
49 According to Klinkum, 'A former General Manager of the Parliamentary Service says that he recognised 
the units were acting in a wider political field than just the parliamentary context. The General Manager of 
the Parliamentary Service in the mid-1990s said the service was "not concerned" about what the units do' 
(Klinkum, 1998a: p.213). 
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some circumstances, MPs rent office space in buildings owned by the political 
parties or MPs themselves.5o The Parliamentary Service's main concern in this 
arrangement appears to be to get arms-length evaluation arrangements done to 
ensure that a fair market rent is charged (O'Sullivan, 1999). The MPs are also 
asked to make a clear physical demarcation between the various activities. MPs 
are not allowed to list the electorate offices as phone numbers for party-political 
contact, nonetheless this appears to occur.51 More commonly, in their 
propaganda, parties list the contact details of their parliamentary offices for 
interested voters. 
O'Sullivan denies that political parties use parliamentary resources in the 
electorates to organise their parties, saying that 'the current rules certainly make 
it quite clear that [the electorate offices] are not meant to be used as party 
organisation offices. Resources that are provided by the taxpayer are not 
intended to provide for party organisational issues' (ibid). He admits, again, that 
'grey areas' exist on this issue, but denies that parties contravene the narrow 
rules as to what is party-political work: 
There has always been an interface between the out-of-Parliament offices and the party 
organisation, because a Member of Parliament by definition is a member of the party .... 
Having said that it is a very grey line between, for instance, developing policy for a party 
and spilling over into purely party activities. It is quite clear that you can draw a line about 
what they are - that you can't use the resources for fundraising activities and you can't 
use them for electioneering on the basis of, say, 'Vote for me'. They also can't be used 
for actually running the party - that is to solicit members and all of that sort of process 
and things (ibid). 
50 For example, it is known that national office and electorate offices space is share'd by the Greens, 
Progressive Coalition Act, and formerly by the Alliance. Between 1997 and 2003 the Act party also rented a 
room in an apartment lived in by Richard Prebble. Christchurch National Party electorate staff work out of 
'National House', which is also the party's Canterbury-Westland headquarters (NZPA, 1999q). In 1990 
National MP Murray McCully admitted that 'the second-floor office space on Bute Rd, Browns Bay, was split 
into two separate tenancies. One side was for constituency work and was paid for by the taxpayer and the 
other side was for party work and was paid for by the National Party' (NZ Herald, 1990d). 
51 See Jensen (1999); Gillon (2002). 
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Even this very wide definition of parliamentary work - which only rules out a very 
limited amount of party activity - is transgressed by the parties. Yet the 
Parliamentary Service takes little interest in monitoring the situation. As 
O'Sullivan admitted in 2001, 'Under the present arrangements and levels of 
resourcing the Parliamentary Service has little opportunity of knowing, on a day 
to day basis, just what activities are undertaken within party leaders' offices and 
out-of-Parliament offices' (O'Sullivan 2001: p.7). Instead of a systematic 
monitoring regime to prevent the misuse of resources, the Parliamentary Service 
relies on only a few safeguards against misuse. First, all contracts of employment 
and job descriptions need to be approved by the Parliamentary Service. Second, 
all bills and expenditures that are charged to the budgets of the parties are 
processed by the Parliamentary Service and thus monitored (O'Sullivan, 1999). 
Third, the Parliamentary Service relies on the idea that 'there is quite a lot of 
scrutiny that is exercised between the parties as to what people are doing ... 
there is a bit of competition to ensure honest use' (ibid). This form of monitoring 
only works, however, to the extent that not all the parties are doing the same 
thing. If they were acting similarly, they would be less likely to act as watchdogs 
on each other. Fourth, the Parliamentary Service relies on the goodwill and 
honesty of the parties concerned. As O'Sullivan admits, 'The present system 
relies heavily on the Parliamentary parties voluntarily complying with the rules, 
i.e. on trust' (O'Sullivan, 2001: p.6). Such safeguards appear to be inadequate. 
Even the Auditor General criticised them in a report on MP allowances and 
reimbursement expenses (ibid). 
In a sense, it appears that the main issue that concerns bodies like the 
Parliamentary Service is parties' 'equity of access to resources; not whether or 
not resources [are] appropriately used by all parties' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.217). In 
the past, the Auditor General has taken a similar approach. A good example 
occurred when Social Credit MP Bruce Beetham asked the Auditor General to 
inquire into the possible misuse of taxpayer funds by Labour MPs who used 
travel privileges to canvass in the marginal seat of Hamilton and the Nelson by-
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election of 1969. According to Klinkum 'The Auditor General refused to do so on 
the basis that a special parliamentary committee set the rules and that providing 
no one side was doing things the other side was not able to do then there was 
not a problem' (Klinkum, 1998: p.217). Similarly, O'Sullivan was pragmatic about 
transgressions of the rules: 'you've got to bear in mind that at the end of the day 
politics and politicians are involved in political processes and political processes 
don't necessarily have tidy boundaries. There will always be some area of 
discretion about the margins that are going to be in judgement' (O'Sullivan, 
1999). This chapter shows, however, that the infringements are not only 
occurring at the 'margins' of parliamentary activity, but at its very centre. 
It is notable that a 2001 investigation by the Parliamentary Service into the 
Alliance's parliamentary offices found many inappropriate uses of parliamentary 
resources. However, this investigation only took place after the party started to 
split, and the party leader, who was defecting from the party, took the unusual 
step of complaining to the General Manager about the activities of his own staff. 
Even then, O'Sullivan took no action to investigate, instead choosing to give the 
staff a warning. It was only after the leader's dispute with staff became public that 
the Speaker of the House was forced to intervene and ask for an investigation 
into the use of resources. It is also notable that O'Sullivan's subsequent 
investigation was largely a whitewash that uncovered only a relatively small 
amount of the inappropriate use of resources. He failed to interview most of the 
staff involved and delivered a report obviously designed to produce little change 
in the status quo (O'Sullivan, 2001 }.52 Similarly, in 1996, when allegations arose 
that ex-National MP Graeme Lee was using his parliamentary office as the 
Christian Coalition election campaign headquarters, the Parliame'ntary Service 
chose not to carry out a thorough investigation, but only to question Lee about 
the situation (O'Sullivan, 1996b). 
52 The author was one of the staff investigated by the review, while working in the Alliance parliamentary 
offices, 
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The use of parliamentary resources for party activities is also perpetuated by the 
fact that National and Labour have ensured the Parliamentary Service and 
Ministerial Services are exempt from the Official Information Act. This means that 
information about the parties' use of state funds is generally not available to the 
public.53 Furthermore, 'no parliamentary body or external agency believes it 
necessary or appropriate to inquire into the way in which parties use their state 
resources' (Klinkum, 1998b: p.427). The public is therefore kept in the dark about 
the situation. 
Proposals for Bulk-Funding 
In recent years, the concept of bulk funding the parliamentary resources has 
become more popular with parties in Parliament because it gives the recipients 
greater ability to use the resources for party-political purposes. Some substantial 
steps have been taken in this direction since 1994, before which MPs were 
provided with a multitude of separate small funding pockets for their 
parliamentary and electorate office costs. This meant that MPs had individual 
budgets for their photocopying, printing, postage, and so forth. This system was 
abolished and, as shown in Part One, each party now receives one Party and 
Members' Support budget (made up of Leaders' Funding, Party Group Funding, 
and Members' Support Funding). These general areas of resources now provide 
for a range of needs without being specific as to how much a party should spend 
on any particular item. According to O'Sullivan, this arrangement means that the 
party leaders have much more autonomy in how they spend their state funding: 
So each party's leaders office can sit down and work out a budget and decide whether 
they are going to have people employed, whether they're going to engage people on 
53 According to Small, 'None of its meetings are open to the public, its agenda is not released and the 
Official Information Act (OIA) does not apply to it - and that is the way most MPs like it. Ironically, the only 
people with routine access to the darkest secrets about individual members - which insiders say is rare in 
any case - are representatives of rival parties. It is this "mutually assured destruction" that keeps much of 
what it does secret' (Small, 2001 a). Gathering material for this chapter has proved very difficult, as there are 
very few sources of information on the parliamentary resources. 
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contract, whether you're going to have two media people or one media people or no 
media people - whatever it might be. They've got all that flexibility and choice now. 
Similarly for a Member of Parliament in utilising their budget, they can make a decision as 
to whether they will have an out-of-Parliament office or not. Some people choose not to, 
and they can use their budget as they see fit - in terms of how much will go into their 
advertising for the services that they have available, how much might go into the mail-
outs to members or to their constituents or whatever it is (O'Sullivan, 1999). 
Even in terms of the employment of executive secretaries within Parliament, MPs 
now have the flexibility to trade these resources for ones that are deemed more 
useful. For example, in the 1990s National MPs Nick Smith and Christine 
Fletcher pooled their entitlement of two secretaries, and instead employed a joint 
secretary and a shared researcher (Klinkum, 1998a: p.344). Likewise, since 
2002, MPs in both United Future and New Zealand First have shared secretaries, 
allowing the operation of larger Leader's Offices and research units (James, 
2002k). 
Since 1996, the Act party has lobbied to extend the bulk-funding arrangements of 
MPs, most prominently by MP Rodney Hide incorporating proposals for bulk-
funding into his campaign against bureaucratic wastage in Parliament. According 
to Hide, the current funding arrangement for MPs is shambolic and fails to 
produce MP accountability. Hide has therefore advocated bulk-funding MPs and 
their parties for everything, giving them a budget of about $500,000 a year, and 
allowing the MP and party to spend it as they like. Such proposals have been 
enthusiastically endorsed by other parliamentarians and state agencies. At the 
time he was leader of the Alliance, Jim Anderton, for instance, backed Hide's call 
for bulk-funding, citing the need for the greater transparency inherent in the 
concept of bulk-funding (Smeele, 1997: p.6). The Treasury and the Parliamentary 
Service have also endorsed the concept and have worked on the development of 
the proposals. The two agencies jointly recommended in 1998 'that all amounts 
currently funded through Crown payment appropriations (with the exception of 
travel for former MPs) be bulk-funded to party groups' (the Parliamentary Service 
and the Treasury,: p.5). One of the bulk-funding options that the Parliamentary 
Service and the Treasury examined and put forward for consideration was a 
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'pure remuneration' model akin to the Hide proposal, where each MP would 
receive virtually all their resources and salary in one financial payment, and their 
own personal remuneration would be the amount of money remaining after their 
expenditure had been made: 
Under this approach, members would receive a single payment, possibly at the 
beginning of a Parliamentary term, out of which they would finance their activities, as 
they see fit. The Parliamentary Service would move to charging for all the services it 
provides, but members would be free to shop elsewhere (the Parliamentary Service 
and the Treasury, 1998). 
Since the Parliamentary Service and Treasury report, another review undertaken 
by ex-Labour MP Stan Rodger included a recommendation of an increased bulk-
funding component that parties should be able to opt-in for if they wished. Then 
in 2002, the first Triennial Review of the Parliamentary Appropriations 
recommended that 'parties and MPs should be given greater flexibility in how 
they spend the money they are given' (Milne, 2002g). 
All the moves in the direction of bulk-funding are essentially attempts to convert 
indirect state funding into direct state funding, albeit bringing in a new funding 
regime through the backdoor. Converting parliamentary resource allocations into 
cash resources that have few restrictions on their use would allow the recipients 
much greater freedom in how they utilise the resources. Inevitably, MPs would 
use such cash resources in an even more party-political way than they currently 
do. Furthermore, the parliamentary wings of the parties would be likely to 
centralise these resources even further - in Hide's scenario of each MP being 
allocated $500,000, it is hard to imagine that the party caucuses and leaders 
would allow individual MPs to control such resources. 
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Part Three: Implications and Problems of State Resourcing 
The state funding of political parties is often justified as a recognition of the vital 
role they play in the democratic process. It is said that it is only fair that the state 
offers some degree of support to parties for their part in providing democratic 
governance. Furthermore, it is argued that state funding of political parties is 
necessary to promote vigorous and strong political party organisations: 
If parties are to be able to present themselves to the electors, and if they are to be able 
to research into alternative policies, they require the finance to employ adequately-
sized staffs. The best way to ensure that parties have sufficient resources to carry out 
their democratic functions is to give them subsidies from the public purse. This 
argument comes typically (though not exclusively) from the political Left (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 10 Sep 1998).54 
In line with this, the Labour Party reported to the RCES that increased state 
funding would 'stimulate political education and research by allowing parties to 
channel more of their maintenance funds into this area' (Labour Party, 1986: 
p.51). Generally, it is argued that the costs of running a political party in a 
modern democracy are rapidly increasing, and without state subsidies the extra-
parliamentary organisations are not adequately able to perform non-election work 
such as policy development. Furthermore, it might be said that with such large 
resources being administrated by governments, state funding is necessary so 
that political parties are not vulnerable to corruption. Such arguments revolve 
around the supposed neutrality or independence that state funding is said to 
provide political parties. For example, the RCES argued that without such 
funding, political parties 
54 See also: Pierre et al. (2000: pAl. It should be pointed out that state funding is not simply supported by 
the parties of the left and opposed by the right. Internationally, it has often been the parties of the right that 
have encouraged state funding. For example, Margaret Thatcher was the first leader of a party to receive 
state aid in the UK (Linton, 1994: p.11). Likewise, according to Linton, 'the pressure for state funding in 
Germany did not come from the left or the centre of the political spectrum, but from the right', and the left-
wing SPD actually went to court to stop state funding (Linton, 1994: p.35) 
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may be forced to rely on institutional sources, such as corporations or trade unions, to 
fund their activities. We consider that would be detrimental to our democracy and might, 
in the long term, lead to corruption of our political process or at least to the suspicion of 
such corruption (RCES, 1986: pp.211-212). 
Likewise, the Labour Party has argued that 'Given the escalating costs of 
election campaigns state funding inhibits an excessive reliance on "special 
interests" and institutionalised sources of finance, be they unions or corporations. 
Such reliance may not be in harmony with the views of all party members and 
may generate policy compromises' (New Zealand Labour Party, 1986: p.51). 
More recently, Labour has suggested that scandals over donations to political 
parties have made state funding an 'urgent necessity' (Armstrong, 2000). 
Increased state funding, Labour says, would 'restore confidence in the political 
system and combat the suspicion that hidden influence is being exercised on the 
political process through substantial secret donations' (ibid). It seems likely, 
however, that the concerns over anonymous donations have had the opposite 
effect on public opinion, giving voters even greater reason to distrust parties and 
making them even less willing to see more public funding awarded to parties 
(Linton, 1994: p.100). Furthermore, the more significant party finance scandals 
have actually involved the use of state funds rather than donations, and these 
are likely to have reduced the public's tolerance of state funding. For example, in 
2001 the Alliance was scrutinised about the misuse of parliamentary resources. 
Then in 2003 the Act party's electoral offices and agents were investigated. 
Certainly there is little support for greater state funding of political parties. The 
most recent opinion poll undertaken on the topic - commissioned by the National 
Party in 1988 - showed that 81 percent of New Zealanders opposed state 
funding (Press, 13 Sep 1988). Fourteen years later, Tim Bale reported little 
change, writing, 'there is no popular support for state funding. Any attempt by 
Parliament's existing occupants to get together a cosy cartel to introduce it would 
be undemocratic. It would only confirm the unfortunate, and largely undeserved, 
reputation politicians have of being a self-serving elite' (Bale, 2002b). 
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Critics of state funding also point out that, wherever comprehensive state funding 
systems have been implemented, this has done nothing to solve the problems of 
political corruption: 'The massive corruption associated with political funding in 
Germany and in Italy has occurred in countries where parties have received 
lavish state aid' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 10 Sep 1998}.55 In fact, state funding can 
lead to a completely new type of financial corruption. As discussed later in this 
chapter, under state funding, a cartel-like arrangement is created in Parliament, 
with political parties becoming addicted to public subsidy and therefore 
constantly attempting to increase the dosage.56 
Affect on Linkages with Civil Society 
Much of the debate about state funding rests on the question of what model of 
party-society-state relations is desirable. The place and role of political parties 
has traditionally been conceptualised as that of forming an 'institutional link 
between the various groups and interests of the wider plural society and the 
institutions of government' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.233). Much like organised interest 
groups, parties were seen as being firmly rooted in civil society, but reaching up 
to represent those interests at the level of the state. This and other chapters in 
this thesis have tried to show that this has changed, and that this linkage is now 
weak. Undoubtedly, state funding reduces the political parties' organic 
attachment to society. In particular, the state's role in being the patron of the 
parties has an impact on their leaderships' orientation towards rank-and-file 
55 Bale has also said, 'state financing doesn't put paid to corruption because parties always want more. Two 
of Europe's best publicly-funded systems, France and Germany, have been plagued by party financing 
scandals for years. For all the banner headlines, Britain's largely privately funded system is seen as very 
much cleaner' (Bale, 2002b). 
56 Parties in Parliament are also likely to use state-funding arrangements to restrict the benefits to 
themselves alone, in an attempt to inhibit the entrance of competitors into the market. As Pinto-Duschinsky 
has argued, 'legislators will have an incentive to make financial arrangements that benefit sitting members of 
Parliament themselves and which place challengers in their seats at a disadvantage' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 10 
Sep 1998). 
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membership. This is something that the Alliance's Matt McCarten has also 
discovered: 
There's been a professionalisation of political leadership, backed up by state funding and 
resources for MPs which has distanced politicians from party rank and file .... In the old 
days you didn't have big salaries and you had to rely on party volunteers more. Now 
politicians are no longer so reliant on the grassroots, they go direct to the media to put 
their message out (quoted in Laugesen, 1999f: p.A3). 
The RCES also made this argument about the discouragement of membership 
recruitment: 
We share the fears that have been expressed that an unnecessary increase in State 
assistance would reduce parties' need to rely on their ordinary members for financial 
support and voluntary work. This could, we consider, lead to a lessened commitment to 
recruitment of, and responsiveness to, those members (RCES, 1986: p.211). 
The RCES clearly saw a positive linkage resulting from high party membership 
and the financial reliance on members: 
For the most part, our parties have met their financial needs from small donations from 
their members and supporters. By concentrating on the establishment and CUltivation of 
large membership bases, the parties have avoided relying on substantial contributions 
from either the State or a limited number of large institutions or corporations. This has 
had beneficial effects, both in terms of high political participation by ordinary New 
Zealanders and in terms of the responsiveness and representativeness of the parties 
themselves (RCES, 1986: pp.216-217). 
While the decline in membership has an array of causes, Chapter Six has shown 
that the flourishing of alternative source of resources for the parties greatly 
reduces the incentives for retaining a large party membership that brings in 
membership fees, other financial contributions and voluntary labour. Thus, 
according to Pierre et aI., 'there will be less interest in catering for the interests 
and opinions of the rank-and-file in the intra-party decision-making process' 
(Pierre et aI., 2000: p.3). Furthermore, the reliance on the state increases the 
autonomy of the leadership and reduces the power of the 'membership strike' or 
departure: 
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For the individual member, involvement becomes less interesting because members no 
longer control a critical resource in their exchange with the party leadership; as 
Hirschman put it, 'exit' are reduced. Public subsidies therefore contribute to the alienation 
and indifference of the rank-and-file membership and increase the centralisation of the 
party organisation (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.3). 
The independence from civil society that state funding affords political parties, 
also has a tendency to moderate their politics. As Simon Lemieux suggests in 
Britain, state funding enhances 'the independence of parties by freeing them to a 
large extent from the ties of their present backers .... It might also lessen the 
polarisation between parties, where Labour are still (rightly or wrongly) seen as 
the party of the 'workers', and the Conservatives as the party of capitalism' 
(Lemieux, 1995). This increasing independence (or weakening linkage) also 
means that some of the classic functions of parties, 'such as the articulation of 
interests and the aggregation of demands, and perhaps also the formulation of 
public policy' are becoming undermined (Mair, 1997: p.153).57 
The 'level-playing field' analogy is also frequently used to explain the necessity of 
state funding, suggesting that political parties should have access to similar 
levels of resources in which to compete with each other. Proponents of state 
funding have argued that the allocation of public funds to parties and candidates 
is necessary to assure this equality. Implicit in this assumption is the idea that the 
distribution of private financing is unfair and undemocratic, leading to some 
sections of society having greater political influence.58 Yet while much has been 
written about the negative political implications of resources derived from civil 
society, little has been said about the implications of resources emanating from 
the public sector. It might be asked whether money from government is really so 
different to money from private sources. Arguably, such funding is no more 
neutral, just because it derives from state sources. In fact, the influence of state 
57 According to John Henderson and Paul Bellamy, 'A greater level of public funding of political parties would 
lessen their dependence on - and hence the possibility of undue influence of - special interest groups. However, 
such a reform runs the risk of further divorcing parties from the public' (Henderson and Bellamy, 2002: p.91). 
58 The Treasury, in contrast, has argued that it is not necessarily unfair or undesirable if "on their own merits" 
some political parties attracted more money than others' (quoted in Atkinson, Dec 1989: p.98). 
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funding is substantial, affecting 'the party system, the internal life of parties, the 
electorate's view of parties, and the saliency of parties vis-a.-vis other political 
actors' (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.13). Conversely, there is something to be said for 
the benefits of the private funding of political parties. For instance, it can be 
argued that it is actually very healthy for parties to be dependent for their 
existence on their ability to attract resources (of both a capital and labour variety) 
from their supporters. For this reason, the National Party has traditionally 
opposed the concept of state funding. As former party president George 
Chapman's told the RCES: 
Soliciting funds from the public may be tedious and time-consuming for the political 
parties but it has the beneficial effect of forcing the parties to expand their membership 
base and listen to the people. Contact between the branch committee member and the 
potential party member is a vital link in a Earticipatory democracy. State funding can 
only weaken it (Chapman, 1986: pp.27-28). 9 
It can be argued, therefore, that private funding of political parties is not 
necessarily undesirable. Instead of replacing the contributions of large 
corporations and labour unions, state funding possibly only supplants the 
contributions of individuals, which should in fact be encouraged as a form of 
political participation (Alexander, 1989b: p.16). Furthermore, there are good 
reasons for political parties to be reliant on even institutional sources such as 
corporations or trade unions, to fund their activities. These sources of support 
and political pressure provide an ideological anchor. As argued in Chapter Five, 
becoming free from such organisational ties encourages ideological 
convergence, as parties no longer need to represent distinct social 
constituencies (and thus Labour is less the party of working people and National 
is no longer simply the party of business). Instead, parties, become more 
independent from social groups, tending to be the vehicles of office-seeking 
politicians and prone to political convergence. As Patrick Seyd has pointed out, 
59 Likewise, Act MP Rodney Hide has argued, 'The good thing about the private funding of political parties is 
that it forces MPs to get out and talk to people and to get an active membership' (Hide, 6 Nov 1998: p.24). 
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the effect of state funding is to weaken a linkage that helps structure and 
organise the party system: 
It is attempting to tamper with existing conflicts and party alignments. For example, 
company and trade-union support of parties reflects one division of interest in society ... 
[and] to argue that 'State funding of political parties could remove the insidious 
connection between politics and vested interests' ... is to fail to recognise that politics is 
about interests and linkages (Seyd, 1998a: p.204). 
Any fundamental changes in party resources, such as increased state funding of 
parties, undoubtedly cause other changes to political competition. In particular, 
this intervention of the state interferes with the 'market function' of the party 
system. Hence, although state funding might 'solve' the financial problems that 
political parties are having in raising funds from civil society, it also masks the 
reasons why the New Zealand public no longer voluntarily give financial support 
to the parties and thereby allows the parties to avoid the deeper problems that 
afflict them. This is a point acknowledged by the RCES: 
if parties no longer have a need to solicit funds from the public, the overall political 
process may stagnate and the natural growth and decline of political parties may be 
inhibited. Political parties are voluntary organisations and the extent to which a party 
can attract financial support is, at least in part, a reflection of that party's appeal to the 
electorate (RCES, 1986: p.211). . 
For this reason, George Chapman has argued that 'a party's popular and 
membership support must reflect in financial support, otherwise its existence is 
no longer justified' (Chapman, 1986: p.16). The Treasury, too, has voiced its 
opposition to proposals to introduce direct state funding to political parties, 
preferring a laissez faire situation because 'the financial state of a party' is 'a 
reflection of its popularity with the electorate' (NZPA, 1989a). By providing 
funding, the state is attempting to rescue New Zealand's political parties from 
poverty when, in a sense, the financial problems of New Zealand parties are 
merely a symptom of their more serious credibility problems. 
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Cartelisation 
State resourcing changes much about the nature of the party system because of 
the tendency for parties to become reliant on this stream of funding and band 
together to ensure its generous supply. Richard Katz and Peter Mair have argued 
that, as a result, a new type of party, the 'cartel party', has been emerging. The 
cartel party can be viewed as a further stage in the evolution of the electoral-
professional party, and its central element is its reliance on the growth of state 
funding. Katz and Mair use the term 'cartel' because the arrangement that brings 
about this funding 'depends on collusion and cooperation between ostensible 
competitors, and on agreements which, of necessity, require the consent and 
cooperation of all, or almost all, relevant participants' (Katz and Mair, 1997: 
pp.1 07-108). It is alleged that nearly all political parties benefit from the resource-
relationship with the state and are therefore all are reluctant to oppose it and 
instead generally encourage its extension. It is in this sense that the parties 
operate like a cartel. 
The cartel is also characterised by the interpenetration of party and state. By 
being part of the legislature, parties actually occupy part of the state and have 
some control over the distribution of resources. As elsewhere, in New Zealand 
the parties have largely designed the generous provision of state funding 
themselves. It is here that it needs to be pointed out that the state is not simply 
some autonomous and exogenous factor influencing party life, but is instead 
controlled by the very political parties that it financially supports. Therefore, 
according to Mair, 'it is perhaps more useful to think of it being the parties which 
are helping themselves, in that, in working to ensure their own survival, they are 
regulating themselves, paying themselves, and offering resources to themselves, 
albeit in the name of the state' (Mair, 1997: pp.143-144). 
As an example of parties becoming reliant on state funding and then being 
reluctant to oppose it, it is interesting that the Act party has previously been 
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critical of state funding, but is now one of the most adept users of it. Following 
the 1996 general election, Act leader Richard Prebble criticised the use of 
taxpayer funds by political parties for their election campaigns, saying 'that other 
political parties used the taxpayer to finance their election campaigns, while Act 
relied solely on supporters' donations' (NZPA, 1997). Prebble also claimed, 'Only 
Act campaigned in the old-fashioned way, relying on donations from its 14,000 
supporters' (quoted in NZPA, ibid). He criticised the funding system as being one 
designed to keep new parties from being elected. However, it was not long 
before Act had clearly become part of the cartel, and in the 1999 and 2002 
general election campaigns it also used parliamentary resources such as rental 
cars, accommodation and daily allowances. The way that the party used its state-
funded electoral offices and agents also suggested a sophisticated manipulation 
of resources for political ends. There are other examples of MPs and parties 
complaining about the unfairness of the system until they received their own 
share of the resources. For example, although the Social Credit party's Bruce 
Beetham complained about the misuse of taxpayer funds in 1969, then 
expressed his 'horror at the "scandalous" misuse of public funds by research 
units preparing for general elections in 1975', in the end, according to Klinkum, 
Social Credit actually soon did the same, becoming a large user of the public 
resources (Klinkum, 1998a: p.193}.60 
State funding has an important effect on the nature of political competition, 
especially in terms of consolidating the existing party system and artificially 
inhibiting change. Pierre et al. have commented on the way in which subsidies 
protect established parties from the competition of new parties: 
Since the parties in government and parliament design subsidies themselves, the subsidy 
system is likely to be structured in ways which favour the established parties. This, in 
60 Similarly, when New Zealand First was formed in 1993 it did not qualify for state-funded broadcast 
advertising but said it was opposed to the funding and would not have accepted it anyhow (Goulter, 1993: 
p.2; Shearer and Shearer, 1994: p.29). Now that the party also receives such funding, this criticism has 
disappeared. 
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turn, interferes with the 'Darwinistic' life-cycle process of party formation, maturity and 
decline; public subsidies are said to be a life-support system for ageing parties which 
obstruct the natural, organic development of the party system. Subsidies, in this view, 
sustain the status quo ante in the party system by strengthening the competitive 
advantage of the established parties vis-a.-vis new actual or potential party formations 
(Pierre et aI., 2000: p.3). 
Certainly in New Zealand, the overall effect of the system of state funding has 
been to consolidate the present players in the party system and prevent the entry 
of new competitors. Much like the state's ban on television advertising by parties, 
and the Electoral Commission's uneven allocation of state funding for election 
broadcasting,61 the provisions of generous parliamentary funding operates as an 
impediment to the competitiveness of new parties in New Zealand politics. It is 
significant that the only new political party to be elected to Parliament since the 
introduction of MMP is the Act party, which was bankrolled by millions of dollars 
of private wealth. No other new party not already represented in Parliament has 
been able to compete with the millions of dollars of state-funded resources that 
the other parties have at their disposal. The other new parties - the Green Party, 
United Future and the Progressive Coalition Party - have all been launched by 
MPs already in Parliament. 
The most blatant examples of the main parties colluding to protect their state-
funded advantage relate to the provision of election advertising money, which 
has always involved a questionable relationship between the two main political 
parties and the state. This relationship was made more overt when in October 
1995 the Labour and National parties legislated to add one Government and one 
Opposition representative to the Electoral Commission whenever it allocated 
election-broadcasting money.62 While the propC?sal was pushed through by 
61 See Chapter Nine. 
62 It is not just National and Labour which have sought to restrict state funding. In 1996, when there were 
four elected parties in Parliament, New Zealand First and the Alliance argued that all other parties should be 
excluded from Electoral Commission election funding (Edwards, 1996b). 
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Labour and National, it was opposed by most of the smaller parties as well as the 
Electoral Commission (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: pp.292-293).63 
Similarly, allegations have been made by the Act party that the actual legislation 
governing the allocation of election broadcasting funds has been constructed by 
National and Labour to benefit the established parties and restrict the entry of 
new parties into Parliament. According to Act, the uneven distribution of such 
funds is inconsistent with the Electoral Act, because the legislation contains 'a 
number of measures which make it clear that all candidates and parties are to be 
treated equally. The size of deposits and limits on campaign expenditure are 
identical for all parties and candidates. All rules are the same for all parties and 
candidates' (Tate, 1999: pp.1-2). The party has therefore argued that 'The 
democratic principle on which allocations should be based therefore is that all 
registered political parties conducting a nationwide campaign should receive the 
same amount of time and money. It is grossly undemocratic and unfair that some 
parties should receive more time and money from the taxpayer than other 
parties' (ibid). This complaint is consistent with the theory of Katz and Mair, who 
have argued that established major parties can use their control over resources 
not only to sustain themselves but also to hinder the rise of new parties. In 
countries like New Zealand, the effect of state funding has been to reinforce the 
existing arrangements in the party system. Because the division of resources is 
determined by parliamentary strength, the system acts to perpetuate the status 
quo and make it more difficult for outside parties to enter, or small parties to 
grow. 
63 The way that parliamentary funding has been configured, it has often disadvantaged even the smaller 
parliamentary. For instance, although the National and Labour parties were not financially penalised in terms 
of their parliamentary funding when various MPs left those parties in the mid-1990s to start and join other 
political parties like New Zealand First, United, and the Right-of-Centre Party, when it came to Alamein Kopu 
leaving the Alliance Party in 1997, that party's funding declined 'by NZ$47,OOO in the first year and 
NZ$77,OOO in the second and third years as the total number of remaining Members fell to twelve and 
therefore below the "medium level" for state support' (Klinkum, 1998b: pA70). This decision made it appear 
that there was one rule for the major parties and another for the minor parties. 
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Klinkum also explains the lack of public debate about the use of parliamentary 
resources by reference to the cartel-like arrangements. Although one of the 
reasons for this lack of debate is simply that the parties each keep quiet about 
their own resources, another reason there has been so little discussion is that all 
parties benefit from the existing arrangements. This means there is no political 
capital to be gained from exposing the whole system of funding (Klinkum, 1998b: 
p.428). The covert nature of the funding arrangements can only add to 
suspicions about the nature of the relationship between the state and political 
parties. It seems to be a telling sign of a cartel-like situation that so few controls 
over the utilisation of parliamentary resources exist at a time when government 
insists upon greater transparency from other state agencies. The reason that 
state assistance for party-political activities tends to be covert rather than overt is 
explainable, according to Palmer, by the simple fact that the subsidies are 
unpopular with the public (Palmer, 1992: p.138). 
Creating Virtual Government Departments 
Katz and Mair believe that the cartel behaviour fosters the development of a 
'political class' in party politics. In their view, politicians are increasingly a self-
referential group of career professionals who develop an independent 
understanding of goals and objectives: 
Finally, with the emergence of the cartel party, comes a period in which the goals of 
politics, at least for now, become more self-referential, with politics becoming a 
profession in itself: a skilled profession, to be sure, and one in which the limited inter-
party competition which does ensue takes place on the basis of competing claims to 
efficient and effective management (Katz and Mair, 1997: pp.111-112). 
Consequently, the leaders become divorced from party principles and their 
members, activists, and even their own voters - continuing the process Robert 
Michels described as early as 1911. A good example of this shift is a statement 
by Act MP Rodney Hide: 'We bump into our opposition parties in the airport all 
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the time and you end up actually chatting away. There's a sort of public thing of 
being against each other politically and all the rest of it, but there's also a 
camaraderie in the sense that you're in the same business' (quoted in Evans, 
1995: p.18). Simon Carr of Act paints a similar picture: 
It is a secret society, joined by covert bonds and awful oaths of loyalty (if not to each 
other). However much they attack their opponents, however different their world view 
is, however ferociously they represent their constituents' interests - they have more in 
common with each other than they have with us. That's worth unpacking: Jim Anderton 
has more in common with [Winston] Peters than he does with the homeless, the 
downtrodden, the huddled masses of Sydenham (Carr, 1997: p.37). 
It is a common source of resources and the disconnection with society that 
allows this 'political class' to develop. By receiving the state's subsidies, the 
parties are partially co-opted into the state, blurring the line between political 
parties as voluntary, representative structures and the state. This provision of 
funds therefore raises questions about the desirability of the closer relationship 
between the state and political parties. Not only does this relationship decrease 
the participatory character of political parties, disrupting the whole notion of 
political parties as the representative organisations of civil society, it also erodes 
the barrier between the parties and state. Hence, while state funding might 
provide the New Zealand political parties with increased independence from their 
more traditional ties in civil society, they conversely become more like state-
funded bureaucracies or 'virtual government departments' .64 As the Economist 
has argued, 'the greater the taxpayer subsidy, the greater the risk that parties will 
64 According to Hague et aI., state funding means that 'major parties are tending to converge into a single 
system of rule: the "party state'" (Hague et aI., 1998: p.137). In some Western European countries the 
relationship between party and state has reached the point where commentators even refer to the 'party-
state'. This is where parties are so dependent upon state subsidisation (along with regulation) that they are 
less like independent organisations and more like agencies or departments of the state. For instance, when 
the German Constitutional Court investigated the constitutional validity of state grants for political parties in 
1966, they reported that 'there was a danger that the parties represented in parliament were devising a 
system to favour themselves and making themselves "part of the organised structure of the state" , (Linton, 
1994: pp.38-39). 
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become institutions of the state rather than voluntary associations of their 
members' (Economist, 1999c: p.47). 
Parties are an essential part of civil society. Thus, there is a good argument to be 
made that the state should be kept at a distance otherwise it may come to regard 
political parties as 'public utilities' (Seyd, 1998a: p.204). As Bale has argued, 
'The whole point about parties is that they stay rooted in civil society so that the 
various competing interests of that society never capture, nor are captured by, 
the state' (Bale, 2002b). The danger is that the growing dependence on state 
funds can lead politicians to become less interested in advancing political 
objectives than in managing the state for their own good (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.2). 
Political life then becomes dominated by the state and is taken away from the 
citizenry, and left only for a political class to participate in.65 This situation leads 
to a convergence of the state and the major parties into a 'party state' system of 
rule.66 The existence of this political class operating in a 'party state' is likely to 
further increase the public's dissatisfaction with parties and politics. 
In New Zealand, the party-state relationship is a very advanced one, with political 
parties no longer playing such a central part in policy creation. It could be argued 
that instead of 'coming from' and 'belonging to' civil society, New Zealand's 
parties now seek to implement the state's policies and playa role of legitim ising 
65 One commentator in the UK has argued that, the introduction of comprehensive state funding would finally 
turn political parties into bland state bureaucracies: 'This would finally seal the fate of democratic politics in 
the UK Parliament. The parties already act more as a bureaucratic state department than independent 
political movements. Put them on the government payroll, and tQe deadening process will be complete' 
(Hume, 2001). Arnauld Miguet, commenting on the French case, argues: 'what becomes apparent and is 
most striking in the French legislation is that since the prohibition of corporate funding, political parties are 
largely dependent on the state which dominates public life. Political life has been nationalised and there is 
even more centralisation at the level of the parties' (Miguet, 1999: p.65). 
66 Interestingly, the current New Zealand prime minister has previously criticised the overly liberal use of 
state-paid advertising by parties in government to promote their reforms, negatively alluding to a 'seamless 
web between party and government' in which voters pay to have policies sold to themselves (Harris, 1993d: 
p.14). 
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them to the public. Rather than being rooted in civil society, the parties - or at 
least the parties' MPs - are in effect a collection of state-subsidised members of 
the political class. They make use of the old fragmenting vehicles that are 
political parties to connect with wider society. Especially since the mid-1980s 
much of the most important legislation has originated from within government 
departments. According to James, political parties are no longer the creators of 
policy, but often merely the implementers of the state's ideas: 
It is true that parties have seen themselves, at least in some sense, as vehicles for policy 
development.. .. In this convenient world, parties thought up policies and public servants 
implemented them. Actually, public servants, at least in the past 30 years, have done 
most of the thinking up of policy or channelling of it from some other external generator 
and the parties' role has been principally as a correction mechanism (quoted in James, 
1998: p.181).67 
According to political scientist Shaun Goldfinch, it is not 'unusual for public 
servants, including Treasury officials, to wield immense influence in policy 
formation, even, in some cases, to a greater extent than their political masters' 
(Goldfinch, 2000: p.200). Increasingly, the role of developing policy for the parties 
is also carried out by the state-funded parliamentary staff, and in particular by 
press secretaries. These recently politicised positions were previously staffed by 
Internal Affairs career press secretaries who were expected to be neutral and 
work for a number of different regimes, implementing whatever their employers 
wanted. 58 According to Ian Templeton this has since changed: 
Then they were seen as the link men between the departments and the ministers, 
whereas now the ministers' offices in the Beehive are more engines of policy, and in 
some cases what ministers need now are policy analysts rather than staff who know the 
minutiae of how departments work (quoted in Kilroy, 1998: p.13). 
67 Furthermore, political parties no longer initiate policy 'except where there has been some strong feeling 
(employment equity is an example) or a minister with an intellect of his/her own and organising skill (Simon 
Upton's health and science reforms)' (James, 1998a: p.181). There are many examples of important policy 
originating from within the state bureaucracy, for example, 'Treasury Secretary Bernie Galvin boasted of the 
influence his department wielded over the Minister of Finance: "His initial thinking was not in favour of the 
Goods and Services Tax. Treasury convinced him of that" , (Sheppard, 1999: p.14). 
68 See: Kilroy (1998: p.13). 
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Templeton has elaborated on the changing division of labour within ministerial 
offices, saying, 'Ministers used to do the political work themselves and the 
secretaries did the secretarial work, but now (ministers) are pushing out press 
statements, going on radio and television and they need people around them 
who are alert to the possibilities' (quoted in Kilroy, ibid). Party-political 'state 
servants', like Labour's Heather Simpson, now dominate that party's policy. After 
becoming director of Labour's research unit, Simpson became heavily involved in 
policy development, and according to another research unit director, her 'stamp 
can be seen on every page of Labour's pre-election policy announcements and 
its election literature' (quoted in Klinkum, 1998a: p.176). Simpson epitomises the 
concentration of power in a backroom party professional: paid for by the state, 
answerable only to the parliamentary leader, but hugely influential on policy 
development and hence party direction. Klinkum has written about many such 
situations where parliamentary staff (particularly in the research units) have 
essentially designed party policy. For example, 'While Ann Hercus, a Labour MP, 
was responsible for Social Welfare policy prior to 1984 the relevant researcher 
wrote most of the policy because the Member was so busy' (ibid: pp.178-179).69 
The Influence on Internal Party Configurations 
Through providing funding to the parties the state has a significant influence on 
the internal configurations of political parties. An illustration of how the state can 
deliberately use its subsidies to influence the internal affairs of the parties is seen 
in the conditions that are sometimes put on the funding. For example in Finland, 
'the parties must transfer some of their subsidy to women's organisations and to 
lower levels of the party organisation. Since 1990, part of the Finnish party 
subsidy is also earmarked for international activities' (Pierre et aI., 2000: p.9). 
69 Often these researchers have a strong ideological influence: 'One commentator has observed of a 
politician such as Ruth Richardson, a National MP, that while she was predisposed toward a particular 
ideological economic viewpoint, she was an "economic empty vessel'" leaving her staff to have a strong 
influence on her and hence on her party's direction (Klinkum, 1998a: p.179). 
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Likewise, in Holland, 'party support is specifically targeted at research activities 
(since 1971) and education (since 1975)' (ibid).70 Similarly, in New Zealand, the 
direct state funding for the election campaign has to be spent on broadcasting, 
strongly shaping the way that parties design their campaigns. It is, however, the 
indirect funding through Parliament that is more influential on the parties. Seyd 
has argued, for instance, that whenever state funding is introduced it has a 
significant impact upon existing power structures, and that normally it is the 
power of the parliamentary leadership that is strengthened: 
To whom would the state allocate money - the leader, the parliamentary party, the 
extra-parliamentary party, constituency parties, or candidate? The power of whosoever 
receives the money would be enhanced by such money. Party leaders are unlikely to 
reduce their powers by allowing grassroot activists to receive funds directly (Seyd, 
1998a: pp.203-204). 
Related to this, one of the major implications of the fact that in New Zealand the 
state resources are provided indirectly is that the parliamentary wings of the 
parties control such resources. This, in turn, reinforces their strong control over 
their parties. The extra-parliamentary wings of the Labour and National parties 
(which have traditionally controlled the resources) therefore have their 
independence and relevance reduced. It might be argued that at least with the 
direct state funding of political parties the money often goes to the extra-
parliamentary wing and therefore acts to counter the increasing dominance of the 
parliamentary leadership of the parties?1 
Even within the New Zealand parliamentary wings, the configurations of the 
funding empowers the party leaders over their MPs. This is because the 
70 Similarly, in Ireland, 'the funding for political parties must be spent on general administration of the party; 
research, education and training; policy formulation, and; co-ordinating branch and party members' activity' 
(MMP Review Committee, 2001: p.89). 
71 In 1999 the General Secretary of the Labour Party, Rob Allen, commentated, 'there is certainly a tension 
over the resourcing of the parliamentary end ... as there are significant resources in the parliamentary party 
provided by the state and very little provided by the state to the party organisations themselves' (Allen, 
1999). 
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Parliamentary Service rules about control of the resources provide the leaders 
with complete control over Leaders' Funding and the Party Group Funding 
(O'Sullivan, 1999). The only budget that individual MPs have some control over 
is the Party Members' Funding. Even then, if an individual MP 'wants to', they 
can agree to give up some of that budget to their party caucus controlled by the 
leader, and in many cases they do (ibid}.72 
Control of the parliamentary resources can be a contentious issue for the parties 
in Parliament. When the Alliance was in Parliament, there was an ongoing battle 
between the party organisation and the parliamentary caucus for control of the 
state-funded resources. In particular, most Alliance MPs were determined to 
control their own out-of-Parliament staff and electorate offices, establishing such 
offices in their own electorates in an attempt to build up local support for 
themselves as individuals. In contrast, the Alliance head office was determined to 
use the resources collectively in the cities and regions to build the extra-
parliamentary organisation and create support for the party as a whole. 
Furthermore, the parliamentary funding that the Alliance ELU received for extra-
parliamentary functions was under constant threat of being cut or restricted by 
the party leader. In this way, the leader was able to ensure that the extra-
parliamentary activities of the party organisation were consistent with his political 
agenda. 
Through his control of these resources, Jim Anderton was independent of the 
wider Alliance party and yet also able to assert his control over extra-
parliamentary officials. He was able to turn the resource tap on and off at will in 
order to control staff who were also activists and 'office-holders within the party. 
The party organisation, president, general secretary and so forth were forced into 
72 In terms of the research units, the leadership of the parties have total control over these. Despite formally 
being their employer, the Parliamentary Service does not control the units and other party staff, which 
means that the parliamentary leadership is able to decide exactly what type of work the units undertake. 
According to Klinkum, 'the Parliamentary Service is unable (and in any case unwilling) to challenge unit 
priorities which they know to be unacceptable to many Members' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.230). 
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a high level of compliance with the leader of the parliamentary wing. Also, 
because the party organisation received such ample resources, it was not 
required to recruit party members and activists for their voluntary labour and their 
provision of resources. Without a large membership or a healthy base of 
activists, the process was self-reinforcing, with the party organisation becoming 
even more dependent on the party leader and caucus. By controlling both wings 
of the Alliance, Anderton was better able to shift the party closer to the political 
centre, moderating its policies and marginalising its more radical and left-wing 
members. Even when the party began to split in 2001, Anderton's caucus faction 
withdrew their MP tithes in an attempt to leverage back control. The ELU, too, 
was effectively closed down and its staff (including this author) were made 
redundant. 
Within the parliamentary caucuses of the other New Zealand parties the state 
funding has been utilised in such a way that it becomes another tool for the 
leadership to control and discipline its MPs. For example, access to research 
units can be controlled by the leadership to punish or reward individual MPs. 
Klinkum has reported that 'ministers of the Fourth Labour Government may have 
sought to restrict the access of rebel backbenchers, such as Graham Kelly, to the 
research unit because they were not happy with the sort of views they were 
espousing' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.135). 
The increase in state funding over recent years has clearly made political parties 
less reliant on their extra-parliamentary party for research and other staff-related 
assistance and therefore more reliant on the parliamentary professionals. David 
Lange has argued that there has been a direct correlation between increased 
state funding and the reductions of personnel and resources in the extra-
parliamentary organisations (Lange, 1992a: p.164). In terms of the research 
units, their role in policy creation has generally been inversely proportional to the 
strength and interest of the extra-parliamentary party organisation in policy 
formulation. According to Klinkum, 'There is likely to be an inverse relationship 
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between high levels of extra-parliamentary party (EPP) policy input and the level 
of research unit involvement in policy development' (Klinkum, 1998a: p.176). 
When an extra-parliamentary organisation is strong and centrally involved in 
policy creation, there is a smaller role for the state-funded research units to play, 
and vice versa. The involvement of Labour's research unit in policy formulation 
has traditionally been less than that of National's research unit, due to the fact 
that the extra-parliamentary Labour Party has traditionally seen itself as a vital 
part of policy formation, while the 'National Party outside parliament have placed 
more emphasis on organising to win elections than on influencing policy. This 
has left policy making in the hands of the parliamentary party. With over worked 
Members, it has sometimes been the case that the research unit has filled the 
void' (ibid). 
Obviously state funding also increases the professionalisation of the parties. By 
providing generous funding to the parties in Parliament to employ professional 
staff, the state makes the parties more professional-oriented, strengthening the 
position of party professionals by assuring their livelihood, and further creating a 
distance between the parties and the electorate. The locus of power has thus 
shifted within the parties, and certain individuals within the parliamentary staff 
have now emerged as key players in party affairs. As Laugesen has written: 
'While the backroom kingmakers have always been around in the established 
parties, today's kingpins have emerged from the reliance that new under-
resourced parties have to place on a few committed individuals' (Laugesen, 
1996c: p.13). 
Conclusion 
New Zealand has an elaborate and generous system of state funding for political 
parties. This system is covert in the sense that the funds are widely used for 
purposes for which they are not officially intended. This chapter looks at the 
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debate about whether parties should be supplied with such generous state 
resources or freed from such state patronage. It has argued that making parties 
seek out their own sources of income would be beneficial to the party system 
because this would encourage political parties to reconnect with various 
elements of civil society. Parties without support from civil society would be 
allowed to fade away rather than be kept alive by state subsidies. Furthermore, 
parties without substantial amounts of capital would be forced to develop 
alternative means of communication and persuasion (as the Green Party did in 
the 1999 election campaign). The inflation in election expenditure might also be 
reversed, and election campaigns might become less of a 'media circus'. In an 
ideological sense, the removal of subsidies would encourage parties to be more 
politically distinctive. This is necessary because as parties become increasingly 
state-orientated, and are correspondingly less firmly tied to their bases of support 
in society, they are becoming more politically bland and centrist. 
Significantly, the exploration of the state-party financial relationship in this 
chapter illustrates that although the New Zealand parties have been in decline in 
the electorate, the leaderships of the parties in Parliament possess more 
resources than ever before. They have adapted to modern conditions by 
penetrating the state and obtaining its resources for themselves. They have been 
helped in this task by the Parliamentary Service's 'corruption management', 
whereby the misuse of millions of dollars of resources for party-political purposes 
is either ignored or explained away. Such state-subsidised privilege is, however, 
vulnerable to voter backlash. Accepting and extending these resources while at 
the same time pretending to be deeply rooted in civil society lays parties open to 
the resentment of voters who prefer their parties to be genuinely representative 
and thrive off the voluntary elements of civil society and not the compulsory 
elements of the state. 
The increasing relationship between state and party is at the expense of the 
traditional linkages with civil society. Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven have 
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shown how New Zealand parties have gradually become detached from civil 
society, and this chapter has illustrated the other side of the coin - the way that 
parties have become increasingly attached to the state. 
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Chapter Nine 
The State Regulation of Parties 
After functioning in the past as voluntary organisations embedded in civil society, 
New Zealand political parties are increasingly linked to the state. The erosion of 
the linkages between parties and society has been examined in chapters Four 
through to Seven of this thesis. Then Chapter Eight showed that the developing 
linkage with the state has been yielding considerable resources for the parties. At 
the same time, however, this linkage has involved increased regulation of the 
parties. How and why political parties have become subject to greater regulation 
is detailed in this chapter. 
The issues of state linkage revolve around the distinction between whether 
parties should be regarded as public or private institutions. Traditionally in New 
Zealand, parties have been deemed to be private organisations, and therefore 
the public have held that the state should not have too much control or influence 
over them. Increasingly, however, voters regard parties as public organisations 
that perform a governmental and public role, and therefore should be carefully 
monitored and regulated by the state. This shift from private to public means New 
Zealand is joining the majority of advanced industrial countries that afford political 
parties little autonomy from the state. 
Part One of this chapter examines the historical background and the reasons for 
the recent increase in regulation. Part Two details the new regulations and Part 
Three discusses the impact that increased state regulation has had on the New 
Zealand political system. The chapter argues that state regulation evolved partly 
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as a response to the public's disillusionment with political parties and partly due 
to the parties' decline as mass membership organisations embedded in civil 
society. It concludes that parties are now over-regulated. Ideally parties should 
have their private status re-established and be 'given back' to their social 
constituencies. This might help reassert democratic control over parties and help 
strengthen their links with those they purport to represent. It would also be 
preferable if civil society could monitor the parties and thus help them to be self-
regulating. This would involve journalists and political scientists playing a strong 
role as watchdogs on political party activity. However, such a model of party 
regulation by civil society looks increasingly unlikely to occur. 
Part One: Historical Background and Transition 
New Zealand's party system developed after 1890 in an electoral system and 
political culture that did not legally recognise political parties. Despite becoming 
central to the country's governance, the parties evaded public scrutiny of their 
internal operations due to a widespread belief that they were 'private 
associations'. Until 1956, there was no mention of political parties in law and it 
was only in the 1970s that their names began appearing on ballot papers. This 
suggested the relationship between political parties and the state was very weak, 
with the parties receiving very little recognition from the state. Over the last 
decade, however, the status of parties has been shifting due to new state 
initiatives, such as the registration of political parties, their receipt of substantial 
indirect state funding, the requirement to disclose donations and election 
expenditure, and the shift to party-based proportional representation. Moreover, 
public suspicion about unfair candidate selections has led to legal requirements 
that such selection processes be democratic. This section details this transition. 
It argues that state regulation of parties in New Zealand has evolved because of 
the increase in 'anti-partyism', the introduction of MMP, and the general erosion 
of parties' memberships and links to civil society. 
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This private-public debate is relevant to party systems throughout the world, and 
in practice there are many variations in the degree to which parties are regarded 
as residing in the public domain. At one extreme, the internal operations of 
political parties in the United States are subject to very detailed legal regulation, 
while at the other end of the spectrum, the United Kingdom has been - despite 
being the home of the regulating state - probably the least intervening: 
The [UK] political system operates with low levels of regulation across the range of 
activities. The parties in both their public face and internal organisation are almost 
entirely private, and subject to a very minor degree of regulation and almost no scrutiny 
(Johns, 1999: p.91 ).1 
Meanwhile, according to Gary Johns, 'countries such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada indicate a middle position' between the US and the UK (Johns, 
1999: pp.91-92).2 However, in 2000 the UK established a number of new laws 
regulating parties. Therefore the UK and New Zealand's recent moves towards 
the regulation of political parties are bringing the party systems more into line 
with countries like the US. 
Right up until the 1995 amendments to the Electoral Act 1993, political parties in 
New Zealand existed mostly without any special legal status. Writing in 1994, 
political scientist Tony Wood pointed out that 'There is a gap between the role 
that political parties play in our political system and the recognition of political 
parties in our constitutional forms' (Wood 1994: p.175). The Royal Commission 
on the Electoral System (RCES) also pointed out in 1986 that, 'At present our 
electoral legislation largely ignores the existence of political parties' (RCES, 
1986: p.265). 
1 Likewise, countries such as Belgium and Ireland generally regard their political parties 'as unincorporated 
associations or private voluntary organisations and their existence is not regulated by law' (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1998). In these countries 'political parties are de facto associations and do not have legal 
personality; hence their accounts are not subject to any fiscal control' (ibid). 
2 According to Johns, These are examples of parties which retain a private status, but have a propensity to 
accept the largesse of the state as it suits their needs' (Johns, 1999: p.92). 
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The relationship between political parties and the state in New Zealand is 
problematic because, according to Margaret Wilson, 'Political parties have held 
an ambiguous position within New Zealand's constitutional arrangements', being 
partly private and partly public, but not entirely either (Wilson, 1998: p.169). In 
the past, the parties regarded themselves as private organisations, and society 
and the state generally agreed. Whenever issues have arisen about the size of 
their memberships or their financial affairs, the two main parties have been 
guarded about providing details, arguing 'that they are voluntary, private 
organisations' (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: p.297). For some time it was largely 
accepted that the political parties were self-regulating and their internal 
operations were their own business. The rules for selecting parliamentary 
candidates, for example, were left entirely in their own hands, party finances 
were kept largely secret, internal rules were beyond state scrutiny, and they 
enjoyed no special legal recognition from the state. Wilson has elaborated on this 
self-regulation: 
As voluntary private organisations, political parties regulate their own affairs, by rules 
that are scrutinised and enforced by active membership. The rules of political parties 
are mainly directed towards regulating the participation of party members in the 
formulation of policy and the selection of those amongst their numbers to represent 
them in the most competitive contest of all, the General Election (Wilson, 1998: p.169). 
Clearly, the absence of state regulation resulted in a high degree of autonomy for 
the parties. By operating as 'private associations', parties were often able to 
organise themselves within this framework without any state recognition. For 
example: 
Political parties were free to register under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, which 
provided that voluntary bodies such as sporting bodies, charitable organisations and 
others not existing for pecuniary gain could become incorporated. The Act provided for 
their management, control and dissolution in a regulated manner while avoiding the 
more complex provisions of the Companies Act. There was, however, no requirement to 
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be registered and little control of any sort over their activities (Jackson and McRobie, 
1998: p.296).3 
That New Zealand's political parties remained unregulated or without legal status 
for so long was probably because the parties themselves desired to remain 
outside the jurisdiction of state control. Wilson has commented that, 'As voluntary 
organisations, political parties have been protective of the right to manage their 
own internal affairs. They therefore resisted legal categorisation and control' 
(Wilson, 1998: p.172). Similarly, Geoffrey Palmer, writing in 1992, puts the 
anomaly of parties lacking legal recognition down to their self-interest in avoiding 
public and state interference in their affairs: 'political parties are amongst the 
least regulated of all the institutions in our society. They are much less regulated, 
for example, than public companies. Indeed the form of legal personality of 
political parties has kept it as primitive as possible, deliberately' (Palmer, 1992: 
p.132). It seems that historically the two main parties dominated and controlled 
the legislature and thereby avoided their own party organisations becoming 
restricted by the state. This is in line with Bernard Hennessy's theory that 'parties 
will be only minimally regulated by law in states where ... two mass parties are 
both electorally strong and agree in the legislation to leave themselves as free as 
possible from legal restrictions' (Hennessy, 1968: p.11). This meant that for many 
decades the issue of state intervention in their affairs was never allowed to 
emerge onto the political agenda. 
There was possibly also an issue of principle involved. Some politicians and 
parties hold to the ideal that the state should not interfere in their internal affairs, 
and should generally be kept at a distance from the political organising activities 
of civil society. It is felt that the intervention of the state into interneil party affairs 
undermines their voluntary and private nature. The belief exists that parties 
should not be 'public utilities' but the expression of society's varying interests. In 
3 Most parties, however, chose not to register as incorporated societies, as such an arrangement placed 
obligations upon parties to disclose certain details of their financial operations, such as income and 
expenditure. 
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Britain such a view was put forward in the minority opinion of the 1976 British 
Royal Commission on Electoral Reform report: 'We think it mistaken and possibly 
dangerous to suggest that any work can be required of a political party - by the 
State, by Parliament or by anyone other than its members' (quoted in Johns, 
1999: p.91). Thus, the belief that parties should not be closely inter-related with 
the state is not just the self-interested belief of the parties, but an important 
philosophical viewpoint about the freedom to organise politically (which, as 
shown later, has ramifications for ideological competition in the party system). 
The lack of legal recognition and regulation is also partly explained by the fact 
that New Zealand's parliamentary system, electoral system, and political culture 
were established before the development of organised political parties.4 As a 
result, the electoral rules tended to ignore the role of political parties in elections. 
Even when the Electoral Act 1956 was enacted, it barely acknowledged the 
existence of political parties, and instead the rules related more specifically to the 
election of individuals representing geographically-defined groups of voters. Alan 
McRobie has outlined the history of the state's infrequent recognition of the part 
played by parties in elections: 
When consolidated in 1956, the Electoral Act included only one reference to 'party' - s 
127(2) declared that it was not an offence to wear or display party emblems on election 
day. Since 1975, the number of references to 'party' in the Electoral Act has risen to five. 
In 1975, the Act was amended to require each candidate's party designation to be 
included on the ballot paper (repealed in 1980 but reinstated in 1990) and for returning 
officers to deliver a list containing the names of all candidates and their party affiliations 
to each residence (repealed in 1977). In 1977, the Act was amended to require 
candidates or party officials to authorise election advertisements and in 1981 it was 
amended to permit political parties to make submissions to the Representation 
Commission before it commenced deliberating (McRobie, 1995: p.312).5 
4 According to Richard Mulgan, writing in 1990, 'we are different from most continental European countries 
which adopted parliamentary government later, after political parties were taken for granted as the major 
contestants in elections. These countries were, and are, much more at ease with enshrining political parties 
and party lists in their electoral law' (Mulgan, 1990). 
5 Later amendments to the Electoral Act 'incorporating provisions relating to parties were confined to the 
right of parties not directly represented on the Representation Commission to make submissions to that 
body before it commenced its deliberations, and their right to display logos, rosettes, ribbons, and streamers 
on election day' (McRobie, 2001: p.188). According to McRobie, 'It is also noteworthy that prior to 1957, 
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The ongoing avoidance of recognition by the state can also be partly explained 
by the fact that New Zealand politics has been dominated by the 'liberal 
constitutional' model of parliamentary activity, which has meant that MPs have 
been viewed as electorate representatives rather than party representatives. 
Regarding MPs virtually as independents, the liberal constitutional view has been 
somewhat hostile to the existence and role of political parties. As explained in 
Chapter Ten, the liberal constitutional model regards political parties as a 
restriction on the democratic and free debate between MPs. 
When the RCES studied the position of parties in 1986, it accepted 'the 
essentially voluntary character of the political parties' (RCES, 1986: p.267). 
However parties were also seen by the Commission as being public, as Wilson 
has commented: 'Political parties then were seen by the Commission as being 
not only organising devices for the management of paid politicians in Parliament, 
but also organisations through which policies were developed for presentation to, 
and legitimation by the voters' (Wilson, 1998: p.171). As a result, the 
Commission sought to correct the ambiguity by recommending greater state 
acknowledgment and control of political parties - in particular by requiring a 
registration process. The implementation of that recommendation has done a 
great deal to change parties from private to public institutions, yet the 
Commission believed that registration would 'not deny the essentially voluntary 
character of the political parties' (RCES, 1986: p.267). Colin James has differed, 
commenting after the introduction of registration, that 'Parties are in that sense 
less private affairs as a result of that change' (James, 1998a: pp.180-181). 
The registration and regulation of political parties is often proposed as a result of 
the state funding of parties (Seyd, 1998a: p.202). It is felt that in exchange for the 
resources they accept from the state, political parties should concede some of 
candidates' party affiliation were not included in the parliamentary paper detailing the election results' 
(McRobie, 1995: p.312). 
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their autonomy and privacy. Certainly in other countries, many of the rules about 
political parties have been 'adopted in the wake of the granting of state 
subventions' (Mair, 1997: p.142).6 Generally, wherever it has occurred, state 
funding has directly led to party registration and other regulations being 
introduced by the state. This is partly because of the necessity of defining 
political parties in law if they are to receive state funding. Likewise, because of 
the usual requirement that demands state-assisted voluntary organisations be 
democratic and accountable, the state also requires political parties to meet 
these minimum criteria. This danger of encouraging undue state interference in 
the internal affairs of a party has led Patrick Seyd to argue against state funding: 
'Legislators would be tempted to intervene and stipulate who in the party's rules 
would be eligible to stand and vote in the election of executives and officers, and 
who would compose the "selectorate" to choose parliamentary and local 
government candidates' (Seyd, 1998a: p.204). 
In New Zealand, too, it is possible that the political parties' increasing reliance on 
state funds is related to the move to state recognition and registration. This is in 
fact one of the arguments made by James in favour of state intervention (James, 
2003b). Johns has argued, however, that New Zealand parties have accepted 
the intervention of the state without any corresponding financial compensation: 
The New Zealand case is 'asymmetrical' because it accepts (potential) intervention in its 
internal affairs. However, it does not receive much in the way of campaign assistance - a 
rather noble form of asymmetry! It has recently undergone a major transformation, where 
there is a requirement in legislation for democratic procedures in candidate selection 
(Johns, 1999: p.92). 
6 Pinto-Duschinsky has documented how, 'A legal status for political parties is associated with systems 
where extra-parliamentary party organizations receive funding from the state' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 21 Sep 
1998: pp.1-3). In New Zealand, the extra-parliamentary party organisations are only allocated a relatively 
small amount of funding (for election broadcast advertising). But as Chapter Eight has shown, the New 
Zealand parties do in fact receive substantial public funding (through Parliament) that is used for purposes 
that in most countries would be performed by the extra-parliamentary organisations. 
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Funding and regulation appear to be inter-related and have the effect of 
encouraging each other.7 For example, in 2000 the Labour Party called for an 
increase of direct state funding, by arguing that the increased regulation of 
political donations justified it (Armstrong, 2000).8 Some in National too, such as 
ex-president Geoff Thompson, have argued in favour of state funding, suggesting 
that it is the logical 'outcome of more rigorous rules on disclosure of donors and 
"clamping down" on private funding' (Gardiner, 2000). 
A more important cause of the increased state regulation of parties in New 
Zealand is the erosion of parties' memberships and links to civil society. The shift 
to electoral-professional parties described in Chapter Six has meant that the 
extra-parliamentary wings of the parties have dwindled in size and purpose. This 
decline means parties are now less able to govern themselves. Alienated 
citizens must rely on a third party (the state) to regulate and monitor the parties 
with which they are no longer involved. The parliamentary parties no longer have 
large and vibrant party memberships and activists to keep their leaders and 
officials in check. They also do not have strong connections with civil society that 
do likewise. Rather, today's elite-cadre type parties are headed by leaders and 
officials who are increasingly unanswerable to anyone in their own organisations. 
The self-interest of Labour and National also comes into the story of the 
increasing regulations such as the limitations placed upon election expenditure. 
This consensus can be seen in the fact that both major parties in 1987 gave 
submissions to the RCES supporting the retention of limits on candidates' 
election expenditure (Harris, 1987b: p.45). Similarly, a ban on political parties 
buying their own broadcast advertising means that the New Zealand parties have 
7 In fact, as Chapter Eight has shown, there was a substantial increase in indirect state funding for political 
parties prior to the introduction of state registration. 
S Labour has called for greater regulation of donations to political parties (a ban on anonymous donations) 
and, at the same time, argued that the result of the increased regulation would be a 'substantial loss' of 
revenue for parties and that therefore the state should provide compensatory funding in exchange (Bain, 
2000b: p.2). 
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been able to keep in check what is in other countries the heaviest campaign 
cost.9 The limitation on election expenditure (which is detailed later in this 
chapter) is the equivalent of an agreement between nations to ban certain costly 
types of weapons and thereby avoid an excessive 'arms race'. 
Calls to regulate parties are not new, and as early as 1948, political science 
professor Leslie Upson was advocating greater controls and monitoring of 
political parties: 
Certain current defects could be removed if more publicity were attached to party affairs, 
for the conception that the internal management of a party's business is purely its own 
concern is a juristic fiction devoid of political validity. Furthermore, the parties which seek 
to operate the democratic process must themselves be organized in concord with 
democracy's principles (Lipson, 1948: p.251). 
Because Upson was writing before the rise of any substantial anti-party 
sentiments, such suggestions of regulation did not have much currency. As 
examined in Chapter Ten, anti-party feeling increased significantly after the 
breakdown of political consensus in the 1970s and the violations of political 
culture by Labour and National governments in 1980s and 1990s. This growth in 
anti-partyism then started to make calls for regulation more influential. Similarly, 
Jack Vowles believes that the debate in New Zealand about campaign spending 
limits and the disclosure of donations really only began following the Labour 
Party's 1987 election campaign, where the party was widely alleged to have 
spent over $3.5 million, which was mostly made up of business donations 
(Vowles, 2002b: pp.420-421). 
As a response to the declining credibility of New Zealand's democratic 
institutions, the recommendations of the 1986 RCES began to be taken up in the 
late 1980s, partly to restore the public's faith in the democratic process. The 
RCES had advocated, among other things, a number of state controls and 
regulations on donations to political parties, with the overall aim of making their 
9 See: Pinto-Duschinsky (1998:). 
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financial affairs more transparent. Subsequently, political pressure forced the 
Fourth National Government to implement some of its recommendations in 1995, 
albeit in an altered form. This was also closely related to the shift to MMP. The 
change in the electoral system finally gave political parties legal status. This was 
primarily because parties are explicitly central to elections that use a list system 
of representation and therefore they could no longer stay outside some sort of 
legal recognition. The RCES recommended that political parties should be 
required to register with the state in order to be eligible to contest the party vote 
under MMP. The Electoral Law Select Committee endorsed this finding, leading 
to its enactment in the Electoral Act 1993. In order to carry out the registration 
process, the Electoral Commission was established. 1o The intention was to 
create a body that would function independently, strengthen the independence of 
electoral administration from governments and enhance public confidence in the 
integrity of the electoral system. However, National and Labour then manipulated 
the rules so that prior to each election, when the Electoral Commission comes to 
the important task of distributing election broadcasting funds, these two parties 
have representatives co-opted onto the Commission. The decision-making 
process of the Commission has thus been politicised. 11 
The effect of the public's anti-partyism has clearly been to increase the pressure 
for political parties to be reined in and restricted by any means possible, and the 
10 The Electoral Act 1993 gave the Commission the tasks of supervising the legal and administrative 
arrangements relating to elections, providing advice to the Minister of Justice and the parliamentary select 
committee, and promoting public knowledge about electoral matters (Electoral Commission, 2000a). 
Previously, some of these roles had been carried out by a variety. of bodies, such as the Broadcasting 
Standards Authority, which made the allocations of broadcasting time and money to the parties at elections. 
11 This process was carried out in October 1995, by the Broadcasting Amendment Act, introduced by the 
Minister of Broadcasting, Maurice Williamson, and supported by the Labour Party (Jackson and McRobie, 
1998: p.292). The National-Labour amendment increased the Commission's membership by two persons -
one to represent the Government and the other to represent the Opposition - whenever it carried out 
allocations to political parties. See also: Pinto-Duschinsky (10 Sep 1998: pp.1-2). The previous body 
responsible for broadcast allocations, the Broadcasting Standards Authority, also had representatives from 
Labour and National on it. 
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state became the obvious mechanism through which to do this. The public's anti-
partyism also corresponded with the elite post-corporatist beliefs held by leading 
politicians, who also believed that parties - or at least the extra-parliamentary 
organisations - were too strong.12 Parliamentarians therefore deliberately 
attempted to reduce the power of political parties by, in effect, making them 
public property. 
Against this anti-party political wave there have been few commentators 
defending the right of political parties to retain a private non-legal status. Instead, 
most journalists and academics have tended to view the private and closed-
nature of the parties as a barrier to their research and thus as an obstruction to 
democracy. A good example of this is the following statement from James: 
Party officials do tend to regard parties, as ... under no obligation to divulge information to 
the media (and so the voters). But in my opinion they are public organisations, seeking 
control over public money and the mechanisms of public coercion. That the 1993 
Electoral Act finally recognises parties after their mysterious shadow-life under the make-
believe electoral laws we used to have implicitly recognises this (James, 1998a: p.180). 
Elsewhere, James has similarly argued, 'Political parties like to believe their rules 
are private. But as public institutions, they should be accountable to the 
electorate' (James, 1996c).13 In reply it might be said that political parties are in 
fact accountable to the electorate through the most democratic and effective 
means possible - general elections. Voters alone should be the ones who decide 
whether a party should be trusted and whether their style of operation is 
appropriate. Being voluntary organisations, political parties do not oblige anyone 
to join them, and therefore the rules of parties and their internal activity should 
only be the business of their members. 
12 See: Chapter Ten. 
13 Likewise, James has stated: 'Political parties claim the public's votes to do the public's business. They 
take public funds for election campaigning. That makes them in a strong sense public bodies, not private 
clubs, and logically accountable to the public - the more so since both Labour after 1984 and National after 
1990 gravely betrayed public expectations' (James, 2003b). 
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Part Two: Mechanisms of State Regulation 
This section outlines the current forms of regulation of political parties. 
Registration of Parties 
Since 1994 the Electoral Commission has been responsible for registering 
political parties and their logos. The registration processes for political party 
names and logos are separate. For instance, a registered party is not required to 
register a logo and an unregistered party is able to register its logo. Parties that 
are unregistered cannot, however, submit a party list and compete for the party 
vote, and are only allowed to put forward candidates in electorate contests. 
A central element in the registration process is the requirement for political 
parties to have 500 members. According to the Chief Executive of the Electoral 
Commission, Paul Harris, the registration process and the requirement that 
parties have a certain number of members, provides some assurances to voters 
that the parties they vote for are 'reasonably substantial organisations' (Harris, 
1997b: p.214). The reason why it is necessary for parties to be 'substantial 
organisations' is not officially stated. Clearly the SOO-minimum membership 
required for registration is based on the mass membership model idea in which 
that party size is important. Consequently, this rule makes no allowance for 
parties that do not seek to be mass membership organisations. A good example 
of the restrictiveness of this is provided by the. Future New Zealand party 
launched by Peter Dunne in 1994 when he left the Labour Party. The party was 
more of an elite-cadre party than a mass party, and consequently it failed to meet 
the requirements of the registration process.14 It seems that the rules of 
registration are designed to inhibit smaller parties from participating. What is not 
14 It was reported in March 1995 that Future New Zealand's membership numbered 'in the hundreds' but still 
below the 500 mark needed to register with the Electoral Commission (Edwards and Boyd, 1995: p.?). 
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clear is how such parties can become more substantial parties without first 
having the ability to participate as registered parties. These rules, set by the 
parties that were already in Parliament in 1995, appear to have been established 
to give themselves an advantage in the electoral market. It is noteworthy that the 
RCES and the select committee recommended the minimum number of 
members required should be 200. Parliament, however, decided that the figure 
should be 500.15 
The Electoral Act also gave the Electoral Commission the power to 'require a 
party to provide the Commission with either a list of the names of current 
financial members, or with personally signed and dated declarations from at least 
500 current financial members who are eligible to register as electors' (Electoral 
Commission, 1997b: p.7).16 This requirement created an issue of privacy for the 
parties, many of which believed that internal party information - such as the 
names of people belonging to a political party - should not be in the public 
domain. However, because the Commission is subject to the Official Information 
Act, it could not guarantee the protection of confidential information provided by 
the parties: 
the Electoral Commission may be asked under the Official Information Act to release the 
list of members or the declarations a party has provided to the Electoral Commission for 
the purposes of registration. The Commission would have to consider each request in the 
circumstances, taking into account the provisions of the Official Information Act and the 
Privacy Act (ibid: p.?). 
15 In 1998 the Electoral Law Select Committee recommended that the registration process be tightened 
further, so that political parties would be required to annually submit a 'statutory declaration concerning the 
party's aims and objects, its membership rules and that it continues to meet the statutory membership 
requirements for registration' (Electoral CommisSion, 1998c: p.12). Some have also wanted the 500 member 
threshold to be raised - for example, in 2001 the Alliance suggested a figure of 1000 members (Alliance, 
1999). 
16 As well as requesting membership information for registration, the statutory requirements of the Electoral 
Act mean that the Electoral Commission enquires about membership information from those parties that 
apply for election broadcasting money, so that the Commission can determine the division of the state 
funding. 
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Although the Commission stated its reluctance to release such information, it did 
admit that internal-party information would be released to the public if the 
Commission 'was satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest based on 
its responsibility to ensure the integrity of the registration process' (ibid). The 
Commission suggested that, 'A party may request the Commission to keep 
membership information confidential', but pointed out to parties that any refusal 
to release information to the public about the parties could be subject to an 
appeal to the Ombudsman (ibid). 
Restrictions on Party Names and Logos 
The Electoral Commission is able to place some restrictions upon the names and 
logos that parties register. The main intention of this role is to give parties some 
protection against other parties that might choose to operate with similar names 
or logos. Party registration therefore acts somewhat like the registration of a 
corporate trademark, with registered parties choosing both a full name and 
abbreviated name. 
The regulations include criteria by which registration can be refused - for 
instance, 'a party may be refused registration where its proposed name is 
considered indecent, offensive, excessively long or likely to be misleading' 
(McRobie, 1995: p.331 ).17 Elements of this criterion are obviously somewhat 
arbitrary and subject to the dictates of the individual members of the Electoral 
Commission. Furthermore, in relation to the censorship of 'offensive' party names 
or logos it might be argued that, in a democratic society, all political parties 
should have the right to be offensive.18 
17 The Electoral Commission in New Zealand has refused to register some parties - in the 1997/98 year one 
party was refused registration because their name was 'likely to cause confusion or mislead electors' 
(Electoral Commission, 1998c). Returning officers are also able to reject a candidate's party name on the 
basis of 'elector confusion' (Electoral Act 1993: s.151). 
18 Under these regulations a member of the public was able to challenge the right of the Aotearoa Legalise 
Cannabis Party to use their party logo because it involved the image of a marijuana leaf. Although the 
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That the state should be given the power to determine what is politically 
acceptable should be questioned. This is made apparent by the example of the 
candidate known as Jesus Christ, who was refused the right to stand for office in 
the 1972 general election. The Chief Electoral Officer deemed that the 
nomination was 'offensive and not made in good faith' and an amendment to the 
Electoral Act was used to refuse the nomination (Cleveland, 1977: p.143). In 
contrast, and perhaps inconsistently, during the same election, a candidate with 
the name Mickey Mouse was deemed acceptable by the Chief Electoral Officer. 
Similarly, socialist parties have at times been threatened with bans by the state -
for example, National Prime Minister Robert Muldoon considered passing 
legislation to outlaw the Socialist Unity Party.19 It is therefore conceivable that if 
the New Zealand state is given powers to prohibit the involvement of certain 
parties from contesting the party vote in elections, parties that are seen as too far 
outside the political centre might be excluded for ideological reasons. Already in 
some Western countries, certain 'extremist' parties can be declared illegal by the 
state. For instance, according to German Basic Law, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court 'has the power to declare that a party constitutes a threat to 
freedom and democracy and is therefore unconstitutional, in which case it orders 
that party's dissolution' (quoted in Johns, 1999: p.91). Similarly, the Italian 
constitution states that 'the reorganization of the Fascist Party is forbidden' 
(quoted in Bianco and Gardini, 1999: p.22). Likewise, in Spain, parties with links 
to the ETA Basque liberation campaign are outlawed. 
challenge was unsuccessful - the Electoral Commission did not find that the party's logo was offensive or 
indecent - this case illustrates how it might be possible for a party that is deemed 'extreme' to be censored 
or banned under the Electoral Act and its regulations. 
19 See Barnett (2000: p.11). It should be pointed out, however, that all Electoral Commission decisions on 
registration can be subject to judicial review (which could encompass Bill of Rights issues). 
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It might also be argued that the rules protecting party names give unfair 
advantage to existing parties.20 Instead of having their names and logos 
specifically regulated by the state, political scientist Michael Pinto-Duschinsky 
therefore advocates that parties should be subject to the same rules as other 
organisations in civil society: 
if an existing party splits into two factions, each wishing to use the party name for its 
candidates, the state should not attempt to step in and set internal party rules to decide 
the rights of the rival factions. If one faction is determined to take legal action against 
another, it should be on the basis of the law that applies to everyday private 
organizations, such as sports clubs or stamp-collecting societies (Pinto-Duschinsky, 
1998). 
If this argument is taken to its logical conclusion, it suggests there is no good 
reason why political parties should not operate, in all manners under the same 
civil laws that regulate other private organisations in New Zealand. 
Limitations on Election Expenditure 
Restrictions on election expenditure have long been a part of the Westminster 
parliamentary tradition. In New Zealand, the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act of 
1881 specified a limited number of goods and services that candidates could 
purchase during the campaign. The legislation remained essentially the same for 
over a hundred years, with adjustments being made for the allowable 
expenditure for each candidate (Harris, 1987: p.33).21 Prior to amendments made 
20 In Britain, according to Pinto-Duschinsky, 'factions that break away from an existing party are not 
permitted to refer to themselves by the title of 'Independent' combined with the name of the party from which 
they have split. The breakaway faction must choose a completely dif·ferent name, thus losing the electoral 
advantage of a name that indicates its roots in the 'old' party (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998:). Such a situation has 
not yet been tested in New Zealand. 
21 See: Harris (1987: p.34). Allowable expenditure included employing 'a limited number of scrutineers, 
clerks and messengers, personal expenses, the costs of printing, advertising, stationery, postage, 
telegrams, public meetings, and the hire of committee rooms' (ibid: p.32). The Act also allowed a limit of £25 
to be spent on 'miscellaneous expenses' (ibid). Between 1895 and 1948, the expenditure limit for each 
candidate remained at £200, after which it was raised to £500. It was again raised 'to $1500 in 1971, to 
$2000 in 1975, to $4000 in 1977, and to $5000 in 1983' (Harris, 1987: p.34). 
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in 1995 to the Electoral Act 1993, candidates were limited to spending no more 
than $15,000 in the three months before the date of a general election. 
Changes to the statutory limits made in 1995 were highly significant because 
they now concerned political parties rather than simply electoral candidates. 
From this point on, individual candidates were limited to expenditures of $20,000, 
while registered parties contesting the list vote were given a limit of $1 million 
plus $20,000 for each constituency seat that they stand in.22 This means that list 
parties currently have a maximum campaign expenditure of nearly $2.4 million 
(not including expenditure of state money on broadcasting).23 This limit applies to 
that spending which might broadly be described as advertising. This includes 
'publishing, issuing, distributing, or displaying addresses, notices, posters, 
pamphlets, handbills, billboards, or cards' (Electoral Commission, 2002b: p.7).24 
Again, the definition of 'election expenses' also includes goods and services that 
the party has acquired at a discounted rate or without cost - thus a party must 
record the true market value of the goods and services used in the campaign, 
and that amount forms part of the party's allowable spending limit. The Electoral 
Commission has also pointed out to parties that they 'should be aware that this 
will include the value to the party of any taxpayer-funded parliamentary postage' 
22 See: Electoral Act (1993: s.2148(2)). The total expenditure limit varies from election to election as the 
number of electorates varies. Parliamentary by-election campaigns also now have an expenditure limit of 
$40,000 - up from $30,000. 
23 Mulgan has argued that the limits on expenditure are 'set at relatively high levels which allow considerable 
variation in the amounts actually spent by different parties' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.253). However, as pOinted out 
in Chapter Seven, election expenses have skyrocketed since the mid-1980s, and in 1987 the Labour Party 
is believed to have spent over $4 million dollars, and in 1999 the National Party spent $2.7 million (including 
state funded advertising), which put it just short of the limit. 
24 Prior to 2002 there was some confusion about what constitutes election expenses, and in its disclosure of 
expenses for the 1999 general election the National Party appears to have included items such as travel and 
opinion polling, which do not count as election expenses as defined in the Electoral Act. 
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(Electoral Commission, 1996b: p.6).25 Anomalously, however, the money 
allocated from the Electoral Commission for election broadcast advertising does 
not count towards the party's electoral expenses. This is an issue of contention 
for the Act party, which claims this rule operates to benefit those parties that 
obtain large allocations of broadcasting money. Such parties effectively have a 
much higher state-imposed expenditure limit, and Act regards this is an iniquitous 
anomaly: 
In so far as the professed intent of the election spending limits, is to prevent one party 
(through its access to money) overpowering other parties unfairly through the media, the 
exclusion of state funded broadcasting and television time from a party's Election 
Expenses, is a complete anomaly (Tate, 1999: p.2). 
Act argues that this exclusion is part of an attempt on the part of the established 
parties to maintain their financial advantage: 
The only other explanation for such an exclusion, is that National and Labour expect to 
get a generous share of the overall state broadcasting time and funding available; and 
have legislated themselves a real advantage by not counting such government funded 
broadcasting as within the overall limit of 'Election Expenses' (ibid). 
It is noteworthy that the media also do not include Electoral Commission 
allocated election funding within their reports of the election expenditure of the 
parties. This thesis, in contrast, combines these figures when discussing election 
expenditure. Obviously, this area requires reform. 
The limitations on election expenditure also discriminate against parties that are 
rich in financial resources in favour of parties that are wealthy in voluntary labour 
resources. This, of course, is justified by the need. to produce a 'level playing-
25 This rule is a misnomer in the sense that although parties commonly use their parliamentary budgets for 
electioneering (see Chapter Eight), they are officially prevented from doing so, and therefore are not able to 
include such expenditure in the election expenditure returns. 
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field' of electoral competition.26 It is generally agreed that it is not fair for parties 
to be able to 'buy' their way into office. Nevertheless, the fact that the limitations 
apply only to capital resources and not to the 'labour resources of the parties 
might make this regulation appear unfair. Clearly, some parties have better 
access to labour resources than others do, and this allows them a considerable 
campaigning advantage.27 For instance, Mark Stonyer of United New Zealand 
has contrasted his party's lack of available labour with the Alliance's access to 
non-working people: 
Matt McCarten took 45 people to the King Country-Taranaki by-election and had them 
door-knocking in every little township and well organised. There were volunteers with 
mini-buses and they did the whole thing and they gathered their vote and they enhanced 
their vote that way. We haven't got those resources - mostly because we would be 
struggling to find 45 people who weren't working for the three weeks of an election 
campaign to go and do it (Stonyer, 1999). 
Clearly, it seems that parties that have greater activist numbers - and whose 
activists are retired, unemployed, independently wealthy and so forth - are 
advantaged by the regulation of finance. It could be argued, therefore, that if 
there are going to be restrictions on the use of capital resources, it would be 
appropriate to place restrictions on the use of labour. If the quid pro quo limits 
were introduced on volunteer time, this would make explicit the limitation on 
freedom of expression that such rules produce. Such an unacceptable scenario 
illustrates the difficulties and absurdities of imposing restrictions on political 
activity: 
if a professional such as an accountant or lawyer, who normally charges clients on an 
hourly fee-for-service basis, provides his time for nothing and uses that time to provide 
his usual professional services, it is possible to put a financial figure on the value of the 
time and the service that have been donated to the party. But it is· rarely possible to 
calculate the value of volunteer time on a commercial basis (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
26 The concept of a 'level playing field' is applied to political parties in that 'it is argued that unregulated 
political finance fails to guarantee a level playing field in the competition for power, thus undermining the 
right to equal political participation' (Fisher, 1999a: p.520). 
27 The Electoral Act (1993: s.2148) specifically excludes the value of labour from its classification of election 
expenses if the labour was provided free of charge. This differs from goods and services provided free of 
charge, to which a value must be recorded. 
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The Labour Party has argued that unequal funding from business makes such 
limits on election expenditure necessary. Rob Allen, the General Secretary of the 
Labour Party in 1999, said that for the election of that year he expected the 
parties of the right to 'collectively have five times at least the amount of money to 
spend on campaigning that the parties on the left had. So for every dollar that we 
and the Alliance spend, they will spend $5 on the other side on politics' (Allen, 
1999). However, this did not appear to be borne out by the declarations of 
election expenditure and broadcasting allocations for the 1999 general election. 
In that election, National and Act spent $2,746,648 and $787,807 respectively, 
while Labour and the Alliance spent $1,645,165 and $939,709. Using Allen's 
comparison (and therefore disregarding New Zealand First and the Greens), it is 
apparent that for every $1 'the left' claimed that they spent, the parties of 'the 
right' claimed that they spent $1.37. 
In order to enforce the legal limits on election spending the state requires the 
disclosure of the relevant election expenses. Prior to the Electoral Act 1993, the 
state only required disclosure of the election expenses of individual candidates. It 
is now a requirement that registered political parties record all general election 
expenses incurred during the three months leading up to polling day. These 
recordings must be audited and submitted to the Electoral Commission within 50 
working days of the declaration of the election of list candidates.28 The Electoral 
Commission then makes the disclosures available for public inspection. 
Prohibition on Broadcast Advertising 
In New Zealand, the state strongly regulates broadcast advertising by political 
parties, with both registered and unregistered parties being prohibited from 
purchasing any advertising on television and radio at election time apart from that 
which is allocated to them by the Electoral Commission. Essentially, parties are 
28 The Electoral Act (1993: s.214C). 
598 Chapter Nine: State Regulation of Parties 
banned from spending their own money on television advertising.29 This is an 
anomaly, in that the parties can spend their own money on advertising in other 
mediums such as newspapers and magazines.30 When other countries, such as 
Australia and the United States, have attempted to introduce similar bans, they 
have failed because such laws have been interpreted as violating citizen rights to 
freedom of speech.31 However, when the legislation was introduced to New 
Zealand, the Attorney General decided that it did not violate the Bill of Rights Act 
(Robertson, 1999a: p.20).32 
Officially, the broadcast advertising ban is intended to inhibit parties from 'buying' 
electoral success, but in practice it advantages the larger parties who receive 
substantially more public funding for broadcast advertising than the smaller 
parties. The restriction particularly disadvantages cash-rich parties that might 
wish to spend money to compete more evenly against Labour and National. 
Combined with the unequal division of official broadcasting money, this ban 
means the Act party and others are restrained from competing on a level playing 
field. In effect, Act has been limited to broadcast expenditure of about 20 percent 
29 The Broadcasting Act (s.70(2)(b)). However, parties are allowed to spend their own funds on the 
production costs for their permitted broadcasts - see the Broadcasting Act (70(2A), 74B(1)(a)). 
30 In 1993 the National Party proposed allowing parties to buy limited amounts of television advertising time, 
but this was opposed by labour (Maclennan, 1993). National's proposal would have allowed parties 'to 
spend their own money on purchasing airtime for advertising, up to a maximum limit of 50 percent above the 
largest allocation to anyone party' (ibid). Broadcasting Minister Maurice Williamson promoted the proposal 
with the view that 'New parties and smaller parties will now be able to have at least some broadcasting time 
if they wish' (quoted in Maclennan, ibid). Again in 1995 National proposed that a party should 'be able to top 
up its tax-payer allocation to a level 25 per cent above the highest such allocation', but failed to find enough 
support to pass the change (luke, 1996). Surprisingly, the only party to support National was the Alliance, 
'which argued it would help small parties to air their policies' (ibid). In 1999 the proposal was defeated yet 
again, with National's coalition allies and the opposition parties - except for Act - opposing the proposed 
changes (laxon, 1999b). 
31 For example, in the early 1990s, the Australian labor Government 'enacted legislation to prohibit political 
advertising in the electronic media ..... In the event the ban was ruled unconstitutional by the High Court in 
1992 on the grounds that it prevented freedom of political communication' (Jupp and Sawer, 2001: p.227). 
32 This restriction was introduced though a Supplementary Order Paper which is not subject to Bill of Rights 
vetting. 
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of that of Labour and National in 1996, 21 percent in 1999, and 27 percent in 
2002. According to Act, 'This is censorship. The only justification for the 
legislation under which this censorship was imposed can be that Parliament 
intended that equal time be made available for all parties. Any other allocation is 
contrary to the principle of free speech, undemocratic and must be an attempt to 
influence the outcome of the election' (Tate, 1999: pp.1_2}.33 McRobie has 
supported this view, saying, 'the differential a.llocations of state funding and 
broadcasting time appear to run counter to the long-standing objective of 
providing all who seek elective office with equality of opportunity' (McRobie, 
2001: p.190). Act MP Stephen Franks says, 'The current system was designed 
when there were two parties, keen to make sure that others couldn't get in' 
(quoted on TV3, 2002). Representing another minor party, Green MP Rod 
Donald has agreed, saying 'It's inherently unfair for the two main parties to get 
the bulk of the funding, and for other parties to not even be able to spend their 
own money to get a level playing field' (quoted on TV3, ibid). 
Bernard Robertson has also argued that because of the existence of other 
election spending rules, the ban on buying election broadcasting time is 
unnecessary. The limitations on total expenditure in the Electoral Act mean that 
for high spending parties, the money spent on broadcasting is money they 
cannot spend on other forms of campaigning. Robertson also believes that 'The 
root of the problem is the idea that there should be any control on electoral 
expenditure. Such controls are simply a restriction on freedom of expression and 
are also inequitable in effect' (quoted in Hunt, 1996). Act asserted a similar view 
in their Minority Report to the Electoral Law Select Committee Inquiry into 
Broadcasting in the 1996 General Election: 
Act New Zealand wishes to stress its view that political parties should be free to spend 
their own funds on advertising as they see fit and does not believe that taxpayer funds 
should be allocated for this purpose. Act New Zealand would be prepared to fund an 
33 See also: Pinto-Duschinsky (3 Nov 1997), who points to the Czech Republic, India, Mexico and Japan, as 
having equal or nearly-equal distribution of broadcasting time or money to parties. 
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advertising campaign entirely out of funds provided by its members and supporters but is 
banned from doing so (Electoral Law Committee, 1998: p.15). 
In a worse position than Act, parties that receive no state funding are denied any 
right to participate in broadcast advertising at all. The most significant examples 
of this are New Zealand First in the 1993 general election and the Progressive 
Coalition Party in 2002, when both parties did not meet the eligibility criteria for 
the allocation of broadcast time and were prohibited from purchasing their own 
time from their own funds.34 
One of the biggest criticisms of the regulations relating to broadcasting has come 
from within the Electoral Commission itself. After 1996, the Electoral 
Commissioner, Paul Harris, told the Electoral Law Select Committee that 'the 
current system of allocating time and funds to political parties for election 
broadcasting is unfair and unsatisfactory and the procedures required by the Act 
are very time-consuming, cumbersome and expensive' (Harris, 2002b). These 
criticisms were repeated again after the 1999 general election. Then following the 
2002 election, Harris called for a revamp of the rules on broadcasting funding, 
adding that, 'A party should then be free to buy time for election broadcasting, 
subject only to a modest increase in the current limit on its election expenses, 
and perhaps also to a secondary limit on its election broadcasting expenditure' 
(ibid).35 Harris described the Progressive Coalition's exclusion from advertising in 
2002 as 'undesirable and undemocratic' (quoted in Milne, 2002e). By contrast, in 
some other countries, such as Italy, electoral broadcasts are equal and free for 
all parties (Bianco and Gardini, 1999: p.26). 
34 However, individual candidates may broadcast (subject to their $20,000 limit) even if their parties do not 
receive broadcasting funding. 
35 According to Harris, the current rules are unfair, confusing and restrictive. He also admitted the anomaly 
of the ban on broadcast advertising, saying that parties 'can spend their own funds on newspaper 
advertising and maybe it's time to bring election broadcasting out of the area it's been restricted to' (quoted 
in TV3, 2002). 
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Donations to Political Parties 
In recent decades many Western democracies have made it compulsory for 
political parties to make information about their income sources public. In New 
Zealand, political parties have been required, since 1996, to disclose the names 
and addresses of all donors who have given more than $10,000.36 The records of 
donations for each calendar year must be audited and submitted by March 31 to 
the Electoral Commission, which makes them available for public inspection. 
Previously the Electoral Act specified that only electoral candidates - and not 
political parties - had to file general election expense returns. Candidates were 
required to itemise any donations received, but invariably they only revealed the 
donations in a lump sum and listed the donor as the local party branch or 
electorate committee, and hence the actual source of their funds usually 
remained hidden (Speden, 1995d: p.2). 37 
The donation disclosure legislation for parties was passed in 1995, during the 
transition to MMP, when the party composition of Parliament was in flux and the 
National Government had lost its majority control on the Electoral Law Select 
Committee. In this situation both the Alliance and New Zealand First attempted to 
amend the Electoral Reform Bill to make the disclosure of party funding 
compulsory - a move that gained the support not only of the Labour Party, but of 
a number of ex-National Party MPs, such as Michael Laws. In his Disclosure of 
Political Donations and Gifts Bill, New Zealand First leader Winston Peters 
proposed that parties and candidates be required to disclose all donations of 
$500 or more and identify the donors. In contrast, Labour proposed more 
moderate legislation that put the threshold at $350 for parties at the electorate 
level, and a threshold of $3500 for the national level.38 Eventually a concession 
36 The Electoral Act (1993: s.214). Between 1996 and 2002 parties were also obliged to disclose any 
donations over $1000 at the electorate level. 
37 Electoral candidates' returns do not have to be audited. 
38 The RCES recommended thresholds of $250 at the electorate level, and $2,500 at the national level. 
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was made to National, whereby thresholds of $1000 and $10,000 were 
incorporated into the Electoral Act 1993.39 Later in 2002, the $1000 electoral 
threshold was removed, leaving a simplified $10,000 threshold for both the 
electorate and national level.4o The public are firmly in favour of regulating 
donations to the parties. According to a 1992 NBR-Mattingly public opinion poll, 
'90 per cent of those polled believed all donations to political parties should be 
declared publicly' (Laugesen, 1995). 
The argument in favour of the compulsory public disclosure of donations to 
parties relates to the potential corrupting influence of donations on political 
parties and governments. Proponents of disclosure say that the best safeguard 
against such corruption is for the public to be fully informed about party finances, 
because as US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously once said, 
'sunlight is the best disinfectant'. If such transactions are made public, then 
corruption is more likely to be noticed and is thereby discouraged. It is also 
argued that donation disclosure aids voters in understanding the likely policies, 
activities, and political style of a party, because the influences on the party are 
visible (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
There have been a number of objections made against the state monitoring of 
donations. Most of these objections rest on the issue of 'the right to privacy' of 
either the political party or the donor. Such objectors have argued that the 
disclosure to the state and public of a party's finances violates the right to privacy 
of belief and association. Those opposed to the encroachment of state 
intervention on individuals' daily lives have argued that the secrecy of the ballot 
should logically extend to donations: 
After all, it is now accepted that the old system of voting, where votes were cast in public, 
inhibited free electoral choice, since electors came under pressure to cast their votes 
according to the instructions and the interests of their landlords and their bosses. 
39 The Electoral Act (1993: s.214). 
40 The Electoral Amendment Act (No 2) 2002. 
Chapter Nine: State Regulation of Parties 603 
Freedom necessitated a secret ballot. On the same lines, it may be argued that free 
participation in politics is liable to be inhibited if donors are forced to declare themselves. 
Wherever donors to political parties are obliged to reveal their payments, they are forced 
at the same time to declare their political allegiances. The principles of the secret ballot 
are negated (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
Likewise, some on the left have argued that such regulation of political donations 
has far-reaching consequences for those political entities that challenge the 
status quo. Disclosure rules might have an inhibiting effect on the donations of 
money to opposition or radical parties, thereby contributing to ideological erosion 
by reducing the participation of non-centrist actors. Pinto-Duschinsky puts 
forward the argument that in societies or periods when opposition is less 
tolerated, 'citizens will hardly dare to come out in open support of opposition 
candidates. Disclosure will strongly favour the governing regime' (ibid). For this 
reason, in the United States the Socialist Workers Party 'refused to publish its list 
of contributors because it might make them subject to police surveillance, and 
the Supreme Court upheld their exemption, citing their history of government 
harassment' (Linton, 1994: p.81). 
New Zealand's disclosure rules are not as tough as in many countries,41 and 
appear to be a compromise solution to objections to, and support of, regulation. 
On the one hand, the rules accept that when donations are relatively small 
($10,000 or less) then the right to privacy should prevail, but when donations are 
large (over $10,000) they must be disclosed. Significantly, there are also no 
limitations imposed on donations, although recently there has been some support 
from the public and politicians for a ban on donations from anonymous sources.42 
The Labour Party, the Green Party, and the Electoral Commission have all stated 
41 The New Zealand disclosure threshold is very high (and therefore lax) by international comparison: 
Australia: AUS$1500; Canada: CAN$100; Germany: DM20,000; Greece: US$1225; Italy: 5 Million Lire; 
United States: US$100 (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
42 See: Speden (1999k), Geddis (2002b), Oliver (2002), Revington (2002: p.32), NZPA (2002k), and NZPA 
(2003k). Interestingly, the Royal Commission originally recommended a law that political parties could not 
actually accept anonymous donations. The Electoral Commission has also said publicly that allowing 
significant anonymous donations undermines the integrity of the donations regime. 
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their preference for the rules relating to anonymous donations to be tightened. 
Some in National also support a ban on political trusts and anonymous 
donations. For instance, ex-party president John Collinge has said, 'I think that if 
you're going to make donations publishable, then you should disallow a device 
that enables you to hide where those donations come from' (quoted in Gardiner, 
2000). And according to NBR-Mattingly's 1992 poll, 'Fifty-seven per cent said 
there should be a ban on business donations to political parties' (Laugesen, 
1995). In the past New Zealand also had laws relating to the financial relationship 
between trade unions and political parties. Robert Milne has outlined changes to 
this legislation between the 1930s and 1960s: 
The Political Disabilities Removal Act of 1936 empowered trade unions to make grants to 
a political party, even if this were not provided for in their rules. By an amending act of the 
National Government in 1950 it was stipulated that such political expenditure could be 
sanctioned only by a majority vote of the total membership (not just of the votes cast). In 
practice this provision was widely, and safely, ignored by the unions .... Unlike Britain, 
there is no provision by which individual members of unions can contract out of union 
contributions to party funds. Legislation by the Labour Government in 1960 substantially 
restored the 1936 provisions (Milne, 1966: p.105).43 
Since this time, the regulation of donations has been concerned exclusively with 
disclosure.44 This has still concerned party fundraisers. Prior to the introduction of 
state regulation of donations in New Zealand, arguments were made by party 
organisations that the public exposure of donors would lead to a reduction of 
funding to parties. The then president of the National Party, Geoff Thompson, 
stated that, 'The requirement to disclose political donations will lead to a drying 
up of funds. This is the overseas experience and although donations are likely to 
resume at a lower level, after 3-4 years, when donors get used to the idea of their 
43 This legislation has remained unchanged since 1960. 
44 In some countries, the regulation of donations by the state sometimes also extends to the proscribing of 
donations by certain organisations. In Brazil, Germany, France, Turkey, and the US there are restrictions on 
donations to parties by trade unions (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). In Germany, for example, 'Unions may not 
donate more than 10 percent of their budgets and they are subject to a specific tax of 50 percent on their 
political donations' (ibid). Likewise, in a number of countries, including Sweden, France, Italy Germany and 
the US, there are strong restrictions on corporations making donations to political parties (DOUblet, 1999: 
p.70). 
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privacy being breached, funds for parties will be tight' (Thompson, 1995: p.4). 
This prediction has since been confirmed by both the Labour and National 
parties, who have complained about their problems attracting funding since the 
regulations came into effect.45 
Despite the negative pUblicity about political donations, it can also be argued that 
the gifting of money to political parties is a democratic and justifiable act. 
According to Linton, 'Parties are vehicles for political action and people who want 
to effect political change will express their support for parties not just in votes and 
in voluntary effort, but in money' (Linton, 1994: p.1). The assumption that it is a 
negative thing for political parties to be influenced to deliver policies favourable to 
the financial backers is also a questionable one - although there are few people 
willing to defend the concept of the financial resourcing of political parties by 
partisan interests. Margaret Wilson, in contrast, has stated that she sees 'nothing 
wrong with people contributing to political parties expecting them to deliver the 
type of policies they support' (Wilson, 1998: p.173). Such a process is merely the 
consequence of different civil interests participating at the political level of 
society. As argued in Chapter Seven, Labour and National have traditionally been 
backed by various organised sections of New Zealand society, and this has 
generally had a positive effect on party politics. It became considered normal for 
interest groups, community organisations and businesses to be partisan, 
supporting their representative party with the supply of financial resources or just 
the legitimacy afforded by their endorsement. In more recent times, however, it 
has become fashionable to decry the linkage between party and societal 
institutions; the linkage between business and right-wing parties and between 
45 For example, it was reported in 1996 that 'National Party president Geoff Thompson told the party's 
annual conference in June that National was already suffering a funding squeeze because of the new law' 
(Maclennan, 1996: p.C4). According to Thompson, donors were 'generally reluctant to have their privacy 
invaded' (quoted in Armstrong, 1996). Likewise, in 1996 labour's president reported a significant decline in 
donations (Maclennan, 1996: p.C4). The 1997-2001 National Party president, John Slater, has confirmed 
the ongoing problems caused by the regulations, but suggested a renewed willingness to donate (Slater, 
1999). See Chapter Five for more on the fall in corporate donations. 
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trade unions with left-wing parties has come to be seen as somewhat insidious. 
The endorsement of a party by an organised grouping has come to be 
associated negatively with self-interest and unseemly financial arrangements. 
Pinto-Duschinsky has argued that it is merely common sense for organisations to 
seek outcomes that benefit them: 
The basic justification is that individual businesses, trade unions, and organisations 
representing groups of corporations or groups of unions are affected by government 
policies. They therefore have direct and legitimate reasons to try to secure the election of 
parties and candidates that will forward their interests. For instance, if a trade union 
wishes to secure legislation that sets a minimum wage or regulations on maximum 
permitted working hours, it may be necessary to lobby the government of the day to pass 
these measures. It may be equally or more rational to aid the election of union activists to 
the legislature who will work from the inside or to secure the return of a new government 
that is committed to these reforms (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
The fact that these societal organisations are the expression of collective voices 
makes their political interventions an obvious avenue for citizens to participate in 
the political process. After all, collective action by like-minded citizens is likely to 
be more effective than the actions of the individual: 
A contribution by a single individual is unlikely (unless it is exceptionally large) to have an 
influence on the party or the candidate to whom it is offered. By contrast, a political 
donation given by a corporation or trade association will be more effective from the 
contributors' viewpoint. As far as donations by working-class electors are concerned, it 
may be essential to pool a large number of small payments if any political impact is to be 
achieved - hence the justification of political donations by trade unions (ibid). 
Democratic Candidate Selection 
The state now imposes an element of internal democracy for all registered 
parties. The Electoral Act 1993 sets out a requirement 'for registered parties to 
follow democratic procedures in candidate selection' (Electoral ACt, 1993: s.71).46 
Before 1996 the processes for selecting parliamentary candidates had been left 
entirely in the hands of the parties themselves. Wood wrote that, 'the state has 
46 There are few countries in which the state regulates the selection of party candidates. According to 
Scarrow et aI., the other exceptions are Germany, the United States, Finland and Norway (Scarrow et aI., 
2000: p.138). 
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had no role in monitoring the internal organisation of a political party, nor in 
practice in determining whether or not a particular group could stand as a party in 
an election' (1994: p.175). According to the Electoral Commission, every 
registered political party is now obliged to make their selection of candidates in 
such a way that involves one of the following groups: 
[a] Current financial members of the party who are or would be entitled to vote for those 
candidates at any election; or 
[b] Delegates who have (whether directly or indirectly) in turn been elected or otherwise 
selected by current financial members of the party; or 
[c] A combination of the persons or classes of persons referred to in paragraphs [a] and 
[b] of this section (Electoral Commission, 1997b: p.19). 
These rules have opened up the internal affairs, rules and procedures of the 
parties to the eyes of the public and the possible legal intervention of the state. 
The candidate selection and membership rules of each registered party must be 
deposited with the Electoral Commission, and thus made available for public 
inspection. However, the Electoral Commission was never given any power to 
enforce the rules about democratic selection, or to intervene in any other way. 
Although the Electoral Act dictates that registration requires having internal party 
rules that adhere to the candidate-selection regulations prescribed, when actually 
registering the parties, the Commission cannot investigate a party's selection 
procedures as part of the registration process (McRobie, 1995: p.331). The 
Electoral Law Select Committee recommended instead, that in terms of redress, 
'some form of review can be sought in the High Court ... seeking a declaration 
that a party's rules or procedures are unlawful' (Johns, 1999: p.92). 
New Zealand First has been subject to controversy about whether their candidate 
selection processes are consistent with the requirements of the Electoral Act. In 
1997 two former New Zealand First candidates and parliamentary staffers, David 
Stevenson and Rex Wilderstrom took legal action against the party over the 
construction of its 1996 party list. The complainants alleged that 'a number of 
party rules were neglected in the procedures that party chiefs followed to 
construct the list.. .. [and that] New Zealand First did not order the list according 
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to the votes' of members (Clifton, 1998a: p.16). However, because both 
Stevenson and Wilderstrom had subsequently left the party, the court ruled that 
they were not eligible to take legal action.47 
Questions were also raised in 1998 about whether the Act party was acting 
legally when it choose to use a primary poll to select its candidate for the 
Taranaki-King Country by-election. Act mailed out primary voting papers to 
33,000 voters, asking them to select its candidate. In appearing to hand over the 
selection decision to the electorate, it looked as if the party membership was 
being bypassed. Act replied to such allegations by declaring that the local 
primary election would not be a binding decision and would only guide the 
decision of the party's selection committee. 
Part Three: Evaluating State Regulation 
There is a need to critically evaluate whether the set of regulations adopted in 
New Zealand is desirable, appropriate and effective in its objectives. It seems 
that the RCES, then the Electoral Law Select Committee and the Electoral 
Commission, have all agreed that the chosen degree of state intervention in New 
Zealand is not so intrusive that it is made problematic or undesirable. Few 
commentators question the closer relationship and intervention of the state in 
political party affairs. In fact, the role of the state in regulating political parties has 
had little discussion in New Zealand. By contrast, debate about it is 'a major 
stream of political discourse in the USA' (Johns, 1999: p.91). Futhermore, 'State 
legislation governs some aspects of the internal affairs of American parties (for 
federal elections), such as the selection of candidates through the primaries 
system, and the public funding and donation disclosure legislation is federally 
47 Later, in 1998, it was revealed by Michael Laws in his book The Demon Profession that the official list 
creation process was a pretence. According to Laws, the creation of the list was left to Peters, Laws and 
Peters' parliamentary assistant, Sarah Neems (Laws, 1998a: p.340). 
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administered' (ibid: p.91). But there are still many countries that do not require 
state registration for parties. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, moreover, the 
debate over issues like state registration is not clear-cut: 
There is good reason for not requiring the registration of political parties. The essence of 
electoral competition in a free society is that it should involve individuals and 
organizations that are voluntary and independent of unnecessary control by the public 
authorities (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
The RCES stated that 'Controls on political finance seek to regulate the 
interaction between political contestants, their electorate, and their supporters' 
(RCES, 1986: p.185). It has to be asked whether this is desirable. Alternatively, 
should not such interaction be allowed to occur without state interference? With 
all the changes in the regulation of parties, and especially in the requirement of 
parties to register with the Electoral Commission, Parliament has given the state 
more control over internal party affairs. Increasingly, internal disputes are likely to 
be resolved by the state rather than by party members and, inevitably, the 
introduction of state controls on internal political party activity brings the 
enforcement agencies of the state into the political process. The Electoral 
Commission is obliged to contact the Police about political parties who fail to 
meet the regulations. In 1999, the Electoral Commission reported 'the secretaries 
of six registered parties to the Police for not meeting some or all of the 
requirements of the Electoral Act 1993 in relation to returns of donations for 
1998' (Electoral Commission, 1999a: p.13). Eight party secretaries were also 
reported to the Police for failing to comply with the rules about the return of 
election expenses (Electoral Commission, 2000: p.19). As a result, political 
parties face considerable penalties for failing to follow state regulations. Failing to 
file a return of donations carries a maximum fine of $20,000, although thus far 
the courts have not applied heavy fines.48 The state also takes infringements of 
the spending limit very seriously. For example, following the 1987 general 
election an initially successful candidate, Reg Boorman, was disqualified from 
48 In 1998, for example, two parties failed to file returns: the Advance New Zealand party was convicted and 
fined $150, while the Republican Party was convicted but not fined (Dominion, 1999b: p.2). 
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Parliament after being judged to have exceeded the expenditure limit (James, 
2001 a: p.208). 
Whether it is appropriate to have the state and the legal system involved in 
parties' candidate selection processes has also not been the subject of public 
debate in New Zealand. Commenting on the general issue, Judge Hodge has 
declared: 'We don't want judges running the internal machinery of political parties 
- and the judges themselves don't want this' (quoted in McManus, 1993: p.5). 
The RCES also claimed to recognise the problems of the state-party relationship: 
'we recognise that there are dangers inherent in excessive State intervention in 
the democratic process. If taken too far, controls may represent an unjustifiable 
intrusion on the freedom of individuals, groups, political parties and candidates' 
(RCES, 1986: p.185). 
There are many reasons to question the fairness of state regulation of parties in 
general. As Pinto-Duschinsky says of the regulations imposed by the state: 'there 
is the underlying danger that they will benefit some parties at the expense of 
others. With the best will in the world, it is hard to devise neutral regulations. In 
fact, the ruling authorities of the day make the regulations' and cannot be 
expected to create rules that disadvantage themselves (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
Furthermore, the interventionist elements of the Electoral Act clearly impose an 
expensive and bureaucratic demand upon some parties. As an example of this, 
the leader of the tiny and now-defunct Mana Wahine party, Alamein Kopu, has 
outlined her party's dispute with the authorities over her initial refusal to submit 
the audited accounts of donations the party had received, because no donations 
had been made: 
We had no returns. And we didn't think it warranted a man's signature - it had to be.a 
chartered accountant - to sign it. That signature cost us $900 - $900 just to get a man's 
signature .... We didn't have any koha [donations] from anybody, and they still want you 
to get a chartered accountant's signature ... They had nothing to audit (quoted in the 
Dominion, 2001: p.8). 
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The measures are, therefore, anti-democratic, in the sense that parties that put 
themselves up for election are increasingly finding that their operations are 
policed by officials and judges who are less accountable to the public. Ironically, 
however, it is the behaviour of the parties and their acceptance of donations that 
is viewed by the public as being undemocratic, sparking complaints about the 
dangerous influence of unaccountable party bosses. 
It also needs to be pointed out that state intervention often has unintended 
consequences. For example, the fact that the expenditure limits used to apply to 
candidates and not parties had the affect of constraining individual campaigning, 
and promoting the expenditure of - and thus growth of - national party 
organisations. According to Ware, in such situations, candidates very rapidly 
'became relatively minor elements in campaigning, and by the mid-twentieth 
century they could add very little themselves to the total vote that their party 
could accrue at an election' (Ware, 1996: p.294). Now the reverse is possible -
parties are potentially able to spend beyond their election expenditure limit by 
promoting individual candidates in their electorates rather than the party. 
Modern state intervention has important consequences for political parties. Peter 
Mair has argued that, 'much of the character of contemporary party organization 
and party activity is increasingly shaped by state regulations' (Mair, 1997: p.142). 
The establishment of rules for how parties operate leads to convergence in ways 
of organising the parties. Rules about candidate selection, membership criteria, 
fundraising and so forth, force parties to adapt their operations. Even the state's 
setting of electoral rules affects the organisation of political parties - for example, 
on a basic level the way in which geographical electorates are created has had a 
huge impact on the structures and activities of the political parties in that they 
have nearly always developed a hierarchical branch structure that mimics the 
existence of electorates.49 In a similar way, the laws limiting election expenditure 
49 The redrawing of electoral boundaries inevitably reconfigures the internal structures of political parties 
each time they are carried out. When the transition to MMP made the consolidation of 99 electorates into 65 
612 Chapter Nine: State Regulation of Parties 
have the perverse effect of triggering an early start to the election campaign by 
the parties. Partly because the parties are restricted in their expenditure for the 
three-month period before the election, the parties are increasingly inclined to 
campaign throughout the parliamentary term. This pushes the parties further in 
an electoral-professional direction. 
In other countries, the state laws applying to parties have been overtly influential 
on the nature of the party organisations: 
In Norway, long-standing laws which offer state financial support for nomination meetings 
which are conducted in a particular way have encouraged the parties to adopt a uniform 
procedure of candidate selection (Svasand, 1994). In Austria, the constitutional principle 
of the 'free mandate' effectively prevents any formal attempt to bring the party in public 
office under the control of the extra-parliamentary party (Muller, 1994) (Mair, 1997: 
p.142). 
In New Zealand, the political parties are increasingly adopting similar 
organisational methods. They are increasingly similar in the way they organise 
their memberships, fundraising, campaign methods, conferences, decision-
making and internal communications. This contrasts strongly with the situation 
half a century ago. In 1954, visiting scholar David S North noted that while the 
heavily regulated US party system ensured that each political party had the same 
internal framework, 'The reverse is the case in New Zealand, where the absence 
of any law regulating the parties as such has allowed each party to evolve its 
own internal structure' (North, 1954: p.6). Since that time, with the introduction of 
the new party laws, it seems that substantial organisational variations are 
becoming outdated, adding to the growing convergence of the parties. 
The Effectiveness of the Regulations 
In evaluating the impact and appropriateness of the state regulations it is 
important to ascertain their effectiveness in achieving their stated objectives. 
necessary, all the main political parties were forced to make SUbstantial changes to their party operations in 
those electorates. 
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Many of the opponents of state regulation allege that the interventions of the 
state into party affairs are prone to failure. This is because it is in the interests of 
at least some parties to evade the rules, and they inevitably find legal means to 
do so. According to Pinto-Duschinsky, 'In country after country, the introduction 
of new regulations has been followed by the development of new loopholes and 
new methods of financing politics that escape existing rules' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 
common, 10 Sep 1998). 
The failure of regulation is most obvious in regard to the disclosure of donations. 
In this area there are a number of loopholes whereby large donations can be 
made without being declared. That these loopholes are very effective is 
suggested by the large discrepancy between what parties declare in their returns 
of donations, and what they spend in the three months before polling day. For 
instance, in the 2002 general election Labour spent $2,089,797 (including 
broadcast advertising) but for that year only declared $617,719 to the Electoral 
Commission. Likewise, Act spent $1,791,858 (including broadcast advertising) 
but only declared $88,971 in the same year. The discrepancies might simply be 
explained by the fact that parties do not have to report all income or because 
they may spend part of their income raised in previous non-election years. It 
appears likely, however, that parties are accepting many large donations in such 
a way that does not require disclosure. 
Sometimes political parties attempt to evade the regulations by getting their 
donors to break their large contributions into smaller donations that are below the 
level specified in the state regulations. In order to prevent those making a series 
of donations of amounts below the threshold from being excluded from a party's 
report on donations, the Electoral Act requires that all donations from the same 
source must be aggregated for the year.50 There is, however, nothing to stop a 
50 The Electoral Act (1993: s.214F). 
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donor from breaking down their contribution and attaching different names to the 
amounts.51 
Most controversially, the Electoral Act allows political parties to record a donor as 
'anonymous', thus permitting large donations to continue to be unaccounted for.52 
In the 2002 election year the parties disclosed $1,558,951 in donations over 
$10,000, of which $692,600 came from anonymous sources.53 Furthermore, 
anonymous donations below the threshold for aggregation logically do not need 
to be aggregated annually. This means that a donor could anonymously 
contribute, say, $9,999, every day of the year, and none of the payments would 
have to be declared. While the regulations stipulate that for a political party to 
label a donation as 'anonymous', the donor must be truly unknown to the party, in 
reality it is not possible to police such rules. 
Alternatively, parties can direct donations through bogus business ventures. For 
example, according to rules outlined by the Electoral Commission, 'People who 
pay to attend a fund-raising event will generally be paying for goods or services 
rather than making a donation' and hence are not subject to the disclosure 
regulations (Electoral Commission, 1998b: p.14). Pblitical parties can therefore 
hold fundraising events, such as a dinner function with the attendance of party 
leaders, to which entry would require a large amount of money, and this would be 
deemed a business transaction rather than a political contribution.54 
51 One Act party donor, Trevor Farmer, opted for this mechanism in order to contribute $115,000 to the 
party, by using 12 individuals to make payments of less than $10,000 each (Johns, 2001a: p.A5b). 
52 The Electoral Act (1993: s.214G[1]). 
53 In the 1999 election year the level of anonymous donations was even higher - the parties disclosed $2.1 
million from anonymous sources, as compared to $1.6 million from named sources. 
54 Other overseas examples of such business ventures include the sale of 'party yearbooks and publications 
in which corporations and individuals purchase advertising space, or 'consultancy' and advisory services 
provided by party officials' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). 
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A further way of providing covert assistance is to donate 'in kind' contributions 
instead of financial payments. By providing free or discounted goods or services 
that would otherwise need to be purchased, a donation is effectively made. 
\ 
However, in New Zealand the government regulations also apply to these non-
cash donations. The Electoral Commission has pointed out: 'If goods and 
services are provided to a party under a contract at 90 percent or less of their 
reasonable market value, the amount of the difference between the contractual 
price of the goods and services and their reasonable market value should be 
recorded as a donation' (Electoral Commission, 1998b: p.14). The extent to 
which the Electoral Commission polices such in-kind donations is not known.55 
Donations can also be disguised as loans. In this situation, 'The party stands to 
benefit from below-market interest rates. Moreover, if the party proves unable to 
repay the loan it may be possible for the donor to write off the loan at a later 
stage as a business loss' (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1998). This occurred in New 
Zealand during the 1950s, when trade unions were restricted in the donations 
they could make to political parties, and according to Milne, they therefore would 
often 'make a contribution to the Labour Party in the disguise of a "loan", which 
was not repaid and was later written off' (Milne, 1966: p.1 05). 
A common scheme is to direct money from donors through other entities. In New 
Zealand, these entities are often trusts. As discussed in Chapter Five, the arrival 
of such conduits mirrors the development of political action committees (PACs) in 
the United States. These PACs are connected to parties and candidates but are 
55 Certainly plenty of stories exist in New Zealand of wealthy party supporters putting pri~ate aircraft or cars 
at the disposal of the parties. Shops and offices, in particular, are often made available as gifts. This is 
confirmed by Mark Stonyer of United Future New Zealand: 'I know that there are people running for 
electorates around the country that had for example shops in mainstreet situations that didn't appear on their 
returns of electorate donations - because they were free' (Stonyer, 1999). Richard Prebble was reported in 
1996 as having 'a computerised office in the hub of the high-priced Wellington suburb of Thorndon, with 
most of the expense - including premises, equipment and staff - donated by Wellington Act supporters' 
(Clifton, 1996a: p.3). 
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all legally unrelated to them and therefore are unaffected by the laws relating to 
donations and campaign expenditure. For instance, in the past the Act party has 
assigned an associated organisation called the Association of Consumers and 
Taxpayers Inc to collect donations on behalf of the party and then to donate the 
lump sum to Act. The donations from the public to this 'non-party' organisation do 
not have to be declared to the Electoral Commission - only the overall annual 
donation made from the Association to Act has to be recorded. In 1997 the 
Association of Consumers and Taxpayers donated $62,500 to ACt.56 Likewise, 
the National Party has channelled some of its donations through the supposedly 
independent New Zealand Free Enterprise Trust, receiving $685,000 from it 
between 1998 and 2001. In 1999 a related organisation named The Southern 
Free Enterprise Trust donated a further $78,013 to various National Party 
electorate organisations. Such entities are clearly a front for receiving money for 
the party in a form that means National can avoid having to disclose an 
embarrassingly large amount of 'anonymous' donations.57 Labour, too, has been 
reported as advocating the use of solicitor trust funds to channel anonymous 
donations from businesses that the party has approached for funding (Milne, 
2001 a: p.2). Similarly, donations can be made to the personal funds of 
politicians, and therefore the parties never have to declare the income (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1998). 
There are many other parts of the regulation regime that are less than robust. 
The limitations on election spending, for example, are more relaxed and open to 
manipulation than might be expected. First, although it is often thought that 
parties are subject to a limit (as well as disclosure) on all of their election 
spending, the limit actually only applies to general' advertising expenditure. Party 
56 In 1996 Act also set up some elaborate trusts in order to circumvent the newly-introduced donation 
disclosure rules. Documents leaked to the Sunday Star-Times in 2001 showed that $6.77 million was 
deposited into such trusts (Johns, 2001 a: p.A 1). See also: Chapter Seven. 
57 The chairman of the New Zealand Free Enterprise Trust is ex-National Party president George Chapman. 
Another former party president, Geoff Thompson, 'has acknowledged telling people who want to give money 
to National anonymously to send their cash to the trust' (Gardiner, 2000). 
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spending on many other types of election campaigning - such as opinion polling 
or travel expenses - are excluded from both the disclosure requirements and the 
limits on expenditure. This, too, is likely to have many perverse consequences, 
with parties directing their funds into these exempt areas. Second, another 
'loophole' relates to the fact that candidates have their own separate spending 
limit of $20,000. Party election expenditure can conceivably be categorised as 
'candidate spending' and therefore omitted from disclosure and the party's 
allowable expenditure. Third, the rules relating to the timing of when the spending 
limitations apply are open to manoeuvre. In the 1998 Taranaki-King Country by-
election, for example, the Act party was able to legitimately spend substantially 
more than its $40,000 by-election limit. This was due to the fact that the limit 
applies only after the candidate is selected. Act only decided on its candidate at a 
late stage, after already spending a great deal of money on the campaign. An 
irregularity of the monitoring regulations also means that the spending rules only 
apply to parties and not any of the partisan lobby groups that participate in the 
election campaigns.58 
The Electoral Commission has very few powers to investigate discrepancies or to 
check that the parties are following the rules. The system essentially relies on the 
honesty of the parties and politicians. The Electoral Commission must, it seems, 
take the parties at their word on any regulation inconsistencies and problems. 
One such example put forward by David Lange, about Labour MP Phillip Field, is 
worth quoting at length because it shows the difficulties in policing the 
regulations: 
Mr Field returned expenditure of $14,996, accounting for his spending on posters, 
pamphlets, hoardings and signwriting. He did not declare the costs of advertising two 
campaign fundraising socials and a campaign rally, or the costs of the food, drink and 
58 Any advertising by a lobby group expressly supporting a party or a candidate must be agreed to by the 
candidate or party since it counts towards election expenses. However, if the advertising does not 
'expressly' support a candidate or party then these regulations do not apply. Examples include election-time 
advertising campaigns by Employers Federation in favour of the EGA, by the Engineers Union in favour of 
removing National from government, and a publishing company selling one of Richard Prebble's books. 
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entertainment which were offered at these events. He made no allowance for the running 
costs of his campaign van, or for its purchase price or its depreciation. On the other side 
of the ledger, he returned a donation of $5000 from the Otara Labour Party Trust, but did 
not disclose another sum of $15,000 given to him by the same trust. These matters were 
referred to the Electoral Office, which referred them to Mr Field. After considering his 
reply, the Electoral Office decided that it would not refer Mr Field's return to the police, 
because it was not satisfied that any offence against the Electoral Act had been 
committed. The act broadly has it that campaign spending need be returned if it relates 
exclusively to the campaign for the return of the candidate (spending which relates to the 
return of two or more candidates is to be apportioned). Mr Field told the Electoral Office 
that the advertising left out of his return did not relate exclusively to his campaign. "The 
fund-raising social," he declared, "was held to raise funds which were used for a variety 
of purposes including for the Labour Party as a whole. Proceeds also went towards 
funding the Mangere Labour Party organisation, including its local committee activities, 
meetings and levies payable to the party's head office." According to the Electoral Office, 
the undeclared advertising for the campaign rally promoted not only Mr Field's candidacy 
but also the launch of Labour's Pacific Island policy, noting that in respect of the 
campaign social, the member had stated that this "was also not a function exclusively 
related to the campaign for my return as the candidate for Mangere". The costs of the 
vehicle, Mr Field advised, were not declared because it was purchased while he was not 
only candidate for Mangere but MP for Otara, and needed the van for his electoral work 
as well as his election campaign (Lange, 1997c: p.11). 
Most of the regulations of the parties relate to political finance. However, as 
Chapter Seven argued, New Zealand party politics does not actually involve a 
great deal of money, apart from the substantial funds spent by the parties that 
are provided through parliamentary resourcing. It is interesting that it is this 
parliamentary funding that is highly unregulated. If there is any urgent need for 
political regulation, it is in this area. 
Controls on party finance grow out of the belief that such expenditure has a 
significant impact on electoral fortunes. However, there is increasing doubt as to 
whether higher spending on elections is of any great benefit. The discussion in 
Chapter Seven showed that there is reason to believe that the much of the 
money spent by political parties is not particularly effective. The tables of 
expenditure against votes suggested that the more that political parties spent, the 
more their average 'cost per vote' rose. In Britain, Justin Fisher analysed annual 
data from 1959 to 1994 in order to answer the question of whether increased 
party spending at the national level is electorally significant. He found 'that there 
is insufficient evidence wholly to support this proposition', concluding that 'party 
spending at national level may not be as effective in electoral terms as is often 
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suggested' (Fisher, 1999a: pp.519, 530). Overall, then, it is debatable that 
access to large amounts of money is of such huge electoral advantage to any 
party that it requires strict regulation. In New Zealand, it is not always the party 
with the most money that wins. The 1993 election was the last contest in which 
the party with the most (non-Electoral Commission) money won. 
It might be more appropriate, therefore, if political parties were left to regulate 
themselves and voters trusted to make their own decisions on whether the 
activities of political parties are acceptable or not. Arguably, society has its own 
built-in suspicions of corruption and antagonisms towards high-spending 
politicians. There is a well-established voter caution against parties 'buying' their 
way into office. Chapter Seven showed that New Zealand voters are inclined to 
dislike and distrust parties that spend heavily. Many voters are also suspicious of 
parties that appear to be close to business donors. Such an idea is seen in Jack 
Vowles' view that the public debate in New Zealand about campaign spending 
and the effect of donations began following the Labour Party's 1987 election 
campaign, where the party was alleged to have spent over $3.5 million, mostly 
made up of business donations (Vowles, 2002b: pp.420-421). 
This debate and the increasing suspicion of ties between the Labour Party and 
big business occurred before the state regulations were in existence. In this 
sense, the public are already on guard against such violations of political culture 
and there is therefore a role for academics and journalists to investigate and 
evaluate these issues of interest regarding how the parties operate. Even without 
state intervention, it normally becomes apparent to voters which parties are 
utilising large amounts of money. Academics and the media together usually play 
a useful role in this respect, investigating the financial relationships of parties. 
Yet, if anything, the introduction of state regulation appears to have led to 
decreased media and academic interest in party finance, as the state's regulation 
now purports to make political finance more transparent and less open to abuse 
and corruption. 
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In contrast to this civil society model of party regulation, state regulation therefore 
gives the public a false sense of security about party activities. The regulations 
succeed in reassuring voters of the legitimacy of the political system, yet as this 
chapter has shown, many of the regulations do not work. There are so many 
loopholes that make the regulations ineffective. Voters (and the media) might 
now think that a level playing field exists in party politics and that corruption is 
less likely, but such confidence is unfounded. The nature of the political activity 
that the state is seeking to regulate means that such loopholes will always exist 
in various forms. Therefore the great danger of the regulations is that they give 
political parties cover for their activities, removing suspicions of political 
corruption and linkages. 
Conclusion 
The importance of party autonomy and independence from the state is not just 
an esoteric principle or belief, but something that has a real impact on politics. 
The increasingly low level of independence affects the way that parties organise, 
and most importantly, it affects parties' relationship with social constituencies -
again reducing pressure on them to formulate, promote and deliver policies that 
represent these voter groups. 
Little has been written on the regulation of parties in New Zealand, and certainly 
very little that is critical of regulation. However, John Henderson and Paul 
Bellamy have summarised the New Zealand situation, stating,' 'There are no 
restrictions on party activity as long as these activities do not violate any of the 
[other] relevant laws and regulations' (2002: p.67). Yet, there are in fact some 
important legal prohibitions and limitations on parties, which have been detailed 
in this chapter. And although Henderson and Bellamy have said, 'The procedures 
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for registration of candidates and parties are fair' (ibid: p.60), this chapter has put 
forward a number of reasons why this might not be the case. 
Together with the last chapter on state funding, this chapter proposes a debate 
about whether parties should be given greater freedom from regulation and state 
patronage - perhaps about whether they should be 'privati sed' and released from 
public ownership and control. In a sense, this is actually about parties being 
given back to the public - or at least to the various constituencies of the public 
that used to be the foundations for various parties. 
The main question to arise centres on the extent to which it is proper for the state 
to supervise and intervene in the activities of voluntary associations such as 
political parties. Clearly, the regulation of parties undermines their private and 
voluntary nature. Just as the postwar process of corporatism brought interest 
groups into a state-client relationship, the parties have been legally recognised 
by the state and taken under their wing.· This has compromised their ability to 
represent their respective economic or social sectors. Parties need to stop being 
treated as 'public utilities', but instead be seen as an essential part of civil society 
at a remove from the state. Democracy is enhanced by political parties having 
sovereignty over their own affairs and voters making the final decision on 
whether they approve of the political nature and organisational practices of a 
particular party. 
This chapter has argued that these regulations - because of their inevitable 
inadequacies - act to obscure the public's understanding of where parties obtain 
their finances and how they spend them. The anomalies of state regulation have 
been highlighted, as well as the unintended consequences. The chapter has also 
pointed out that regulations only have a limited effectiveness. In New Zealand 
and other countries, the introduction of regulations is inevitably followed by the 
development of new loopholes. Furthermore, in New Zealand the Electoral 
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Commission has little power to police the Electoral Act. Therefore, there is a 
strong case to be made for the deregulation of the party system. 
In order to make political parties more acceptable to the public it is likely that their 
activities actually require less state intervention rather than further regulation. 
The parties need to have their essentially private nature reconfirmed by the state 
and therefore to be free from the requirement to hand over internal information 
about their finances and membership to the state and from restraints in their 
other private activities. In such a deregulated scenario, political parties would still 
be obliged to abide by the laws that govern other societal organisations, and their 
party names and logos could still be protected by intellectual property law. The 
media and academics should also still play their part in investigating the 
operations of parties. Most importantly, however, it would be the voters, giving 
their verdict in elections, who would be the final arbiters or regulators. In an 
ideological sense, deregulation and removal of subsidies would encourage 
parties to be more independent, more politically distinctive and more responsive 
to the members and sections of society that they purport to represent. This is 
necessary because as parties become increasingly state-orientated, and are 
correspondingly less firmly tied to civil society, they are becoming more politically 
bland and centrist. 
Although this chapter makes an argument for the deregulation of political parties, 
its main purpose is more explanatory than to provide solutions. It seeks to 
provide an additional explanation for why parties have been prone to ideological 
erosion. It suggests that parties' growing relationships with the state have been 
proportionally inverse to their declining connections with civil society. This has 
made them increasingly independent of pressures from key social constituencies 
to represent their social and economic interests. If this new pattern of politics is 
something that is deemed to be negative for society (and this thesis argues that it 
is), it might indeed seem advisable to deregulate the party system. However, 
deregulation will not solve the deeper problem. For beyond this argument over 
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regulation is a new reality. The connection of parties with civil society is now so 
weak and tenuous that it is debatable whether either the parties or the public can 
monitor and regulate the types of party activity discussed in this chapter. When 
parties operated under the model of the mass party they were better able to 
attain the confidence of voters, but this time has passed. This chapter is 
therefore another part of the critique of the modern electoral-professional party 
model. 
Discussion of all these issues has been virtually non-existent in New Zealand 
society, let alone the academic field. New Zealand seems to be going down the 
track of a highly-regulated political system where the parties act as 'virtual 
government departments', yet the public has had no input into this change. For 
instance, no voters have been asked if the parties should be co-opted into the 
state apparatus. Furthermore, little research has been carried out as to whether 
the public believes affirmative action programmes should be extended to the 
party system - it is just taken for granted that the state needs to intervene in the 
party system to produce a level playing field. While there may always be the 
need for the state to play some sort of referee role in democratic politics, it could 
be argued that in New Zealand the referee has become a very interventionist one 
and now disturbs the natural 'flow of the game' . 
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Chapter Ten 
Anti-Partyism and the Electoral-Professional Party 
There is a passive revolt going on in New Zealand against political parties. A 
substantial number of New Zealanders are increasingly disillusioned, dissatisfied 
or uninterested in political parties. This has been a growing phenomenon since 
the 1950s, but one that accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter argues 
that this revolt is a logical consequence of the significant changes in party politics 
that are examined in this thesis. In particular, it is a response to the shift by the 
parties from class mass organisations to electoral-professional cadre 
organisations. This transition, which also began in the 1950s, has not only meant 
that the New Zealand parties have become more centrist and pragmatic, but they 
are increasingly professionalized, dependent on the .state for their resources, 
more based on heterogeneous voter support, and generally less connected to 
civil society. As well as making this shift, the parties have had to adapt their 
policies to globalisation and the need to maintain New Zealand's economic 
viability. Since 1984, this adaptation has had a significant affect on the way the 
public perceives parties. 
This negative public response towards parties can be summed up by the general 
term 'anti-partyism', which covers sentiments and responses ranging from 
outright antagonism towards the very concept of political parties through to a 
more passive detachment or apathy relating to parties and politics. In this sense, 
the concept of anti-partyism is therefore about the absence of popular legitimacy 
for contemporary political parties. People with anti-party sentiments might still 
think the institution of the party is necessary, but they are dissatisfied with, or 
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alienated from, the current party system. A number of indicators can be used to 
establish the existence and extent of this anti-partyism. This chapter examines 
these and shows how such attitudes have been increasing since the 1950s, but 
have become more endemic since the mid-1980s. 
The electorate's growing alienation from partisan politics is an international 
phenomenon, but comparisons are made in this chapter to illustrate that the New 
Zealand case of anti-party sentiment is a particularly advanced one. This is 
despite the fact that the New Zealand political system was once internationally 
regarded as a model of political participation, in part because the public had 
relatively positive attitudes towards the institution of the political party. 1 David 
Denemark has pointed out, for example, that 'more than in any western 
democracy, New Zealand's electoral politics have sustained as their hallmarks, 
strong party loyalty and high levels of party identification, unequalled levels of 
voting turnout, and a widespread trust of political institutions' (Denemark, 1990: 
pp.62-63). According to Jack Vowles, 'New Zealand political culture in the 1960s 
( 
was characterised by relatively high levels not only of voter participation but also 
of party membership, political efficacy, harmony, integration, trust and high 
sense of civic duty' (Vowles, 1998: p.105). 
These positive features have been eroding since the 1950s, and the New 
Zealand case might now be seen as displaying a relatively high level of anti-
partyism. For example, according to Vowles et al. (1995), 'The level of political 
distrust reached in New Zealand surpasses the heights attained in the United 
States at the peak of that country's loss of faith in its political system' (Vowles et 
aI., 1995: p.136). That New Zealanders are alienated from political parties is one 
1 Denemark has pointed out, for example, that 'more than in any western democracy, New Zealand's 
electoral politics have sustained as their hallmarks, strong party loyalty and high levels of party 
identification, unequalled levels of voting turnout, and a widespread trust of political institutions' (Denemark, 
1990: pp.62-63). According to Vowles, 'New Zealand political culture in the 1960s was characterised by 
relatively high levels not only of voter participation but also of party membership, political efficacy, harmony, 
integration, trust and high sense of civic duty' (Vowles, 1998b: p.1 05). 
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of the single most important political facts of our time. During the 1990s, the 
public's respect and tolerance for parties dropped to an all-time low. Although the 
parties are still central to the political process - especially under the Mixed 
Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system - they are remote from a society 
that distrusts them and believes they lack relevance. 
A popular scepticism now exists about the integrity and honesty of the 'political 
class', and there is an increasingly widespread belief that the established 
politicians are self-serving and untrustworthy. As Bruce Jesson has pointed out, 
'Traditional allegiances have been replaced by a mood of utter cynicism. The 
division between the political parties is no longer the dominating feature of the 
political scene; there is now a greater gulf between the politicians and the 
electorate' (Jesson, 1992g: p.116). This chapter is therefore the story of party 
decline in terms of the electorate rather than the parties - the previous nine 
chapters have concentrated on the transformation of the parties, and this one 
shows the public's response to this change. 
As a prelude to the Conclusion, this chapter pulls together all the different 
elements of party transformation, decline and adaptation described in previous 
chapters and illustrates their cumulative effect in producing the public's 
significant anti-party attitudes. Part One looks at the different manifestations and 
evidence of anti-partyism in New Zealand, arguing that it is a significant 
phenomenon. Part Two then shows how the growth of anti-partyism in New 
Zealand is closely related to the transition to the electoral-professional party and 
the effects of economic globalisation. 
Part One: Evidence of Anti-Partyism 
The popular legitimacy of political parties can be measured by such tangible 
indicators as levels of voter attachment to parties, electoral volatility, levels of 
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party membership, as well as surveys about the public's political trust. These 
manifestation of anti-partyism are examined below. 
Party Identification 
The public's detachment from party politics is indicated by the decline in the 
number of people who tell political scientists that they feel any level of 
identification with a party. Survey research measures 'party identification' by 
asking questions such as: 'Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself 
as National, Labour, Alliance, New Zealand First, or some other, or don't you 
usually think of yourself in this way?' (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.228). Traditionally, a 
large proportion of New Zealanders have been able to respond with a party that 
they feel some degree of affinity with, but in recent years the number of people 
doing so has fallen.2 Yet even as late as 1987, Vowles found that 85 percent of 
survey respondents showed some degree of identification with a party (Vowles, 
2002b: p.415).3 In 1990, this figure plummeted to 59 percent, and then in 1999 it 
dropped to 55 percent (ibid). 4 This decline can be seen in Figu re 10.1. 
2 Within the category of those that identify with a party there are various degrees of identification. For 
example, according to Aimer, in 1990, only about 'one third (35 per cent) of electors felt a strong attachment 
to any political party. The rest described their preferences as "not very strong", or said they only felt "a little 
closer to" a party, or denied any general identification at all' (Ai mer, 1992: p.332). 
3 Not everyone who expresses an identification actually votes for that party. For example, 'In 1990,47 per 
cent of all respondents expressed an identification with the party they had voted for, in 1993 it was 43 per 
cent; and in 199645 per cent did so' (Aimer, 1997c: p.8). 
4 The partisanship for the two major parties is even lower, falling from 65 percent in 1981 to 48 percentin 
1999 (Vowles, 2002b: p.415). Chapter Four has shown that Labour and National have lost their monopoly 
on their traditional supporters by becoming more catch-all in their approach. In their strategy of being 'all 
things to all people', parties reduce their ability to create fervour and staunch loyalty from anyone section of 
society. See also: Levine and Roberts (1997: pp.189-191), who suggest that those identifying with parties is 
somewhat higher. 
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These statistics show that although there is still a great number of voters 
choosing to vote for parties, a declining amount of people feel any affinity with 
those parties. For example, voting for a particular party because it is 'the best of 
a bad bunch' does not suggest a positive commitment to that party. Rather than 
voters identifying themselves as 'supporters' of a particular party, they are now 
more likely to think of themselves merely as people who vote for the party from 
time to time. 
The new minor parties in the New Zealand Parliament have a particularly low 
level of party-identifying voters. It has meant their electoral foundations of the 
party system remain inherently insecure, and this partly explains how the vote for 
a party like the Alliance can collapse over a period of nine years, from 18 percent 
(1993) to only 1 percent (2002). Instead of creating anything like voter fervour or 
staunch loyalty, support for the Alliance, Greens, New Zealand First, Act and 
United Future is not firmly attached. The high amount of vote-splitting under 
MMP also indicates the limited degree of party identification in New Zealand. In 
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both 1996 and 1999 about 36 percent of voters split their votes; this increased in 
2002 to 39 percent.s 
The decreasing strength of party attachments in New Zealand is consistent with 
the trends in other advanced industrial democracies. In a recent comparison of 
19 OECD nations, 17 were found to have a decreasing level of party 
identification, and in all 19 the strength of party ties was eroding (Dalton and 
Wattenberg, 2000a: p.262). In another study by Paul Webb, subjective partisan 
attachment had declined in all the thirteen countries examined (Webb, 2002a: 
p.441 }.6 
Electoral Volatility 
The term electoral volatility refers to the extent to which voters switch parties in 
successive elections. There are two basic approaches to measuring volatility, 
and when applied to the New Zealand case, both have shown substantial 
increases from the 1950s through to the 1990s. The method for which there is 
the most continuity of data is that which measures how much electoral change 
there is between elections. 'Aggregate volatility' measures 'the average change 
in party vote shares between adjacent elections'. A volatility index can be 
'calculated as the total percentage point gains for all the parties between the two 
adjacent elections, divided by 2' (Dalton et aI., 2000: p.39)? Using this method, 
Vowles' calculations (seen in Figure 10.2) have shown that volatility increased in 
most elections since the 1950s. Volatility averaged about 4 percent in the 1960s, 
5 In contrast, in the German equivalent of MMP, ticket-splitting has been considerably lower, albeit rising. 
Since 1976, the number of votes splitting their votes has risen in every election - going from 6 percent in 
1976 to 20 percent in the 1998 election (Klingemann and Wessels, 2001: p.288). 
6 A good deal of caution is required in comparing New Zealand's rate of 55 percent party identification with 
other countries, as different questions are used across nations. But for some comparison, see Dalton and 
Wattenberg (2000), where the most recent identification rates are 86 percent in the UK, 56 percent in Italy, 
64 percent in Germany, 56 percent in France, and 85 percent in Australia. See also: (Diamond and 
Gunther, 2001: p.ix). 
7 See also: Pedersen (1979). 
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rising to about 8 percent in the 1970s, dipping briefly for the 1981 election before 
jumping to 16 percent in 1984, a level at which it has generally remained.8 
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The second approach to measuring volatility does so on an individual level, by 
surveying voters and asking how they vote in consecutive levels. This provides a 
more precise measure of volatility, because it takes account of the fact that many 
voters cancel out each other's votes by switching between parties. With the first 
(aggregate) measure, this means that although many people may have changed 
their votes, the actual electoral outcome may remain the same, which masks the 
volatility of individual voters. Hence the first measure understates the true level of 
volatility, and the second (survey) method often provides a more stark result. 
Before the 1980s, survey-based studies tracked the shifting choices of voters 
and found a low level of volatility. For instance, at the 1952 election '92 per cent 
voted for the same party they supported at the previous election' (thus producing 
a volatility figure of 8 percent) (Rudman, 1999: p.A 11). Similarly, a survey by 
8 Jackson and McRobie's alternative calculations show a similar trend: 'The average volatility rate for 
elections between 1954 and 1969 ... was 6.6 per cent; between 1972 and 1990 the rate doubled to 13.3 per 
cent, with the elections of 1984, 1987 and 1990 generating the highest volatility scores of all, averaging 
17.3 per cent. In 1990 it reached a new peak of nearly 20 per cent' (Jackson and McRobie, 1998: p.11). 
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Alan Robinson of Dunedin Central voters in 1960 found that 90 percent voted the 
same way as they had in 1957 (meaning 10 percent were volatile) (Robinson, 
1967: p.103).9 
In the following election of 1963, 89 percent voted for the same parties they had 
supported in 1960 (producing volatility of 11 percent) (Vowles and Aimer, 1993: 
p.14). Stephen Milne was thus able to write in the mid-1960s that New Zealand 
electoral politics was characterised by 'a "massive stability" in voting behaviour' 
(Milne, 1966: p.93).10 This low volatility was, however, slowly eroding, and by 
looking at interview-derived statistics from the 1978 and 1981 elections, Vowles 
has calculated that about 40 percent of voters were volatile at this time (Vowles, 
1997c: p.200).11 The 1990s then produced an unparalleled degree of political 
volatility, during which new political parties rose to prominence and profited from 
the public's discontentment with Labour and National.12 Opinion polling varied 
tremendously due to the unstable or absent allegiances to anyone party. At 
different times during the 1990s, both the Alliance and New Zealand First 
registered support levels of around 30 percent (although neither party has come 
close to gaining this level of votes).13 Survey results from the New Zealand 
9 Robinson also found that 'three-quarters of major party voters had never voted for any other parties' and 
'two-thirds of major party voters fifty years and under clearly still voted for the same party as their parents' 
(Robinson, 1967: p.1 03). 
10 Milne also points out that under First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), this "'massive stability" is concealed by the 
fact that a comparatively small change in votes produces a disproportionately greater change in seats' 
(Milne, 1966: p.94). 
11 According to Vowles, 'only about half of the people who could vote at each election ~hose the same party 
each lime, nearly 22 per cent chose different parties, and another 20 per cent either moved into or out of 
non-voting. Thus over two-fifths of the people who were able to vote in both elections were "volatile'" 
(Vowles, 1997c: p.200). 
12 Then, according to Aimer, only two-thirds of eligible electors in 1987 and 1990 chose to vote for the same 
party in the two consecutive elections, while less than one half of 1984 voters were still voting for the same 
party in 1987 and 1990 (Ai mer, 1992: p.331). 
13 For details of party polling (1991-94), see Vowles et al. (1995: p.9). 
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Election Study programme showed that volatility in 1996 climbed to 46 percent 
(Aimer, 1998: p.51 ).14 
Electoral volatility has been a standard feature in most advanced industrial 
democracies. Webb's cross-national study found increasing volatility in 12 out of 
16 countries studied (Webb, 2002a: pA40). Similarly, Dalton et al.'s cross-
national study of 18 OECD countries showed that aggregate electoral volatility 
was increasing in fifteen of eighteen nations between the 1950s and the 1990s 
(Dalton et aI., 2000: pAO). In this comparison, New Zealand's increase in 
electoral volatility was second only to Italy (ibid: pA1). As Jack Vowles and Peter 
Aimer have commented, New Zealand is 'a distinctive case in terms of the 
degree and intensity of this process' (Vowles and Aimer, 1995: p.218).15 
Closely related to voter volatility is 'campaign swithering', in which voters change 
their minds, or delay making up their minds, during the election campaign about 
which party to support. Again, the existence of this behaviour suggests a low 
voter attachment to parties. Whereas in 1987, only about a quarter of voters left 
their decision until the campaign period, by the late 1990s this had risen to about 
half. For example, in 1999,48 percent of voters made up their minds during the 
four-week campaign, including 14 percent of voters who decided in the week 
leading up to the election, and 12 percent who made up their minds on election 
14 The degree of volatility varied between supporters of different parties - while National retained 71 percent 
of its vote between 1993 and 1996, Labour could only hold onto 56 percent (Aimer, 1998: p.56). New 
Zealand First had a loyalty rate of 52 percent, while the Alliance had a very low 30 percent retention rate 
(Aimer, 1998: p.58). Similarly, when Labour came to power in 1999, half of those voting for the party had 
not voted for it in the previous election (Levine and Roberts, 2000: p.166). Again in 1999, surveys indicated 
that 'less than half of the Alliance's and Act's election day support level of 7-8% came from voters who had 
been with them also in 1996' leaving a hard core committed vote for each party of only 3-4 percent (Gamlin, 
2000). 
15 Likewise, according to Bale and Roberts, 'At an average of 12.1 percent between 1975 and 1993, New 
Zealand's vote volatility has exceeded the European average and has risen more consistently than in 
European countries' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: p.9). See also: Vowles et al. (1995: pA3). 
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day. Throughout the campaign, 31 percent of voters changed their minds about 
which party to support (Vowles, 2002a: pp.17-18). 
New Zealand's continued and increasing volatility goes against the expectation 
that proportional representation should bring more electoral stability.16 A high 
amount of switching suggests dissatisfaction with the parties. The fact that voters 
are very willing to abandon their 'party of choice' from election to election, 
provides further evidence that voters have only a weak attachment to, or opinion 
of, the parties they vote for. 
Voter Turnout 
Participation in general elections is one way that the New Zealand electorate's 
positive attitude to parties used to be expressed. Despite not being compulsory, 
New Zealand used to have one of the highest polling turnouts in the world, with 
about 90 percent of eligible voters casting a vote in the immediate postwar 
elections (Aimer, 1992: pp.328-329}.17 That people used to feel strongly about 
participating in democracy is illustrated by a 1960s survey of Palmerston North 
electors in which 95 percent disagreed with the statement: 'So many other 
people vote in a general election that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or 
not' (Robinson, 1967: p.1 05). Similarly, according to a survey by Mitchell in 1966, 
85 percent thought voting was 'very important', 11 percent thought it was 'quite 
important', and only 3 percent thought it unimportant (Mitchell, 1969: p.199). 
Figure 10.3 shows that voter turnout eroded steadily in the postwar years, and by 
1966 only 79 percent of eligible voters participated. A recovery then took place, 
16 According to Vowles, 'under MMP, all other things being equal, electoral behaviour should become more 
stable' (Vowles, 2002a: p.83). 
17 Turnout is defined here as the number of valid votes cast as a proportion of the population aged 18 and 
over. In contrast to the official method which uses the number of voters enrolled as a denominator, this 
method avoids the 'bias in the official figures due to differences in the electorate enrolment rate over time' 
(Vowles, 2002a: p.91). For a discussion on measuring voter turnout, see: Wattenberg (2000: pp.69-71). 
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and by 1984 nearly 86 percent were participating. Participation then fell sharply 
in 1987 to 78 percent, which is about where it remained until 1999, when it fell to 
75 percent, and then to 72 percent in 2002.18 
Figure 10.3: Turnout of Age-Eligible Voters 
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Source: Vowles (2002a: p.416) and Electoral Commission (2003). 
New Zealand's declining voter turnout is consistent with that of other advanced 
industrial democracies. Webb found that electoral participation has dropped in 
twelve of sixteen democracies under his study (Webb, 2002a: p.440). Likewise, 
Martin Wattenberg examined turnout figures in nineteen established 
democracies of the OEeD and found that for 17 countries the turnout figures in 
the 1990s had been lower than those of the early 1950s (Wattenberg, 2000: 
p.72). According to Wattenberg, this study showed that New Zealand's voter 
participation had declined by 19 percent between the 1950s and 1990s, and this 
made New Zealand's decline second only to Switzerland (39 percent decline). Of 
the whole study, the 'median change from the 1950s has been a 10 per cent 
decline in turnout' (ibid: p.71 ).19 
18 This decline continued after 1996, despite the fact that political scientists believe that proportional 
representation encourages a higher voter turnout than FPTP systems because of the increased party 
choice and the reduced affect of marginal electorates. See: Vowles (2002d: p.84; 2002c: p.111). 
19 For a contrary view, see Bale and Roberts, who claim that New Zealand's turnout 'is now only at about 
the median position when compared with other advanced democracies' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: p.8). 
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In New Zealand there has also been a sUbstantial decline in public participation 
in other electoral activities. For example, fewer members of the public now 
attend election meetings. Large election meetings are a thing of the past - the 
last mass election rally to be held was in the 1987 general election, when 4000 
National Party supporters came to the launch of the party's campaign. That rally 
was the 'second-biggest indoor political meeting ever held in New Zealand' 
(Bolger, 1998: p.21). Previously, Robert Muldoon had spoken to a rally of over 
6000 National supporters in the 1975 general election campaign (Vowles et aI., 
1995: p.56). Yet as Vowles et al. pointed out about the 1993 general election, 
'one of the largest audiences either of the major parties could muster in 1993 
was estimated to be no more than 500' (ibid). 
Party Membership 
The shrinking level of party membership in New Zealand is a strong indicator of 
the increasingly unpopular nature of political parties and the extent of political 
disengagement. As detailed in Chapter Six, National Party membership has 
fallen from a height of about 250,000 in the 1960s, down to about 20,000 in 
2003. Labour's membership has similarly has dropped from the 40,000-60,000 
level in the early 1980s, to around 14,000. The minor parties have much fewer 
members. As Table 10.4 shows, in the 1950s nearly one in five of the electorate 
were party members, and this has steadily declined until by the 1990s only about 
one in fifty belonged to a party. 
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Figure 10.4: Membership as a Percentage of the 
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Far camparative purpases, Figure 9.4 also. includes the membership infarmatian 
far Italy, the United Kingdam, and France, all af which had smaller propartians af 
party members in the 1950s but in the 1990s have ended up with similar levels to. 
New Zealand. This camparisan is indicative af the fact that New Zealand's 
membership decline has been much greater than that af many ather advanced 
industrial cauntries. Accarding to. the internatianal camparisans made by Susan 
Scarrow (2000), New Zealand parties have been afflicted by a greater 
membership decline than in any ather af the 14 DECO cauntries she stUdied. 
Decline of the Vote for the Major Parties 
New Zealanders' growing detachment from party politics can be detected in their 
dissatisfactian with the Labaur and Natianal parties. Over the last faur decades 
the public has increasingly turned away from bath, either to. vate for minar parties 
ar in favaur af not vating at all. This decline can be seen in Figure 10.5. In the 
1940s, the average cambined (Natianal and Labaur) vate as a percentage af the 
electarate was 90 percent. In the 1950s, it dropped to. 81 percent, in the 1960s to. 
73 percent, in the 1970s to. 69 percent, and in the 1980s to. 68 percent (McRabie, 
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1995: p.321). During the 1990s, it averaged 54 percent. It then hit the historical 
low of only 44.6 percent at the 2002 election. As can be seen, the shift away 
from the major parties began long before the introduction of MMP, despite the 
discrimination of the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system against third 
parties. 
100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
CI) 60% 
- 50% 0 
> 40% 
30% 
20% 
10% 
0% 
Figure 10.5: Two-Party Vote as Percentage of Age-
Eligible Voters 
1.10% 
~5.70% 
......... ~66.90% .. 71.30% ..... 
~ --. ...... .-.- ~ 
~ 48.60%..... A"' 
,.- ~. 
<0 (j) T""" "<t I'-. 0 C') <0 (j) N l!) co T""" "<t I'-. 0 C') <0 (j) N 
"<t "<t l!) l!) l!) <0 <0 <0 <0 I'-. I'-. I'-. co co co (j) (j) (j) (j) 0 (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) (j) 0 
T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" T""" N 
Election Year 
Source: Vowles (2002b: p.416) and Electoral Commission (2003). 
Anti-Partyism in the New Parties 
At the same time as voting for Labour and National has declined, there has been 
a growth in a number of minor parties displaying various anti-party sentiments. 
The first party to challenge the Labour-National duopoly was the Social Credit 
Political League, which won 11 percent of the vote at its first election in 1954, 
after which it continued to playa significant role in elections until the late-1980s. 
According to Raymond Miller, Social Credit had a 'doctrinally-based resistance to 
political activity, particularly partisan activity' (Miller, 1985: p.208). Therefore it 
avoided the use of the word 'party', preferring to be known as 'a "league", 
"association of electors", and "social movement"'. Such terms, according to 
Miller, 'were intended to suggest spontaneous popular support, minimal 
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organisation, and individualistic rather than collective values' (Miller, 1985: 
p.208). 
Then in the 1990s a large number of parties emerged without the word 'party' in 
their title - such as New Zealand First, Act New Zealand, the Alliance, United 
New Zealand and Future New Zealand.2o This labelling reflects the current 
unpopularity of the institution of 'the political party' in New Zealand and the 
intention of the parties to avoid anti-party sentiment. 
In the current Parliament, New Zealand First has done the best to exploit the 
growing mood of anti-partyism in the electorate. To a large extent, Winston 
Peters' success with the voters lies in their perception of him as the ultimate 
lanti-party-politician".21 In creating New Zealand First, Peters was well aware of 
public disenchantment with politics, politicians and parties, and on this issue he 
very carefully positioned his party on the side of 'the people'. Peters was also 
very careful to align himself with the anti-party mood, specifying, for example, 
that all New Zealand First MPs were to put their own electorates before the 
interests and policies of the party. 
The Green Party is also in tune with anti-party sentiment, and downplays its 
'party-ness', sometimes by posing more as a movement than as a party. In fact 
the Greens have been known to reject the idea that they are a party at all. When 
applying for permission to make a submission to the Royal Commission on 
Genetic Modification, the party said that it was not primarily a political party and 
its entry into Parliament was only to obtain another place to raise the Green 
voice (Upton, 2000b). Representing a somewhat pessimistic soCial movement 
and ideology, the Greens are ideally suited to exploit the negative anti-party and 
20 The Green Party, too, more commonly uses its shortened name 'the Greens' without the term 'Party'. 
21 Trotter described the establishment of New Zealand First as an anti-system response to the way politics 
had recently been carried out in New Zealand: 'Essentially, it's an anti-political mass of marginalised and 
disaffected New Zealanders operating outside the traditional party structure' (Trotter, 1993f: p.14). 
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anti-politics mood of the electorate.22 The Green Party generally exploits anti-
party sentiment in the sense that it has promoted itself around the theme of 
distrusting the ruling elite and status quo politics. 
Act is also strongly aligned with anti-party sentiments. The party's aim has 
always been to encourage the public to make the association between anti-
politician feeling and anti-statism. The party's anti-politics have been best 
encapsulated in their slogan "values, not politics". Their very name is an acronym 
(Association of Consumers and Taxpayers) that shows their origins as an 
interest group and belies any identification as a political party. 
In the late 1990s a number of other 'movements' took on the task of reducing the 
influence of parties in New Zealand politics. The registration in 1999 of a party 
called the New Millennium Party is one example. According to its founder, David 
Phillips, the party was set up to get rid of political parties, and 'revert the present 
state of chaos and bring a new era of peace' (quoted in Rotherham, 1999: p.8).23 
Likewise, the OneNZ Party claims to stand for an end to the party system, 
arguing that, 'The solution is independent MPs with no boss except common 
sense' (Bone, 2002a: p.30). 
22 The Greens have had solid strains of anti-party elements from the very beginning. When the first national 
gathering was held in November 1989 to explore the formation of ~ Green Party, the emphasis according to 
Stephen Rainbow, 'was very much on building an "anti party party" with a strong regional focus' (Rainbow, 
1991: p.88). The environmental activists' suspicion and disdain for political parties also led them to reject 
traditional organisational structures when they built the new party, with Rainbow commenting on the 
extreme 'fear of hierarchy in the Greens, an almost pathological distrust of power' (Rainbow, 1991). See 
also: Jesson (1991 f: p.158). 
23 The New Millennium Party aimed to achieve this by winning a number of list seats through appealing to 
the anti-party vote, and then refusing to fill the seats in Parliament. After only a few months in existence the 
party claimed nearly 2,000 members (Rotherham, 1999: p.8). 
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Alternative Political Movements 
Some commentators have suggested that parties are being replaced by interest 
groups and single-issue campaigns. It is certainly the case that political parties 
no longer have a monopoly on political participation, and that an array of new 
groups and single-issue causes are being adopted by the public. This rise of 
'single-issue' groups and various social movements has gone hand-in-hand with 
the weakening relationship of political parties with the New Zealand electorate. It 
is a sign of the public's antipathy towards political parties that those people who 
are still interested in political participation are now increasingly inclined to 
channel their activity into these alternative avenues of political involvement. 24 
That there has been a distinct trend of people showing less enthusiasm for the 
main parties and more interest in single-issue politics is apparent in the interest 
shown for environmental and charity groups. The decay of New Zealand party 
politics into single-issue activism is also illustrated by the fact that more people 
belong to the Royal Forest and Bird Society than all the parties combined. 
But arguments about the rising influence of alternative organisations can often 
be exaggerated. As Chapter Five pointed out, a number of political and non-
political societal organisations have also faced declining participation. Groups 
from Greenpeace through to the Scouts have suffered significant membership 
decline. 
Increase in Candidate-Centred Politics 
New Zealand society's anti-partyism is reflected in an increased candidate-
centred politics. Although political parties are still central to parliamentary 
24 Lipow and Seyd: The 'market for participation is now more open and varied than previously and, as a 
consequence, political parties face a more vibrant, competitive market for people's support' (Lipow and 
Seyd, 1996: p.276). 
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elections, the influence of anti-party sentiment has encouraged many party-
backed candidates and MPs to emphasise their independence from their parties. 
More than ever before, candidates are downplaying their party backing and 
selling themselves as the champions of local issues. New Zealand First 
candidates, in particular, are notable for such an emphasis. Despite the party's 
name, New Zealand First made this 'localism' part of their founding platform in 
1993, professing that their candidates would put their electorates first. There are 
many other examples of candidates attempting to de-emphasise their party 
backing. For instance, in the 1996 general election Derek Quigley erected his 
billboards minus any reference to his Act party, and only added the party logo in 
the last week of the campaign (Carr, 1997: pp.88-89). But the tendency relates 
more to party leaders. For example, in the 1990 election Mike Moore sought to 
counter the unpopularity of his own party by simply publishing newspaper 
advertisements without the Labour Party logo, and by selling the benefits of 
electing Moore as Prime Minister rather than electing a Labour Government.25 
The increasing use of presidential-style strategies has been studied by a number 
of political scientists, such as Jackson (1991 ).26 The rise of leadership-based and 
personality campaigning occurred most dramatically in the 1960s. Although party 
leaders have always been a central part of any party political election campaign, 
the question of leadership was not necessarily a primary issue, and in contrast to 
the centrality of leadership today, the campaigns of the past were relatively free 
of the intense focus on personalities. As well as matching the rise of electronic 
media, this increase in presidential ism in parliamentary elections is the logical 
25 Jackson commented on the case of Labour: 'Providing a new twist to theories of "party identification" in 
voting, it had already in many instances played down or reportedly omitted the label "Labour" altogether. 
With a new leader elected so soon before an election it now largely abandoned not only the traditional label 
but also the traditional "team" emphasis with a campaign centred upon individual leadership' (Jackson, 
1991 ). 
26 See also: Bale (2001), Hayward and Rudd (2000), Church (2000), and Denemark (1992). 
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extension of anti-partyism, and this has been witnessed in recent New Zealand 
elections. 27 
That political parties are unpopular with electors is reflected particularly strongly 
by the decline or withdrawal of national-level parties from local government 
politics. Although the backing of a national political party might have once been 
an asset for a hopeful mayoral or council candidate it is now more likely to be a 
liability at the level of local government. Therefore even those individuals who 
are members of political parties now normally choose to distance themselves 
from such organisations and often run under alternative non-party labels. So-
called 'independent' candidates now make up the overwhelming majority of local 
body politicians. For example, of the 1,992 councillors and community board 
members elected in the 1995 local body elections, 1,694 (or 85 percent) rejected 
any party label (Berry, 1998: p.A6). In the 1990s, the Labour and Alliance parties 
still played a small role in local government elections but, according to Ruth 
Berry, both admitted 'their place in local body politics has changed and that they 
are focusing on endorsement of more independents and building cross-party 
initiatives with other local groups instead' (Berry, 27 Sep 1998: p.A6). 
Political Reforms 
A number of political reforms have been introduced since the early 1990s that 
have related to and reflected anti-party sentiment in society. For example, the 
introduction of Citizen Initiated Referendums in 1993 related strongly to the 
government's desire to counter anti-party sentiment amongst voters.28 
The most significant political reform has been the introduction of MMP, which 
paradoxically makes political parties more central to the political process. There 
27 Jackson: 'those without strong partisan commitment and relatively low interest in politics are especially 
prone to see politics in terms of political leaders compared to those with higher levels of interest who tend to 
give more weight to issues' (Jackson, 1991). 
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is no doubt, however, that the groundswell of popularity for shifting to MMP was 
at least partly due to a desire by many voters to punish politicians and parties -
especially Labour and National. Likewise, the subsequent and substantial 
demand for the abolition of MMP in the late 1990s reflected strong dissatisfaction 
with the party system. Similarly, it is likely that anti-party sentiment is part of the 
public's desire to reduce the number of MPs. In a 1999 referendum, 81.5 percent 
of voters supported reducing the size of Parliament from 120 to 99 members. 
The Electoral (Integrity) Amendment Act 2001 (otherwise known as the 'Anti-
Party-Hopping Act') passed by Labour, the Alliance and New Zealand First, is 
another measure designed to stymie the continued evolution of the party system, 
and to appeal to the public's anti-party reactions to the evolution that has already 
taken place. The Act obliges MPs to leave Parliament if they depart from the 
party with whom they were elected. Ironically, although the act was introduced to 
mitigate the public's anger with politicians within the MMP system, it actually 
strengthened the power of the party (or at least the parliamentary leadership) 
against the individual MP.29 
Another indication of anti-partyism is public attitudes to the growing state 
regulation of political parties. As detailed in Chapter Nine, some politicians, 
parties and commentators have acted on anti-party sentiments in society to 
promote a greater degree of state monitoring, control and prescription of political 
parties and their affairs in the past two decades.30 The intention and effect of 
these regulations has generally been to weaken the parties (or at least the extra-
parliamentary wings). The New Zealand public has become increasingly in 
favour of such regulation by the state. For instance, public' concern about 
anonymous and large donations to parties indicates a general suspicion and 
28 See: Bale and Roberts (2002: p.i2). 
29 See: Bale and Roberts (2002: p.i?). 
30 It might seem ironic that the parties that the public distrusts now have greater recognition in electoral law 
than ever before, but this is perhaps a consequence of the mistrust - the public feel that the parties need to 
be reined in and regulated. 
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dislike of the parties and the perception that, as independent and private 
organisations, political parties might possess too much power and autonomy.31 
Advocating tighter controls on the financial affairs of political parties seeks to 
disempower them. Similarly, public alienation is reflected in opposition to the 
provision of state funding of parties.32 
Declining Political Trust 
Since the 1960s - and particularly from the mid-1980s onwards - New 
Zealanders' trust of government, democracy and political parties has been in 
decline. At the start of this period, positive attitudes to politics were still 
detectable. For example, a 1966 survey by Austin Mitchell showed that only 8 
percent assessed the quality of MPs as 'poor', while 46 percent of respondents 
rated them as 'good' or 'very good', and 46 percent rated them 'satisfactory' 
(Mitchell, 1969a: p.180). The same survey suggested that 86 percent of the 
public thought Labour or National could be relied on to either completely or at 
least partly, fulfil their election promises (ibid: p.197). 
Contemporary political culture, by contrast, is characterised by a great deal of 
cynicism and distrust. A central part of this is a suspicion of political parties, 
which reflects the growth of anti-partyism. There is a great deal of survey data 
that illustrates the public's declining levels of trust and confidence in parties. 
According to the Heylen Research Centre's report, Full Trust and Confidence 
Polls, 1975-1993, public trust and confidence in party politics, 'declined markedly 
during the 1970s and 1980s: in 1975, 33 percent of the population said they 
trusted their politicians but by 1993 this had dropped to a mere 4 percent' 
31 For instance, a 1992 NBR poll showed that 90 percent of New Zealanders believed there should be 
public disclosure of all donations to political parties (Laugesen, 1995). The NZES survey of 1993 also 
showed that 70 percent of voters favour financial disclosure (Vowles et aI., 1993: p.186). 
32 The most recent opinion poll undertaken on the topic of direct state funding of parties - commissioned by 
the National Party in 1988 - showed that 81 per cent of New Zealanders are opposed to it (Press, 1988). In 
the 1993 NZES survey, only 12 percent favoured state funding of parties (Vowles et aI., 1993: p.186). 
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(quoted in McRobie, 1995: p.321). Around this time another poll found that 81 
percent of New Zealanders believed politicians were 'corrupt' (James, 1993: 
p.273). 
Vowles and Aimer also found that 46 percent of 1990 voters exhibited a mistrust 
of New Zealand's main parties - either distrusting both Labour and National or 
distrusting one and being unsure of the other (Vowles and Aimer, 1992).33 Then 
at the 1993 general election a NZES survey found that Labour and National each 
had the trust of only 14 percent of respondents (Vowles et aI., 1995: p.132). 
Paul Perry and Alan Webster's 1999 New Zealand Study of Values found that 92 
percent of adults surveyed had either 'very little' or no confidence in New 
Zealand political parties (Perry and Webster, 1999: p.15).34 The survey showed 
that 'only a quarter believed that political parties cared about what ordinary 
people thought' (Vowles, 2002b: p.413).35 Similarly, those expressing either 
'quite a lot' or a 'great deal' of confidence in government had dropped from 48 
percent in 1985 to only 16 percent in 1998. Webster commented, 'Government 
has suffered a massive decline in public confidence over that time, far more than 
any other institution we surveyed' (quoted in Laugesen, 199ge).36 Significantly 
the study found growing disenchantment with party democracy itself. Thirty-nine 
percent of respondents were in favour of having 'experts, not a government, 
make decisions according to what they thought best for the country'. Seventeen 
percent were in favour of a 'strong leader who doesn't have to bother with 
parliament and elections', and two percent expressed support for army rule 
(Perry and Webster, 1999). 
33 The Labour Party was distrusted in 1990 by 55 percent of the population, while three years later National 
was faced with similar levels of distrust (Banducci and Karp, 1997: p.2). 
34 By comparison, an extensive 1995-98 World Values Survey found that '22 per cent of the public 
expressed confidence in political parties as institutions' (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000a: p.264). 
35 See also: Bale and Roberts (2002: p.16), and Levine and Roberts (2000: p.164). 
36 According to Bale and Roberts, 'In 1993 and 1996 only one-third of New Zealanders surveyed felt they 
could trust the government most of the time' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: p.5). 
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Part Two: The Electoral-Professional Party and Anti-Partyism 
The central focus of this thesis is on the shift away from the class-based mass 
membership party towards the electoral-professional party type. This second part 
of the chapter argues that a number of elements involved in this shift have 
played a significant part in producing dissatisfaction with, and alienation from, 
political parties. As outlined earlier, the electoral-professional party is 
characterised by an increased emphasis on elections, a social support base that 
is relatively heterogeneous, a much greater professionalisation of the party 
organisation, a significant decline in the numbers and involvement of party 
members, the prominence of a personalised leadership, and a stress on populist 
issues rather than ideology. It is associated with a weakened relationship 
between the party and civil society, but a correspondingly stronger linkage with 
the state. Most notably, the shift towards the electoral-professional party is 
inclined to produce an erosion of ideology, which is defined as an increase in 
electoral pragmatism and a move towards the centre of the political spectrum. 
The initial shift towards electoral-professional parties can be identified as 
beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, when National and Labour began responding 
to significant changes in the social structure, and new technologies arose that 
changed the basis of political communication and electioneering. From this point 
on the New Zealand parties began behaving less like class-based mass parties, 
and instead displayed more of the characteristics described above. 
As stated in Chapter One, these party models are heuristic ideal types which 
might be considered to exist at two ends of a polar spectrum, along which 
individual parties might position themselves at different places over time. 
Generally, between the 1950s and 2003 the New Zealand parties have been 
moving towards the electoral-professional end of the spectrum. In some aspects, 
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however, the transition process was temporarily interrupted during the 1984-93 
period, when the party system was both radicalised and restructured. As argued 
in Chapter Two, parties in this period responded to significant changes in society 
and the economy, which meant that they were not highly characterised by either 
the policy-seeking orientation associated with the class-based mass party nor the 
office-seeking orientation of the electoral-professional party. Thus, erosion of 
ideology was not a key feature of this period. But in other ways the transition to 
the electoral-professional party was intensified. This can be seen in relation to 
the further decline in the class alignments of the parties (seen in Chapter Four), 
a substantial erosion of membership and party activism after 1987 (seen in 
Chapter Six), an increase in the professionalisation of the party organisations 
(seen in Chapter Seven), an increasing linkage with the state (seen in chapters 
Eight and Nine) and the growing prominence and dominance of a personalised 
leadership (seen in this chapter). This radicalism of 1984-93 also played a 
significant part in the story of party decline and the rise of anti-partyism, as 
radical policies were implemented causing considerable public dissatisfaction (as 
explored later in the section on 'Economic Globalisation'). In the decade since 
1993 the existence of the electoral-professional party has become even more 
obvious and, at the same time, anti-party sentiment has become further 
embedded. 
The connection between the transition to the electoral-professional party and the 
unpopularity of party politics is looked at more closely in the following sections. 
Ideological Erosion 
This thesis has attempted to show that the most significant element of the now 
dominant electoral-professional party is its orientation to ideology. Typically, the 
modern party institution is office-seeking and politically centrist. This trend 
towards convergence and pragmatism has both alienated voters and given them 
little reason to participate in party politics. Over the postwar period in which the 
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electoral-professional party has been becoming dominant in the New Zealand 
party system, there has generally been a substantial lessening of ideological 
differences between the parties. For many voters, the perceived stark choice in 
elections between a 'socialist' and a 'non-socialist' government has faded. In the 
1960s such a characterisation of political competition lost its credibility for most 
voters, as a strong consensus developed, based around the social democratic 
welfare state.37 Its effect was to make citizens believe that the differences 
between the parties were less important. One survey in 1960 showed that half of 
the public felt there was little or no difference between Labour and National 
(Mitchell, 1962a: p.180).38 Another survey in 1966 produced a similar result -
when asked about the degree of difference between the parties, 58 percent felt 
the difference was 'little', 'very little' or there was no difference (Mitchell, 1969: 
p.198). 
The postwar consensus then started breaking down in the 1970s, and party 
politics started becoming more fluid and radical. As Chapter Two points out, both 
society and politics experienced turbulence from the early 1970s and minor 
parties like Values and Social Credit rose to significance in elections. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that a 1975 survey showed that the proportion of the public 
who thought the differences between parties were so small that it did not matter 
who you voted for, was only 20 percent (Levine and Robinson, 1976: p.142). 
In the 1980s the dominance of the two major parties was re-established in the 
electoral system. By 1987 no other parties effectively contested the election, 
leaving only National and Labour in Parliament for the following three years, 
during which time they became incredibly similar. This increasing ideological 
37 This long-term trend of growing dissatisfaction with poles of left and right was accelerated, first by the 
discrediting of social democratic economics in the 1970s, then by the collapse of Eastern European 
communism in the 1980s, and finally by the introduction and unpopularity of the free-market model in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
38 In a Gallup Poll of the same year, one third of respondents also agreed that 'there isn't much difference 
between Labour and National' (Mitchell, 1962d: p.180). 
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convergence was reflected in a Stephen Levine and Nigel Roberts survey at the 
1987 election which found that 38 percent of voters thought there was either 'not 
much difference' between the parties or 'none at all' (Levine and Roberts, 1989: 
p.436). Three years later this had increased to 52 percent (Levine and Roberts, 
1992: p.501). 
During this period, the major New Zealand parties were starting to establish a 
'new consensus' - one that echoes the postwar consensus, but with some 
significant differences (as examined in Chapter Three). Despite the shift to 
proportional representation, Chapter Three argues that after 1993 the party 
system increasingly offered only small policy alterations rather than significantly 
alternative political frameworks. The less meaningful choices available have 
encouraged a negative view of parties. 
That New Zealand party politics have become bland and undifferentiated has 
been one of the major conclusions drawn by political commentators covering 
recent general elections. Of the 1999 general election campaign, for example, 
Molesworth noted that 'voters are simply not interested in talking about politics. 
The media have noticed this, too, as their focus groups tell them audiences do 
not want to watch or read about MPs' (Molesworth, 13 Aug 1999). Again in 2002 
- aside from the debate about GM - the election campaign was deemed to be 
particularly unappealing for the public. Taking a larger view, astute political 
observers have commented on the growing distance between most people's 
lives and the issues and events of New Zealand's parliamentary elections. The 
fact that parties have a problem projecting a distinct or separate identity from one 
another makes them less appealing to voters. This reduces voter turnout and 
party identification and increases dissatisfaction with democracy. 
These problems partly reflect the decline of ideological frameworks. As Frank 
Furedi argues, a strongly ideological framework formerly gave real meaning to 
politics in the West but has been lacking since the 1990s: 
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At the beginning of this [twentieth] century, political life was dominated by radically 
different alternatives. Competing political philosophies offered contrasting visions of the 
good society. Conflict between these ideologies was often fierce, sometimes provoking 
violent clashes and even revolutions. 'Left' and 'right' were no mere labels. In a 
fundamental sense, they endowed individuals with an identity that said something 
important about how they regarded the world and their lives. Ardent advocates of 
revolutionary change clashed with fervent defenders of the capitalist system. Their 
competing views about society dominated the conduct of everyday politics (Furedi, 
1999).39 
Thus, by the start of the 21 st century, there is little room for either the extension 
of neo-liberal reforms, or the socialist transformation of society, which 
encourages politics not only to be more moderate, but also somewhat apolitical 
(Furedi, 1999). There are fewer genuine passions and conflicts, and instead 
political debate has become more characterised by empty posturing about trivial 
matters and banal proposals (Furedi, Jul 1999). [insert quotes as examples] This 
does not mean that there are no conflicts and debates of significance, but just 
that there are fewer that structure party politics. As a result of this depoliticised 
culture, all the political parties - and especially Labour and National - have 
become extremely pragmatic and have elevated opportunism over principle. 
Where no real clash of views occurs and the politicians avoid debate over any 
sort of principle few voters are likely to respect parfy politics, feel any loyalty 
towards them and engage in politics themselves. 
Hermann Schmitt and Soren Holmberg (1995) have argued that the level of 
polarisation in a party system has a direct effect on the degree of partisan ties. 
After studying the Swedish party system, Schmitt and Holmberg contend that 'an 
increase in the level of ideological conflict between the two major party 
alternatives leads to stronger partisan attachments in most countries', and 
conversely, a decline in ideological polarisation leads to a loosening of partisan 
39 Now without strong ideological frameworks there is an increasing fuzziness in what most parties 
represent. Bently et al. (2000) can credibly claim: 'The all-encompassing ideologies which dominated 
twentieth century polities have broken down during the last three decades. In the industrialised world, the 
economic and social policies of the so-called left and right have merged in increasingly fluid ways' (Bently et 
al.,2000). 
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ties among the electorate (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995: p.113). Schmitt and 
Holmberg make it clear that if levels of ideological and issue conflict are low, 
then the whole existence or meaningfulness of a party is undercut: 'Political 
conflicts are the raison d'etre, the breath of life, for political parties. Without 
conflict parties languish' (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995: p.123}.40 They argue that 
the further a party is from the political centre, the more it is likely to attract 'true 
believers', while 'volatile pragmatists' gravitate towards the mild centre parties 
(Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995: p.118). In their study of Swedish party system 
Schmitt and Holmberg found that the decline of partisanship there was largely 
the result of 'the ideological alienation of voters and the increasing ideological 
similarity of the parties' (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995: p.117). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that with all the political parties in the New Zealand Parliament - and 
especially Labour and National - orienting or moving towards the centre, there 
should be an increase in anti-party indicators such as declining membership, 
party identification, turnout and so forth. 
Reduced participation in politics also results from the reduced coherence of 
politics for many voters. This has arisen out of ideological convergence. Without 
strong ideological signposts, issues are made more unwieldy, which leads many 
voters to cease participation.41 Issues are less mediated by the clear-cut partisan 
platforms and convenient signposts that previously helped voters in the West 
understand and participate in elections and politics: 
In the post-war era, socialism could offer a visionary response to all such questions, 
transcending their complexities, and conservatism had different answers. Turnouts were 
high because political outcomes mattered, as everyone could see. Now, the centrist 
fudge that tends to be the only way these difficult, often technical, problems can be 
40 Schmitt and Holmberg: 'When ideological conflicts between parties diminish, people's need of parties 
abates and partisanship becomes less intense. Thus, one would expect partisanship and the relevance of 
political parties to increase again, if and when ideological differences and issue conflicts flare once more 
and become more acute' (Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995: p.123). 
41 According to Bently et aI., 'A more plausible explanation is that voters are put off by the complexity of 
issues they are being asked to vote on. Without such clear ideological preferences or party differences, 
making up one's mind is increasingly difficult.' (Bently et al" 2000). 
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addressed doesn't satisfy the appetites of baffled, indifferent voters yearning for a 
simplicity that's not available. So they switch off and clear out (Hugo Young, 2002). 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1995) has also argued that the decline in attachment 
to political parties in advanced industrial democracies is a result of changes in 
the ideologies of the parties. The traditional appeal of political parties - and that 
which inspires loyalty and partisanship - is that the parties provide world views 
that relate to the major conflicts in society. That the old blueprints for solving 
society's problems have become outmoded, irrelevant or weak means that the 
parties have less appeal and interest for voters (Klingemann, 1995: p.186). In 
this situation, the political parties, like any sellers in a marketplace, have to 
manipulate into existence some sort of brand differentiation. That the parties 
promote themselves as being distinctive without any substantial basis only 
serves to confirm people's suspicions about them - that not only are they not 
distinctive, but they are often dishonest. 
In New Zealand there is strong evidence which links partisan decline with party 
convergence. Significantly, while voter turnout had been recovering in the 
decade before 1987, it then declined markedly in the election of that year, 
starting off an ongoing decline that was only halted temporarily at the 1999 
election. The 1987 election was also noteworthy because it was the first election 
after the Fourth Labour Government introduced neo-liberal economic reforms. 
This reform programme was associated with right-wing ideas and was widely 
acknowledged as moving the Labour Party to the right, eventually leading to 
considerable ideological convergence with National and an ongoing re-
arrangement of the party system. After this point, many voters saw little 
difference in whether a Labour or National government was in power, and thus 
had a reduced incentive to vote. Such a correlation is consistent with what 
Watternberg (2000) discovered in other Western countries with falling 
participation: 
Turnout first began to decline markedly when the party systems of these countries 
experienced a major upheaval. Though the nature of partisan change differs, in each 
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case the decline in the relevance of long-standing party cleavages - or the major parties 
themselves - led to a smaller percentage of the population being mobilized to go to the 
polls (Wattenberg, 2000: p.74). 
Wattenberg points out that in Britain, France and Germany, turnout decline 
coincided with significant party system change. Prior to their election to office in 
1997, the British Labour Party made a considerable transformation into a centrist 
party much less tied to either the union movement or socialist beliefs. In the 
same election, turnout declined consistently (Wattenberg, 2000: p.7S). Likewise, 
in Germany turnout fell significantly in 1987, when 'the Free Democrats' change 
of coalition partners led to a turn (die Wende) from a socialist to a non-socialist 
government. After this shift had itself played out, the consequences of whether 
the CDU or SPD held power probably seemed far less to many citizens' 
(Wattenberg, 2000: p.7S). Likewise, Wattenberg says that the key date for 
turnout decline in France was 1988, and this followed two years of cohabitation 
and cooperation between the major parties of the left and right, which meant that 
'the parties could no longer as effectively call their supporters to the polls based 
on fears of letting the other ideological tendance have power' (Wattenberg, 2000: 
p.7S). Similarly, in the early 1990s, the polarised party systems of Canada, 
Japan, and Italy all collapsed, followed by a 'noteworthy turnout decline' in each 
(Wattenberg, 2000: p.7S). 
The Professionalisation of Politics 
The shift of parties towards a more professional basis of organising has been 
one of the most well-established and important trends in Western party politics -
hence Angelo Panebianco'S use of the term electoral-professional party, which 
he says draws attention to this crucial organisational dimension. Panebianco's 
thesis is that the transition to electoral-professional organisations has in large 
part been caused by the impact of television and other new techniques of 
political communication, which together have been 'causing an earthquake in 
party organizations' (1988: p.266). The effect of these changes is to favour a 
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more heterogeneous audience and drive parties towards personalised 
campaigns and issue-oriented campaigns requiring 'expert preparation' 
(Panebianco, 1988: p.266). Professionals with extra-political and extra-party 
skills become of more use to the organisation than the traditional party 
bureaucrats who are therefore displaced. Similarly, these communications and 
technology changes undermine the position of party members. In general the 
whole nature of party operations change, as labour-intensive campaign practices 
are replaced by more capital-intensive methods. This change is discussed in 
Chapter Seven. It notes that such transformation strengthens the parties in some 
senses - especially in their greater ability to follow public opinion - but, at the 
same time, 'the new modes of mediation also work to isolate them from the 
everyday reality of grass roots politics and to make them more invisible to their 
critics' (Atkinson, Dec 1989: p.107). This has added to the public's cynicism and 
apathy, according to Miller, because professionalisation has had 'the unintended 
outcome of reinforcing the prevailing impression of distant, inaccessible and 
manipulative political parties and politicians out of touch with grass-roots 
sentiment' (Miller, 2001: p.234). 
Thus, the central part of the professionalisation and communications revolution 
in politics - the growth of the mass media and the introduction of television - has 
coincided with the increased indicators of public dissatisfaction discussed in Part 
One. The 1963 general election was New Zealand's first 'television election', 
although other forms of media still dominated. Survey research in that year 
indicated that, 'At least four-fifths of the electors, then, came into contact with the 
campaign (if at all) mainly by means of the mass media' (Robinson and 
Ashenden, 1964: p.9). However, it was not until the 1969 and 1972' elections that 
politics became heavily television-oriented.42 In the 1980s and 1990s, television 
was the primary medium for connecting the parties with voters and thereby 
42 See: Harvey (1992a; 1992b). Also, according to Denemark, the use of television in election campaigns 
did not really develop properly until the 1970s, when 'there was a significant reliance on television by 
Labour's Kirk in 1972 and National's Muldoon in 1975' (Denemark, 1992: pp.163-164). 
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getting their message across. Television is now the central focus of election 
campaigns and its critical importance is recognised by all New Zealand political 
parties. There has, thus, been a distinct shift in the 'location of electoral 
communications, from newspapers towards television, from the constituency 
grassroots to the party leadership and from amateurs towards professionals' 
(Norris, 1998: p.115). 
Of course the growing dominance of a television-centred politics has significant 
consequences for political parties and how they are perceived. In one sense, it 
further propels the trend of party politics towards a non-policy orientation, with 
party professionals concentrating on pushing 'what looks good on TV'. As 
Raymond Miller and Helena Catt have argued: 
The growth of the media, especially television, and the displacement of policy are related. 
With the evolution of modern television the "horse-race" aspect of election coverage has 
become pre-eminent. The entertainment imperative has played a significant role in 
magnifying personal competition and conflict to the virtual exclusion of reasoned debate 
(Miller and Catt, 1993: p.181). 
As such, the focus of the media is increasingly on trivial personal and leadership 
issues.43 Colin James has argued that this focus on the superficial is not in line 
with the interests of voters: 
In the USA, for example, the media typically report elections primarily as a game, 
emphasising candidates' character and personality, and treat policy mainly as an 
ingredient in a candidate's strategy to win the race. So coverage of policy is usually 
fragmented (for example, into 10-second "sound-bites" for television and radio) and 
loaded with reporters' interpretations. Voters, by contrast, have indicated to pollsters that 
their frame of reference is not the game, which makes no difference to their lives, but 
policy, which, when implemented, does (James, 2001a: p.202). 
With this professionalisation has come a move away from traditional forms of 
political organising, towards the use of highly technology-dependent methods, 
delivered to individuals in private settings, where people participate in a very 
individualised way: 
43 See: Church (2000: p.118), and Hope (2001: p.318). 
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Voters decide on political attitudes in a private setting, largely removed from interaction 
with peers, and almost completely removed from interaction with politicians. This is the 
very opposite of the interactions characterised by the town-meeting. The creation of 
political reality from television campaigns is therefore asocial in the sense that it does not 
in any way involve those whom it directly affects - the voters. This 'privatisation of politics' 
is one consequence of television-fought political campaigns; the public construction of 
political reality gives way to a private construction displacing 'politics' from the public 
arena to the realm of the private space. Politics become privatised (Wilkes, 1978: pp.218-
219). 
Such an individualised system of democracy cannot effectively promote citizen 
involvement. Carl Boggs has pointed out that there is consequently nothing 
surprising about the existence of anti-partyism and a resentment of political 
parties: 'Depoliticization is the predictable mass response to a system that is 
designed to marginalize dissent, privatise social relations, and reduce the scope 
of democratic participation' (Boggs, 1998: p.315). 
As in other Western democracies, the modern New Zealand parties perform the 
task of 'aggregating thousands of atomised voters who are not expected to 
participate in politics beyond providing an election vote' (ibid). This mobilisation 
of voters by parties is no longer done from within civil society, but from above 
society. In order to perform this task, the parties have professionalized - which 
as Chapter Seven has described, has meant giving significant control to party 
professionals who often do not originate from within the party but who are 
dedicated to the idea of politics as a marketing enterprise rather than an 
ideological struggle (ibid). 
Remoteness from Civil Society 
One of the central argument of this thesis is that there is a significant and 
growing decline in the linkages between political parties and civil society. This is 
another key characteristic of the electoral-professional party. It has been argued 
that the linkages between parties and voters have been weakened in terms of 
social cleavages (Chapter Four), by means of the weakening relationships with 
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societal groups (Chapter Five), and through declining membership numbers and 
participation (Chapter Six). Correspondingly, political parties are 
professionalizing and using technology and media and public relations specialists 
to communicate with society (Chapter Seven). The parties' organisational 
penetration of society has, thus, become shallower, and this has led to a closer 
relationship between parties and the state (chapters Eight and Nine). 
The decline in membership has acted to reinforce anti-party attitudes, mainly by 
reducing the reach of political parties into civil society. With sizeable 
memberships now being the exception rather than the norm, parties no longer 
have representatives in the form of members, interacting with the electorate at 
large. Parties have become an alien and distant phenomenon. As Miller has 
pointed out, the decline of New Zealand's parties as mass parties 'is likely to 
accelerate the process of public disengagement and exacerbate feelings of 
political cynicism and distrust' (Miller, 2000: p.19). 
This downgrading of the party outside of Parliament further severs the 
connection between civil society and the politicians, as it has traditionally been 
through the mechanisms of the extra-parliamentary party that the public has 
been able to participate and interact with politics - through membership of the 
parties, public meetings, the visit of canvassers to homes, and so forth. 
Electoral-professional parties, by contrast, are substantially removed from the 
reality of people's everyday lives (Diamond and Gunther, 2001: p.xii). It is no 
surprise that people therefore have less attachment to them or are so 
unresponsive or unforgiving of their errors or crimes. The decline in the extra-
parliamentary organisation logically encourages 'a lower voter ,turnout, as the 
parties are less equipped to mobilise voters at election time.44 Parties simply do 
not have many volunteer workers to contact voters, which in the past enhanced 
44 See: Wattenberg (2000). 
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turnout.45 It is no surprise therefore that turnout has fallen most sharply in 
countries where parties have low memberships.46 
Chapter Eight argued that the organisational relationship between parties, 
society, and the state has distinctly changed in New Zealand. To a large extent 
the electoral-professional model moves parties away from acting as the 
representatives of civil society at a state level. Instead it is being seen as part of 
the apparatus of the state itself (Mair, 1994: p.8). Typically, the electoral-
professional party is organisationally very separate from voters - something 
above civil society, rather than something inside society. In the process of the 
party leaderships shifted away from a reliance on traditional forms of funding, 
while becoming increasingly reliant on the state for resources, the principles of 
trust, accountability and representation between leaders and members have 
been sacrificed. Parties have become more resource-rich, but this has been at 
the expense of an inter-dependence with their constituencies. Inevitably this 
marginalisation of members has encouraged the feelings of cynicism and distrust 
with which most people now view political parties (Mair, 1997: p.153). 
The New Zealand parties used to be a greater part of people's lives: many voters 
were party members, parties held more 'meaningful' and often well attended 
public meetings, the leaders used to visit the electorates to communicate ideas, 
a large number of party members decided on the candidates for public office, 
and so on. This was reflected in the relatively large membership bases of the 
parties and the strong cleavage bases of the parties. In New Zealand the class 
mass party was strongly rooted in civil society - it came from and belonged to 
45 See Vowles, who argues that, 'A decline in party mobilisation of voters and a movement away from 
traditional parties have been linked to New Zealand's declining turnout (Vowles 1994). When New Zealand 
political parties had higher memberships, there was almost certainly significantly greater contact between 
voters and political parties face to face by means of party canvassing door to door, which also assisted the 
process of voter enrolment' (Vowles, 2002d: pp.90-91). 
46 In Scandinavian countries, by contrast, where party membership is still relatively high, turnout has held up 
much better than most other countries. 
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civil society, and each party sought to express and implement in public policy the 
interests of its members and supporters. 
Now there is less direct communication between parties and voters. The actual 
party organisations - as opposed to the parliamentarians - have no real 
communication with voters beyond the media. None of the New Zealand parties 
operate any substantial channel of public communication, such as a widely 
circulating or regular party newspaper.47 In fact nearly all party communications 
originate out of the each party's parliamentary headquarters and are created by 
state-paid professionals rather than by the extra-parliamentary head offices. In 
contrast, the extra-parliamentary organisations are increasingly just the invisible 
election machines for politicians. 
It is not merely the remoteness of parties under this model that might reduce the 
public's empathy for them, but it is because 'cartelisation' shifts the party leaders 
further into being 'a self-interested, unprincipled, power-seeking party elite' 
(Diamond and Gunther, 2001: p.xii). Also, as Chapter Eight suggests, the 
growing subsidisation of political parties (and the scandals that erupt around it) 
also encourages the public to resent the parties even more. That the parties get 
into Parliament and then devise rules and ways of funding themselves might be 
cause for the public to regard the parties as parasitical or corrupt. 
Politics is seen by many voters as a game played by cynical insiders with little 
social concern, and this breeds cynicism in audiences (Bennett, 1998: p.743). 
Political parties are ascribed the cynical motive of only being interested in buying 
and manipulating the votes off the public. The only time that voters have any real 
contact with parties - if at all - is during the election campaign. 
47 In the past, parties in most countries controlled their own resources, maintaining a network of 
communications, (often a widely read internal or 'public' newspaper) (Mair, 1997: p.135). 
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By contrast, where in Europe political parties retain large elements of their class 
mass nature, they are often more integrated into society in areas outside of 
parliamentary politics: 
Parties in Germany, Sweden and Finland have large budgets devoted to training and 
political education. Parties in Italy run festivals of music and theatre and playa rich part in 
their members' social lives. Parties in Belgium run the national health insurance, Swedish 
parties run their lottery, and Spanish even train former guerrillas from Latin America in the 
ways of democracy (Leonard, 1998). 
In all these ways, political parties here are becoming more remote, and together 
these developments are playing a considerable part in the increasingly 
widespread anti-party sentiment in New Zealand society. 
The Relegation of the Extra-Parliamentary Party Organisations 
Under the class mass party model, the extra-parliamentary party organisation 
has an exalted position, and played some role in counterbalancing the 
parliamentary leadership. By contrast, the electoral-professional party model 
dictates that the place of the party organisation is downgraded and weakened, 
while the position of the parliamentary wing and· leadership is enhanced. 
Whereas the class mass party is, by definition, one that integrates a large 
number of the population into the political process, the electoral-professional 
model places a low value on popular participation. This allows the leadership 
increased autonomy to easily alter party policy in response to exogenous factors. 
For the parliamentary wing to be able to assert their dominance over the party 
organisations and actively weaken the role of those organisations, this 
sometimes requires the politicians to denigrate the status of these organisations 
by promulgating anti-party sentiments and arguments. In this way, the politicians 
pose as restraints on the overly-partisan, petty, or ideological influence of parties. 
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As discussed in Chapter Six, the role of the extra-parliamentary organisations 
especially came under attack in the 1980s. The first significant experience the 
Labour Party had with this was immediately after its election to government, 
when its Economic Summit was organised without an invitation being extended 
to the party. The new party president, Margaret Wilson commented that, 'Given 
the importance of the Economic Summit... we had expected to be invited .... It 
was obvious, then, that the government intended from the outset to lay down the 
ground rules of how it saw its relationship with the party' (Wilson, 1989: p.46). 
The leaders of the Labour Government clearly showed that they had little regard 
for, or felt bound by, the extra-parliamentary wing. To the Cabinet, neither 
decisions made at party conferences or by the Policy Council were deemed to 
control the party's MPs. Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer told a Labour 
Party annual conference that, the 'Government reserved the right to implement 
the policies it chose' and suggested that party 'manifestos are merely statements 
of intent and cannot be seen as binding contracts' (quoted in Chapman, 1999: 
p.344). According to Chapman, 'The. right of conference as nominal governing 
body of the Party to contribute to binding electoral policy was thus ... set aside by 
the Party's parliamentary leaders' (Chapman, 1999: p.345). 
Throughout his time as the minister of finance, Roger Douglas treated his own 
Labour Party 'as but one more vested sectional interest which the government 
should not allow itself to be captured by' (Mulgan, 1992: p.520}.48 Douglas 
argued that his government was there to serve the 'nation as a whole not to 
particular interest groups, institutions or political parties' (quoted in Mulgan, 1995: 
p.91). Also of note, was government minister Richard Prebble's statement that 
the Labour Party was 'totally irrelevant to the election undertaki!lgs we gave to 
the New Zealand public', and Trevor De Cleene agreed by stating that 'political 
48 Roger Douglas and his colleagues 'embraced the argument of public choice theory that all political 
pressure for policies contrary to their own prescriptions was the self-serving expression of vested interests. 
Once persuaded that the public interest demanded that they stand firm against all political opposition, they 
felt obliged, if necessary, to use all power at their disposal to override their own parties' (Mulgan, 1997a: 
p.117). 
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parties do not and should not have a role in Government' (both quoted in 
Sheppard, 1999: p.8}.49 
When the New Zealand Council of the Labour Party declared that Jim Anderton's 
expulsion from the Labour caucus was unconstitutional and that he would have 
to be readmitted, Prime Minister David Lange, 'told a press conference the 
Labour caucus would not be dictated to by any external agencies' (Trotter, 1995f: 
p.?). Ironically, 12 years later, when Anderton was leader of the Alliance and 
deputy prime minister, he also argued that MPs needed to resist the 'subjugation 
to unaccountable back-room party officials' (Anderton, 2002). He characterised 
his disagreements with his own party as being because he was trying to stop 
such party officials - and in particularly, his party president - from attempting to 
run the country.50 
Many of the arguments that politicians have used to subjugate the party 
organisations relate to the 'liberal constitutional' model of the proper role of MPs 
in Parliament. As opposed to the 'democratic' party model which views MPs as 
being elected primarily as party representatives expected to be members of a 
party team in Parliament, the liberal constitutional model sees 'individual MPs as 
independent representatives of local constituencies' (Mulgan, 199?a: p.106). 
According to Richard Mulgan, the 'liberal constitutional' model is 'liberal' 
because, 'it was associated with classic British liberals of the nineteenth century, 
such as the philosopher J.S. Mill, who sought to restrict the power of the state 
and particularly valued the freedom and independence of individual MPs' (ibid). 
In a more conflict-orientated and collective fashion, the 'democratic' model 
49 Mulgan labelled this strategy "Rogerpolitics", pointing out that Douglas believed that, 'If the people were 
to be consulted it was as members of a disorganised and passive mass, through opinion polling ... or 
through media advertising' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.324). 
50 Many of the new political parties of the 1990s were set up in a way that centralised power. Instead of 
establishing the parliamentary-party organisation dichotomy of the class mass party, new parties like Act 
designed its constitution and party operations in an attempt to prevent such dual-power situations from 
occurring. See: Hine (1995: pp.18-21). 
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believes that the 'function of political parties is to appeal to the various sections 
and interests of the plural society and enable the voters to use their vote to help 
choose a party-based government and to influence its policies' (ibid: p.1 07). 
In its simplest form therefore, the liberal constitutional model is anti-party and the 
democratic model is pro-party. Liberal constitutionalists generally welcome any 
mechanism or agreement that acts to reduce the power or influence of political 
parties in Parliament. In a sense, conscience and free votes are a concession to 
the liberal constitutional model.51 Liberal constitutional anti-partyism is also 
implicit in arguments about the value of select committee work in the New 
Zealand Parliament. Some politicians and commentators have encouraged the 
New Zealand Parliament to place more emphasis on the work of these 
committees - as is the case with the United State congressional committees -
and under MMP this has in fact occurred.52 Similarly, an emphasis on MP 
electorate work is advocated. This is largely because electorate work is non-
partisan. In this situation the MP supposedly interacts with the public not as a 
party member but as a local Member of Parliament. 
Often anti-party politicians and commentators argue that the New Zealand 
parties are ideologically restrictive. 53 This argument is premised on the liberal 
constitutional idea that individual MPs should make their own decisions in 
Parliament. It is said that parliamentary or social debate is restricted because 
party members are obliged to resort to their party line and this impedes real 
debate and reasoned decisions. Therefore a common popular criticism is made 
that MPs do not vote in Parliament as they truly wish, but simply follow the 
dictates of their 'party bosses'. 
51 However, in practice, conscience and free votes actually allow strong party unity to otherwise continue. 
Such votes, which occur infrequently, are normally only permitted where 'Party unity may be unnecessarily 
threatened if the party comes down on one side or another' of a contentious issue normally associated with 
morality, such as abortion or euthanasia (Mulgan, 1997a: p.113). 
52 See: Palmer (1987: 74-75), and Mulgan (1997a: p.127). 
53 See, for example: Upton (1993c). 
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Liberal constitutional critics also claim that the existence of parties leads to 
unnecessary politicking - and therefore division - over questions that might 
otherwise be put 'above politics'. It is said that consensus and the development 
of the best outcome are stymied by the existence of competitive blocs. Related 
to this, technocrats have pushed the argument that there are some key policy 
areas that are either too important or too technical to be left to party politics. 
Attempts are therefore made to find multi-partisan agreements (which really 
means 'multi-politician agreements') on issues, with compromise being viewed 
as honourable, and certain areas of policy deemed to be best left to the 
decisions of experts. That the Reserve Bank has been given a SUbstantial 
degree of control of the country's interest rates is one such example, along with 
the short-lived superannuation accord and the Fiscal Responsibility Act. 
That parties in power seek to further the interests of their supporters when in 
power is also criticised by those that think politics should not be so strongly 
partisan. Yet the whole concept of the political party is to be partisan - that is to 
fight for particular interests rather than be neutral. Elements of the liberal 
constitutional model are therefore compatible with the electoral-professional 
party, which is essentially about weaker organisations facilitating the election of 
individual politicians rather than a movement of voters in society. 
Economic Globalisation 
There is much about the increase in anti-partyism that is not closely related to 
the shift to the electoral-professional party type, but rather to the implementation 
of neo-liberal economic policies during the 1984-93 period. As Chapter Two 
examines, parties in power during this period were pressured by exogenous 
forces - which might be referred to by the term 'economic globalisation' - to 
adopt a new economic framework that was neither mandated by voters nor 
popular. In implementing the reforms, both the Labour and National parties were 
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not simply acting as policy-seeking class mass parties nor as office-seeking 
electoral-professional parties, but were being forced into a managerial-reforming 
orientation by particularly strong exogenous economic forces. The economic 
restructuring that occurred was perceived by many as an attack on jobs, living 
standards and social services. Thus, widespread hostility to this programme 
resulted. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that much of the public has a 
negative opinion towards the economic restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s and 
that this negativity has carried over to a general suspicion of the parties that 
carried out these programmes as well as towards established political institutions 
in general. Therefore not only did the successive parties in government during 
the 1980s and 1990s negatively affect public confidence in themselves but they 
also managed to tar the whole party institution - and politics in general - with 
their actions. 
Susan Banducci and Jeffrey Karp have also argued that New Zealanders' trust in 
their political parties is related to the performance of the parties - in particular in 
their handling of the economy when in government. They argue that the 
'dramatic economic reforms implemented between 1984 and 1994 resulted in 
severe disruptions in the economy' and this led to a decline in trust for the parties 
(Banducci and Karp, 1997: p.6). Their survey research found that there was a 
relationship between a voter's perception of economic reform and their trust of 
the party in government. Similarly, in Britain, Arthur Upow and Patrick Seyd have 
studied anti-partyism in depth, and believe that the popularity of anti-partyism 
can largely be put down to the economic downturn and restructuring since the 
1970s: 'In our view, the anti-party theorists are a symptom of the economic and 
political transformation which began in the 19708 and has continued to gather 
force in the past two decades' (Upow and Seyd, 1996: p.280). 
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As well as the substance of the reforms producing dissatisfaction, the 'style' in 
which they were brought about also angered the public. 54 The style of the 
reforms can be summed up as being without mandate, and implemented without 
consultation but instead in the face of considerable public opposition.55 Such 
political behaviour throughout the 1984-93 period was not simply due to bad 
political management, but was actually strategic in the sense that because 
economic reform was necessary, its continued implementation had to be largely 
without warning. As David Lange famously explained, Roger Douglas had from 
the outset purposely not signalled that Labour would implement such policies, 
precisely because he 'thought they were worth implementing'. Douglas later 
made it clear that in order that the new economic programme was carried out, it 
was essential that public opinion be ignored. Thus the Fourth Labour 
Government broke promises and offended against the expectations of its key 
supporters in order that the new economic framework would be put in place. 
Such behaviour ran counter to the political culture of New Zealanders (Vowles, 
2002b: p.417). 
Following the Fourth Labour Government's transgressions, the next National 
Government's actions only cemented in these new impressions of political 
parties in office. The National Government broke a number of both specific and 
general promises,56 but more than this, the government continued implementing 
54 According to Vowles et aI., 'It seems clear that the performance of New Zealand political parties in the 
1980s and early 1990s has led to a crisis of confidence in those parties as effective means for democratic 
government' (Vowles, et aI., 1995: p.131). 
55 According to Mulgan, 'One of the major conventions governing single-party government was that the 
party would keep to its election policy as set out in the party's "manifesto" placed before the voters during 
the election campaign. This was the party's "mandate", the basis of its democratic right to govern .... When 
both Labour and National governments broke explicit commitments in their election policies they seriously 
weakened the cohesion of their parties, both in the parliamentary caucus and in the wider extra-
parliamentary party' (Mulgan, 1997a: p.115). 
56 For example, despite campaigning to remove the surtax on superannuation and promising not to change 
the social welfare benefit structure, almost as soon as the party got into power both promises were broken. 
Banducci and Karp: 'In November 1991, 95 percent of the respondents believed that Bolger broke 
promises' (Banducci and Karp, 1997: p.2). 
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neo-liberal policies without a strong mandate. Vowles et al. (1995) labelled the 
National Government's programme an elite driven agenda of change, criticising 
the fact that the party never gave any indication of its intention to continue the 
neo-liberal reforms of the previous government: 
National for its part began to implement the most radical social agenda in the history of 
the New Zealand welfare state. Apart from a vague reference to the need to 'redesign' 
welfare with a view to achieving a more affluent and self-sufficient society, the reforms 
had not been the subject of public scrutiny or discussion during the election campaign 
(Vowles et aI., 1995: p.10}.57 
So not only did the new government break a number of promises, but it angered 
many voters due to the fact that despite the messages given in the 1990 election 
campaign, the new National Government represented the continuation of 
Rogernomics (Kelsey, 1995: p.41). According to Barry Gustafson, the neo-liberal 
economic restructuring that begun under Labour and continued by National, also 
severely damaged New Zealand's political culture: 
there is no doubt that in New Zealand successive governments after 1984 pushed 
through radical reforms in a way and to an extent that was against the will of the majority 
of people. This destroyed much of the consensus on basic values that had marked New 
Zealand civil society and policies for so long, upset the balance between individual and 
community interests, and undermined respect for and trust in politicians and the political 
process itself (Gustafson, 2001: p.34). 
That an elite was able to concentrate such power in their own hands and push 
through a series of unpopular reforms in the space of just a few years turned 
many people against party politics. By breaking their electoral mandate the 
Labour and National parties played a key role in creating public dissatisfaction 
with parties. 
Conclusion 
New Zealand's electoral-professional parties increasingly have no clearly defined 
constituency, ideology, structure, or objectives. It is therefore not surprising that 
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few New Zealanders feel particularly sympathetic towards their parties, when 
they have transformed into such diffuse and formless organisations. Constantly 
gravitating towards the centre of political opinion in order to maximise voter 
support, they may win voters over on an issue-by-issue basis but this catch-all 
strategy does not make for a cohesive relationship between a particular party 
and a particular section of society. The vitality of party politics has been removed 
by the professionalisation of the parties and the removal of any real differences 
amongst them all. And although party politics might be becoming less 
ideologically polarised, this does not reflect a widespread view amongst voters 
that New Zealand society has reached a 'golden age' where social and economic 
problems no longer exist. Instead New Zealand party politics are bland because 
the parties are exhausted and no longer have any ideologically coherent and 
convincing answers to the array of problems in society. From the point of view of 
voters, many social problems still exist, but the politicians are less relevant to 
these issues than they once were. According to political scientist Patrick Seyd: 
'Life for most people is about the insecurities, uncertainties and pressures of 
work; about maintaining a regular, reasonable income; and about the provision of 
accommodation. Politics is unimportant to most people' (Seyd, 1998a: p.206). 
Quite simply, if people are not strongly attached to any parties, and are hostile to 
them as a whole, it is because the politics on offer fail to provide any real choice. 
In advanced industrial democracies, the arrays of different party brands offer 
only variations on the same basic political programme. When party politics is a 
contest between sound-bites rather than alternative ways of organising society 
then it is not surprising that a certain disinterest or even disdain for the parties 
exists. While modern designer politics, with its market research and spin-
doctoring might provide the election campaign with colourful personalities and 
trivialities, at the same time it makes the parties all appear bland. An insipid and 
vacuous party system obviously make party politics seem less relevant or worthy 
to voters. 
57 See also: Mulgan (1995: p.89). 
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There has been little effort in New Zealand to document and explain anti-
partyism. Yet it is a significant phenomenon in New Zealand - for every indicator 
of anti-partyism explored in Part One, it appears that New Zealand exhibits an 
advanced case. Tim Bale and Nigel Roberts (2002) have written what is the most 
comprehensive survey of anti-partyism in New Zealand, in which they 
convincingly illustrate how the indicators of anti-party sentiment have increased 
in recent years. However, they then conclude that because the recent increase in 
anti-party sentiment is only a continuation of early postwar trends, and is 
therefore an established trend rather than anything new, the prevalence of anti-
party sentiment should be accepted as 'chronic' rather than 'acute' (Bale and 
Roberts, 2002: p.17). Bale and Roberts therefore suggest that those 'who stress 
the burgeoning cynicism, dealignment and anti-party sentiment would do well to 
pause and draw breath' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: p.17). Unlike this thesis, which 
views anti-partyism as one of the single-most important political phenomena of 
our time, Bale and Roberts see it as business as usual, saying it should be 
regarded, not as 'pathological', but as 'normal' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: p .17). 
Yet if we are to accept as 'normal' the fact that political parties are perceived as 
failing, then we run the risk of being complacent about what is an increasingly 
shallow democracy. We are in danger of saying that the public's dissatisfaction 
with party politics is not to be taken too seriously. Just because modern 
democracies 'still seem to function at least adequately' (Bale and Roberts, 2002: 
p.17) in spite of dissatisfaction with the parties, does not mean that this public 
alienation should not be taken very seriously. This issue relates to one of the 
larger conclusions of this thesis - namely that although political parties show no 
sign of disappearing or fading away, their survival should not in any way be taken 
as a sign of their good health or performance. The ongoing existence of the 
established parties is not proof of their health, but of their ability to adapt and 
continue to control the mechanisms of power. Therefore, instead of accepting 
the high levels of anti-partyism as normal, we should be asking whether political 
parties with such low public support can successfully remain the central 
institutions of representative democracy. Because anti-partyism shows no signs 
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of disappearing, it seems unlikely that political parties are soon going to be able 
to engage voters and win their commitment. As long as political parties are 
unable to produce security and general prosperity in a quickly changing world 
economy, they will lack legitimacy. In lieu of that happening, the only chance of 
politicians redeeming themselves is if they are successful in lowering the public's 
expectations of them. 
Voter apathy and antagonism towards parties reflects what this thesis has 
argued is the decline of all the positive elements of political parties in parallel 
with the increase of all their negative elements. The positive elements in decline 
include party membership numbers, strong voter loyalty, connections with 
interest groups, and the parties' structuring and articulation of society's interests. 
In all these areas, political parties are weaker. On the other hand, political parties 
are more professionalized, more regulated and recognised by the state, they 
collect their votes from a broader cross-section of society, and are better 
financed. In this sense, political parties are stronger than ever. Therefore the 
political party institution per se is not in decline, and parties are certainly not 
disappearing. But this thesis has argued that parties are in decline in the sense 
that their political programmes are exhausted, they fail to inspire the loyalty of 
many voters, they have a very limited organisational penetration of society, and 
they no longer integrate civil society into the political processes of the state. This 
failure has fuelled voter apathy and antagonism towards politics, and general 
partisan decline. 
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Conclusion 
Party Failure 
Political parties in New Zealand are failing in their most important roles - that of 
providing meaningful choices and fostering citizen participation in political 
decision-making. Their ability to aggregate and articulate the interests of different 
sections of civil society into meaningful alternatives has been substantially 
diminished. Democracy is therefore being weakened. This failure is closely 
related to the homogenisation of politics. The key exhibit of this decline is the 
erosion of ideological differences about how New Zealand society might be 
organised. The convergence of policy and the elevation of electoral pragmatism 
have increasingly meant that parties cease to offer clear ideological alternatives 
about political direction. Voters have effectively been denied the clear policy 
choices about political direction that a party system should provide. 
Paradoxically, despite parties moulding their policies to the median voter and 
opportunistically using market research politics to create populist policies, the 
public is more dissatisfied with parties than ever. 
This thesis has argued that political parties in New Zealand have evolved over 
the last half century from ideologically distinctive class-based mass membership 
organisations towards more generic electoral-professional elite formations. 
Whereas in the class-based mass party model the focus of policy and 
programme formulation is typically driven by the desire, above all else, to 
articulate and represent key social constituencies, the emphasis of the electoral-
professional model is on electoral success, and policy formulation is merely a 
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means to achieve this. The result is that voters are no longer offered meaningful 
choices. 
The two models of party studied here might be seen to sit at polar ends of a 
spectrum, and this thesis has argued that the New Zealand parties have moved 
considerably closer to the electoral-professional end. The transition has been 
central to most of the issues examined in the thesis. This final chapter seeks to 
relate this shift to an evaluation of the modern political party in New Zealand. 
Some of these issues have already been brought together in Chapter Ten, which 
looked at the public's reaction to the transformation of political parties and found 
substantial alienation from the democratic process. This raises the question of 
whether the party institution is therefore in decline. The conclusion reached is 
that, while parties are not about to disappear, they are declining in the sense of 
their ability to fulfil important democratic functions. 
This thesis is unashamedly political and normative. As Stefano Bartolini and 
Peter Mair have argued, 'any discussion of the role of parties in present and 
future democracies involves strong normative overtones and combines different 
and not necessarily complementary hypotheses'(Bartolini and Mair, 2001: 
p.338). This thesis is no different, and has painted the transition of New Zealand 
parties to the electoral-professional model as a negative phenomenon. A 
preference has been indicated for the politics associated with the class mass 
party, along with a critical view of the electoral-professional model and its many 
aspects. 
The shift towards the electoral-professional form has been closely related to the 
changing structure of society. In terms of class, the old social cleavages and 
group identities associated with the emergence of the mass party have eroded or 
diminished. This heterogeneous political market further encourages the shift to 
electoral-professional parties that attempt to win broad popular support. A key 
part of this transition has been the erosion of the linkages between parties and 
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civil society. Prior to this, New Zealand party politics was largely representative of 
the divergent interests of different classes, and these divisions provided the basis 
of much of the conflict and competition in the party system. With these 
relationships in society weakening, the materialist conflicts around economics 
and the role of the state (as represented by the left-right spectrum) have 
softened. Previously, the parties' close interaction with social structure, and with 
civil society in general, meant the party leaderships were never able to simply 
follow popular trends or base their policies primarily around pursuing the support 
of the median voter. Instead, parties were closely linked to their goals of 
representing and articulating the interests of certain social groups. Therefore 
mechanisms for attracting the median voter, such as market research politics, 
had little currency in party politics. The shift to more electoral-professional ways 
of organising has eroded these constraints on party leaders and shifted the focus 
of their activities. Parties have been increasingly oriented towards office-seeking, 
and without an active membership or a parliamentary interested public, there is 
now little to restrain this from occurring. While under this model the parties do not 
simply seek power at any cost, they have become significantly more inclined to 
do so. The pressures of a firm social constituency or large membership base 
have now disappeared and, as a result, all the parties in Parliament have 
become relatively unconcerned with ideological representation. 
The obvious objection that might be raised to this type of 'end of ideology' 
analysis is that New Zealand has recently been characterised by highly 
ideological politics - firstly between 1984 and 1993 when government carried out 
radical economic reforms, and secondly in the post-1993 MMP environment 
where a multi-party parliament has involved a number of minor- parties. This 
thesis has dealt with both periods in chapters Two and Three, and argued that 
neither of these examples contradict the long-term transition towards a low-
ideology, pragmatic politics. 
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Chapter Two shows that in the 1984-93 period, politics was characterised by a 
strong technocratic managerial-reforming orientation rather than the radical 
ideological orientation that is commonly ascribed to it. The economic crisis 
determined that significant restructuring and change was required to return the 
economy to long-term viability. The Labour Government of 1984-90 chose to 
implement what was the dominant and increasingly orthodox economic 'solution' 
- neo-liberalism. By this stage the Labour Party had moved a great distance 
towards being an electoral-professional party, as it was substantially divorced 
from its traditional class base (in terms of its vote, membership and leadership), it 
had professionalized its organisation, its union affiliates were less influential, and 
the party was substantially more office-seeking in orientation than policy-seeking. 
It was therefore prone to the technocratic managerial politics required for the 
large-scale restructuring of the economy that occurred. The National Party joined 
Labour in this neo-liberal approach, and in power between 1990 and 1993 it 
accelerated the unpopular reform process. In implementing these policies, both 
parties were not acting in a simple policy-seeking orientation, as is associated 
with mass class parties wanting to transform society, nor were they simply 
following office-seeking strategies associated with classic electoral-professional 
parties. Rather, they were following a separate managerial-reforming orientation 
which led them to put aside office-seeking motivations in order to carry out what 
they perceived were the reforms necessary to retain the New Zealand economy's 
solvency. This period has, thus shown how important exogenous forces can be in 
shaping the policies of electoral-professional parliamentary parties and therefore 
of governments. It raises questions about the degree to which government policy 
is dictated by economic circumstances over which the party in power has little 
control. 
It seems that while exogenous factors shape the environments in which politici3,1 
parties exist, as well as the set of policy options available, they do not determine 
exactly how parties will actually respond to those challenges. This allows issues 
relating to the parties' organisational form to influence political direction. That the 
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New Zealand parties implemented such radical and unpopular policies can be 
seen, therefore, to be related to their essentially electoral-professional nature. 
Such parties are inclined to change their ideological nature very easily, as well as 
operate in a managerial fashion, as was demonstrated in this significant period. 
By contrast, class-based mass parties are more rigid in dealing with such 
situations. This is due to the strong and formalised role of members in controlling 
the party, the large extra-parliamentary bureaucracy, and often close ties to 
ancillary organisations such as trade unions and business groups. 
Chapter Three dealt with the post-1993, MMP era and showed how, despite the 
introduction of the proportional representation electoral system, the scope of 
ideological political conflict was actually reduced with the establishment of a 'new 
centre' or consensus in parliamentary politics. Whereas the 1984-93 period was 
marked by heightened ideological conflict and radical policies, after 1993 a new 
consensus emerged, based around the neo-liberal framework (albeit with some 
corrections). Under the MMP electoral system, voters were expected to be 
offered a smorgasbord of political options, but with the parties all shifting towards 
the centre of the political spectrum and becoming ideologically pragmatic, this 
diversity has not eventuated in any meaningful way. A strong political consensus 
has developed, with some similarities with the social democratic consensus that 
characterised the 1950s and 1960s. 
Yet rather than seeing the post-1993 period as the start of a new consensus that 
merely mirrors the postwar consensus, it might make more sense to view the 
political events since the 1950s as being one where consensus and managerial 
politics is the norm under the electoral-professional 'model. In this sense, politics 
since World War \I might be seen as one long consensus that was temporarily 
interrupted between 1984-93 because of the need for dramatic reform in the 
context of a deep and protracted economic crisis. However this crisis resulted in 
a new form of consensus. While the convergence in the 1950s and 1960s was 
around the priorities of welfare-state full employment, by the 1990s the agreed 
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set of principles revolved around the priority of markets. In this view, the radical 
interregnum represented the difficult birth process of a new consensus. 
The post-1993 consensus has many other aspects that differentiate it from the 
consensus of the postwar period. These mainly relate to the fact that 
contemporary parties are even closer to the ideal-type electoral-professional 
party. Most significantly, the parties have become more oriented to seeking 
office, whereby plainly the primary goal is electoral success. This varies between 
the parties in Parliament (and within the various parties, the balance between 
office-seeking and policy-seeking orientations also obviously varies). The smaller 
flank parties such as the Greens and Act are not yet totally driven by simple 
electoral expediency (although this orientation is certainly strong in these 
parties), while it is hard to argue that parties like National, United Future, Labour, 
the Progressive Coalition Party and New Zealand First do not primarily exist in 
order to win office. They certainly have secondary goals, such as implementing 
or promoting particular policies and representing certain constituencies, but it is 
obvious that these functions have become more of a means to facilitate their 
primary objective than being a goal in themselves. 
Party Decline or Failure 
In recent decades political scientists throughout the West have speculated on the 
apparent decline of parties. Implicit in the term 'decline' is some sort of negative 
evaluation of the trends relating to parties. This thesis shares that evaluation, but 
is less inclined to summarise the transformation in the New Zealand party system 
as being one of decline. This is mainly because the term decline has 
connotations of disappearance or eventual death, and there is nothing about the 
New Zealand case to suggest the parties are dying or about to become extinct. 
Yet while parties are clearly not disappearing - and have in fact been 
strengthened in recent years - they are certainly failing in many of their functions, 
and are, in other respects, weaker organisations. The term 'party failure' might 
Conclusion 681 
therefore better describe the nature of, and changes in, party politics in New 
Zealand. 
The introduction to this thesis outlined four crucial roles that political parties 
supposedly play in modern liberal democracies. On the basis of this thesis, it 
might be said that they are failing in at least some of these key roles. First, 
parties are said to function as the agents of elite formation and recruitment. 
There can be no doubt that parties continue to function in this role, especially 
because the MMP electoral system guarantees them this role. Indeed, it is a sign 
of their survival and relevance that MPs in New Zealand still emerge almost 
exclusively from the parties. 
Second, political parties perform the role of organising the government, providing 
leaders to government and controlling the state apparatus. Again it is difficult to 
argue that parties do not continue to be effective in this regard. This shows how, 
in spite of their supposed decline, parties continue to keep an iron grip on many 
aspects of politics. 
Third, parties are said to serve as a point of reference for many supporters and 
voters, giving people a key to interpreting a complicated political world, as well as 
socialising and mobilising the public into politics. It is here that this thesis has 
raised questions about the degree to which the New Zealand parties do in fact 
foster democratic involvement and support on the part of the citizen body. In 
terms of involving citizens in the parties and in mobilising electoral turnout, the 
parties have clearly been performing poorly. This thesis has shown that the 
parties fail to integrate citizens into political decision-making. 
Fourth, parties supposedly serve as agents of interest articulation and 
aggregation. They unite a multitude of specific demands into manageable 
packages of proposals that combine as coherent programmes. The programmes 
offer the various sections of SOCiety useful channels for seeking to influence 
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government policies in their favour. In this way voters are provided with a means 
of deciding between alternative ways of organising society. But the reality is that 
it is in this area that parties' capacities have most weakened. In becoming catch-
all organisations, parties have clearly failed to publicly express and pursue the 
political demands of particular social groups. 
Conclusion 
The Introduction chapter asked in what ways New Zealand parties are 
transforming. That has been the main question of this thesis, and it has been 
answered in every chapter. Chapters Two and Three showed the considerable 
ideological transformation of the party system since the postwar period. Chapter 
Four showed the transformation in terms of the social structure of political parties. 
Chapter Five examined the transformation of parties' relations with societal 
organisations. Chapter Six showed the organisational transformation of parties, 
especially in regard to party membership. A similar transformation was seen in 
Chapter Seven - this time in regard to capital resources. Elaborating on the most 
significant change in capital resources, Chapter Eight showed how parties are 
harnessing the resources of the state for their own political ends. The related 
transformation in state regulation of parties was then detailed in Chapter Nine. 
Then the general response of the public to all of these transformations was 
outlined in Chapter Ten on anti-partyism and partisan decline. 
This thesis has, thus, argued that New Zealand political parties have been 
subject to a tremendous transformation over recent decades, making them 
weaker in many ways, and stronger in other ways. A key part of this 
transformation has been an erosion of ideology whereby ideological competition 
in the party system has been subject to both centrifugal tendencies and 
increasing office-seeking behaviour. Other significant elements of party 
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transformation examined in this thesis include the declining linkage of parties with 
civil society, voter dealignment, and growing partisan decline. 
Because this thesis has evaluated these trends to be negative for democracy and 
society, it is argued in this concluding chapter that the type of party 
transformation occurring in New Zealand might be described as party failure. This 
term is useful in conveying that the institution of party is failing in many of its 
roles, and its value to citizens is eroding. It does not mean that parties are 
disappearing, but that they are transforming into an inferior type of institution, the 
electoral-professional party. This thesis has compiled a large amount of evidence 
on the shift of parties away from their mass party form to the electoral-
professional type. While this shift does not equate with party decline, it is closely 
linked with party failure and a shallow version of democracy that results from it. 
The conclusions reached in each chapter have suggested that these party 
changes represent not merely a transformation, but a weakening or a failure. 
Such terms reinforces the idea that these changes are actually a negative 
phenomenon, not just a neutral transformation. To suggest that political parties 
have merely been "transformed" misses an important point. While it highlights the 
ways that parties have reacted to changes, it ignores the decay of the party 
institution due to the weakening of their position and role. It suggests a 
substantial dynamism on the part of the parties that this thesis has not detected. 
In some ways the shift can be seen as nothing more than a change in the way 
parties organise, which might not be evaluated negatively or positively. Rather 
being a decline or degeneration, the parties have merely adapted to modern 
circumstances, and this can be examined dispassionately rather than judged. 
Certainly much of the political science literature has found these trends easier to 
describe than to evaluate. And as Webb has suggested, 'Whether one looks at 
this and sees the glass half-empty (party decline) or half-full (party adaptation) 
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ultimately depends on what one understands by, and expects of, the term 
"democracy'" (Webb, 2002b: p.13). 
One of the main conclusions that arise from establishing that parties are failing 
and are less connected with citizens is that the Downesian model of political 
parties is more appropriate now than ever. Many political scientists have argued 
that although Western parties never operated quite as Anthony Downs asserted, 
his theory of the office-seeking party was best suited to the postwar decades up 
until the late 1970s. This thesis argues that the office-seeking model is again 
appropriate for understanding New Zealand political parties in the 1990s and 
beyond, and that it is in fact more valid than ever, due to the currently weak state 
of partisan ties. Therefore Downs most basic hypothesis that 'Parties formulate 
policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate 
policies' seems more relevant than ever in New Zealand politics (Downs, 1957: 
p.28). 
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1917 1,000 Levine 1917-18; 1,000 Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1925 5,278 Levine 1925-26; 5,278 Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1929 5,170 Levine 1929-30; 5 170 Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1934 6,554 Levine 1934-35; 6 554 Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1935 8,300 Gustafson '1935, there were only 229 branches in NZ with a total membership of 8300' (Gustafson, 1992: p.275). 
1938 51,174 Gustafson 'between 1938 and 1969 the total direct branch membership of the NZLP dropped from 51,174 in 630 branches in 80 
constituenCies, to a mere 13,476' (Gustafson, 1976: p.10); (Gustafson, 1992: p.275). 
1939 51,174 Levine 1939-40; 51,174 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1940 51,174 Webber 1940: 51,174 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1940 54,000 Hamilton 'Branch membership has declined from 54,000 in 1940' (Hamilton, 1972: p.205). 
1944 20,340 Levine 1944-45; 20,340 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1945 20,340 Webber 1945: 20,340 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1946 20,631 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1949 38,155 Levine 1949-50; 38155 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1949 34,547 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1950 38,155 Webber 1950: 38,155 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1951 37,809 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1954 30,760 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1954 38,261 Levine 1954-55; 38,261 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1955 38,261 Webber 1955: 38,261 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
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1957 25,380 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1958 30,052 Levine 1958-59; 30,052 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1959 30052 Webber 1959: 30,052 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1960 30,520 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1963 13,122 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1964 17,812 Levine 1964-65; 17,812 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1965 17,812 Webber 1965: 17,812 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1966 18,404 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1969 13,245 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1969 13,384 Levine 1969-70; 13,384 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1969 13,476 Gustafson 'to a mere 13,476 in 307 branches in 84 constituencies' (Gustafson, 1976: p.10). 
1970 13,384 Webber 1970: 13,384 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1970 10,000 Hamilton 'an estimated 10,000 in 1970' (Hamilton, 1972: p.205). 
1972 12,313 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1974 14,247 Levine 1974-75; 14,247 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1975 13,997 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1975 14,247 Webber 1975: 14,247 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1975 14,000 Gustafson 'remained at about 14 000 until after the 1975 election' (Gustafson, 1992: p.275). 
1975 14,000 Strachan 'a fiQure sliQhtly above 14 000 at the end of 1975' (Strachan, 1985: pp.163-164). 
1975 <15,000 Grafton 'fewer than 15,000 after the 1975 defeat' (Grafton, 11 Nov 1990: p.16). 
1975 15,000 Wood 'Labour's total of 15,000 or so individual members in 1975' (Wood, 1988: p.80). 
1976 55,000 Strachan 'By September 1976 membership had reached 55 000' (Strachan, 1985: pp.163-164). 
1976 55,000 Webber 'by the end of 1976, had rebuilt the party's branch membership to 55 000' (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1978 45,838 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1979 13,000 Levine Number of Members: Labour, 13,000 (Levine, 1979: p.67). 
Early 1980s 45,000 Gustafson 'Party membership rose to an estimated 45 000' (Gustafson 1992: p.275). 
Early 1980s 80,000 James 'membership climbed to around 80,000 in the early 1980s' (James, 1987 The State of the Parties: p.32). 
1981 49,837 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1981 49,837 Bain 'Labour's Was a much humbler 49,837 in 1981' (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
1981 100,000 Anderton 'Membership had fallen from 100,000 in 1981 to 40,000 in 1984, he said' (McLennan and Rentoul, 13 Sep 1989). 
1983 65,000 Grafton 'Membership ... peaked at about 65,000 in 1983' (Grafton, 11 Nov 1990: p.16). 
1984 38,337 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1984 80,000 Davidson 'By the end of 1988, party membership had slumped to around 10,000 from about 80,000 in 1984' (Davidson, 1989: 
pp.324-325). 
1984 60,000 Anderton Anderton 'claimed membership under his leadership was 60,000 back in 1984' (McBride, 2 October 1989: p.A9). 
1984 40,000 Anderton 'Membership had fallen from 100,000 in 1981 to 40,000 in 1984, he said' (McLennan and Rentoul, 13 Sep 1989). 
1984 40,000 Constable 'Mrs Constable said .... "there was 40,000 on the computer" , (McLennan and Rentoul, 13 Sep 1989). 
1984 50,000 James 'Membership slumped from around 50,000 in 1984' (James, 1990: p.66). 
1984 45,000 Kelsey 'party membership fell from around 45,000 before the election in 1984' (Kelsey, 1995: p.36). 
1984 135,000 Wood 'By the mid 1980s, before Labour returned to power, it could count around 135,000 members (300,000 if members of 
affiliated trade unions were included)' (Wood, 1988: p.80). 
1985 42,000 NZHerald 'The present figure is way down on a computed figure of some 42,000 recorded in early 1985' (NZ Herald, 31 May 
1989i. 
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1986 65,000 Wilson 'Margaret Wilson estimates that there are about 65,000 individual members of the Labour Party' (Ovenden, Sept 
1986: p.30). 
1986 50,000 Labour The Royal Commission 'were advised that there were about 50,000 ordinary members in early 1986' (RCES, Dec 
1986: pp.212-213). 
1987 30,701 (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1987 27,000 Gustafson 'branch membership down to 27 000 in 1987' (Gustafson, 1992: pp.275-276). 
1987 25,000 James 'The party has suffered a big drop in membership - to around 25,000 by the best inside estimates' (James, 1987 The 
State of the Parties: p.36). 
1987 <30,000 Wood 'it thereafter dropped, to under 30,000 individual members in 1987, before the buildup for the August elections' 
(Wood, 1988: p.80). 
1988 10,000 Walker 'By 1988, unofficial membership estimates stood at around 10,000 to 15,000' (Walker, 1989: p.217). 
-15,000 
1988 30,000 Munro 'a bold campaign to lift the party's flagging membership to 120,000. It is understood the membership is a quarter of 
that figure' (Munro, 19 Feb 1988). 
1988 24,800 Ansley 'Labour's current financial membership is only 24,800 (although another 14,000 may yet pay their overdue fees)' 
(Anslev, 28 May 1988: pP.20-21). 
1988 11,000 Kelsey '11,000 in May 1988' (Kelsey, 1995: p.36). 
1988 11,000 Gustafson 'only 11 000 by May 1988' (Gustafson, 1992: pp.275-276). 
1988 10,000 Davidson 'By the end of 1988, party membership had slumped to around 10,000' (Davidson, 1989: pp.324-325). 
1989 9,000 NZHerald 'Labour Party membership is around 9000, senior party members have been told' (NZ Herald, 31 May 1989). 
1989 15,000 McBride 'It is still, however, understood to be only around 15,000' (McBride, 2 October 1989: p.A9). 
1989 8,000 Anderton 'Mr Anderton, speaking at Otago University, said he understood the Labour Party had about 8000 members' (NZPA, 
31 May 1989). 
1989 6-7,000 Anderton Anderton: The old Labour Party has somewhere between 6000 and 7000 members (quoted in NZPA, 15 Aug 1989). 
1989 25000 Atkinson 'The party has suffered a big drop in membership - to around 25,000 by the best inside estimates' (Atkinson, Dec 
1989: p.36). 
1980s 8,000 Gustafson 'Labour's membership dropped from about 80,000 to about a tenth of that figure during the 1980s' (Gustafson, 1993: 
p.74). 
1990 19,203 (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1990 6,987 Sheppard 'in 1990 the total membership of the Labour Party nationwide was only 6,987' (Sheppard, 1999: p.215). 
1990 10,000 McLoughlin 'Labour's membership has fallen below 10,000' (McLoughlin, Sep 1990: p.85). 
1990 20,000 James 'Membership slumped from around 50,000 in 1984 to around 20,000 on the most generous count in 1990' (James, 
1990: p.66). 
1990 19,203 Bain 'The last time political scientists garnered the official membership figures for Labour was in 1990, when it had 19,203 
members' (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
1990 12,000 Gustafson 'The Labour Party's mailing list to both financial party members and supporters in November 1990 was only 37 000, 
with the financial membership possibly being less than a third of that figure' (Gustafson, 1992: pp.275-276). 
1990 10,000 Grafton 'numbers are now believed to have slumped to about 10,000.' (Grafton, 11 Nov 1990: p.16). 
1991 13,000 James 'financial membership is a low 13,000' (James, Oct 1991: p.17). 
1992 10,000 Trotter 'current membership below 10,000 paid-up members' (Trotter, Sep 1992: p.14). 
1993 10,000 Hague etal. 'Labour's membership fell from around 80,000 in the early 1980s to under 10,000 in 1993' (Hague et aI., 1998: p.136). 
1993 7,000 McLoughlin 'Labour has about 7000 members left, most on paper only' (McLoughlin, Apr 1993: p.43). 
1993 5,600 Elder 'a disaffected MP in April revealed party membership may have dropped from 5600 to 3600' (Underhill, 10 June 1994: 
p.9) 
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1994 3,600 Elder 'a disaffected MP in April revealed party membership may have dropped from 5600 to 3600' (Underhill, 10 June 1994: 
p.9) 
1994 4,000 Douglas 'Sir Roger said that the Labour Party had fewer than 4000 members' (Birss, 20 Jul1994). 
1994 5,000 Sheppard 'Labour 'Party membership has never been lower; it is widely believed to have slumped below 5,000 nationwide' 
(Sheppard, Nov 1994: p.8f 
1995 5,000 Booker 'revelations that the Labour Party has hit an alHime low of fewer than 5,000 members' (Booker, 24 Nov 1995: p.1). 
1996 5,000 Trotter 'With branch membership below 5000 and the trade unions losing money' (Trotter, 16 Feb 1996: p.6). 
1996 5-10,000 Laugesen 'membership thought to be somewhere between 5000 and 10,000' (Laugesen, 24 March 1996: p.6). 
1996 5,000 Kirk Membership 'numbers have shrunk to less than 5000' (Kirk, 8 June 1996: p.23). 
1996 <10,000 Laugesen 'Labour's membership is reputed to be well under 10,000' (Laugesen, 12 Sep 1996: p.13). 
1997 6,500 Edwards 'Party membership is up from an estimated 5000 last year ... to about 6500 now' (Edwards, 24 Nov 1997: p.7). 
1997 6,500 Herbert 'membership had sunk to 5000 and remains low at 6500' (Herbert, 24 Nov 1997). 
1999 20,000 Allen 'We have membership exceeding 20,000' (Allen, 24 May 1999). 
1999 20,000 Laugesen 'Labour's membership has fallen from the 42,000-43,000 level in 1984, to just under 20,000' (Laugesen, 1 Aug 1999: 
p.A3). 
1999 10,654 Young 'Labour had 10,654 in 1999' (Young, 21 Apr 2001). 
1999 10,654 Williams 'Mike Williams says the membership is up slightlv on the 10,654 of 1999' (Small, 1 Dec 2001). 
2000 15,000 Harvey 'Harvey said party membership, which Labour claims to be in excess of 15,000, was down on numbers five years ago 
and 10 years ago' (Laugesen, 30 Apr 2000: p.3). 
2000 10,654 Small 'Mr Williams inherits a party with sound if unspectacular membership of 10,654' (Small, 20 Nov 2000). 
2001 3,000 Prebble 'Labour's membership is only 3,OOO!' (Prebble, 15 Jan 2001). 
2001 11,000 Williams 'Mike Williams says the membership is up slightly on the 10,654 of 1999' (Small, 1 Dec 2001). 
2001 12,000 Williams 'Williams describes a "contented" party where membership is up (although only to 12,000), (Espiner, 2 Dec 2001: p.6). 
2002 14,000 Tunnah 'Labour and National are by far the largest parties, with an estimated 14,000 and 26,000 members respectively' 
(Tunnah, 24 Jun 2002). 
Appendix C: Labour Party Affiliate Membership 
Year Figure Claimant Quote/Reference 
1917 10,000 Levine 1917-18; 1,000; 10,000; 11,000; 90.91 (Levine, 1979: p.71 . 
1925 40,399 Levine 1925-26; 5,278; 40,399; 45,667; 88.46 (Levine, 1979: p.71 . 
1929 45,481 Levine 1929-30; 5,170; 45,481; 50,651; 88.46 (Levine, 1979: p.71 . 
1934 24,663 Levine 1934-35; 6,554; 24,663; 31,217; 79.01 (Levine, 1979: p.71 . 
1935 23814 'in 1935, 184 unions with a combined membership of 23814 were affiliated with the party' (Gustafson, 1992: p.274). 
Gustafson 
1935 80,929 Milne 'Trade union membership rose from 80,929 at the end of 1935' (Milne, 1966: p.103). 
1937 232,986 Milne 'Trade union membership rose ... to 232,986 at the end of 1937' (Milne, 1966: p.103). 
1939 185,431 Levine 1939-40; 51,174; 185,431; 236,605; 78.37 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1940 185,431 Webber 1940: 185,431 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1944 136,923 Levine 1944-45; 20,340; 136,923; 157,263; 87.07 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1945 136,923 Webber 1945: 136,923 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1949 174,913 Levine 1949-50; 38,155; 174,913; 213,068; 82.09 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
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1950 174,913 Webber 1950: 174,913 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1954 135,941 Levine 1954-55; 38,261; 135,941; 174,202; 78.04 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1955 135,941 Webber 1955: 135,941 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1958 142,873 Levine 1958-59; 30,052; 142,873; 172,925; 82.62 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1959 142,873 Webber 1959: 142,873 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1962 >120,000 Mitchell 'the unions still provide over two-thirds of the party membership of approximately 180,000' (Mitchell, 1962: p.17). 
1964 167,602 Levine 1964-65; 17,812; 167,602; 185,414; 90.39 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1965 167,602 Webber 1965: 167,602 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1969 189,890 Levine 1969-70; 13,384; 189,890; 203,274; 93.42 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1970 189,890 Webber 1970: 189,890 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1974 184,656 Levine 1974-75; 14,247; 184,656; 198,903; 92.84 (Levine, 1979: p.71). 
1975 184,656 Webber 1975: 184,656 (Webber, 1978: p.191). 
1975 185000 Gustafson 'the actual number remained constant at about 185 000' (Gustafson, 1992: p.274). 
1986 200,000 Labour The Labour Party advised the RCES in 1986 that they had approximately 200,000 affiliated members' (RCES, Dec 
1986: pp.212-213). 
1987 211589 Gustafson 'There were 211 589 affiliated members in 1987' (Gustafson, 1992: p.275). 
1988 200,000 Munro 'In 1988, the party had 200,000 union affiliates' (Munro, 28 Nov 1994: p.2). 
1990 175000 Gustafson 'by 1990 the affiliated union membership had dropped to 175 000' (Gustafson, 1992: p.275). 
1990 141,000 Kilroy 'Trade union affiliation is believed to have dropped significantly to about 141,000 in 1990' (Kilroy, 5 Sep 1992: p.1 -
check). 
1991 126,000 Kilroy 'Trade union affiliation is believed to have dropped to 126,000 in 1991' (Kilroy, 5 Sep 1992: p.1 - check). 
1992 70,000 Munro 'By 1992 that figure had slumped to 70,000' (Munro, 28 Nov 1994: p.2). 
1994 51,000 Munro 'today it is 51,000' (Munro, 28 Nov 1994: p.2). 
1998 40,000 Vowles 
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1938 100,000 National 'in August 1938 shortly before the election, total membership was estimated to be in excess of 100,000' (Gustafson, 
1986: p.26). 
1938 100,000 Wood 'By 1938 the party journal, sent to all members, had a circulation of 100 000' (Wood, 1989: p.223). 
1946 181,000 Gustafson 'membership, which by August 1946, four months before the election, had reached 181,000' (Gustafson, 1986: p.50). 
1954 250,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1954 250000 Bain 'National's peak was 250,000 in 1954' (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
1954 >200,000 National 'it claims a total membership of more than 200,000' (North, 1954: p.42). 
1960 246,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1960 246,000 Gustafson 'in 1960 National's membership was its highest ever, 246,000 in 1,300 branches' (Gustafson, 1997: p.139). 
1960 230,000 Hamilton 'the peak of 230,000 in 1960' (Hamilton, 1972: p.205). 
1962 230,000 Mitchell 'its enormous membership of 230,000' (Mitchell, 1962: pP.21-22). 
1966 150,000 Hamilton 'It is a mass party with a membership in 1966 of nearly 150,000' (Hamilton, 1972: p.205). 
1972 150,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1972 148,000 Gustafson 'it was still a very impressive 148,000' (Gustafson, 1997: p.139). 
1972 150,000 Gustafson Membership 'rose from 150000 in 1972' (Gustafson, 1997?: p.139). 
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1973 90,000 Gustafson Membership 'came up rapidly from a trough of about 90,000 in 1973 to 125,000 in 1974 and 196,000 in 1975' 
(Gustafson, 1986: p.192). 
1974 125,000 Gustafson Membership 'came up rapidly from a trough of about 90,000 in 1973 to 125,000 in 1974 and 196,000 in 1975' 
(Gustafson, 1986: p.192). 
1975 196,000 Gustafson Membership 'came up rapidly from a trough of about 90,000 in 1973 to 125,000 in 1974 and 196,000 in 1975' 
(Gustafson, 1986: p.192). 
1975 196,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1975 170,000 Webber 'at least 170 000 members in 1975' (Webber, 1978: pp.190-191). 
1975 200,000 Gustafson 'At the qrassroots level the National Party had about 200,000 members' (Gustafson, 1986: p.122). 
1975 196,000 Gustafson Membership 'rose from 150000 in 1972 to 196000 in 1975' (Gustafson, 1997: p.139). 
1978 200,000 Wood jWood, 1980: p.131). 
1978 200,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1978 200,000 Gustafson 'It hit another stabilised peak of about 200000 in 1978 and 1981' (Gustafson, 1997b). 
1979 200,000 Levine Number of Members: National, 200,000 (Levine, 1979: p.67). 
1981 200,000 Gustafson 'It hit another stabilised peak of about 200 000 in 1978 and 1981' (Gustafson, 1997b). 
1981 200,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1984 133,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1984 133000 Gustafson 'A drastic collapse to 133 000 in 1984' (Gustafson, 1997b). 
1985 100,000 National 'The. party advises that it has a large and fluctuating membership estimated to have been close to 100,000 at the end 
of 1985' CRCES, Dec 1986: p.214). 
1987 100,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1987 100,000 8ain 'The last time political scientists garnered the official membership figures .... for National was 1987, when it had 
100,000' (8ain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
1989 100,000 Young 'the party's membership which Mr Young estimates at around the 100,000 mark' (Ramsay, 15 Feb 1989: p.7). 
1989 80,000 NZHerald 'The National Party membership is believed to be around 80,000 with the party planning to double it over the next six 
months' (NZ Herald, 31 May 1989). 
1989 100,000 Jesson '40,000 members in the Auckland region and 100,000 nationally' (Jesson, Dec 1989: p.166). 
1990 100,000 Gustafson 'further erosion to about 100 000 in 1990' (Gustafson, 1997b). 
1990 130,000 National 'National claims to have 130,000 members' (McLoughlin, Sep 1990: p.85). 
1990 80,000 McManus 'decimated since the October 1990 election - from a high of nearly 80,000 to only 33,000 today' (McManus, 26 Feb 
1993: p.5). 
Early 1990s 50,000 Gustafson 'National's membership by the early 1990s was only a quarter of that when Muldoon first became Prime Minister in 
1975' (Gustafson, 1993: p.74). 
1992 40,000 Gustafson 'a record low of about 40000' (Gustafson, 1997b). 
1993 37,000 Peters Peters noted 'that National's membership was at present around 37,000' (NZ Herald, 12 Feb 1993). 
1993 33,000 McManus 'decimated since the October 1990 election - from a high of nearly 80,000 to only 33,000 today' (McManus, 26 Feb 
1993: p.5). 
1993 60,000 Collinge 'Collinge disputes the latter figure, saying membership is currently running at around 60,000' (McManus, 26 Feb 1993: 
p.5). 
1993 40,000 McLouqhlin 'National has about 40,000, again mostly on paper' (McLoughlin, Apr 1993: p.43). 
1993 50,000 National 'membership had fallen form 150,000 in 1991 to 50,000 in 1993' (Riddell, 3 May 1993: p.1). 
1993 38,000 Peters '38,000 was not far wrong' (Riddell, 3 May 1993: p.1); Ex-party official, 'Tremewan cannot give a current party 
membership figure, but says the 38,000 alleged by Winston Peters "may not be far off" , (Rudman). 
1993 50,000 Upton 'National probably has only a quarter of the members it had back in the heady days of 1975 when it touched the 
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200,000 mark' (Upton, 30 Aug 1993: p.8). 
1993 45,000 Upton At the time, the party's financial membership was possiblv 45,000' (Upton, 21 Feb 1995: p.11). 
1994 40,000 Upton 'National remains the largest political party in New Zealand, with some 40,000 members' (Upton, 21 Mar 1994). 
1994 <20,000 'Some political opponents claim it has now fallen below 20,000' (?, 16 Mav 1994: p.1). 
1994 55,000 National 'all 55,000 claimed members' (James, 24 Jun 1994). 
Mid-1990s 40,000 Wood 'By the mid 1990s membership was reputed to be but 40 000, and by the decade's end even lower' (Wood, 2001: 
p.246). 
1996 20-40,000 Laugesen 'is estimated at between 20,000 and 40,000' (Laugesen, 24 March 1996: p.6). 
1999 40-50,000 Laugesen 'between 40,000-50,000' (Laugesen, 1 Aug 1999: p.A3). 
2001 10,000 Prebble National 'is believed to now have just 10,000 members' (Prebble, 15 Jan 2001). 
2001 22,000 Young 'Party membership has sunk to about 22,000' (Young, 21 Apr 2001). 
2002 26,000 Tunnah 'Labour and National are by far the largest parties, with an estimated 14,000 and 26,000 members respectively' 
(Tunnah, 24 Jun 2002). 
Appendix E: New Zealand First Membership 
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1994 10,000 NZ First 'It claims a membership of more than 10,000' (Scherer, 18 Jul1994). 
1996 (second largest Peters 'Peters had repeatedly boasted that NZ First now possessed the second largest party membership in the country -
membership) outstripped only by National. Like many of Winston's claims this one also exceeded the straitjacket of actuality, and 
embarrassment loomed' (Laws, 1998: p.347). 
1998 2,000 Smith 'New Zealand First could be as low as 2000' (Smith, 14 Nov 1998: p.18). 
Appendix F: Act Membership 
Year Figure Claimant Quote/Reference 
1994 1,000 Douglas 'The organisation now had about 1000 paid-up members, but it was not actively encouraging more to jOin, he said' 
(Scherer,25 Mar 1994). 
1995 5,000 Orsman 'Act wants 20,000 people to make a financial commitment of $20 a month ... Act has only a quarter of this number in 
members so far' (Orsman, 2 Jan 1995 - check quote). 
1995 3,000 Act 'ACT already has over 3,000 members' (Act, 2 Feb 1995). 
1995 (6-7,000) Hide 'Mr Hide said the party now had between 6000 and 7000 people on its mailing list either as members or supporters' 
(Orsman, 8 Apr 1995). 
1995 (8,000) Act 'Act currently had about 8000 people on its mailing list, though not all of these were members. The party's exact 
membership was not known' (The Dominion, 17 Apr 1995). 
1996 5,746 Act 'Other parties to publish their 1996 memberships included ACT (5746)' (Mulgan, 1997: p.249). 
1996 7,000 Scherer 'Act is counting on significant contributions from its 7000 members' (Scherer, 25 Mar 1996). 
1996 7,000 Hide 'Mr Hide says ACT's membership of 7000 and more than 50 well-funded party organisations' (Kirk, 30 March 1996: 
p.23). 
1996 7,000 Scherer 'Manv of the 7000 or so people who now belong to ACT' (Scherer, 27 March 1996: p.5). 
1996 7,000 Prebble 'I wrote to the members - all 7,000' (Prebble, 1996). 
1996 5,746 Act 'Act New Zealand told the commission it had 11,500 members and Richard Prebble said 5746 of them were "full 
members": The others were registered supporters: (NZPA, 9 Aug 1996). 
1997 (14,000) Prebble Prebble: "Only Act campaigned in the old-fashioned way, relying on donations from its 14,000 supporters." (NZPA, 28 
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Jan 1997). 
1999 (14,000) Act 'Act NZ says it has the second highest political membership of any party in New Zealand even though it only has "in 
excess of 14,000 people" who have "requested" to be members, supporters or on the mailing list' (NZPA, 28 May 
1999: p.2). 
1999 14,000 Prebble 'Act NZ leader Richard Prebble was happy to tell the Dominion that Act has 14,000 members' (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
2001 5,000 Act 'Act Qained 800 new members in the past month, taking membership to 5000' (Langdon, 12 March 2001: p.2). 
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1979 3,600 Levine Number of Members: Values, 3,600 (Levine, 1979: p.67). 
(Values) 
1990 1,000 Greens 'The party has only about 1000 members, according to [party spokesperson Alan] Hallett' (Hubbard, 10 Sep 1990: 
p.12). 
1992 500 James 'Total membership of around 500' (James, 17 May 1992: p.11). 
1997 (2,000) Sheppard 'there are three Green parties in New Zealand. It may surprise you even more to know that they are roughly the same 
size and collectively would have a membership of less than two thousand' (Sheppard, July 1997: pp.16-23). 
1998 861 Greens 'The party is thin on the ground, claiming 861 financial members at the end of April' (Speden, 28 Oct 1998: p.14). 
1998 1,000 Donald 'Green party membership is now more than 3000 - three times what it was a year out from the last election, says co-
leader Rod Donald' (YounQ, 28 Jan 2002). 
1999 1,348 Greens 'The Green Party had 1348' (NZPA, 28 May 1999: p.2). 
1999 500 Greens 500 (NZPA, 28 May 1999: p.2). 
1999 2,500 Delahunty 'Co-convener Catherine Delahunty says membership hit 4000 in December, up 1500 on three years ago' (Taylor, 2 
Jun 2003). 
2001 2,000 Trotter 'With fewer than 2,000 members nationwide' (Trotter, 23 May 2001 : p.15). 
2000 2,500 Greens TVNZ Report on Green Party annual conference 
2001 2,590 Small 'with only 2590 members, the Greens will struggle' (Small,S Jun 2001) 
2001 2,600 Greens 'Now in their 11 th year, the Greens have seven MPs, claim to have 2600 members' (Langdon, 9 Jun 2001: p.2). 
2002 3,000 Donald 'Green party membership is now more than 3000' (Young, 28 Jan 2002). 
2002 3,370 Donald 'Green Party co-leader Rod Donald told the Herald it had 3370 members' (Tunnah, 24 Jun 2002). 
2002 4,000 Delahunty 'Co-convener Catherine Delahunty says membership hit 4000 in December, up 1500 on three years ago' (Taylor, 2 
Jun 2003). 
A endix H: United New Zealand and Future New Zealand Membership 
... - . . - . - - -
1996 1,789 United 
1999 2,800 FNZ 
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Appendix I: Progressive Coalition Party Membership 
Date Figure Claimant Quote/Reference 
2002 1,177 PCP 'the Progressive Coalition, signed up 1177 members in a week, 80 per cent of them former Alliance members' (NZPA, 
10 May 2002). 
2002 2,000 PCP 'Jim Anderton's claim that his Progressive Coalition's 2000-plus membership ranks it among the top three parties in 
the country' (Tunnah, 24 Jun 2002). 
2002 2,200 PCP 'And 75 per cent of the 2200 membership had no association with the Democrats' (Young, 14 Oct 2002). 
~ppen IX . lance em ers IP . A d" J All" M b h" •.. - . - • Mi'I"'I~ - - - -
1993 Auckland: 6,000 Alliance The Alliance 'says it has about 6000 members in the [Auckland] region' (Munro, 19 April 1993: p.2). 
1993 15,000 Gustafson 'in July 1993 the Alliance's five parties mustered a total of 15,000 members' (Gustafson, 1993: p.74). 
1993 14,000 McCarten 'McCarten claims the combined membership of the coalition was 14,000 at the last election' (McLoughlin, Sep 1994: 
p.64). 
1993 17,000 Alliance 'The Alliance declared before the election that its membership was 17,000' (Laugesen, 24 March 1996: p.6). 
1993 17,000 McCarten 'the Alliance now has 17,000 paid members, half of whom joined "the Alliance" and not any of its constituent parties' 
(Harris, 12 Nov 1993: p.17). 
1994 22,000 McCarten 'McCarten claims the combined membership of the coalition ... has since reached 22,000' (McLoughlin, Sep 1994: 
p.64). 
1994 18,000 Alliance 'Its published membership is a healthy 18,000' (Riddell, 10 December 1994: p.23). 
1996 25,127 Alliance 'The Alliance was the first to disclose its previously secret information: 25,127 members' (NZPA, 9 Aug 1996). 
1996 25,000 McCarten 'the 25,000 members' (Boyd, 13 Aug 1996: p.5). 
1996 >25,000 Laugesen 'the 25,000-plus membership the Alliance enjoys' (Laugesen, 12 Sep 1996: p.13). 
1998 6,800 Alliance Alliance informant 
1999 (60,000) Alliance 'The Alliance said that with its mailing list, it could claim more than 60,000 supporters' (NZPA, 28 May 1999: p.2). 
1999 15,600 McCarten 'Alliance strategist Matt McCarten was more helpful, saying the party has 15,600 members' (Bain, 7 Oct 1999: p.8). 
2001 4,000 Alliance Alliance informant 
2002 3,700 Young 'when Mr Anderton writes to an estimated 3700 members in the next week or two' (Young, 23 Feb 2002). 
Appendix K: Christian Heritage Party Membership 
.!IT. - . - - -
1996 I 4,200 ICC I 'The Christian Coalition put its membership at 4200' (NZPA, 9 Aug 1996). I 
1999 I 3,683 I CHP I 'CHP currently has 3,683 members' (Van Wichen, 18 May 1999: p.5). I 
2003 I 5000 I CHP I Capill had 'taken the party's membership from just 300 to more than 5000' (Lane, 25 Aug 2003). I 
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1960 2500 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1960 2,500 Miller 'Membership rose from approximately 2500 in 1960' (Miller, 1985: p.209). 
1962 5,000 Mitchell 'it has only some 5000 members' (Mitchell, 1962: p.26). 
1966 7500 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
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1966 7500 Miller 'Membership rose from approximately 2500 in 1960 to 7500 in 1966' (Miller, 1985: p.209). 
1966 9,000 Levine 'its 1966 peak of more than 9,000 members' (Levine, 1979: p.77). 
1969 10,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1969 10,000 Miller 'over 10 000 in 1969' (Miller, 1985: p.209). 
1972 2000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1972 2,000 Miller 'a membership of less than 2000' (Miller, 1985: p.210). 
1972 2,000 Levine 'its 1972-3 decline to 2,000 persons' (Levine, 1979: p.77). 
1975 8,000 Social Credit 'its membership at the time of the 1975 General Election comprised 8,000 persons' (Levine, 1979: p.77). 
1978 5,400 James In 1978 Social Credit had a membership of 5400 (James, 1986: p.117) 
1979 8,000 Levine Number of Members: Social Credit, 8,000 (Levine, 1979: p.67). 
1981 22,000 (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1981 35,000 James 'By the election in 1981 $1 million was raised and 35,000 members enrolled' (James, 1986: p.117). 
1984 11,000 Vowles (Vowles, 2002: p.416). 
1984 11,000 Spoon ley 'a membership level in 1984 of 11,000' (Spoonley, 1987: p.228). 
1984 11,000 Social Credit 'as at December 1984 the party's membership was sliqhtly over 11 ,000 (RCES, Dec 1986: p.215). 
1985 4,000 Spoon ley 'the membership in mid-1985 was approximately 4000 ... with less than 50 percent renewing their membership 
compared with 80 percent in past years' (Spoon ley, 1987: p.228). 
2002 1,600 Kane Peter Kane 'said the party had 1600 members, 500 of whom had dual membership of the Progressive Coalition. 
(Younq, 14 Oct 2002). 
2003 1,623 Kane 'president Peter Kane said membership had been about 30,000 at its peak, but it now stood at 1623' (The Press, 13 
Jan 2003). 
Appendix M: Aotearoa Le alise Cannabis Part 
. - . ............. .. 
1996 7,000 ALCP 
1999 3,000 ALCP Bain, 7 Oct 1999: .8. 
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1 This appendix table provides election expenditure figures for all parties at the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections. The 'Declared' figures are those provided by the 
parties as required by the Electoral Act 1993. The 'State' figures are the amounts of election broadcasting state funding allocated by the Electoral Commission. 
This information is not available for elections before 1996. 
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Peoples Choice n/a n/a 
.... 
n/a $269 $18,000 $18,269 n/a n/a n/a 
Party 
.' 
",'.' 
Freedom Movement n/a n/a .. :X·· '.'. n/a $133 $4,700 ····$4,833 n/a n/a "\:'i}X:y,." " n/a 
Christian Coalition $313,407 $92,953 .•... ·$406,360 n/a n/a . n/a n/a n/a '.':';';. n/a 
Proqressive Greens $70,650 $35,322 $105,972 n/a n/a ri/a n/a n/a n/a 
NZ Conservative $45,939 $35,356 
•.•.•.• !81.,295 n/a n/a ,: n/a n/a n/a I's., i'. 'n/a Party 
Green Society $18,873 $23,031 ":$41,904 n/a n/a .. ,'. 'nla n/a n/a .,.' '" /n/a 
Ethnic Minority Party $8,190 $22,606 ':<:$30.796 n/a n/a i" nta n/a n/a I .•.... , n/a 
Animals First $3,750 n/a ')':'$3,750 n/a n/a >1 n/a n/a n/a I''; 'n/a 
McGillicuddy Serious $3,339 $35,371 ····''$38,710 n/a $18,000 $t8,OOO n/a n/a I .. :' ·i·:: ':n/a 
Advance NZ Party $2,694 $23,027 .i:' $25,721 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ' .. ,.:' .':' n/a 
NZ Superannuitants $1,749 $23,032 :,~.$24, 781 n/a n/a . ··.···.·.n/a. n/a n/a I·J.n/a 
Te Tawharau Party $1,518 $22,806 ••. :"., :$24,324 n/a n/a '. " n/a n/a n/a "···.iL··.n/a 
Mana Wahine n/a n/a ~;;:;.:.' n/a n/a $920 . i. .....<.$920 n/a n/a . <::;,i::~ ;n/a 
Asia Pacific United n/a n/a ",./i;.' rita $0 $18,000 1·····$18;000' n/a n/a ··:;:';1~;j:;Y';n/a 
Total $5,068,402 $2,049,734 .$1;961,396 $5,238,462 $1,982,167 .$7,243,725 $5,629,948 $2,045,042 $7::674;990 
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2 This appendix table calculates the cost per vote achieved by all the parties at the 1996, 1999 and 2002 elections, by dividing the 'Total Cost' of the party's 
campaign (derived from Appendix 1) by the number of party votes won. 
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Freedom Movement n/a n/a n/a 454 $4,833 . $10.65 n/a n/a n/a 
Christian Coalition 89,716 $406,360 '($4.53 n/a n/a nla n/a n/a n/a 
Proqressive Greens 5288 $105,972 $20;04 n/a n/a •• nla n/a n/a \ .. n/a 
NZ Conservative 1431 $81,295 $56.81 n/a n/a nla n/a n/a nla 
Party ;.' .. 
Green Society 2363 $41,904 ,:0':<>' "$17.73' n/a n/a I·· .... nla n/a n/a ," n/a 
Ethnic Minority Party 2514 $30.796 .' ········'$12.25 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a ', •. .n/a 
Animals First 3543 $3,750 1.,"$1;06 3244 n/a n/a n/a n/a .... :. .n/a 
McGillicuddy Serious 5990 $38,710 1";;<$6.46 3191 $18,000 ." '$5 .. 64 n/a n/a .' ..•. >< ..... n/a 
Advance NZ Party 949 $25,721 ;·$27 .. tO n/a n/a ~ nla n/a n/a .......... n/a 
NZ Superannuitants 1244 $24,781 .'. '.' $19~92 n/a n/a .. ·.·.·n/a n/a n/a • nla 
Te Tawharau Party 404 $24,324 [:'. $60.21 n/a n/a .. • ....... . n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Mana Wahine n/a n/a I···· .... n/a n/a $920 "n/a n/a n/a . .... : nla 
Asia Pacific United n/a n/a ,,'; .. ' n/a n/a $18,000 :'" .. ' nla. n/a n/a ....< "'n/a 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
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nn,,,,n"IY P: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 19963 
3 1996 was the first year of the donation disclosure regime and the figures only cover the months May to December 1996. 
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NZ First $15,000 Rothmans NZ $15,000 
United New Zealand $8000 Anonymous $8000 
Total $989,152 $989,152 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
Appendix Q: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 1997 
Party Amount Donor Party Total 
Act New Zealand $12,868 John Boscawen 
Act New Zealand $25,000 Anonymous $37,868 
Alliance $12,000 NZ Democratic Party 
Alliance $11,467 NewLabour Party 
Alliance $23,361 Green Party of Aotearoa NZ $46,828 
Democratic Party $22,000 Auckland West Housie $22,000 
Labour Party $15,000 Natural Gas Corporation 
Labour Party $190,000 Public Trust Office 
Labour Party $25,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous $280,000 
National $35,000 National Gas Corp Management Ltd 
National $25,000 Anonymous $60,000 
Natural Law Party $19,900 Anonymous $19,900 
Total $466,596 $466,596 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
Appendix R: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 1998 
Party Amount Donor Party Total 
Alliance $14,223 NZ Democratic Party 
Alliance $15,340 NewLabour Party 
Alliance $15,628 Green Party of AotearoaiNew Zealand 
Alliance $10,000 Westpac Trust 
Alliance $10,203 Jim Anderton MP $65,393 
NZ Democratic Party $10,000 New Lynn Social Club (1989) $10,000 
Green Party $17,000 Anonymous $17,000 
Labour Party $30,000 Westpac Trust 
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Labour Party $27,500 Natural Gas Corporation 
Labour Party $16,961 Public Trust Office (E. Haines estate) 
Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous $94,460 
National Party $15,000 Gallagher Group, Hamilton 
National Party $30,000 Westpac Trust 
National Party $27,500 Natural Gas Corp Management Ltd 
National Party $50,000 NZ Free Enterprise Trust $122,500 
Total $309,355 $309,355 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission . 
.u.nln .. r.nix S: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 1999 
r.fl!!l!lfl!ll1II!!I 
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Act New Zealand $25,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $50,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $20,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $20,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $20,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $25,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $50,000 Anonymous 
Act New Zealand $50,000 Anonymous $805,000 
Alliance $23,029 NZ Democratic Party 
Alliance $20,529 NewLabour Party 
Alliance $20,000 Engineering, Printinq & Manufacturing Union Inc. 
Alliance $14,934 Mt Roskill Alliance 
Alliance $13,004 Mt Albert Alliance 
Alliance $12,575 Wiqram Alliance 
Alliance $10,780 Auckland Alliance 
Alliance $10,386 Te Atatu Alliance 
Alliance $10,229 Jim Anderton 
Alliance $10,031 Phillida Bunkie 
Alliance $10,000 NZ Seafarers Union 
Alliance $10,000 National Distribution Union 
Alliance $50,000 Dr David Becroft $215,497 
Christian Heritage $13,000 H Bouchier 
Christian Herita!:le $12,000 Society for Protection of the Unborn Child $25,000 
Democratic Party $36,000 Auckland Democrats 
Democratic Party $26,400 Canterbury Democrats 
Democratic Party $34,000 Panmure Democrats 
Democratic Party $28,000 Younq Democrats, Auckland 
Democratic Party $20,000 Eden Democrats 
Democratic Party $10,200 Marlborough Democrats 
Democratic Party $34,700 New Lynn Democrats (Housie) $189,300 
Labour Party $15,000 AMP 
Labour Party $25,000 Brierley Investments 
Labour Party $15,000 Clear Communications 
Labour Party $50,000 Lion Breweries 
Labour Party $30,000 Natural Gas Corporation 
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Labour Party $80,000 NZ Enqineers Union 
Labour Party $20,000 Saturn Communications 
Labour Party $11,000 Tower Ltd 
Labour Party $20,000 Transalta New Zealand 
Labour Party $25,000 TV3 Network Services 
Labour Party $195,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $120,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $114,375 Anonymous 
Labour Party $100,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $60,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $40,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $30,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $25,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous $1,115,375 
National Party $25,000 Barry E Brill 
National Party $570,000 NZ Free Enterprise Trust 
National Party $25,000 RS Bhatnager 
National Party $15,000 Clear Communications 
National Party $15,000 Pub Charity Trust Inc., Wellinqton 
National Party $15,000 Giltrap Group Holdings Ltd 
National Party $25,000 Transalta NZ Ltd 
National Party $30,000 Natural Gas Corporation 
National Party $15,000 AMP 
National Party $50,000 Brierley Investments Ltd 
National Party $11,000 Tower Ltd 
National Party $20,000 Saturn Communications 
National Party $20,000 Isaac Construction 
National Party $26,000 Wellinqton Business Committee 
National Party $370,000 Anonymous (total aqqreqate) $1,232,000 
Total $3,649,572 $3,649,572 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
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Appendix T: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 2000 
Party Amount Donor Party Total 
Alliance $10,460 NZ Democratic Party 
Alliance $20,000 Telecom 
Alliance $16,102 Jim Anderton 
Alliance $13,485 Sandra Lee 
Alliance $13,485 Laila Harre 
Alliance $13,184 Matt Robson 
Alliance $11,320 Phillida Bunkie $98,037 
Democrats $26,400 St Asaphs Cultural & Welfare Society $26,400 
Labour Party $15,000 Westpac Trust 
Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous $35,000 
National Party $15,000 Westpac Trust 
National Party $15,000 NZ Free Enterprise Trust $30,000 
Total $189,436 $189,436 
Source: complied from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
Appendix U: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 2001 
Party Amount Donor Party Total 
Alliance $14,287 Laila Harre 
Alliance $14,259 Jim Anderton 
Alliance $12,200 Matt Robson 
Alliance $16,265 NLP 
Alliance $12,000 Democratic Party 
Alliance $12,200 Sandra Lee $81,212 
Christian Heritage $16,500 Sterling Holdings, Auckland $16,500 
Labour Party $15,000 Westpac Banking Corp, Wellington 
Labour Party $20,000 Ericsson Comms Ltd, Wellington 
Labour Party $25,000 Contact Energy Ltd, Wellington 
Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $27,525 Anonymous $107,525 
National Party $20,000 Ericsson Comms Ltd 
National Party $15,000 Westpactrust 
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National Party $50,000 NZ Free Enterprise Trust 
National Party $25,000 Contact Energy Ltd 
National Party $10,335 Electoral Holdings, Levin 
National Party $12,500 Hauraki Chambers Inc, Thames $160,360 
Total $365,597 $365,597 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral Commission. 
Appendix V: Donations declared to the Electoral Commission, for 2002 
Party Amount Donor Party Total 
Act New Zealand $15,000 Mallett Holdinqs Ltd 
Act New Zealand $23,971 John Boscawen 
Act New Zealand $50,000 Anonymous $88,971 
Alliance $10,894 Laila Harre MP $10,894 
Greens $10,280 Rod Donald 
Greens $29,980 Jeanette Fitzsimons 
Greens $25,000 Edward & Catherine Goldsmith 
Greens $10,590 Nandor Tanczos 
Greens $10,150 Sue Kedqlev $86,000 
Labour Party $70,000 Engineering Printing and Manufacturing Union 
Labour Party $66,631 Maxi Marketing Services 
Labour Party $40,000 Sky City Entertainment Group 
Labour Party $10,038 Lim Chhour Investment Trust 
Labour Party $15,000 Tower Holdings 
Labour Party $15,000 Westfield New Zealand 
Labour Party $25,000 Lion Nathan 
Labour Party $30,000 Westpac Trust 
Labour Party $20,000 Dr & Mrs GMO Becroft 
Labour Party $30,050 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $100,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $40,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $50,000 Anonymous 
Labour Party $40,000 Anonymous 
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Labour Party $20,000 Anonymous $671,719 
National Party $64,168 Holland Memorial Trust 
National Party $40,000 Sky City 
National Party $17,999 Southern Free Enterprise Trust 
National Party $30,000 WestpacTrust 
National Party $123,000 Waitemata Trust 
National Party $25,000 Lion Nathan 
National Party $40,000 Sky City Auckland Holdings Ltd 
National Party $15,000 Tower Corp Holdinqs Ltd 
National Party $13,950 C Foss 
National Party $30,050 Anonymous 
National Party $50,000 Anonymous 
National Party $20,000 Anonymous 
National Party $50,000 Anonymous 
National Party $50,000 Anonymous $529,167 
New Zealand First $10,000 WestpacTrust 
New Zealand First $15,000 Gold Times Sports $25,000 
Progressive Coalition $20,000 D & G Becroft 
Progressive Coalition $19,000 NZ Enqineers Union 
Progressive Coalition $26,000 Proqressive Members Fund 
Progressive Coalition $25,000 Anonymous 
Progressive Coalition $15,000 Anonymous $105,000 
United Future $19,700 Ian Tulloch 
United Future $22,500 Anonymous $42,200 
Total $1,558,951 $1,558,951 
Source: compiled from the records of donation disclosures kept at the Electoral CommisSion. 
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